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”Kirghizstan has truly undergone a complete transformation. 
It is of its hard past, wonderful present and still more 
beautiful future (…) that I shall speak (…).“ 
 
Dikambayev 1960, 6 
 
 
 
”I have witnessed three systems: the pre-socialist, the socialist 
and the capitalist system. But today I don’t know what 
kind of system we live in anymore – it seems to be 
a barbarian system. The taxes are so high!“ 
 
Abdyrasul Tashtanov, retired teacher, 
Kyzyl-Tuu, 2008 
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Abstract 
 
 
Over the last two decades, academic and policy-oriented debates on development in 
post-socialist societies and economies have thrown up starkly contrasting approaches 
to conceptualizing post-socialist development. The early 1990s were dominated by the 
neoliberal Washington Consensus, which considered ‘transition’ a rapid and linear 
process of change from the socialist economy towards modern market capitalism. The 
tools that were meant to bring about this change included rapid privatization of state 
assets, price liberalization and deregulation of markets. However, things went seriously 
wrong. By the mid-1990s it had become obvious that many countries whose 
governments had followed the Washington Consensus were experiencing the fastest 
rates of poverty increase worldwide and that socioeconomic disparities had rapidly 
worsened. The weakening of the neoliberal hegemony eventually gave way to 
alternative approaches to post-socialist development. They built on the idea of 
‘transformation’ as a bundle of evolutionary, multi-directional and open-ended 
processes, in which actors recombine and improvise on the old and the new in order to 
cope with the numerous challenges ‘transition’ poses. These alternative approaches 
promoted a shift away from the previous macroeconomic focus towards multi-level 
analysis and particularly emphasized actor research at the micro level. 
 
The present study takes up these approaches to examine processes of post-socialist 
transformation in rural Kyrgyzstan. After 1991, Kyrgyzstan was among the fastest 
neoliberal reformers in the former Soviet Union. Collective farms were dissolved and 
rural households endowed with private property rights over arable land, livestock, 
infrastructure and machinery. However, rural Kyrgyzstan today is experiencing 
widespread poverty and a considerable divide between the wealthy and the poor. In 
order to gain a better understanding of these processes, the study adopts a livelihoods 
perspective to examine the recursive relationship between various actors engaged in 
agro-pastoral production and the institutional and organizational context. To do so, it 
draws on advances in – among others – new institutional economics, property rights 
theory and legal pluralism. The empirical data presented here were obtained during a 
total of 10 months’ field research between 2006 and 2009 in two case study villages in 
Naryn oblast (province), Central Kyrgyzstan. The study combines quantitative and 
qualitative methods, i.e. a household survey; semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
representatives of local households and state representatives at various levels, and 
others; participant observation and group discussions. 
 
The first focus of the study is on the existence and emergence of socioeconomic 
disparities at the level of rural households. A quantitative household survey carried out 
in spring 2007 revealed a striking gap between wealthy and poor households in terms 
of livestock ownership, which is a common wealth indicator in rural Kyrgyzstan. On 
the one hand, there are many households with no animals of their own, as well as 
numerous smallholders with very small private flocks. On the other hand, there are a 
few large farm households with large private flocks and access to more private arable 
land per capita than others. Further qualitative analysis showed that these disparities 
are not entirely new. Instead, they already existed in the socialist economy, where the 
principles of rational redistribution and allocative power allowed rural elites to 
accumulate more wealth than others. At the same time, however, the symbiosis 
between the official and the so-called ‘second’ economy – in the form of illicit transfers 
between state-controlled and private production – also ensured the survival of the less 
wealthy rural population. In many cases, the rapid privatization of the Kyrgyz 
agriculture in the 1990s exacerbated these existing disparities. The reasons for this 
include the prominent role of rural elites in the dissolution of ‘their’ kolkhoz and the 
sometimes unfair distribution of land, livestock and infrastructure; legislative reforms 
which often lagged behind decisions taken at the local level and a lack of control by 
Abstract 
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higher levels of the state administration; a poorly planned distribution process which 
led to the loss of thousands of animals due to fodder shortages and uncontrolled 
diseases; and a striking lack of knowledge among many ordinary kolkhoz workers 
about how they should establish a private peasant farm and profitable agro-pastoral 
production. Research thus suggests that the privatization of the Kyrgyz agriculture 
took place in a hybrid institutional context. Far from being a just and proper 
distribution of assets along neoliberal rules, it was instead a final round of resource 
allocation along organizing practices and social networks inherited from the socialist 
economy. 
 
The second focus of the study is on the various actors, practices, organizations and 
institutions around current agro-pastoral production. It examines how people 
negotiate, defend and use their property rights over arable land, livestock and pastures. 
Evidence shows that private land ownership endows people with an economic and 
symbolic value that suggests a certain sense of security. At the same time, however, it 
implies new liabilities. Irrigation is subject to the payment of user fees and 
contributions to maintenance costs, the terms for the use of machinery must be 
constantly renegotiated, and arable land is subject to taxes. Land cultivation has thus 
become closely related to monetary exchange. This represents a major obstacle to 
many among the less wealthy, who often struggle to earn sufficient cash in the local 
context. More than ten years after the heyday of reforms, the concept of private farm 
units has not yet come into its own, land has become a liability for many, and a great 
deal of land has fallen out of production. In terms of animal husbandry, evidence 
shows that most rural households consider livestock not only a key financial asset that 
can be converted into cash whenever the need arises, but also a pivotal point for the 
reproduction of social relations and the definition of wealth. Wealth in the form of 
livestock is often equal to negotiating power over resources and also governs people’s 
access to pastures. Evidence shows that wealthier households can refer to formal rules 
and regulations when they are handy for securing their claim over pastures, but also 
recombine these rules with other less formal strategies and routine behavior. At the 
same time, less wealthy households are often unaware of the existing pasture law, or 
else have no means of referring to or circumventing it. 
 
In conclusion, the changes in property relations stemming from the Kyrygz agrarian 
reforms redefined the economic value and social significance of land and other 
resources, as well as the livelihood prospects of and the social relations between the 
asset-rich and the asset-poor. To a considerable extent, community life has evolved 
according to the logic of the market and social relations have become embedded in a 
poorly regulated economic system. While wealthy and powerful households can extend 
their property rights over resources, the less powerful often struggle against various 
forms of uncertainty, which seriously undermines their prospects to escape the vicious 
cycle of short-term coping and resource depletion. In the long run, this may exacerbate 
rural socioeconomic disparities. Under these circumstances, the study suggests that the 
introduction of new laws and regulations needs careful consideration and must be 
embedded in a thorough understanding of the specific processes that cause and 
reproduce disparities between potential stakeholders. Otherwise, apparently ‘strong’ 
new rules and ‘robust’ institutions run the risk of widening the existing gap between 
the rich and the poor. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Die akademischen und politischen Entwicklungsdebatten der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte 
haben unterschiedliche Zugänge und Strategien postsozialistischer Entwicklung 
hervorgebracht. In den frühen 1990ern dominierte der neoliberale Ansatz des 
‘Washington Consensus’, welcher ‘Transition’ als einen raschen, linearen Wechsel von 
der sozialistischen Staatswirtschaft hin zur freien Marktwirtschaft begriff. Die 
propagierten Mittel lauteten Privatisierung, Liberalisierung und Deregulierung. Mitte 
der Neunzigerjahre jedoch geriet das neoliberale Modell in die Kritik, denn viele jener 
Staaten, welche ihre Reformpolitik am ‘Washington Consensus’ ausgerichtet hatten, 
wiesen den weltweit höchsten Armutszuwachs sowie sich rasch verschärfende sozio-
ökonomische  Disparitäten auf. Die seither entstandenen alternativen Erklärungs-
ansätze interpretieren postsozialistische Entwicklung daher als ein Bündel pfadab-
hängiger, von handelnden Akteuren gestalteter Prozesse und umschreiben sie mit dem 
Begriff der ‘Transformation’. Dies impliziert die Abwendung von einer rein makroöko-
nomischen Betrachtungsweise hin zur Berücksichtigung miteinander verknüpfter 
Handlungsfelder und der damit verbundenen Akteursgruppen. 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit folgt diesen alternativen Ansätzen mit dem Ziel, Transforma-
tionsprozesse im postsozialistischen ländlichen Kirgistan zu beschreiben und unter-
schiedliche Entwicklungspfade auf der lokalen und der Haushalts-Ebene zu erklären. 
Kaum ein Nachfolgestaat der Sowjetunion setzte nach 1991 so rasch und entschieden 
auf neoliberale Reformen wie die Kirgisische Republik. Schon früh wurden landwirt-
schaftliche Kollektivbetriebe aufgelöst und Land, Vieh und Infrastruktur in Form 
privater Eigentumsrechte an ländliche Haushalte verteilt. Heute jedoch ist ländliche 
Armut nach wie vor weit verbreitet, und es bestehen grosse Disparitäten zwischen Arm 
und Reich. Um die gegenwärtige Situation und die Entwicklung seit den späten 
Achtzigern zu untersuchen, bedient sich diese Studie einer ‘Livelihoods’-Perspektive. Sie 
analysiert die wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen verschiedenen, für die agro-pastorale 
Produktion relevanten Akteuren und ihrem institutionellen Umfeld. Dazu greift die 
Studie unter anderem auf Erkenntnisse der Neuen Institutionenökonomie, der Verfü-
gungsrechtstheorie sowie des Rechtspluralismus’ zurück. Die empirischen Daten 
wurden während insgesamt 10 Monaten zwischen 2006 und 2009 in zwei Dörfern im 
Naryn oblast (Provinz) erhoben. Dabei wurden sowohl quantitative als auch 
qualitative Erhebungsmethoden angewandt, u.a. eine Haushaltsvollerhebung sowie 
halbstrukturierte Interviews mit Angehörigen lokaler Haushalte und Repräsentanten 
staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Institutionen und Organisationen. 
 
Ein erster Schwerpunkt der Studie liegt auf der gegenwärtigen Ausprägung und dem 
Entstehen sozioökonomischer Disparitäten auf der Lokalebene. Die Ergebnisse der 
Haushaltsbefragung belegen grosse Unterschiede zwischen Haushalten bezüglich dem 
Eigentum von Vieh, einem in Kirgistan gängigen lokalen Wohlstandsindikator. 
Während zahlreiche Haushalte gar keine oder nur sehr wenige eigene Tiere haben, 
verfügen einige wenige Haushalte über sehr grosse Herden. Die Untersuchung zeigt 
jedoch, dass solche Disparitäten nicht gänzlich neu sind und bereits in sozialistischer 
Zeit existierten. Das sowjetische Prinzip der rationellen Zuteilung von Gütern und 
Ressourcen erlaubte es ländlichen Eliten, mehr Reichtum als andere zu akkumulieren. 
Gleichzeitig aber sicherten halb- bis illegale Gütertransfers zwischen Staats- und 
Privatwirtschaft das Überleben der breiten Bevölkerung. Durch die rasche Privatisie-
rung der Landwirtschaft nach 1991 wurden die bestehenden Disparitäten jedoch weiter 
verstärkt. Gründe dafür sind unter anderem die wichtige Rolle ländlicher Eliten bei der 
Auflösung der Kolchosen und die daraus resultierende Ungleichbehandlung lokaler 
Haushalte bei der Verteilung von Produktionsmitteln; eine fehlende Kontrolle lokaler 
Verteilprozesse durch übergeordnete Instanzen; Gesetzesreformen, welche mit lokalen 
Entwicklungen nur selten Schritt halten konnten; sowie eine schlecht vorbereitete 
Zusammenfassung 
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Privatisierung des Viehbestand, welche zum Tod Tausender Tiere durch Krankheit und 
Mangelernährung führte. Zudem fehlte vielen ehemaligen einfachen Kolchos-Arbeitern 
und Arbeiterinnen die notwendige Erfahrung, um einen eigenen, marktorientierten 
landwirtschaftlichen Kleinbetrieb zu führen. Die Privatisierung der kirgisischen Land-
wirtschaft fand damit in einem sogenannt hybriden institutionellen Kontext statt: statt 
einer fairen Güter-Verteilung als Ausgangspunkt zur Schaffung eines freien Marktes 
handelte es sich vielmehr um eine auf den Netzwerken aus sozialistischer Zeit 
basierende Ressourcen-Zuteilung. 
 
Der zweite Schwerpunkt der Studie liegt auf den verschiedenen Akteuren, ihren 
Praktiken sowie relevanten Organisationen und Institutionen im Kontext der agro-
pastoralen Produktion. Dabei wird untersucht, wie Verfügungsrechte über Kulturland, 
Vieh und Weiden verhandelt, verteidigt und genutzt werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass privates Landeigentum für ländliche Haushalte einerseits von wirtschaftlichem 
und symbolischem Wert ist und damit auch einen gewissen Grad an Sicherheit vermit-
teln kann. Andererseits bedingen Landeigentum und -nutzung auch neue Verpflichtun-
gen – wie etwa Gebühren für Bewässerung oder Steuern auf Kulturland – und sind 
damit eng mit monetären Austauschbeziehungen verbunden. Dies stellt vor allem 
weniger begüterte Haushalte vor grosse Probleme, die nur selten Zugang zu Lohnarbeit 
und somit Bargeld finden. Damit zeigt sich, dass sich das marktwirtschaftliche Prinzip 
privater landwirtschaftlicher Unternehmer in Kirgistan noch immer nicht 
vollumfänglich durchgesetzt hat. Stattdessen ist die Ressource Kulturland für viele 
Haushalte zur Bürde geworden. Dies erklärt, warum ein Grossteil des Landes heute 
nicht mehr für landwirtschaftliche Produktion genutzt wird. Bezüglich der Viehwirt-
schaft zeigt sich, dass Tiere nicht nur eine wichtige finanzielle Ressource darstellen, 
welche bei Bedarf in Geld umgewandelt werden kann, sondern auch zentraler Dreh- 
und Angelpunkt für die Reproduktion sozialer Beziehungen sind. Wohlstand in der 
Form von Vieh ist oft gleichbedeutend mit Verhandlungsmacht über Ressourcen und 
bestimmt damit auch über den Zugang zu Weideressourcen. Dabei können wohlha-
bendere Haushalte oft vom Nebeneinander verschiedener, mehr oder weniger formaler 
Regeln und Normen profitieren. Je nach Absicht berufen sie sich entweder auf 
staatliche Gesetze oder informelle Regeln und Verhaltensweisen, oder sie kombinieren 
beides miteinander. Weniger wohlhabende Haushalte hingegen kennen sich mit 
formalen Regeln oft nur ungenügend aus, oder es fehlen ihnen die Mittel, sie je 
nachdem zu nutzen oder aber erfolgreich zu umgehen. 
 
Die Neudefinition von Verfügungsrechten durch die Kirgisischen Agrarreformen hat 
damit nicht nur den Marktwert natürlicher Ressourcen, sondern auch die 
längerfristigen Aussichten ländlicher Haushalte sowie die Beziehungen zwischen Arm 
und Reich grundlegend verändert. Ländliche Lebenswelten und soziale Beziehungen 
werden heute massgeblich durch einen Markt geprägt, der insgesamt nur sehr schwach 
reguliert ist. In der Folge gelingt es wohlhabenden, handlungsmächtigen Akteuren 
meist, ihre Verfügungsrechte über Ressourcen auszuweiten, während sich weniger 
Wohlhabende mit verschiedenen Aspekten von Unsicherheit konfrontiert sehen. Dies 
schmälert längerfristig ihre Aussichten, der Armutsfalle zu entrinnen. Es ist daher 
wahrscheinlich, dass sich die bestehenden sozioökonomischen Disparitäten im 
ländlichen Kirgistan weiter verschärfen werden. Die langfristigen Auswirkungen der 
landwirtschaftlichen Reformen zeigen damit deutlich, dass die Einführung neuer 
Gesetze und die Reform lokaler und regionaler Institutionen und Organisationen nur 
mit grosser Vorsicht geschehen sollte und ein detailliertes Verständnis der Prozesse, 
welche lokalen Disparitäten zugrunde liegen, erfordert. Vermeintlich ‘mächtige’ 
Gesetze und ‘robuste’ Institutionen laufen ansonsten Gefahr, den bereits beträchtlichen 
Graben zwischen Arm und Reich weiter zu vertiefen. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
“Understanding agrarian structures requires (…) asking the basic questions: 
who owns what, who does what, who gets what and what do they do with it? 
Social relations inevitably govern the distribution of property (including land), 
patterns of work and division of labour, the distribution of income 
and the dynamics of consumption and accumulation.” 
 
(Scoones 2009, 186) 
 
 
In late summer 2008, towards the end of my empirical field research for this thesis, I 
came across a village’s alpine summer pastures that had been affected by a mining 
company starting to dig for gold, silver and other precious metals. Local herders told 
me that the kombinat, as they called it, had opened in 2006 and since then had 
constantly expanded the area of the open-cast mine. Many herders bitterly complained 
that the mine would not only spoil their village’s drinking water, but also destroy 
“their“ pastures, i.e. the alpine meadows where they kept their animals during 
summer. Obviously, the mine severely limited local people’s future prospects to make a 
living from animal husbandry. Therefore, I at first considered the situation to be a 
clear-cut conflict over land resources between local and external actors, between 
inherited ways of  pastoral production and the growing extraction industry. 
 
However, it soon turned out that the situation was more complex than I had initially 
thought. I learnt that since spring 2008, about 70 people from the nearby village had 
taken paid employment in the mine. Among them were not only rich and poor people, 
but also many herders who worked in 15-day shifts and ’commuted’ between their 
family’s summer camp and the mining compound, which were sometimes only a few 
hundred metres apart. I also learnt that about half of the herding families on the 
nearby pastures regularly sold yogurt, milk and meat to the mining company in return 
for either cash or electricity. This puzzled me. What is it, I wondered, that makes 
people adopt two different income-generating activities if they know that these 
activities directly conflict with each other? Why do they accept precarious working 
conditions – the kombinat did not offer any working contracts – to dig up their 
summer pastures, a resource so praised by the Kyrgyz people and so crucial to the 
maintenance of animal husbandry, which has been one of the pillars of people’s 
livelihoods in rural Kyrgyzstan for hundreds of years? 
 
Unfortunately, I only encountered this intriguing case towards the end of my empirical 
field research, and time ran out to examine it in every detail. The simple answer to my 
questions, of course, was that the kombinat offers very attractive salaries that by far 
exceed local and regional standards. However, when I analyzed in more detail the 
empirical data I had collected in the two years prior to the ‘mining case’, I eventually 
realized that this was about more than just money. Instead, the case turned out to 
reflect the very issues which are the focus of this thesis. 
 
 
 
1.1 Aims of the study and research questions 
 
Focusing on agro-pastoral livelihoods and processes of institutional change in rural 
Kyrgyzstan, the present study examines the recursive relationship between actors and 
institutions that shapes transformation. It explores the interplay between concrete 
livelihood realities and the wider institutional context with which agro-pastoral 
households in rural Kyrgyzstan must cope to make a living in an ongoing process of 
post-socialist transformation. 
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The first objective of this thesis is to examine current agro-pastoral livelihoods in rural 
Kyrgyzstan and related processes of change, i.e. how households and individuals make 
a living today and how they have coped with processes of post-socialist transformation 
since the late 1980s. To do so, I adopt a livelihoods perspective and use the notion of 
livelihood trajectories to account for the historical perspective (Scoones 1998; de Haan 
and Zoomers 2005). As a second objective, the study examines the institutional and 
organizational context in which rural livelihoods were and are embedded, again 
focussing both on the current situation as well as on processes of institutional 
transformation since the late socialist period (Nuijten 1999; Appendini and Nuijten 
2002). The analysis of the recursive relationship between these processes of 
institutional change and actors’ livelihoods trajectories forms the third objective of the 
thesis. 
 
I base my study on the assumption that the last 20 years of post-socialist change have 
fostered socioeconomic disparities in rural Kyrgyzstan, and that today, the local 
institutional and organizational context is characterized by a complex interplay of 
formal and informal, state and non-state, socialist and post-socialist structures, 
procedures and practices. I also assume that, to a considerable degree, people’s ability 
to make use of certain institutions and organizations – and thus to access certain 
resources – is governed by these socioeconomic disparities. The following are the 
specific research questions of the study: 
 
• How do rural Kyrgyz households make a living today? What socioeconomic 
disparities exist between them? How can these livelihoods be categorized? 
• How have these rural livelihoods changed since the late socialist period? How 
did households and individuals cope with the privatization process in the 
1990s? 
 
• Which institutions and organizations are relevant for rural livelihoods today? 
• How have these institutions and organizations changed since the late socialist 
period? 
 
• How do rural livelihoods and the local institutional and organizational context 
influence each other? How does the latter support or hinder people from 
making a living? And how does people’s agency contribute to processes of 
institutional change? 
• How has this interplay changed since the late socialist period? 
 
My analysis builds on field research over a total of 10 months in Naryn oblast 
(province) in Central Kyrgyzstan. The evidence I present comes from two case study 
villages I  visited on numerous occasions between 2006 and 2008. Due to the lack of 
reliable statistical data for the village and the household level, I have combined 
quantitative and qualitative methods, i.e. a household survey; semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with representatives of numerous local households, state representatives 
from the local up to the national level, and others; participant observation and focus 
group discussions. 
 
By exploring the interlinkages between livelihood dynamics and processes of 
institutional transformation, this study addresses an important gap in the 
understanding of post-socialist transformation which – particularly in the case of rural 
Kyrgyzstan – has rarely been looked at up till now1. 
 
                                                
1 A gap which seems all the more relevant in view of ongoing efforts by various donor agencies to ‘build 
and strengthen’ institutions in the Kyrgyz countryside (cf. World Bank 2008). 
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1.2 From ‘transitology’ to ‘transformation’ research 
 
Over the last two decades, academic and policy-oriented debates on development in 
post-socialist societies and economies have taken several turns, and have thrown up 
starkly contrasting approaches to conceptualizing ‘transition’ or ’transformation’2. The 
early 1990s were dominated by economic, relatively functionalist approaches informed 
by the neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus. Advocates of the Consensus 
– under the guidance of the leading International Financial Institutions (IFI) such as the 
World Bank and the IMF, and thus with considerable influence on many governments 
in the post-socialist space – considered ‘transition’ a rapid and linear process of change 
from the inefficient socialist economy towards efficient modern market capitalism, 
which should “get under way within two years or so (…)” (IMF, IBRD, OECD, EBRD 
1990; cit. in Abazov 1999, 199). The tools proposed to bring about this change were 
mainly economic policy measures, including rapid privatization of state assets, 
liberalization of prices and deregulation of markets. Economic growth was declared the 
main indicator for measuring the progress of transition (World Bank 1996; Kolodko 
1999; Eisen 2001; Pender 2001; Rose 2009; Pickles 2010).  
 
Revising the Washington Consensus 
 
However, things went seriously wrong. By the mid-1990s it became obvious that many 
countries whose governments had followed the World Bank’s ‘blueprint for reform’ 
experienced the fastest rates of poverty increase worldwide and that socioeconomic 
disparities had worsened rapidly. Also the expected spillover effects between economies 
and societies actually hardly ever occured. In short, transition did not progress as 
predicted. Consequently, and in response to the increasing criticism of neoliberal 
policies worldwide, the IFIs began to revise their stance on economic primacy for 
development, taking into account recent insights from New Institutional Economics on 
the role of institutions in the economy (Gelb 1997; Stiglitz 1998; Wolfensohn 1998). 
This eventually resulted in a new, comprehensive approach to development which 
became known as the Post-Washington Consensus. It acknowledged the role of social, 
political, environmental and cultural aspects in development (Carothers 2002; World 
Bank 2005). 
 
Although it had far-reaching consequences for reform policies in many transition 
countries, the new paradigm was less ‘post’ than it appeared. On the one hand, the IFIs 
did not abandon the modernist, binary logic of post-socialist transition as a linear 
process from socialism towards free market capitalism, which remained the final 
objective of all their policy recommendations. On the other hand, the approach was 
still functionalist in the sense that it considered ‘institution building’ to be a matter of 
replacing old, socialist institutions with more efficient ones. In other words, the new 
perspective was more about finding more elaborate tools to get the process ‘back on 
track’ rather than about scrutinizing the modernist assumptions behind the transition 
paradigm (Lines 1998; Hann 2006). Thus, the Post-Washington Consensus also 
offered little help to better understand and explain the multitude of development 
processes in the post-socialist space and their ostensible ‘deviations’ from the predicted 
linear transition path. 
 
‘Transformation’: alternative approaches 
 
However, the weakening of the neoliberal hegemony eventually gave way to alternative 
approaches to post-socialist development and to a more fundamental criticism of the 
transition paradigm. In essence, the criticism, which mainly emerged from the social 
sciences and critical development studies, focused on the paradigm’s normative 
                                                
2 In this thesis, the term ’transition’ is mainly used in regard to post-socialist reforms and the 
macroeconomic perspective, while ‘transformation’ is used in connection with local-level processes and 
the ethnographic perspective. For more details on the conceptual differences between the two terms, see 
2.2.1. 
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character, i.e. its orientation towards the outcome rather than the course of the 
transition process, and challenged its emphasis on the two sole factors markets and 
institutions (Hopfmann 1997; Smith and Pickles 1998; Buraywoy and Verdery 1999; 
Müller 2001; Scoones 2009). Instead, the various new approaches built on the idea of 
‘transformation’ as a bundle of evolutionary, multi-directional and open-ended 
processes, in which actors recombine and improvise on the old and the new in order to 
cope with the numerous challenges ‘transition’ poses. Consequently, many of these 
scholars have refrained from crafting a ‘theory of transition’, seeking instead mid-range 
concepts that allow them to adequately describe and explain the apparent diversity of 
transformation processes at various levels (cf. Stark and Bruszt 2001; Pavlinek 2003). 
Drawing on advances in, among others, new institutional economics, property rights 
theory and legal pluralism, these concepts include ideas of path-dependency (cf. 
Verdery 1991; Altvater 1998) simultaneous development (cf. Offe 1994; Stark 1992), 
hybridity (cf. Koehler and Zürcher 2004; Lindner and Moser 2009), institutional 
bricolage (cf. Cleaver 2001), and uncertainty (cf. Mehta et al. 1999, 2001; Kandiyoti 
2002; Herbers 2006b; see 2.2.2 for details). 
 
These alternative approaches promoted a shift away from the previous macroeconomic 
focus towards multi-level analysis, and particularly emphasized actor research at the 
micro level. As a consequence, the noughties have witnessed a rise in ethnographic 
transformation research, which has led to a better understanding of local responses to 
the socialist collapse and the national transition policies after 1991. Meanwhile, there 
is a wide array of excellent studies available on the local aspects of transformation, 
especially for Central and Eastern Europe (cf. Smith and Pickles 1998; Burawoy and 
Verdery 1999; Hann 2006) as well as for Russia (cf. Hann 2002; Lindner 2008, Ries 
2009). Since a profound review of this rich and extremely diverse literature is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, I shall focus on the state of the art of research on livelihoods, 
agrarian change and pastoralism in rural Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia3. 
 
 
 
1.3  Transformation research in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia 
 
The early dominance of the macro-economic perspective and the subsequent rise of 
multi-level and ethnographic analyses is also reflected in the existing literature on 
Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia4. Early contributions to the transition process focused on 
the effects of the Kyrygz reform policies on agricultural production and commodity  
markets and were concerned with policy adjustments to foster economic growth 
(Duncan 1994; Bloch et al. 1996; Delehanty and Rasmussen 1996; Lerman 2000, 
2003)5. Early concerns about the social costs of reforms – in the form of extreme 
inflation and rapid rural pauperization – were raised soon after, when the interim 
outcomes of the Kyrgyz ‘shock therapy’ could be compared to the situation in 
neighboring republics (cf. Spoor 1997, 1999; Abazov 1999). However, most of these 
and subsequent similar studies remained at the macro level and relied primarily on 
analysis of statistical data and legal documents (cf. Kadyrkulov and Kanchayev 2000; 
Tashmatov et al. 2000; Trouchine and Zitzmann 2005; Christensen and Pomfret 2007; 
Peyrouse 2009). 
 
The institutional perspective 
 
Other authors, however, sought to verify their concerns about the reforms’ outcomes 
empirically through local-level studies. Most of these studies focused on the 
                                                
3 There is also an important body of research available in Russian on the topic which is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4 Lindner (2008, 3f) observes the same for the Russian context. 
5 In addition, the World Bank, various UN and bilateral donor agencies, and the Kyrgyz Government have 
published countless reports and assessments on agrarian sector reforms. Unless they are of direct 
relevance to this thesis, these will not explicitly be mentioned. 
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consequences of land reforms for the rural population, highlighting problems of equal 
access to land and agrarian markets (Mearns 1996; Spoor 1999, 2004; Giovarelli 
1998; Childress et al. 2003; Jones 2003; Bruce et al. 2006). With the increased 
attention of the government to administrative reforms in the late nineties, issues of 
local governance also came to the fore. Most authors raised concerns about the 
effectiveness of the Kyrgyz decentralization program and noted the general absence of 
a ’civil society’ (Anderson 2000; Geiss 2002; Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003; TACIS 
2005; Libman 2008; Ibraimova 2009). Others examined how the public services sector 
coped with the challenges of rural transition, including education (Rufer and Wälty 
2001; de Young et al. 2006) and health care (cf. Meimanaliev et al. 2005). 
 
The growing attention to rural organizations and institutions also generated increased 
interest in the legacy of socialist structures, i.e. how collective and state farms modified 
the rural social contract. While Verdery (1991) emphasized the importance of the 
historical perspective for post-socialist studies in general at an early stage, Mearns 
(1996) was one of the first to highlight the continued influence of former Soviet 
hierarchies on Central Asian rural societies. However, while he considered the 
persistence of socialist power structures a major obstacle to successful reforms, Roy 
(1999) argued for a less prejudiced view of the socialist legacy, whose structures often 
provided minimum social safeguards for the rural poor. Either way, later contributions 
from the Uzbek (cf. Trevisani 2007) or the Russian context (cf. Lindner 2008) 
confirmed the continuing importance of the Soviet legacy to processes of institutional 
and social transformation in postsocialism. 
 
The livelihoods perspective 
 
From the late 1990s on, the theme of local livelihood dynamics at household and 
individual level became increasingly popular in publications. While first household 
studies carried out in the early years of independence had focused on identifying 
different sets of coping responses (cf. Howell 1996, 1998; later on also Mearns 2004; 
Ronsijn 2006; Shigaeva et al. 2007), academic interest soon shifted to particular 
livelihood aspects, such as the role of social networks (Werner 1998; Kuehnast 2000; 
Kuehnast and Dudwick 2004; Sabates-Wheeler 2004), land use practices (cf. Garn 
2002; Eriksson 2006; Herbers 2006a,b) or particular livelihood alternatives such as 
labor migration (Rohner 2006; Thieme 2008b; Schmidt and Sagynbekova 2008; 
Schoch 2008). With the aim of assessing the micro-level effects of the Kyrgyz 
privatization and decentralization programs, ethnographic studies also increasingly 
scrutinized the new property regimes in agriculture, raising critical thoughts about new 
private and common property regimes alike (cf. Behnke 2003; Bichsel 2006; Sehring 
2007; Larue 2008; Bichsel et al. 2010; Robinson et al. 2010). 
 
One of the dominant topics which somehow cuts across most of these issues is 
pastoralism, i.e. animal husbandry and the use of pastures, which is an essential 
constituent of livelihoods throughout rural Central Asia and a key concern of this 
study. 
 
 
 
1.4  The discourse of pastoral transformation in Central Asia 
 
There has been vigorous academic interest in animal husbandry and (agro-)pastoralism 
over the last decades. Towards the turn of the century, mobile animal husbandry has 
gained increased attention as a particular form of adaptation to the effects of climate 
change, such as droughts and desertification (cf. Behnke and Scoones 1992; Scholz 
1997; Davies et al. 2010). Until the early 1990s, most of this research focused on the 
African (cf. Scoones 1995; Little et al. 2001; Hesse and MacGregor 2006; Homewood 
2008) and South Asian contexts (cf. Ehlers and Kreutzmann 2000; Kreutzmann 2004), 
while only a few studies explicitly dealt with pastoral production in Soviet Central Asia 
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(cf. Dienes 1975)6.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, other regions with 
a rich pastoral tradition, such as Northern Siberia, the Altai, Mongolia, and Central 
Asia, caught the attention of Western scholars. There is now a rich body of literature 
about the different forms of mobile animal husbandry in the region, their adaptation 
processes to constantly changing political, economic and environmental conditions, 
and their environmental and social consequences. 
 
Curtailed mobility 
 
The recent alteration of mobility patterns is a recurring theme in these publications. 
Most scholars observe a massive reduction of mobility among pastoralists after 1991, 
which is mainly ascribed to the privatization of livestock and the disbandment of large 
organizational structures, as in Mongolia (Humphrey and Sneath 1999), Kazakhstan 
(Kerven 2003a; Kerven et al. 2003) or Kyrgyzstan (van Veen 1995; Wilson 1997; 
Jacquesson 2003; Ludi 2003, 2004; Farrington 2005; Undeland 2005). In regions 
where no radical agrarian reforms have taken place, such as in Xinjiang, processes of 
sedentarization are seen as an important cause of the reduction in flock mobility 
(Kreutzmann 1995, 2009). 
 
Environmental consequences 
 
A large proportion of publications are devoted to the environmental consequences of 
this reduced pastoral mobility. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that the 
termination of the highly intensified socialist livestock production, which caused severe 
overgrazing of all types of pastures, had positive effects (Wilson 1997; Jacquesson 
2003; Undeland 2005). On the other hand, however, most authors observe that the 
reduced mobility caused new forms of rangeland degradation, mainly through over-
utilization of pastures close to settlements and under-utilization of remote summer 
pastures (Fitzherbert 2000; Ellis and Lee 2003; SDC 2009). This again lowers the 
overall level of nutrition for animals, which leads to a further decrease in livestock 
productivity (Wright et al. 2003). Therefore, the academic discourse by and large 
argues in favor of a return to former migration patterns, acknowledging mobile 
pastoralism as a highly adaptive and productive form of livelihood. 
 
Transforming the pastoral commons 
 
Other scholars have focused their attention more on organizational and institutional 
aspects of pastoral economies. While the consequences of legal reforms to agro-
pastoral production have been widely discussed in most countries (for Kyrgyzstan, see 
Childress et al. 2003; Undeland 2005), the role of informal, non-state institutions and 
organizations has rarely been examined thus far. The exception is Mongolia, where a 
series of studies on processes of institutional transformation within the pastoral 
commons revealed that the withdrawal of the state led to a weakening of formal 
institutions, while at the same time informal institutions re-emerged. Finke (2004), 
however, finds that the latter are often too weak to ‘close the gap’; this eventually 
increases transaction costs and uncertainty among local herders. Instead, people refer 
to a variety of customary (or traditional) rules and norms concerning the use of 
pastures, which increase uncertainty about the behavior of others (Upton 2005). In 
such a situation, wealthier herders often have better opportunities to secure their access 
to pastures and other resources than less wealthy ones (Mearns 2002; Kerven et al. 
2003). In a search for new ways to regulate the Mongolian pastoral commons, 
Fernández-Gimenez (2002) challenges the need for a rigid definition of formal property 
rights as  new institutional economics has suggested. Instead, she argues for flexible 
institutional regulations that build on reciprocity among actors and allow for mobility 
since, for many pastoralists, resource access would be more important than tenure 
security. An altered balance between the formal and the informal is also noted by 
Meierhans (2008), who observes a considerable gap between Kyrygz herders’ and 
                                                
6 There are, however, numerous studies of the Soviet livestock sector as a whole (cf. Newth 1962; Jasny 
1964) 
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scientists’ knowledge and practices regarding the management of pastures (see also 
Liechti and Biber-Klemm 2008). 
 
Agro-pastoral livelihoods  
 
The growing number of livelihood studies has further improved the understanding of 
the effect of transformation on agro-pastoral societies. On the one hand, evidence 
suggests that rural people increasingly depend on land and livestock for their survival 
(cf. Liechti 2008). On the other hand, the increasing social stratification and loss of 
mutual trust and aid among rural households creates a situation where most people 
prefer to work on their own and distance themselves from new forms of cooperation. 
Although they deploy a wide range of coping responses, rural producers hardly ever 
cooperate with people outside their household and immediate kin (Finke 2004; 
Farrington 2005). A related concern is that many of them continuously fail to enter 
rural commodity markets and to develop their livelihoods beyond mere subsistence 
production. Although the possibility of using common pasture resources for private 
livestock production is seen as a competitive advantage (Kreutzmann 1995), research 
has identified several issues hampering the development of a solid value chain for 
livestock products, including remoteness, poor raw material quality, absence of disease 
controls, insufficient price information, and generally weak demand (Humphrey and 
Sneath 1999; Ajibekov 2005; Näscher 2009; SDC 2009). Recent studies increasingly 
scrutinize gender aspects of pastoral agro-production, either in terms of women’s 
difficult access to livestock and related resources (Undeland 2008), or in terms of 
women’s increased domestic workload when their husbands and sons migrate for labor 
(cf. Schoch 2008; Schoch et al. forthcoming). 
 
The present study takes up this discourse of pastoral transformation in Central Asia 
and combines it with alternative approaches to processes of post-socialist 
transformation and a focus on livelihoods and institutions. By emphasizing the 
recursive relationship between actors and institutions, the study will contribute to a 
better understanding of ongoing processes of socioeconomic change in rural 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
 
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is composed of twelve chapters divided in three parts. Part A (chapters 2 to 
4) is concerned with different theoretical and methodological approaches to 
transformation and gives an overview of the Kyrgyz transition politics after 1991. 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical approach of the study with reference to ongoing 
discourses of post-socialist ‘transition’ and ‘transformation’. It develops a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of actors and institutions in transformation. Building on 
that, Chapter 3 introduces the research methodology and reflects on the practice of 
participatory, actor-oriented research for the study of post-socialist transformation. 
Chapter 4 then outlines political and economic reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic. It 
starts from the late socialist period and focuses on the two main guiding principles of 
the Kyrgyz reform agenda, i.e. privatization and decentralization.  
 
Part B (chapters 5 to 8) builds on empirical evidence to examine the persistence of old, 
and the emergence of new, socioeconomic disparities in rural Kyrgyzstan. Based on the 
results of a quantitative household survey carried out in spring 2007, chapter 5 
develops a household typology to describe current socioeconomic disparities in the two 
case study villages. Asking the question whether such disparities existed in the socialist 
economy already, Chapter 6 examines the ‘modes of operation’ of the two collective 
farms and how they affected people’s livelihoods in the Soviet period. Chapter 7 then 
deals with the ‘heyday of transition’ between 1991 and the early noughties. It examines 
how the two collective farms were dissolved, how people were invested with new 
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claims over land, livestock and infrastructure, and whether and how the distribution 
process influenced the reproduction of existing, as well as the emergence of new, 
disparities. Chapter 8 summarizes Part B and relates its main findings to the theoretical 
concepts used in this study. 
 
Part C (Chapters 9 to 11) also builds on empirical evidence to examine actors, 
practices, organizations and institutions around agropastoral livelihoods. It asks what 
local actors do with the different resources they received during the privatization 
program. Chapter 9 focuses on the actors, practices, organizations and institutions 
involved in the use of arable land. It asks how people access land and other production 
factors such as water for irrigation, workforce and cash, and examines the role of 
agrarian commodity markets for rural livelihoods. Chapter 10 follows a similar 
approach in regard to livestock and pastures. It explains the social and economic 
significance of livestock for rural livelihoods and examines how people access and use 
pastures in the current institutional and organizational context. Chapter 11 
summarizes the main findings of Part C and relates them to the theoretical concepts 
used in this study. 
 
Chapter 12 concludes the study. It refers to the mining case presented at the very 
beginning of this chapter, summarizes the main findings and discusses them with 
regard to the ongoing transformation discourse and in relation to the various concepts 
used to record post-socialist transformation at the micro level. 
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2 From ’transitology’ to the study of processes of 
post-socialist transformation 
 
 
“Spread the truth – the laws of economics are like the laws of engineering. 
One set of laws works everywhere.” 
 
Lawrence Summers, World Bank chief economist, 1991 
(cit. in Rose 2009, 2) 
 
 
“Why then has transition been so difficult?” 
 
(Gelb 1997, 451) 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan was one of the first countries in the Former Soviet Union to adopt a 
neoliberal reform agenda put forward by the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and other International Financial Institutions. As a consequence, Kyrgyzstan’s 
economic, political and social development after 1991 became closely associated with 
the market-oriented concepts that dominated the discourse of post-socialist transition 
in the early 1990s. In order to achieve rapid economic growth, reformers were thus 
mainly concerned with liberalizing prices, privatizing state property and decentralizing 
the state administration. By the mid-nineties, however, it became obvious that most 
predictions regarding post-socialist transition had failed. Neither had the free market 
really gained ground, nor had post-socialist societies necessarily become more equal 
and free, and the neoliberal reformers had to admit that they had underestimated the 
complexity of post-socialist transition. Considering the advances made by New 
Institutional Economics regarding the importance of institutions for economic 
development, the World Bank and its allies eventually adjusted their development 
paradigm – at a time, however, when the most valuable resources in rural Kyrgyzstan 
had already been distributed or appropriated (cf. chapter 4). This is why section 2.1 
gives due attention to the leading paradigm behind early transition policy. 
 
The failure of the neoliberal transition paradigm also paved the way for a broader, 
more critical academic debate of post-socialist transition. In order to explain the 
multitude of development processes observed in the post-socialist space, early critics 
addressed the lack of adequate theoretical explanations for the socialist collapse and its 
consequences. They argued that a better understanding of the recursive relationship 
between actors and institutions was needed in order to grasp ‘processes of 
transformation’ (instead of transition). This also entailed a shift of focus from 
macroeconomics to processes of structuration at the micro level. Section 2.2 shows that 
while these critical approaches have not (yet) developed into a comprehensive ‘theory 
of transition’, they have led to a more differentiated understanding of the multiple 
processes of transformation. 
 
This thesis builds to a great extent on the insights achieved by the transition line of 
critique. Therefore, the second half of this chapter revisits this critique’s underlying 
theoretical concepts regarding the linkages between structure and agency. Section 2.3 
explores institutional and property rights theory and eventually puts forward a 
conceptual framework for the analysis of organizations, institutions and organizing 
practices in transformation. Section 2.4 refers to actor-oriented approaches in 
development research in order to bring forward an analytical approach that makes it 
possible to examine people’s diverse and path-dependent responses and contributions 
to processes of post-socialist transformation. 
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2.1 ’Transitology’ and the neoliberal opinion leaders of the 
1990s 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 came 
as a surprise to many observers – and made a strong case for neoliberal thinking. In 
conjunction with the so-called ‘third wave of democracy’, referring to the end of 
military dictatorship in Latin America in the 1980s and of authoritarian regimes in 
Southern Europe, the unprecedented events in the East soon led Western policymakers 
to conclude that socialism, the state-planned economy and ‘collectivist’ property 
institutions had utterly failed. Hence, they argued, the model of democracy, free 
market economy and private property had finally prevailed (Rufer and Wälty 2001; 
Carothers 2002; Beyer 2006; Hann 2006; Pickles 2010). 
 
 
2.1.1 Economy matters! ‘Transition’ and the Washington 
Consensus 
 
In this situation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), along 
with regional development banks, took the lead ‘to develop’ the former socialist world. 
To this purpose, they deployed their proven 1980s recipes, suggesting rapid reforms 
towards a free market economy (Rufer and Wälty 2001, 652). The Bretton Woods 
institutions based their arguments on their successful tackling of the international debt 
crisis of the 1980s, through which they had contributed to global economic recovery. 
At the time, neoliberal exponents such as Jeffrey Sachs and IMF chief economist 
Stanley Fischer had rapidly tackled Bolivian and Israeli hyperinflation by deploying a 
so-called economic ‘shock therapy’ based on the three pillars of price liberalization, 
stabilization and privatization. This portfolio of economic policy interventions 
developed by the World Bank, the IMF and other Washington-based policy advisors 
became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Lines 1998, 2). In 1990, IMF advisor 
John Williamson outlined the Consensus’ key policy prescriptions as follows (Table 
2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 The Washington Consensus’ key policy prescriptions (Williamson 1997, cit. in Kolodko 1999, 237) 
 
1) Fiscal discipline Keep the budget deficit small 
  
2) Public expenditure Redirect public expenditure toward neglected fields with high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution 
  
3) Tax reform Broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates 
  
4) Financial liberalization Let the market determine interest rates 
  
5) Exchange rates Foster exports by unified exchange rates between countries 
  
6) Trade liberalization Replace quantitative trade restrictions by progressively reduced tariffs 
  
7) Foreign direct investment Abolish barriers that impede the entry of foreign firms 
  
8) Privatization Privatize state enterprises 
  
9) Deregulation Abolish regulations that impede the entry of new firms or that restrict competition 
  
10) Property rights Provide secure property rights 
 
 
The objective of these purely economic-policy-based prescriptions could be 
summarized as rapid and sustained economic growth based on maximized private 
property, a liberalized market and a minimized role for the state. This objective has 
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been articulated repeatedly by the World Bank, the IMF and related policy-thinkers 
since the early 1980s. Economic growth, measured by per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP), thus became the main indicator for measuring the success of the 
Washington Consensus (Pender 2001, 398; Kolodko 1999, 236). 
 
Pro-market, anti-state 
 
The explicit focus on economic growth made the market appear as a meta institution 
paving the ground for development in general: “Without a faster rate of production 
increase, other objectives cannot be achieved (…)” (World Bank 1981, cit. in Pender 
2001, 398). So-called ‘transitologists’ were convinced that a liberalized economy would 
promote democracy through spillover effects and that a country moving away from 
dictatorship was automatically in transition to democracy (Müller 2001, 6; Carothers 
2002, 6ff; Pickles 2010, 129f). Democracy building and state building were seen as 
mutually reinforcing, i.e. state institutions were automatically strengthened by 
strengthening democracy. As a result, the Washington Consensus aimed to reduce the 
role of the state to a minimum by promoting privatization, price liberalization and 
deregulation – a policy directly challenging political reality in most developing 
countries and all the states of the Former Soviet Union. In practice, the provision of 
‘secure property rights’ thus meant the predominance of private property over 
collective property; the proponents of neoliberalism usually referred to Garrett 
Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ (1968) and related it to the failed state economy 
(Hann 2006). 
 
‘One-world consensus’ 
 
In principle, the World Bank and the IMF argued that the newly independent states of 
the Former Soviet Union would face the same structural problems as other countries in 
the Third World. Opening up their economies, adjusting prices and reducing state 
intervention would therefore be the right recipe for them (Lines 1998, 4). Thus, the 
Washington Consensus’ reform experiences from Latin America were transferred to 
post-socialist transition countries (Kolodko 1999, 236). In the sense of a “one-world 
consensus” (Müller 2001, 6), each national economy was treated “as part of the global 
economy [and] structural adjustment programmes [were] similar in all parts of the 
world.” (Altvater 1998, 595) 
 
Binary logic of transition: informed by modernization theory 
 
The Washington Consensus was informed by modernization theory and based on a 
binary logic. Transition was therefore understood as a linear development from one 
system to another, i.e. between the two “extremes of inefficient socialist systems and 
efficient modern market capitalism” (Altvater 1998, 592). From the very beginning, 
such thinking consequently ruled out the possibility of a ‘third way’ between socialism 
and capitalism (Altvater 1998, 592). The focus was on the process’s destination and 
not its origin. In other words, transition was thought from where it should lead to, not 
where it came from. New structures had to be built on the ruins of the old, collapsed 
system. In this sense, the Consensus was “a package (…) aimed to dissolve the past by 
the fastest means possible” (Burawoy and Verdery 1999, 5). Michael Burawoy (1992, 
cit. in Smith and Pickles 4) called this reworked modernization theory ‘transitology’. 
 
The logical consequence of this thinking was that every form of development that did 
not reach the defined objective of rapid economic growth had to be viewed as 
‘unsuccessful transition’ or as an ‘anomaly of transition’ (Hopfmann 1997a, 44; Müller 
2001, 7). Surprisingly however, hardly ever was it discussed where exactly – to what 
kind of ‘free market economy’ – the proposed reforms should lead (Rufer and Wälty 
2001, 654). By the mid-1990s already, some ‘transitologists’ realized that this lack of a 
clear vision and the generally narrow conception of the transition process was 
problematic. 
Part A   Post-socialism: politics of transition and approaches to transformation 
 14 
Speed of reforms: the ‘all-out’ approach as the only viable way 
 
One of the few, at least partially debated, issues among the Bretton Woods 
representatives was the speed of reforms. In the 1996 World Development Report, the 
World Bank acknowledged that in principle there would be two possible ways of 
‘doing transition’: a quick ‘all-out’ approach (often referred to as ‘big bang’ or shock 
therapy) versus a gradual approach (for which China was the favored example). 
Nevertheless, the Bank argued that the Former Soviet Republics had no other choice 
than to embark on the all-out approach. “The fact that there are two model routes 
from a planned economy to the market does not mean that all countries are in a 
position to choose between them. (…) [The] chaotic environment, combining a 
disintegrating economy with a rapidly weakening government, allowed no scope for 
gradual reform. For these countries the all-out approach was the only one available” 
(World Bank 1996, 10f). Jeffrey Sachs was one of the most popular advocates of the 
‘big bang’ strategy. He argued that interdependencies between the different parts of an 
economy would make the implementation of a step-wise approach impossible, and that 
only a shock therapy was able to circumvent the expected resistance against reforms 
(Eisen 2001, 17; at the time, Sachs expected resistance mainly from within the 
administration, not from the general public). Others even insinuated that arguments in 
favor of a gradual approach would be of a political rather than a technical nature 
(Friedman 1989, cit. in Eisen 2001, 19). Ironically, the World Bank itself stressed that 
weak governments may cause problems for transition countries – the resulting need for 
institution building, however, was recognized only later on. 
 
Conditionality and structural adjustment 
 
As a matter of fact, poor countries – such as the newly independent Kyrgyz Republic – 
could not really choose the character of their reform program. They were in urgent 
need of foreign investment, which, by and large, came from the World Bank and the 
IMF. Yet these institutions linked their financial assistance to the implementation of 
the economic policy interventions recommended under the Washington Consensus 
(Pender 2001, 399). This concept of ‘conditionality’ – linking financial assistance and 
policy prescriptions through so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) – was 
first introduced by Robert McNamara in 1979. It allowed the World Bank and the 
IMF to agressively promote its agenda and was thus one of the main reasons why the 
neoliberal development paradigm became so successful in many Former Soviet 
Republics. Unfortunately, it left little room for national governments to develop their 
own, locally adapted models of transition (Pender 2001, 399f). 
 
 
2.1.2 Institutions matter! Critical reflection and advent of the ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’ 
 
The institutional economists’ critique 
 
Early criticism of the neoliberal transition largely built upon arguments from ‘New 
Institutional Economics’ (NIE; cf. also 2.3.1). Their most renowned representatives, 
Douglass North and Roland Coase, had emphasized the role of transaction costs and 
property rights for economic development even before the advent of the Washington 
Consensus and the socialist collapse. Their main argument was that development of 
markets always rests on a set of political and social institutions, and that the free 
market economy was not ‘designed and implemented’ within a few years, but grew 
historically over time (North 1991; Müller-Böker 2001). Consequently, NIE accused 
neoliberal concepts of neglecting institutional aspects, arguing that the implementation 
of a new economic order would, at least initially, have to acknowledge and make use 
of inherited structures in order to create sufficient legal and political certainty (Ellman 
1997; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Thomi 2001). In contrast to most ‘transitologists’ 
who promoted an all-out approach and thought about adequate criteria to measure 
when transition was ‘accomplished’, institutional economists rather advocated a 
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gradual approach to post-socialist transition that would allow sufficient time for so-
called ‘institution building’ (Kolodko 1999). 
 
Since then, the idea that ‘building’ adequate institutions is crucial to make post-
socialist transition work has constantly gained ground. Ellman (1997), for instance, 
outlined five ‘surprises of transformation’ to explain why the rebuilding of the post-
socialist economy would take so much time. Besides pointing to unexpected 
developments in the banking and industrial sectors, he highlighted difficulties related to 
the transformation of institutions and the initial lack of attention paid to such 
processes by many economists (1997, 27). In a similar analysis, Dunford (1998, 107) 
identified a ‘triple failure’ of transition policy: “(…) first, to anticipate the impact of 
structural adjustment on economies that were not already market economies, second, 
to identify the nature of institutions on which capitalism depends and, third, to 
understand that modes of economic conduct taken for granted in capitalist societies 
have to be learned.” And Lines (1998), stressing that the complexities of transition 
processes affect all levels of a society, argued for greater emphasis on building 
economic and democratic institutions in order to make transition work. 
 
The World Development Report 1996: first concerns about the transition paradigm 
 
While the World Bank and its partners had long ignored such objections, by the mid-
nineties they could no longer ignore the fact that post-socialist transition was not going 
as they expected. In the World Development Report 1996 – an extensive review of the 
achievements of post-socialist transition – the World Bank had to admit that only in a 
few cases had the observed development in the post-socialist world met the initial 
expectations and predictions. Obviously, too many countries revealed certain 
‘anomalies of transition’, which could not be made to match the neoliberal model of 
post-socialist transition any longer. 
Five issues gave cause for serious concern. First, many countries which had initially 
adopted the reform prescriptions by the World Bank and the IMF – and the Kyrgyz 
Republic was one of them – did not implement the full range of suggested reforms 
(Rufer and Wälty 2001, 655). Second, many of these countries revealed the fastest 
rates of poverty increase worldwide and a rapid aggravation of socioeconomic 
disparities. Thus, instead of moving towards free market economies, many of them 
increasingly resembled Third World countries (Müller 2001, 7). Third, in the absence 
of functioning capital markets, privatizing state property turned out to be more 
difficult than initially expected and obviously fostered corruption and nepotism (World 
Bank 1996, 13; Rufer and Wälty 2001, 655). Fourth, the high hopes pinned on the 
economy as the driving force of transition, i.e. the expected spillover effects between a 
liberalized economy and democratic structures, had hardly materialized (Müller 2001, 
8). Fifth, many Asian countries which had adopted a gradual instead of an ‘all-out’ 
approach, e.g. China and other Asian countries, seemed to be much more successful in 
their economic development (Müller 2001, 7). 
In its first part, however, the World Development Report 1996 still represented 
mainstream thinking along the lines of the Washington Consensus doctrine, measuring 
transition against the usual indicators of economic growth, and ranking transition 
countries according to an ‘economic liberalization index’. The report’s somewhat 
disappointing conclusion was therefore that a few countries were on their way to a 
market economy, while the remaining majority still had a long way to go. Spoor (1997, 
585) heavily criticized this simplistic dichotomy: “The collapse of the Soviet Union has 
affected all CAS [Central Asian States] in different ways, and various sets of policy 
reforms have been (and are being) implemented, whose effects cannot be captured 
within this simple dichotomy that is popular amongst the IFIs [International Financial 
Institutions]. The picture is indeed less clear than mainstream thought is suggesting 
(…).“ 
 
In its second part, however, the report outlined some major ‘challenges of 
consolidation’, indicating a certain change of attitude among IFI representatives 
towards the objections raised by institutional economists. The challenges included a 
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reconsideration of the role of governments (which had been widely neglected so far), 
the importance of long-term institution building, and the implications resulting from 
the insight that transition was a path-dependent process (World Bank 1996, 85ff). 
 
Gelb, Wolfensohn, Stiglitz: open criticism of the Washington Consensus  
 
In his 1997 article “Assessing the transition from plan to market: what have we 
learned about policies and economic theory?”, Alan Gelb, the staff director of the 1996 
World Development Report, further substantiated the Bank’s growing self-criticism. 
First, Gelb admitted that the Washington Consensus’ initial assumptions regarding 
transition may have been too simplistic and identified an urgent need to reform key 
institutions in transition countries. These included the legal framework, the banking 
system and the government itself, as well as mechanisms of social protection. He 
argued that institutions play a crucial role in economic development, which would 
explain why the market economy had not so far unleashed the large efficiency gains 
that had been expected. Second, Gelb admitted that “economies and people do respond 
to liberalizing reforms (…) even where the foundations of market systems are weak” 
(Gelb 1997, 451). It seemed that shock therapies did not anticipate any resistance to 
and reinterpretation of reforms, and that such responses came not only from within the 
administration but also from a wider audience. The third lesson revolved around the 
insight that the economic structure of a country at the outset of reforms played a 
decisive role in its further development. Although he was still arguing from a purely 
economic perspective, Gelb thus addressed the issue of path-dependency in transition 
(and in development in general). Last but not least, he also acknowledged that the 
success of any reform depended upon political circumstances, e.g. the struggles 
between reformist governments and the old socialist nomenclature. 
In general, Gelb concluded that if transition were to serve more just than the 
national elites, broad reforms including social policies and institution building were 
necessary to tackle increasing poverty and inequality. He also brought the curtain 
down on the once so popular ‘one-world consensus’ by admitting that “economic 
policies are critically important, but they cannot simply be transferred between (…) 
starkly different countries“ (ibid., 454). The 1996 World Development Report and 
Alan Gelb’s subsequent article thus marked the beginning of a shift among IFIs away 
from the Washington Consensus towards what eventually became known as the ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’. 
 
After a year of internal disputes over the Bank’s overall strategy (Pender 2001, 406; 
Müller 2001, 10), in 1998 the then leaders of the World Bank, president James 
Wolfensohn and chief economist Joseph Stiglitz, openly admitted the “well-
documented failures” (Stiglitz 1998, 1f) of the Washington Consensus. Up till then, the 
Bank had tended to explain a country’s development shortcomings by pointing to 
insufficient implementation of the Bank’s policy prescriptions by the respective 
government. Wolfensohn, Stiglitz and many others within the World Bank now began 
to criticize these prescriptions openly. In their opinion, the Bank’s too narrow focus on 
the Washington Consensus’ three pillars – price liberalization, stabilization and 
privatization – obscured perception of issues of distribution, competition and equality. 
Private property alone, they realized, was not a sufficient incentive to increase 
efficiency in production. 
 
“Too often we have focused too much on the economics, without a sufficient understanding 
of the social, the political, the environmental, and the cultural aspects of society. We have 
not thought adequately about the overall structure that is required in a country (…). Today, 
in the wake of crisis, we need a second framework.” (Wolfensohn 1998, 12) 
 
The market and the private sector had obviously failed in their role as the sole drivers 
of development. The Bank therefore enriched its vocabulary by developing the notions 
of institutions, people, civil society and sustainability, and started to pay greater 
attention to the organization of market structures and to the behavior of actors in 
transition economies. The focus now turned to organization, structure and a wider 
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range of actors, i.e. politics and practices of governance at different levels. (Kolodko 
1999, 240) 
 
The Post-Washington Consensus 
 
Since the new approach towards development had to address all components of a 
society, the World Bank built its ‘second framework’ around the ideas of integration, 
ownership and participation. The need for development was now acknowledged not 
only for the private sector, but also for the public sector and thus at community, family 
and the individual level, where the sharp increase in poverty and inequality had to be 
addressed. Consequently, decentralization of decision-making processes and 
governance became a preferred strategy to empower these sub-national levels. 
This shift towards a more comprehensive approach became known as the ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’. While the former consensus promoted the market as the 
meta-institution for development, the new consensus acknowledged issues of 
governance and policy as equally important to the economy. Highlighting the 
important role of existing institutions, the new consensus also represented a departure 
from the former ‘no-preconditions’ line (Carothers 2002, 16). In general, it 
encompassed a wider focus; an integrative character, considering social and 
institutional aspects not as externalities to, but as preconditions for functioning 
markets; and a long-term development perspective which replaced the former focus on 
rapid economic growth (Stiglitz 2005). 
 
The ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’: new conditionalities 
 
By 1999, the World Bank had translated its new approach into a new paradigm called 
the ‘Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)’ and in 2001 formally endorsed it 
as the basis for all of the Bank’s activities. The CDF is based on four core principles: i) 
a long-term holistic vision that should help to balance structural, social, economic and 
financial issues; ii) country ownership, meaning that government, parliament, the 
private sector and civil society should take the lead in defining development objectives; 
iii) country-led partnerships to harmonize interventions with country-specific systems; 
and iv) a results focus to strengthen monitoring and evaluation at national level (World 
Bank 2005, 2). By prioritizing public sector interventions for poverty reduction, 
improving the performance of governments and administrations at all levels has 
become a key concern of the CDF. Consequently, the World Bank now makes a 
government’s effort towards a ‘good policy environment’ a condition for further 
financial support (‘good governance’). A government must prove its willingness to 
adopt pro-poor policies in a so-called ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)’, 
which not only outlines the financial needs but also comprehensive policies for 
economic growth and poverty reduction. A government should thus be enabled to 
‘own’ its country’s development and forge partnerships through a national consultation 
process on the PRSP. 
PRSPs have often been presented as a response to the Structural Adjustment 
Programs of the early 1990s, which had been widely criticized for their top-down 
mechanisms and their negligence of the social sector. “The CDF […] is not a blueprint. 
It is voluntary, and each country must decide on, and own, its priorities and programs” 
(Wolfensohn and Fischer 2005). Critics say however that such willingness has been 
limited. Financial assistance is only delivered on the basis of a PRSP. This in turn must 
build on CDF principles – which are defined by the World Bank. Thus, the new 
approach remains conditional in principle and thus restricts the CDF’s claim of country 
ownership. In addition, as Pender (2001, 409) notes, the related discourse on what 
may be a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ policy environment represented a step into “highly 
controversial political territory”. 
 
NIE should undoubtedly take the credit for having formulated the first widely received 
and policy-effective critique of the Washington Consensus. From the mid-1990s 
onwards, Western policy advisors increasingly acknowledged the important role of 
institutions for economic growth in general and post-socialist transition in particular. 
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This eventually led to the Post-Washington Consensus, which promotes a more 
comprehensive approach to development by dissociating itself from the former 
explicitly economic focus. In addition, the observed ‘deviations’ from the predicted 
transition path made the Bretton Woods institutions turn away from the former ‘one-
world consensus’ and the insistence on an ‘all-out’ approach (compare section 2.1.1). 
 
Nevertheless, the binary logic behind the transition paradigm, i.e. the conception of 
post-socialist transition as a linear shift from a state-controlled economy and a socialist 
society towards the free market and democracy, has never been challenged. The 
assumption remains that “if only the institutional conditions can be fulfilled (including 
well-functioning markets in all sectors and the ‘rule of law’), then creating private 
owners in the only rational way to (…) promote development” (Hann 2006, 41). Thus, 
the new consensus is probably less ‘Post-Washington’ than it pretends to be. Instead, it 
is more about getting the tools and velocity right to reach the same pre-defined 
objective of maximum private property and rapid economic growth. Lines (1998, 7) 
gives a good example of the prevalence of modernist thinking and of a functionalist 
approach towards transition: “The central task involves the replacement of one set of 
social, political and economic institutions by another.” Thus, the question of whether 
transition (or transformation) may be more than just a linear modernization process, 
what diverse outcomes it may produce, and whether socialist ‘collective’ property 
institutions may simply be ‘replaced’ by private property rights, has eventually been 
raised by others. 
 
 
 
2.2  ‘There is no theory of transition’: the sociological 
transition critique 
 
Only a few observers developed alternative conceptions of post-socialist transition or 
voiced their concerns about the neoliberal transition paradigm before 1996 (among 
them Verdery 1991; or Brie 1995 and Gowan 1995, both cit. in Müller 2001). Smith 
and Pickles (1998, 4; emphasis in the original) relate this silence during the early 1990s 
to the immense power of the dominant neoliberal discourse at the time, which left little 
room for alternative approaches: “Anti-communist sentiment left little room for those 
who remained to articulate alternatives to ‘shock therapy’ and the ‘three zatsias’ 
(privatizatsia, demokratizatsia, liberalizatsia), (…)”. According to Müller (2001), the 
initial euphoria about the free market economy resulted in a close entanglement of 
research and policy, seriously hampering critical research. In his view, representatives 
of the neoliberal discourse occupied the scene before the political and social sciences 
could even start to articulate their positions. Either way, this meant that, for many 
years, the objections raised by new institutional economics (see 2.1.2) remained the 
only effective and widely perceived critique of the transition paradigm. A review of 
critical transition literature gives the impression that it was mainly the World Bank’s 
paradigm shift itself7 that eventually triggered a theoretically informed analysis of post-
socialist transformation and a more fundamental critique of transition policy in the 
post-socialist space8. 
                                                
7 Public resistance to the Washington Consensus first became pronounced in 1999 during the ‘battle of 
Seattle’ at the WTO Ministerial Conference, and afterwards in the annual debates hold at the World 
Social Forum in Brazil (Scoones 2009). 
8 The fact that the sociological transition critique built more on local and regional case study analysis than 
on economic modeling and forecasts may have been another reason why it lagged behind mainstream 
transitology. 
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2.2.1 From a ‘theory of transition’ towards a ‘set of conceptual 
 frameworks’ 
 
Critical contributions from the social sciences, i.e. sociology, political science, 
geography, social anthropology and others, have taken the transition critique much 
further, and to a more fundamental level than NIE. In principle, this ‘sociological 
critique’, as I call it, starts from the 1996 World Development Report’s observation 
that there were obvious ‘deviations’ from the predicted linear transition path. Unlike 
the Bank’s subsequent, self-critical discourse, however, independent authors do not 
attribute these ‘deviations’ to the hitherto insufficient attention paid to the role of 
institutions and the failure to draft functioning rules and regulations. Instead, they 
argue that such a large variety of mostly unexpected transition outcomes must be the 
result of as many different transformation processes, taking place “at the intersection 
of economy, politics, social structure and culture” and at various levels (Müller 2001, 
10). Mainstream transitology, so the argument goes, is unable to adequately explain 
such variety for two different reasons. First, modernist thinking is normative, since it is 
oriented towards the outcome (free market, democracy, growth, welfare) of the 
transition process rather than its course9. Now that the intermittent outcomes were 
anything but the expected, the normative model of a directed process was obviously 
failing to explain what had happened (Hopfmann 1997a; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; 
Müller 2001). Second, neoliberal thinking (market) and institutional economics 
(institutions) each emphasize only one single factor to explain transition processes. 
Given the complexity of the processes observed, however, such single-factor theorizing 
can no longer be upheld. In summary, the criticism is that the mainstream conception 
of transition is woefully under-theorized (Smith and Pickles 1998, 2ff; Müller 2001, 
10). 
 
Transformation as a non-linear, undirected process of structuration 
 
Building on advances in sociological and development theory, the new critics have thus 
targeted the normative, functionalist assumption behind the transition paradigm, i.e. 
the simplistic idea that transition can be ‘made’ and ‘directed’, and that institutions can 
be ‘built’. They argue that development in general and post-socialist transition in 
particular encompasses more than simply designing and implementing proper rules and 
‘robust’ institutions. Instead, it is a complex reciprocity between old and new 
institutions and the actors whom they are made for, i.e. a recursive relationship 
between structure and agency. The result of this relationship is a constant re-working 
of development rooted in the socialist past into something new10: 
 
„Thus, it is important to view the transformation as a combination of path-dependent 
evolutionary social and economic change with active path-shaping change based upon key 
active decisions of social institutions and decisive actors.“ (Pavlinek 2003, 95) 
 
Thus reconnected with Giddens’ theory of structuration, processes of transformation 
definitely become dissociated from linear, deterministic conceptions, without arguing 
for indeterminancy. Instead, they appear as evolutionary, multi-directional and open-
ended processes, in which actors – intentionally or not – recombine the old and the 
new and improvise on practised routines to adjust and respond to all the challenges 
transition confronts them with (Stark 1996, 995; Stark and Bruszt 2001, 1132f). 
Ultimately, transformation also encompasses developments that move away from the 
neoliberal ideals of a free market and democracy – something the modernization 
terminology would call ‘failures of transition’ (Herbers 2006b, 9f). 
 
                                                
9 Stark (1992, 18) calls it “cookbook capitalism”. 
10 A process that many authors prefer to call transformation rather than transition; see below. 
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‘Charting diversity’ 
 
The sociological critique thus represents a shift of focus, away from finding the right 
tools to get an already predicted process back on track and towards finding the right 
vocabulary to describe – and the proper instruments to analyze – a variety of processes 
commonly referred to collectively as ‘transformation’. Outlining a ‘political economy 
of transition’, Smith and Pickles (1998, 5) articulate 
 
“a need (…) for an alternative set of conceptual frameworks on transition to challenge the 
neo-liberal hegemony and account for the variety of strategies, techniques and effects that 
constitute transition-in-process (…). We do not want to articulate a single, hegemonic 
perspective (…) [because] the variety of actually existing transitions does not allow this.” 
 
Consequently, critical transition research has refrained from crafting a ‘theory of 
transition’ but has increasingly gone for the analysis of qualitative single-case studies 
and for the development of “middle-range concepts capable of (…) charting diversity” 
(Stark and Bruszt 2001, 1130). Herbers (2006b, 8) shows the different motivations for 
that shift. While some believe that it was but a matter of time until there was sufficient 
empirical and theoretical knowledge available to write a new grand theory of 
transition, others argue that the complexity and geographical specifics of 
transformation would on principle make it impossible to do so: “(…) transformation 
of a given societal entity cannot be analyzed without paying attention to what is 
empirically observable in the supposed transformation of that specific entity” (Beyer 
2006, 46; emphasis in the original; see also Pavlinek 2003, 88; Müller 2001, 11). 
 
‘Transition’ versus ‘transformation’ 
 
The first question to arise from this shift of focus then is what ‘transition’ or 
‘transformation’ is. Müller (2001, 10) suggests that it would be best to define 
‘transformation’ as the sum of the transition countries’ diverse reactions to a common 
problem constellation. Similarly, Burawoy and Verdery (1999, 16) conceive the 
‘process of transition’ as the continual, nonlinear and uneven interaction between 
policy and reaction. Finke (2004, 2) uses ‘transformation’ as a description of systemic 
change, i.e. the passage between two systems, while he rejects ‘transition’ as too 
normative and teleological and therefore inadequate for the purposes of analysis. In a 
comparable attempt to grasp the complexity and multi-dimensionality of post-socialist 
change, Altvater (1998, 594f) argues that there was not “a simple transition from 
‘there’ to ‘here’ (…) but a complex and articulated transformation of social, political 
and economic forms, not to mention changes of individual habits, social culture and 
the social relation to nature” [original italics]. In a similar manner, Stark (1992, 22) 
stresses the fundamental difference between transition, which emphasizes destination, 
and transformation, which emphasizes actual processes. 
 
So while some authors actively dissociate themselves from the neoliberal discourse by 
using ‘transformation’ instead of ‘transition’, others continue with a critically reflected 
notion of ‘transition’ (cf. Burawoy and Verdery 1999, 14ff). Herbers (2006b, 5) shows 
that most authors use ‘transformation’ as a general but often vaguely defined guiding 
theme for their analyses. The common denominator of all these elaborations seems the 
idea to relieve ‘transition’ and/or ‘transformation’ from its normative character and to 
use it instead for circumscribing the common subject of investigation, i.e. processes of 
change in post-socialist systems. Most critical approaches have adopted an 
evolutionary, path-dependent understanding of transformation processes and agree 
that they may yield multiple outcomes (Pavlinek 2003, 88f). 
 
Since one of this study’s key concerns is to analyze the effects of transition policy upon 
local actors, institutions and processes and vice versa, it seems useful to distinguish 
between ‘transition’ in the sense of overall (normative) transition policy and 
‘transformation’ in the sense of related processes of livelihoods transformation and 
institutional change in a given spatial context – in other words, the reworking of 
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transition policy through local-level processes of transformation, adaptation and 
reconfiguration (Stark 1992). 
 
A critical examination of transition and transformation also raises the inevitable 
question of what, then, postsocialism is, and whether the notion still means something. 
If transformation is considered a continuum, where then should the shift from pre to 
post be placed? Nevertheless, as Caroline Humphrey argues (in: Hann et al. 2002, 
26ff), there are good reasons to retain the term for the time being. After all, socialism 
remains an important point of reference for many, although younger people 
increasingly reject the notion as a reference to something outside their own personal 
experience (see also Pickles 2010). 
 
Towards a ‘critical political economy of transition’ 
 
The second question raised by the sociological critique is how all these diverse 
processes of transformation can be adequately conceptualized, i.e. how the 
abovementioned ‘set of conceptual frameworks on transition’ or ‘middle-range 
concepts’ might look. Smith and Pickles (1998, 6) propose to “rebuild a critical 
political economy of transition” around arguments about path-dependency, the 
changing role of the state and society, institutional change, and the role of social 
networks in reforms. Such a multifaceted and multidisciplinary analytical approach 
would make it possible to analyze various actors, institutions and processes at different 
levels of the transformation process, without being bent on drafting a new ‘grand 
theory of transition’. 
 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, an increasing number of researchers from various 
disciplines have begun to look critically into processes of post-socialist transformation 
at different levels. Findings from (institutional) economy, political sciences, geography, 
sociology, ethnography and others have thus contributed to what may be collectively 
described as a rich, yet very heterogeneous ‘critical political economy of transition’. 
The next section discusses some of its most important cross-cutting themes that seem 
relevant to decipher processes of transformation in rural Kyrgyzstan. 
 
 
2.2.2 Key concepts: path-dependency, hybridity, bricolage and 
uncertainty 
 
The sociological critique has taken up the notions of path-dependency and multiple 
ways of transition (or transition trajectories) from institutional economics and has 
gradually transferred their application from macro- to micro-level analyses. The two 
notions are closely related and build on three arguments. 
 
Differing initial conditions, important legacy, path-dependent development 
 
First, intial conditions differ. The tendency of neoliberal reformers to assume more or 
less similar ‘starting conditions’ (and, consequently, a comparable destiny) for all 
transition countries appears inappropriate, given the fact that all these countries (and 
regions) have had their own economic, social and political history. Although 
commonly subsumed into the notion of the Eastern Bloc (or Communist Bloc), 
national and regional disparities at the onset of reforms were large, both in regard to 
the development during the socialist era as well as in terms of their cultural and 
institutional legacies from pre-colonial and pre-socialist times (Herbers 2006b, 4). 
Pavlinek (2003, 89) calls this assumed homogeneity of all former socialist states a 
“pessimistic functionalism” that would provide a wrong impression of the region. 
 
Second, legacy matters. Understanding development as a path-dependent process 
involves acknowledging that the economic, political and social conditions that exist at 
a particular time have a considerable influence upon everything that comes afterwards. 
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With regard to post-socialist transition, this means acknowledging the potential of the 
socialist legacy to structure post-socialist development. Such a perspective suggests that 
the collapse of the socialist system in 1991 should be perceived as a gradual process 
(although with a highly increased frequency of processes of re-working networks, 
power and institutions) rather than a shock that creates an ‘institutional vacuum’ 
(reflected in the World Bank’s tabula rasa conception). Consequently, an appropriate 
analysis of post-socialist development depends on a proper understanding of the 
socialist legacy. Katherine Verdery’s (1991) early call for such an approach has 
unfortunately received little attention. In a convincing attempt to theorize the dynamics 
of ‘real socialism’, she has called for a theoretical understanding of “the social order 
that went before (…) [because] in purporting to characterize what eastern European 
societies are ‘transiting’ from, it illuminates certain areas as critical for research in the 
coming decade (…) [and] we can expect to learn more about socialism during the 
transition than we have to date.” (419f; original italics)11. 
 
Third, development is path-dependent. Path-dependency must not be confused with 
past-dependency in the sense that the socialist legacy simply persists to influence (or 
hinder) the development of new structures, such as a free market economy and 
democracy. Instead, it describes the constant, active re-working of inherited and new 
structures by decisive actors (compare with the quote from Pavlinek above). The 
notion of path-dependency thus again takes up the idea of transformation as a process 
of structuration (compare 2.2.1). People’s agency is not only influenced by a particular, 
existing institutional context (e.g. a particular set of transition policies), but the 
intended and unintended outcomes of what they do alters this context as well. Giddens 
(1997, 569f) calls this the “active making and re-making of social structure in the 
course of everyday activities”. From this perspective, transition branches out into a 
multitude of different pathways of transition or transition trajectories. Since human 
agency always yields unintended outcomes, anticipating all these trajectories is 
impossible. As I will show later on (2.3), the notion of trajectories thus also serves as a 
useful concept to grasp processes of transformation at the micro level. 
 
Simultaneity of development 
 
Simultaneity is another factor shaping transition trajectories. It is of particular 
relevance for post-socialist development processes, and is often brought forward to 
distinguish them from development processes in general (cf. Stark and Bruszt 2001, 
1131; Herbers 2006b, 5ff). Offe (1994, 57ff) has shown how the collapse of the 
socialist order triggered parallel processes of change in the political, economic and 
social sphere. This simultaneity made decisions affecting the development of one or the 
other sphere extremely difficult. Being confronted with several fundamental challenges 
at the same time – building democracy, privatizing state property, facilitating free 
markets –, actors have no other choice than to address them all at once, and this often 
results in mutually obstructive effects. Consequently, policy measures, legal reforms, 
development interventions and all other kinds of responses to the socialist collapse 
begin to overlap and interfere with each other, because they hardly ever follow the 
same pace. These parallel processes are often asynchronous and hardly ever harmonize 
with each other (Stark 1992, 18f; Hopfmann 1997b, 24). Simultaneity thus affects 
different actors and institutions at all levels. As a result, post-socialist transformation 
and the resulting transition trajectories are characterized by a twofold simultaneity: on 
the one hand, there is the simultaneous existence of the old and the new, the persistent 
and the transferred, and this is all contained in the term path-dependency. On the other 
hand, there is a need for actors at various levels to address the particular challenges of 
postsocialism all at once. 
 
                                                
11 Other authors took up Verdery’s argument a few years later (cf. Altvater 1998, 593f; Carothers 2002, 
16). 
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Hybridity, gray zone, bricolage 
 
As a result of this twofold simultaneity, the (intermediate) outcomes of transformation 
processes are not only numerous and very different from each other (‘multiple 
outcomes’), but often also of a hybrid character. In other words, processes of 
transformation do not lead to completely free market economies or purely democratic 
systems (whatever those might be), but nor does the old socialist system persist 
unchanged and unchallenged. On the one hand, this applies to the policy level: Lindner 
and Moser (2009) for instance describe the privatization process in post-socialist rural 
Russia as a ‘hybrid privatization’ that constantly hovers between different degrees of 
economic freedom and state intervention. On the other hand, hybridity also exists at 
the micro-level: depending on the situation, individuals and groups may stick or revert 
to routine behavior patterns or handed-down social networks to reach their objectives, 
or they may repeatedly refer to different sets of institutions (Hopfmann 1997b, 24f; 
Burawoy and Verdery 1999, 8). The sociological transition critique has put forward 
different notions to capture this diversity, such as bricolage (Cleaver 2001), 
recombinant property (Stark 1992, 1996; Stark and Bruszt 2001), gray zone 
(Carothers 2002, in regard to transitional political regimes), or hybridity (Hopfmann 
1997a; 1997b; Koehler and Zürcher 2004)12. In the end, all these notions come rather 
close to what legal pluralists circumscribe under the term forum shopping (compare 
2.3.3). 
 
Uncertainty 
 
Last but not least, the transition critique has repeatedly related processes of post-
socialist transformation to the rise of uncertainty and has identified two main causes. 
First, the collapse of key institutions of the socialist system – state-sponsored 
healthcare, education, social security and guaranteed employment – has led to the loss 
of former safeguards and routines and thus to a severe destabilization of post-socialist 
societies. In many cases, rapid decentralization policies have also fostered legal and 
political uncertainty, especially at the local level, where human and financial resources 
to adopt the new rights and responsibilities are often absent (Hopfmann 1997b; Finke 
2004; Herbers 2006b). Second, the rapid privatization of former state property in the 
early 1990s has fundamentally redefined property rights over natural (e.g. land, water), 
financial (e.g. revenues) and physical resources (e.g. infrastructure). Because “property 
relations exist not between persons and things but between persons in respect of 
things” (Hann 2006, 19), this has fundamentally altered the social relations between 
people. In the absence of sufficient political and legal security, this alteration has often 
given rise to new conflicts over resources between competing individuals and user 
groups (Mehta et al. 1999, 2001; Kandiyoti 2002; Sikor 2002; Bichsel et al. 2010). 
With reference to Giddens, Herbers (2006b) can thus describe transformation as a 
‘critical situation’, which is characterized by the dissolution of people’s routine 
behavior and livelihood strategies and thus by a general uncertainty about how others 
behave and what they do. All in all, post-socialist transformation has made the 
interactions between institutions, policies and actors at different levels less predictable, 
increasing transaction costs and uncertainty for all those involved (compare 2.4.2). 
 
* * * 
 
In essence, the sociological transition critique shows that an analysis of the multiple 
processes of transformation, including their socialist legacy as well as former and 
current practices and institutions, has a far greater potential to reveal what post-
socialist transformation may be and where its manifold trajectories may lead to, than 
an analysis based on a linear, normative concept of transition. However, such a critical 
analysis requires a proper analytical framework that makes it possible to grasp actors, 
practices and institutions (including property relations) in transformation. 
                                                
12 For an excellent metaphor describing post-socialist path-dependency and hybridity, see Stark and Bruszt 
(2001, 1129). 
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2.3 Organizations, institutions, and practices in 
 transformation 
 
 
“I am in no way arguing that formal organization is irrelevant to what is 
happening – only that formal organization is not what is happening.” 
 
(Barth 1993, 157) 
 
 
In line with the sociological transition critique, I argue that the key to gaining a better 
understanding of post-socialist transformation lies in the analysis of the recursive 
relationship between agency and structure, i.e. between people’s behavior and practices 
on the one hand, and a constantly changing organizational and institutional context on 
the other hand. I therefore predicate my analysis on the assumption that institutional 
change is not simply initiated by politicians and their advisors, who draft new 
transition policies, issue new laws and adjust certain regulations. Instead, institutions 
and institutional change are equally produced and reproduced at the local, the 
household and the individual level. Individuals and groups of actors constantly 
refashion existing rules and structures, give them new meaning and incorporate them 
into their daily lives in many different ways. 
 
The advances of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Common Property Resources 
theory (CPR) have informed the first effective critique of the neoliberal transition 
paradigm (compare 2.1.2). Therefore, their basic conceptions are key for a better 
understanding of institutions and organizations (2.3.1). Subsequently, the sociological 
critique of these conceptions has put forward a broader, less functionalist view of 
institutions (2.3.2). I have built my conceptual framework for the analysis of 
institutions and institutional change on this ‘embedded’ understanding of institutions. 
To do so, I refer to the advances in property rights and legal pluralism theory (2.3.3) as 
well as to a broader concept of institutions and organizations as brought forward by 
Appendini and Nuijten (2002; 2.3.4). 
 
 
2.3.1 Institutions in the New Institutional Economics and in 
Common Property Resources theory 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Common Property Resources (CPR) theory 
have made a significant contribution to a better understanding of the importance and 
the role of institutions in economies, and have elaborated the first widespread critique 
of the transition paradigm (compare 2.1.2). By showing that local people can 
successfully manage natural resources through a set of rules and regulations 
(institutions), CPR theory additionally presented a strong case against Hardin’s 
‘tragedy of the commons’ (cf. Hardin 1968; North 1991, 2002; Ruttan 1998; Ostrom 
1999a, 1999b, 2005; Mehta et al. 2001; Haller 2002; Anderies et al. 2003). 
 
Unlike neoclassical and neo-Marxist economic theory, new institutional economists 
argue that economic growth is  strongly determined by the existence of institutions 
rather than the availability of production factors alone (labor, money, resources). 
Thus, economic growth is also path-dependent in regard to institutional development 
rather than in regard to technological progress alone (Thomi 2001, 5). The first basic 
assumption of NIE is that market coordination is not free of cost, but yields certain 
transaction costs – costs that arise when two or more actors engage in an economic 
transaction. These costs (or, to put it in non-monetary terms, uncertainties) can be 
reduced through institutions that regulate the behavior of market actors, thus helping 
individuals to form expectations about the behavior of others. In what has become a 
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classic definition, North (2002, 3) therefore describes institutions as “the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, (…) the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction.” NIE thus follows a regulative, normative understanding of 
institutions (Nuijten 1999, no pagination; Haller 2002, 10; Strasser Schoch 2007, 36). 
 
NIE generally distinguishes between formal and informal institutions. Formal 
institutions include rules, laws and constitutions. They are usually developed by the 
state, local communities or other formal entities. Informal institutions include cultural 
norms, conventions, traditions, and codes of conduct. They form the basis in which 
formal institutions are embedded (Haller 2002, 10). A further distinction is made 
between institutions and organizations. Both of them structure human interaction, but 
institutions are made up of (invisible) rules and norms, while organizations are visible 
and measurable structures, consisting of specific individuals which are bound by a 
common purpose and represent certain institutions (Mummert 2001; Thomi 2001; 
North 2002; Koku and Gustafsson 2003). Uphoff (1993) emphasizes this distinction 
between norms and structure, but also shows that the two can overlap (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 Institutions and organizations as overlapping sets (Uphoff 1993, 626) 
 
Institutions that are not 
organizations 
Institutions that are organizations, and 
vice versa 
Organizations that are not 
institutions 
   
Money 
The law 
Marriage 
Land tenure 
Higher education 
Technical assistance 
The Central Bank 
The Supreme Court 
‘The family’ 
The land registrar’s office 
Oxford University 
The World Bank 
A local bank 
A new law partnership 
A particular family 
A surveying company 
A tutoring service 
A consulting firm 
 
 
The second basic assumption of NIE is that individuals are rational and self-interested 
actors who always seek the best possible outcome. They are constrained, however, by a 
limited access to knowledge and information. Institutional change is then understood 
as an aggregation of decisions taken by bounded rational actors. Consequently, NIE, in 
its analysis of institutions and institutional change, focuses on the individual level 
(Mummert 2001, 302; Haller 2002, 10). 
 
Common Property Resources (CPR) theory has built on these assumptions to present a 
collective action approach. It says that several users can take best advantage of a 
resource if they agree on common rules (institutions) for the use of that resource. 
Collective action is thus seen as a rational choice beneficial for all group members. 
Authors including Wade (1998, cit. in Agrawal 2001) and Ostrom (Ostrom 1999a, 
2005; Anderies et al. 2003) have arrived at sets of ‘facilitating conditions’ or ‘design 
principles’ for building robust CPR institutions. In both cases, homogenous group 
interests are considered a crucial criterion (Ruttan 1998; Agrawal 2001; Mehta et al. 
2001; Haller 2002). 
 
 
2.3.2 Towards a more contextualized understanding of institutions 
 
In recent years, NIE and CPR theory have been increasingly challenged and developed 
by authors who have looked into the dynamics of property regimes over natural 
resources (cf. Leach et al. 1999; Agrawal 2001; Mehta et al. 1999, 2001; Cleaver 
2000, 2001; Nuijten 1999, 2005; Appendini and Nuijten 2002; Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan 2002; Upton 2005). 
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Institutions are embedded in the everyday context 
 
A main point of criticism aims at the primacy ascribed to economic rationality at the 
expense of a broader, less functionalist view of institutions. As Rauch (2001, 13f) 
critically remarks, NIE comprehends institutional change as widely independent from 
social change, expecting that a set of institutions designed along certain principles can 
successfully be implemented anywhere and irrespective of the concrete social and 
political context. According to Cleaver (2000, 364f), such design principles imply a 
disputable evolutionist notion in the sense that existing, informal structures should be 
crafted into more robust (read ‘better’) institutions, reducing the former to a mere basis 
on which the latter are to be built. In a similar way, Mehta et al. (1999, 5) criticize NIE 
for being too static and insensitive towards “(…) the everyday context within which 
institutions are located and how rooted they are in local history and society”. 
According to Upton (2005, 584), institutions are instead “an integral, unconscious part 
of daily life” – not at all clear-cut sets of rules for which ‘design principles’ can be 
formulated.  
 
The main problem with taking an ahistorical and apolitical view of institutions is that 
it tends to downplay issues of difference and power among various actors and – as in 
the case of CPR theory – often relates institutions to collective goals. The assumption 
that institutions are formed and agreed upon by homogenous communities does not 
really explain why people often prefer loose and flexible (some say informal) networks 
and practices to formalized structures and procedures (such as newly established 
resource user associations). Instead, empirical evidence suggests that individuals or 
groups are “embedded in multiple institutional settings at the same time” (Nuijten 
1999, 1), combining more and less formalized institutions depending on the situation 
and according to their personal needs. In short, people tend to organize things at local 
level by mobilizing multiple networks, rather than by joining formal organizations 
(Nuijten 1999; Mehta et al. 2001; Appendini and Nuijten 2002). 
 
The ‘messy middle’ 
 
Consequently, many authors reject explicit distinctions between formal and informal 
institutions, between state, collective and private property, or between the local and the 
extra-local level. Instead, they emphasize the existence of a messy middle, where 
different institutions and organizations, practices and procedures overlap. This messy 
middle becomes especially important when the rights of marginalized groups are not 
formally endorsed, giving them a certain room for maneuver to secure their stakes by 
making use of other, less formal institutions and regulations. This is where the debate 
adds to the sociological transition critique and the notions of institutional bricolage 
(Cleaver 2001) and recombinant property (Stark 1996; compare 2.2.2). However, at 
the same time as bricolage may increase certainty for some, it can cause uncertainty for 
others, since a blurring of the rules makes it even more difficult to predict the behavior 
of others (Mehta et al. 1999, 36). 
 
Alternative approaches thus seek to look at institutions in a more contextualized, 
socially embedded way. Instead of understanding them as sets of formal or informal 
rules and norms, they conceive of institutions as “regularised patterns of behavior 
between individuals and groups in society” (Mearns 1995, cit. in Leach et al. 1999, 
226). Similarly, Cleaver (2000, 365f) articulates a “need to see institutions in terms of 
their constituent located practices (…) [since] institutions are partial, intermittent and 
indeed often invisible, being located in the daily interactions of ordinary lives”. Just 
like NIE, embedded approaches to institutions and institutional change thus start at the 
individual level, but reject the idea of rational behavior. Instead, they focus on the 
often-changing and highly complex social relations between, and practices of, 
individuals and groups, propagating a dynamic understanding of institutions that 
makes it possible to capture the often invisible and flexible rules and norms regulating 
the use of resources in societies (Upton 2005, 585). 
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2.3.3 Property relations as an entry point to analyze the links 
between institutions and social practice 
 
Recent advances in property rights and legal pluralism theory present a useful entry 
point to conceptualize the propagated relationship between institutions and social 
practice. Property is a central institution in all societies and in the most general sense 
concerns “the ways in which the relations between society’s members with respect to 
valuables are given meaning, form and significance” (Hann 2006, 22). Thus, property 
relations exist not only between people and objects but between people in respect to 
these objects: 
 
“Hence, property regimes are characterised by often ambiguous rules, by flexible 
membership of organisations, and by overlapping and contested boundaries, and they are 
sustained in such forms by ongoing social processes.” (Mehta et al. 2001, 36). 
 
In that sense, property does not just describe one specific type of right or relation such 
as private or collective ownership, but encompasses a wide variety of different 
arrangements at different levels, including more formal aspects such as written rules, 
less formal ones such as people’s beliefs and values, as well as concrete practices 
(Mehta et al. 2001, 35). On the one hand, property rights must therefore be seen as an 
‘umbrella concept’ “which includes several types of rights to different forms and uses 
of resources” (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001, 11). They are commonly grouped into 
the two categories of rights to use and rights to regulate and control (decision-making 
rights). While an individual actor may have only rights to use a particular resource, he 
or she may gain decision-making rights over the same resource by joining a larger 
group of actors. Therefore, property rights are better conceptualized as overlapping 
‘bundles’ of rights, rather than in a narrow sense as mere ownership (cf. Meinzen-Dick 
et al. 2004). 
 
On the other hand, property stems from many different sources, such as international 
and state law, religious law and practices, customary rules and their living 
interpretation, or certain project regulations. Usually, every source defines property 
over a certain resource in a different way, so that these multiple normative and 
cognitive orders influence each other and cannot be analytically separated. Property 
claims over resources can therefore have multiple and overlapping bases. Depending on 
the situation and their social, political and economic assets, actors can refer to various 
legal orders to legitimize their claims, decisions or behavior towards a larger 
community – a process known as forum shopping. In this process, formal state law is 
but one resource of several to draw upon, and may not even be useful to all actors at 
all times. This also explains why different people often have totally different views on 
what the formal structure is (Nuijten 2005, 5). Property rights are therefore best seen 
as negotiated outcomes between actors who refer to multiple normative and cognitive 
orders – outcomes, namely, which are often anything but the expected result of 
‘institutional design’. Instead, power relations between different actors play a decisive 
role, since the powerful can often draw on more different sources to legitimize their 
claim and thus establish stronger rights (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001, 2002; 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). 
 
Four layers of property 
 
Property must therefore be seen as something highly flexible and volatile. In order to 
grasp this legal plurality behind property relations and their socially embedded nature 
analytically, Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006, 14ff) have taken up the idea of a ‘bundle’ 
of rights to bring forward a model of property, which distinguishes four different 
‘layers of social organization’ (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 The four layers of social organization according to Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006, 14ff) 
 
Cultural-ideological layer Ideas and ideology behind property (e.g. neoliberal emphasis on private property) 
  
Layer of legal regulation Concrete normative and institutional regulations such as laws and regulations 
  
Concrete social relationships Social relationships between actors, power relations 
  
Property practices Social practices around the allocation and use of resources 
 
 
The model emphasizes that property is not just about questions of economic efficiency 
and legal regulations, but is always embedded in a specific social and political context 
with links to all four layers. Thus, property is multi-functional and always plural in 
nature. The first layer includes ideologies and culture, where the neoliberal emphasis 
on private property may collide with local concepts of common property. The second 
layer focuses on legal concepts, which are often directly related to ideologies and 
concepts, but are more specific in the sense that they define concrete rules and 
procedures. Here again, state-defined laws and customary rules may either coincide or 
collide. The third layer emphasizes the gap between de jure and de facto, i.e. that 
people’s actual property relations are often different from abstract norms defined by 
state, customary or religious law. Such relations are often multifunctional and reflect 
local power relations shaped by community and kin or by social, political or economic 
dependencies (e.g. patron-client relations). The fourth layer – property practices – feeds 
back into each of the preceding three layers. It is in concrete practices where laws, 
ideologies and social relationships become reflected, reproduced, and eventually 
transformed. According to Hann (2000, 8), this is also the layer at which conflicts 
between actors can be identified. Thus, the model by Benda-Beckmann et al. again 
emphasizes the central role of social practices in any analysis of institutional 
arrangements and change. 
 
Property regimes and post-socialist transition policy 
 
Property relations and legal pluralism thus offer a useful entry point to deal 
analytically with transition policy in the post-socialist space (cf. Verdery 1999; Hann 
2000, 2003, 2006; Alexander 2004). In Kyrgyzstan, just as in many other former 
socialist countries, the imposition of the neoliberal property paradigm in the 1990s has 
led to a fundamental legal redefinition of property rights. Ideologies have changed 
(from socialism to neo-liberalism), and laws and regulations become continuously 
adjusted (concrete transition politics; compare chapter 4). At the same time, the 
parallel decentralization of the state administration has weakened the role of the 
central state in favor of the regional and the local level. At a first glance, this has 
strengthened local and regional actors because they have been endowed with new 
resources and with more power to decide and control. 
However, a more nuanced view of property as introduced above suggests that this 
endowment with resources has been more than just a reallocation of material objects. 
Since “property relations exist not between persons and things but between persons in 
respect of things” (Hann 2006, 19), the reforms of the 1990s have also fundamentally 
altered the social relations between actors. A new ideology regarding property, a bunch 
of new formal laws on resource use and the distortion of local hierarchies have 
fundamentally altered the multiple normative and cognitive orders behind property, as 
well as ways of drawing on them. Consequently, individuals and groups have adjusted 
the ways they behave and act, and altered their social practices in relation to resources 
and other people. At the same time, however – as I will show in this thesis – many 
former regulations and concrete social relations from the socialist economy have 
persisted and continue to influence local property relations and institutional change up 
to the present. Thus, property in post-socialist Kyrgyzstan is not only shaped by legal 
definitions of private, state or common property, but also by factors such as new and 
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inherited local power structures, various forms of income generation, mutual economic 
dependencies, uncertainty, land scarcity and others. 
 
The four layers of Benda-Beckmann et al.  thus help to understand the embedded 
nature of property better and to examine empirically the recursive relationship between 
institutions and practice. However, focusing on property alone would unnecessarily 
limit the scope of my analysis. Even if conceptualized in a very broad sense, including  
“aspects of citizenship (…), such as the right to (…) subsistence, to the long-term 
continuation of one’s primary collective identity” (Hann 2000, 18), the concept risks 
precluding other forms of institutions and organization that may equally influence 
what people do. 
 
 
2.3.4 Towards a conceptual framework for the analysis of 
organizations, institutions, and processes of 
institutionalization 
 
In order to get a better grasp of the various forms of institution, organization and 
processes of institutional change, I therefore use an analytical concept that was 
developed by Monique Nuijten and Kirsten Appendini (Table 2.4; Nuijten 1999; 
Appendini and Nuijten 2002). 
 
Organizations, institutions and the local institutional context 
 
The concept upholds the distinction between institutions and organizations advanced 
by New Institutional Economics and Common Property Resource theory. With 
reference to Scott (1995), organizations are defined as “entities set up around defined 
processes that result in the attainment of particular goals” (Appendini and Nuijten 
2002, 73). Organizations are based and depend upon a certain institutional setting. 
However, the authors reject the artificial divide between formal and informal, local 
and extra-local, or state, collective and private institutions. Therefore, and in line with 
legal pluralism, they define institutions as highly flexible, negotiated orders that consist 
of “cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability, 
coherence and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various 
carriers – cultures, structures, and routine” (ibid., 73). The local institutional context is 
then defined as the specific manifestation of all institutions and organizations relevant 
within a given geographical area (e.g. a region or a village), whether or not they are 
‘physically present’ at the local level. 
 
Organizing practices and processes of institutionalization 
 
Just like Benda-Beckmanns’ property practices, Appendini and Nuijten pay particular 
attention to the social practices shaping institutions and institutional change. For this, 
they adopt the notion of organizing practices. It builds on the assumption that certain 
forms of structuring or patterning can be found in the manner in which people try to 
achieve certain objectives. These forms hardly ever result from a common 
understanding or a normative agreement on certain rules, but are fragmentary and 
closely related to forms of social inclusion and exclusion, and thus also to power 
relations. Organizing practices can therefore be found in personal networks, group 
formations, individual relationships or ad-hoc constellations – relationships in which 
formal organizations and institutions often play only an indirect and partial role. Yet 
although situation-specific, organizing practices may follow certain regular patterns 
and may develop into regularized (but not necessarily formalized) practices or 
institutions over time. It is through such processes of institutionalization that 
organizing practices can give rise to the emergence of institutions, and thus to 
institutional change (ibid., 73). The concept thus offers a useful analytical tool to 
examine the micro-level processes behind processes of institutional change and post-
socialist transformation. 
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Table 2.4 Core concepts (based on: Nuijten 1999; Appendini and Nuijten 2002, 73) 
 
 Definition Examples 
   
 
Organizing practices 
 
Different actions and strategies that people follow to 
sustain and develop their daily livelihoods and other 
life projects 
 
 
Personal networks, group formations, 
individual relations and alliances, ad-
hoc constellations 
 
   
 
Institutions 
 
Cognitive, regulative and normative structures and 
activities that provide stability, coherence and meaning 
to social behavior 
 
 
Household, family, clan, gender 
relations, community, property rights 
(e.g. land ownership, water use 
rights), rules, laws, constitutions 
 
   
 
Organizations 
 
Entities set up around defined processes that result in 
the attainment of particular goals 
 
 
Credit groups, farming cooperatives, 
regional bank branches, local 
government, NGOs, user and 
producer associations, self-help 
groups, private companies 
 
   
 
Local institutional 
context 
 
Constituted by the specific manifestations of 
institutions and organizations in a given geographical 
area, even though these institutions might extend 
beyond the physical boundaries of that area 
 
 
Concrete entity of institutions and 
organizations within the boundaries 
of a village, community or town 
 
 
Two reasons led me to adopt an anthropological approach towards institutions for my 
analysis of processes of post-socialist transformation and institutional change in rural 
Kyrgyzstan. First, it starts from the idea of agency or social practice instead of 
structure and thus offers a better way of understanding the driving forces behind recent 
developments at the micro level. Second, the anthropological approach accepts the 
messy middle between the formal and the informal and is thus open to notions such as 
hybridity, institutional bricolage, recombinant property, or forum shopping. The 
approach thus makes it possible to examine how actors in the post-socialist context 
improvise on practised routines to rebuild organizations and institutions with – and 
not ‘on’ – the remnants of the socialist past, and how in an uncertain environment, 
actors try to keep hold of their resources by maneuvering across various legitimating 
principles and standards of measure (Stark 1996, 993ff). 
 
Such an explicit focus on the analysis of actors and their social practices inevitably 
raises the question of who these actors actually are and how their diverse practices in a 
highly dynamic context can be analyzed and described. I therefore develop an 
analytical approach to the study of actors in transformation in the next section.  
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2.4 Actors in transformation 
 
 
”(…) we chose to follow the actors, observing what they 
did in the face of extraordinary uncertainties and 
documenting the patterns of conflict and alliance 
that reshaped institutions.” 
 
(Stark and Bruszt 2001, 1132) 
 
 
So far, I have argued that research of institutional change and processes of post-
socialist transformation requires a shift of focus towards local actors and micro-level 
processes. If institutions are understood as the negotiated outcome between actors who 
refer to multiple normative and cognitive orders, then empirical research needs to focus 
on the concrete engagement of various actors in local-level processes. The capabilities 
and resources of individuals and groups, their inherited and newly adopted attitudes, 
experiences, habits and behavioral patterns all result in sometimes creative, sometimes 
resistive local contributions to the various ‘paths’ of post-socialist transformation. 
Smith and Pickles (1998, 11) point out that the diversity of responses to transition 
policies builds on differing local capacities, conditions and histories. In addition, many 
authors argue that the high degree of hybridity, uncertainty and disorientation that 
characterize post-socialist transformation processes calls for a detailed analysis of local 
actors’ ways of coping with that uncertainty and their flexible day-to-day responses 
(Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Stark and Bruszt 2001; Hann 2002; Humphrey and 
Verdery 2004; Hörschelmann 2002; Pavlinek 2003; Herbers 2006b). 
 
Adopting these arguments, I deploy a conceptual framework in this thesis that takes 
account of the diversity of local actors’ responses to transition, their ways of coping 
with uncertainty, and their active role in shaping development processes. As a first 
step, I therefore refer to recent advances in the study of rural livelihoods that help to 
grasp actors, their capabilities and objectives better (2.4.1). In a second section, I 
examine how the different forms of uncertainty so characteristic of post-socialist 
transformation affect people’s livelihoods (2.4.2). This finally leads me to the concept 
of livelihood trajectories, which enables one to analyze livelihood dynamics over time 
(2.4.3). 
 
 
2.4.1 Local actors and response in a livelihoods perspective 
 
Any attempt to understand actors and their practices at local level involves adopting a 
people-centred research perspective. In development research, this perspective has 
mainly been developed by the livelihoods approach. It entered the development 
discourse in the late 1980s as a response to conventional analytical approaches to 
development and to the dominance of an economic and technical focus in development 
cooperation. 
 
Today’s diverse livelihoods literature13 builds to a large extent on the groundbreaking 
work of Chambers and Conway (1992), who linked discussions about sustainable 
development triggered by the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report to Amartya Sen’s 
notion of capability with an explicit focus on people. Instead of natural and physical 
(technical) resources, the livelihoods approach puts people at the centre of 
development. It attempts to comprehend the complexity and diversity of how people 
                                                
13 Over the last few years, NCCR N-S has done extensive livelihoods research in various thematic and 
geographical contexts, among others: Liechti 2002; Steimann 2005; Kaspar 2005; Rohner 2006; Thieme 
2006; Lindberg 2007; Nair et al. 2007; Shigavea 2007; Schoch 2008; Näscher 2009; Shahbaz 2008, 
2009; Strasser Schoch 2009. For a critical review, see also Geiser et al. (forthcoming). 
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make a living by analyzing their access to and their strategies of using and combining 
various resources. 
 
“A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and 
activities required for a means of living.” (Chambers and Conway 1992, 7) 
 
The perspective thus acknowledges that livelihoods are multidimensional and complex, 
composed of economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological aspects, and closely 
linked to institutional and organizational regulations (de Haan and Zoomers 2003, 
350). Three aspects make the perspective particularly innovative for development 
research. 
 
Capabilities, assets and response 
 
First, livelihoods thinking is people-centered: it builds on the notion of ‘capability’ as 
defined by Sen (Sen 1985; Dreze and Sen 1989; in: Bagchi et al. 1998), which is 
concerned with the (in)ability of individuals to act and to pursue certain goals. People 
are not seen as victims, but instead as capable and dynamic actors who can draw on a 
set of resources to define their own objectives and respond to changing circumstances, 
such as shocks or trends (see below). In line with the livelihoods guidance sheets (DFID 
2001), many livelihood studies commonly categorize these resources (also referred to 
as assets or capital) into five different types, i.e. human capital (skills, knowledge, 
labor, health and education) social capital (networks and connectedness, membership 
of groups, and relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchange) natural capital (private 
and common property resources such as land, water or forest), physical capital (private 
and common basic infrastructure and producer goods, such as  transport, shelter, 
energy, and information), and financial capital (available stocks such as cash savings or 
livestock, (ir)regular inflow of money such as earned income, pensions, remittances, 
loans and credits). 
 
While this categorization of assets has triggered extensive debates and has been 
repeatedly modified or extended by adding other asset types (cf. Korf 2004a; Scoones 
2009; Geiser et al. forthcoming), the real advance of focusing on assets seems to be 
that people’s assets are taken into consideration at all. Even if at first glance what poor 
people have may appear marginal, the livelihoods perspective starts with the 
assumption that individuals or groups of actors (e.g. households) are able to combine 
different assets with each other, pool them with those of other actors, convert certain 
assets into other ones, and finally use them for particular activities to secure their 
livelihoods. Such coping responses or strategies14 can be aimed at changing or 
preserving given circumstances, and may take the form of immediate, short-term action 
or continuous, long-term activity. Thus, livelihood research stands for ‘optimistic’ 
studies dealing with people’s capability to actively shape development, initiate change 
and achieve certain objectives and outcomes (de Haan and Zoomers 2005, 29). 
 
Externalities and the institutional context 
 
Nevertheless, the livelihoods perspective acknowledges that people cannot access and 
use their assets and develop and pursue their strategies independently. Instead, they do 
so in a wider context of externalities. On the one hand, actors must deal with 
externalities that lie far beyond their control in the short and medium term. These 
include shocks (short-term, often unanticipated events with an immediate effect such as 
natural disasters, economic collapse, livestock or human diseases or political conflicts), 
trends (long-term developments such as population growth, resource decline, changes 
in governance or technological innovations) or seasonalities (mid-term changes, such as 
                                                
14 Mainstream livelihoods literature (cf. DFID 2001) usually emphasizes the notion of livelihood strategy, 
which implies strategic, target-oriented conduct. I argue, however, that much human conduct is non-
strategic in the sense that actors are not able to actively specify the objectives of what they do. In order 
to capture such non-strategic conduct, I therefore prefer to distinguish between livelihood strategies and 
coping responses. 
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price or output fluctuations). This range of natural, social and political externalities 
constitutes particular challenges and uncertainties to which people must adapt and 
respond. Depending on the availability of and access to different resources and their 
ability to make use of them in a meaningful way, actors are more or less able to cope 
with such externalities (DFID 2001; Ashley et al. 2003; Korf 2004; Chambers 2006; 
Shahbaz 2008; Geiser et al. forthcoming). 
On the other hand, actors deploy their coping responses within a wider institutional 
context (compare 2.3.4) which affects not only people’s capacity to access, combine 
and use certain resources, but also their ways of interacting with other actors, as well 
as the terms of exchange between different types of resources. Unlike the 
abovementioned externalities, which lie outside the control of actors, and with 
reference to the socially embedded nature of institutional arrangements, individual and 
group actors can however actively contribute to the shaping of institutions. What 
people do to pursue their livelihoods, i.e. their various responses to cope with external 
changes in the short and the long run, can thus be seen as ‘organizing practices’ in 
Appendini and Nuijten’s sense of the term (2002, 73): “Different actions and strategies 
that people follow to sustain and develop their daily livelihoods and other life 
projects.”  
 
Beyond economic primacy 
 
Last but not least, livelihood thinking argues that resources not only have an economic 
value, but also an inherent, subjective meaning that evolves from social interaction 
between actors. Consequently, social practices and categories like identity and status 
gain central importance for livelihoods and are as crucial as the economic value of 
resources. Or, as Bebbington (1999, 2022) puts it: “People’s assets are not merely 
means through which they make a living; they also give meaning to the person’s 
world.” (original italics). Inheritance of land, for instance, is thus not only seen as a 
transfer of an economic resource between two generations, but also as a social practice 
within a household or family. This also means that the resources people draw upon are 
by no means related to agrarian production alone – an insight which considerably 
contributed to the disentanglement of the conventional merge of the concepts ‘rural’ 
and ‘agricultural’ (Bebbington 1999). 
Eventually, the increased attention to individuals and their values and practices has 
also fostered the application of qualitative methods and ethnographic approaches in 
development research. Consequently, livelihoods research often starts at the household 
level, conceptualizing household as a social and economic entity in which individuals 
pool and share their resources and skills15 (Chambers and Conway 1992; Bagchi et al. 
1998; Ellis 1998; Bebbington 1999; DFID 2001; de Haan and Zoomers 2003; 2005; 
Korf 2004; Thieme 2006; 2008a; Nair et al. 2007). 
 
 
2.4.2 Livelihoods and uncertainty 
 
Recent anthropological and sociological research has begun to relate processes of rapid 
change to the rise of uncertainty. In the case of post-socialist transformation, the 
sociological transition critique has ascribed uncertainty mainly to the collapse of the 
former economic and political order, as well as to the fundamental redefinition of 
property rights after 1991  (compare 2.2.2). Consequently, uncertainty has also 
increasingly been seen as a driving force of transformation processes, both aggravating 
but also fostering certain processes of change. Or, as Scoones (1995, 6) puts it: 
 
“There are two basic alternatives for planning in an uncertain world. The first aims to 
reduce uncertainties (…) by the collection of more and more data on more and more 
variables. (…) The alternative is to accept that uncertainty and indeterminacy are 
fundamental and central.” 
                                                
15 For a critical discussion of the households as an analytical entity, see 3.2. 
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The livelihoods perspective accounts for uncertainty in the sense that it considers 
people’s conduct as a response to certain externalities which are beyond the actors’ 
influence. From that perspective, the Soviet collapse can be seen as a shock, and the 
subsequent neoliberal reform policy as a trend, which both have deeply affected 
people’s livelihoods. 
 
Four types of uncertainties 
 
Various authors concerned with livelihoods research have further developed the 
linkages between human conduct and uncertainty, and have contrasted the latter with 
the notion of risk (cf. Mehta et al. 1999, 2001; Little et al. 2001). They argue that 
actors can deal with risk by calculating alternative outcomes or probabilities and can 
avoid or at least minimize it if economic and social costs allow. By contrast, 
uncertainty describes a situation characterized by indeterminacies, making it impossible 
to calculate probabilities. However, since uncertainty can affect all spheres of human 
conduct, the concept requires further analytical distinction. Mehta et al. (1999, 2001) 
differentiate between ecological, livelihood, knowledge, and social and political 
uncertainties (Table 2.5) 
 
Table 2.5 Four types of uncertainties (based on Mehta et al. 2001) 
 
Ecological uncertainties Environments are not necessarily stable and balanced. 
  
Livelihood uncertainties Economic systems are in a constant state of flux. 
  
Knowledge uncertainties Knowledge is always partial, situated and contested. 
  
Social & political uncertainties Sociopolitical configurations often change. 
 
 
Ecological uncertainties relate to the unpredictable and variable nature of ecosystems 
with which people interact. Since the effects among variables within an ecosystem are 
often complex and intermittent, non-equilibrial dynamics are often the norm. This is 
particularly true for dryland ecosystems, where resource management is often highly 
complex, since it is not a matter of adhering to a single factor, but of seizing 
opportunities and flexible response. For instance, pastoral production systems are often 
interpreted as a direct coping response to environmental uncertainty, because their 
intrinsic mobility allows people to respond flexibly to droughts and general resource 
scarcity in dryland ecosystems (cf. Scoones 1995; Scholz 1997; Hesse and MacGregor 
2006). 
 
Livelihood uncertainties mainly refer to the generally unstable and unpredictable 
conditions in the economic sphere. Capital flows or exchange rate fluctuations often 
influence what people produce, and access to labor and commodity markets is often 
anything but secure. In the absence of reliable rules and regularities, the behavior of 
other actors is difficult to predict, as are the outcomes of what they do. In addition, 
new economic opportunities may fundamentally alter people’s livelihoods, for instance 
when men migrate to cities and leave their families to take over all farming activities 
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001). 
 
Knowledge uncertainties exist because lay and scientific knowledge are both always 
plural, contingent, situated and contested. Each individual actor relies on different sets 
of information that are, furthermore, located within particular institutional settings 
(Mehta et al. 2001). Thus, people’s knowledge about markets, the behavior of others 
or institutional arrangements is always incomplete and necessarily gives rise to 
uncertainties. 
 
Social and political uncertainties relate to social developments such as rural exodus or 
urban immigration, as well as to changes in political regime, including altered power 
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relations at regional and communal level. For instance, decentralization policies may, 
at least temporarily, add to political uncertainties at various levels, since it redistributes 
responsibilities and powers between various actors. In a similar manner, multiple, 
simultaneous interventions by the state, donor agencies, non-governmental 
organizations and other groups may cause confusion and generate unanticipated 
outcomes (Mehta et al. 2001). 
 
It is important to note that these different types of uncertainty often overlap and 
influence each other. For instance, the redistribution of state powers may add to 
political uncertainties, which may further increase knowledge uncertainties among 
various actors. Thus, the four categories cannot always be clearly distinguished from 
one another. At the same time, as Mehta et al. (2001, 2) note, “uncertainty is 
experienced very differently in different places and amongst people distinguished by 
wealth, background, gender, social or political affiliation, and so on.” Thus, whether 
someone considers a situation insecure or not depends to a considerable degree on his 
or her wealth or social status. 
 
Responding to uncertainty through flexibility: legal pluralism and livelihoods diversification 
 
People often respond to uncertainty by widening their range of options, i.e. by 
increasing the flexibility of their ways to achieve certain objectives. In general, two 
phenomena seem to be particularly related to uncertainty. As Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan (2001, 12) show, legal pluralism is a widely adopted means of coping with 
uncertainties. In times of drought, for example, people who experience problems 
accessing water resources may try to appeal to norms regarding sharing, while in 
normal times they prefer rules that exclude others. In a similar way, actors may 
acknowledge basic livelihood needs as a justification for claiming certain property 
rights, even though formal laws prohibit it. The flexibility of legal pluralism and the 
practices related to it – forum shopping, institutional bricolage, recombinant property 
– thus provides an oft-deployed coping response to survive in an uncertain 
environment. At the same time, however, legal pluralism can also exacerbate 
knowledge uncertainties. If others refer to multiple normative and cognitive orders to 
legitimize their claims, it becomes difficult to predict their behavior (compare 2.3.3). 
 
The other form of increasing flexibility is livelihood diversification. Recent actor-
oriented research suggests that under constantly uncertain circumstances, people often 
seek to improve or at least secure their capital base by diversifying their livelihood 
sources. At household level, diversification thus describes the process of adding new 
economic activities. However, diversification does not necessarily improve a 
household’s economic situation. On the one hand, long-term diversification is more 
often than not a strategic choice that allows households to build on complementarities 
and to spread risk. A typical example of such strategic diversification may be when 
capital savings, good returns from agriculture or access to affordable credit allow a 
farming household to open a shop. For the relatively rich, diversification is thus often a 
strategy of accumulation. On the other hand, short-term diversification is often forced 
and unplanned when households in financial distress are pushed into diversification. 
While such diversification may help them to secure a living in the short run, it often 
exacerbates future impoverishment, because the newly adopted activities compete with 
existing ones. A household that is unable to cultivate its own land may lease out the 
land and look for another source of income; or a farmer who cannot get a loan to buy 
fertilizers may have to accept additional wage labor in order to generate the cash 
needed (Scoones 1998; Smith and Pickles 1998; Barrett et al. 2001; Little et al. 2001; 
Ashley et al. 2003; Strasser Schoch 2009). 
However, whether and how people diversify does not only depend on socioeconomic 
differences, but also on the local institutional and ecological context and the related 
opportunities and constraints. Over the last decade, livelihood studies have repeatedly 
established a global tendency among rural households to increasingly diversify their 
livelihoods beyond the agricultural sector and the local level, thus developing a very 
diverse, often multi-local portfolio. This phenomenon is often interpreted as a response 
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to the global rise of livelihood opportunities in the form of increased mobility and 
improved access to national and international labor markets (cf. Bebbington 1999; De 
Haan and Zoomers 2003). 
 
 
2.4.3 From livelihoods diversification towards livelihood trajectories 
 
“Understanding change should be at the centre of any analysis of livelihoods.” This 
focus on change and long-term dynamics as emphasized by Ashley et al. (2003, 2.2) 
seems particularly relevant to the analysis of livelihoods in a transformation context. 
While the notions of strategy and response help to distinguish the different ways in 
which people try to sustain their livelihoods, they are of little use when describing 
processes of livelihood change over long periods of time. This is so because most actors 
deploy strategic and non-strategic conduct simultaneously, so that livelihood strategies 
and coping responses overlap, and intended and unintended outcomes coincide. 
Consequently, analyzing a single strategy or response reveals only little about the 
prospects of a household’s livelihoods. 
 
Pathways and trajectories 
 
In order to better account for this historical perspective, recent livelihoods literature 
has put forward the notions of pathways and trajectories. Scoones (1998, 10) defines 
livelihood pathways as the result of a series of livelihood choices that emerge over time, 
or as different combinations of livelihood strategies that are pursued sequentially: “It is 
this dynamic element, evident in the composition and recomposition of livelihood 
strategies, which it is important to examine (…)”. De Haan and Zoomers (2003, 2005) 
also emphasize the importance of distinguishing between a household’s strategy and its 
history. While a strategy usually attains a pre-set goal, a pathway “arises out of an 
iterative process in a step-by-step procedure in which goals, preferences, resources and 
means are constantly reassessed in view of new unstable conditions” (de Bruijn and 
van Dijk 1998, cit. in de Haan and Zoomers 2003, 357). Thus, the notion of pathways 
also accounts for the influence of structural factors, because it shows “(…) that people 
make their own livelihoods, but not necessarily under conditions of their own 
choosing” (de Haan and Zoomers 2005, 43). 
 
The term livelihood trajectories used by other authors describes more or less the same 
processes. According to Bagchi et al. (1998, 457), it “(…) refers to the consequences of 
the changing ways in which individuals construct a livelihood over time”16. Ashley et 
al. (2003, 2.3) emphasize the need to distinguish theoretically between short-term 
fluctuations and long-term trajectories, although in practice the boundaries are usually 
blurred. For the sake of clarity, I shall use the notion of livelihood trajectories in this 
thesis17. Ashley et al. (2003) argue that although they are much more complex than 
single responses or strategies, trajectories generally lead towards either accumulation or 
impoverishment; they therefore distinguish between negative and positive trajectories 
(see Figure 2.1). 
 
 
                                                
16 Cf. also Murray 2002. 
17 Confusion only arises when de Haan and Zoomers (2005, 43ff) use livelihood trajectories for their 
method of analyzing livelihood pathways. 
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Figure 2.1 Negative and positive livelihood trajectories (Ashley et al. 2003, 2.2) 
 
 
 
 
Negative trajectories lead to a worsening of livelihoods through the gradual depletion 
of resources. As a result, a household may gradually lose its capability to respond to 
externalities such as shocks or negative trends, and may become less prepared to take 
advantage of new opportunities. By contrast, positive trajectories result in a gradual 
improvement of a household’s livelihoods through the accumulation of resources. A 
household may thus become better prepared to cope with negative impacts and to 
actively respond to new opportunities. The notion of livelihood trajectories can thus 
help to explain patterns of household impoverishment or asset accumulation over long 
periods of time. At the micro level, however, the boundary between negative and 
positive trajectories may often appear less clear-cut and may be difficult to grasp 
analytically (Ashley et al. 2003). 
 
Transition trajectories, livelihood trajectories 
 
Nevertheless, the notion of livelihood trajectories offers a useful link between the study 
of livelihoods and the analysis of post-socialist transformation at the micro level. I have 
argued in section 2.2.2 that post-socialist transformation should be seen as a multitude 
of path-dependent processes: they are rooted in the socialist past, but are also shaped 
by a series of active decisions of various actors at all levels. The sociological transition 
critique has developed the notion of transition trajectories to account for such multiple 
and dynamic processes. Apparently, the notion fits in well with the idea of livelihood 
trajectories, which incorporates the dynamic nature of livelihoods, adopts a long-term 
perspective and takes livelihoods analysis beyond the level of particular strategies, 
responses and outcomes. Thus, just as post-socialist transformation may deviate from a 
foreseen ‘transition’ path, people’s livelihoods may embark upon different cycles over 
time. 
 
Obviously, the dynamic idea of trajectories, as well as the other concepts and notions 
which I deploy to analyze livelihoods and institutions in a context of post-socialist 
transformation and which I have outlined in this chapter, entail particular 
methodological decisions. These will be described in the next chapter. 
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3 Methodology and methods 
 
 
”It is precisely the sudden importance of the micro processes lodged in moments 
of transformation that privileges an ethnographic approach.” 
 
(Burawoy and Verdery 1999, 2) 
 
 
Most methodological decisions – to do actor-oriented, multiple-level research, to carry 
out a comparative case study, to adopt a historical perspective and to integrate 
quantitative and qualitative methods – were taken step-by-step during the early stages 
of my research. Most of them resulted from my theoretical approach, from already 
existing research and my own research questions. Others, however, were triggered by 
my former research experience18 or were caused by the wider research context. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.1 I describe the wider organizational 
context of this study and the most important research partnerships it involved. In 
section 3.2 I disentangle the various decisions and assumptions behind my research 
methodology. In section 3.3 I give an overview of the various stages of the research 
process and the methods related to them. Finally, I critically reflect on some practical 
methodical aspects in section 3.4. 
 
 
 
3.1  Research context 
 
This study was carried out at the Human Geography Division of the Geography 
Department at Zurich University, Switzerland. It is embedded within the National 
Centre of Competence in Research North-South (NCCR N-S), funded jointly by the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC). Under the overarching theme of ‘Research Partnerships for 
Sustainable Development’, the NCCR N-S supports research partnerships between 
research institutions in Switzerland and in developing and transition countries on issues 
related to sustainable development. At the time of research, the NCCR N-S consisted 
of four ‘Work Packages’, each with a particular regional and thematic focus. This 
study forms part of Work Package 2, coordinating research on livelihood options and 
globalization mainly in South Asia and Central America. Since my research focused on 
Central Asia, I have received considerable logistical support from the Work Package 4. 
Besides, the study also contributed to the NCCR N-S Transversal Package Project 
(TPP) on Pastoral Production Systems, comparing pastoralism in West Africa and 
Central Asia. Continuous exchange has also taken place with the TPP on Multilocal 
Livelihoods. 
 
Various research partnerships evolved from this context over the course of my study. 
Exchange within the TPP was particularly intensive during the early stages of research, 
i.e. through workshops, field excursions and joint publications on agro-pastoral 
production systems in Kyrgyzstan (Steimann et al. 2006; Steimann and Weibel 2007). 
At a later stage, three Master’s students supported my research with their dissertations. 
The first one by Meierhans19 (Meierhans 2008) analyzed the different ways in which 
local pasture users and scientists assess pasture quality in Northwest Kyrgyzstan. The 
second, by Schoch20 (Schoch 2008; Schoch et al. forthcoming), looked at the links 
                                                
18 On livelihoods and institutions in the forestry sector of northwest Pakistan (Geiser and Steimann 2004; 
Steimann 2004, 2005) 
19 Under the Work Package 4 
20 Under the Work Package 2 and the TPP on Multilocal Livelihoods 
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between the two livelihood strategies of migration and animal husbandry in Southern 
Kyrgyzstan. The third one, by Näscher21 (Näscher 2009; Näscher et al. forthcoming), 
analyzed the effects of mobility on pastoral households’ vulnerability to Brucellosis in 
Central Kyrgyzstan. 
 
During my research, the main local partner organization of NCCR N-S in Central Asia 
was the Central Asian Mountain Partnership (CAMP), a regional development 
network initiated by SDC and established by the Centre for Development and 
Environment at the University of Berne, Switzerland in 2000. In 2008, NCCR N-S 
started an additional partnership with the University of Central Asia (UCA), which was 
founded by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the Aga 
Khan Foundation in 2000. Exchange with project managers and pasture specialists at 
CAMP during the initial phase of my research influenced the selection of Jergetal 
village as one of the case study sites for my research (see below). 
 
I also made use of my own personal networks in Kyrgyzstan for this study. Between 
July 2000 and April 2001, I worked with the ‘Business Promotion Project’, operated by 
the Swiss development agency Helvetas. The project worked on the development of 
rural tourism and this allowed me to gain some first insights into rural livelihoods and 
transition-related challenges, to visit different parts of the country and to establish 
many personal contacts. During my second stay from June to September 2001, I 
worked as a guide for a Swiss-Kyrgyz tour agency, accompanying Swiss tourist groups. 
On a private journey to Kyrgyzstan in autumn 2005, I paid a first visit to Kyzyl-Tuu, 
which eventually became the second case study village for this thesis (see below). 
 
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
Actor-centered research 
 
As argued in section 2.4, I consider an actor perspective essential to understanding the 
manifold processes of post-socialist transformation. To this end, I decided to adopt a 
livelihoods perspective and to make use of the notion of livelihood trajectories. This 
means that, from a methodological point of view, my analysis works ‘from the ground 
up’, i.e. it starts with the actors at the micro level instead of official models of and 
normative statements about transformation processes (Nuijten 2005, 9). 
 
According to de Haan and Zoomers (2003, 361), an analysis of people’s livelihood 
trajectories needs to look not only at what people have, but especially at what they do, 
i.e. at their organizing practices and their diverse responses to different challenges and 
opportunities. The same authors (2005, 44) mention that the study of livelihood 
trajectories should “explicitly focus on matters of access to opportunities, especially 
mapping the workings of power”. Similarly, Nuijten (2005, 9; referring to Wolf 1990) 
suggests to look at the ‘flow of action’, i.e. “to ask what is going on, why it is going 
on, who engages in it, with whom, when, and how often”. Hence, there was no way 
around taking an ethnographic approach.22 
 
Integration of qualitative and quantitative methods 
 
It was nevertheless clear to me that I first had to acquire some basic knowledge about 
what people have (their assets in the livelihoods terminology) before inquiring what 
they do. Unfortunately, reliable statistics for the household level are scarce in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. Communal authorities usually keep only simple statistics for the 
                                                
21 Under the Work Package 2, the TPP on Multilocal Livelihoods and the TPP on Pastoral Production 
Systems 
22 Other authors arguing for an ethnographic approach to post-socialist tranformation include Burawoy 
and Verdery 1999, Hann et al. 2002, Kandiyoti 2002, Pavlinek 2003, Finke 2004, Herbers 2006b. 
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whole ayil okmotu (community), while there are seldom any figures at ayil (village) 
level. In order to identify those in need, households are visited every year by the 
communal social tax inspector, but methods of data collection are rarely transparent, 
and results are confidential. In addition, local statisticians often doubt their own 
figures, especially when it comes to livestock numbers, for the reasons explained 
below. Therefore, even a simple comparison between two ayil okmotus is hardly 
possible. 
 
This is why I decided to integrate qualitative and quantitative research methods by 
basing my ethnographic approach upon a quantitative household survey. According to 
White (2002, 519), combining qualitative and quantitative work can strengthen both: 
“Anthropological studies can help us better understand the findings from quantitative 
analysis (…)  [while] quantitative data [can] provide a framework to raise the questions 
to be addressed by qualitative approaches”. Netting’s (1981) famous work on alpine 
resource management, for instance, is an excellent example of the successful 
combination of the two. My motivation to combine qualitative and quantitative 
methods also came from my previous research experience in Northwest Pakistan 
(Steimann 2005), where I had conducted a quantitative baseline survey on rural 
livelihoods and had realized the useful yet limited scope of quantitative methods for 
social research. 
 
The household as a starting point for multi-level analysis 
 
As argued in section 2.4.1, I decided to start analysis at household level. The household 
seemed an appropriate unit to start with; accounts from literature and some of my own 
early insights prompted me to assume that the privatization of the Kyrgyz agriculture 
had first and foremost strengthened the household as the new main economic unit at 
the local level. After 1991, entitlements to private land were calculated on an 
individual basis, yet ownership certificates were issued jointly for whole households 
(see chapter 7 for a detailed account of the Kyrgyz privatization process). 
 
The household is also a common, yet not undisputed, social category in geographical 
anthropological research. As Kaspar and Kollmair (2006) show, the household is not 
only an evident social entity providing a fundamental context of human behavior, but 
is also attractive from a methodological point of view, since it is visible and concrete. 
However, they stress that the household is not a monolithic entity but a “social 
construct based on dynamic norms and rules” (ibid., 118), and that any household-
level research should be aware of intra-household differences between the various 
individuals that constitute a household. Such differences may concern the ability to 
take decisions or the distribution of resources; individuals within a household often 
have different interests, and their ability to assert themselves depends on their personal 
bargaining power (Berzborn 2007). Korf (2004, 278f) however argues that the term 
‘individual’ can be misleading, too, because it suggests the idea of a person’s isolation 
from the wider social and historical context. 
 Thus, households can have both elusive and clear boundaries at the same time. 
Werner (1998) and Kandiyoti (1999) show for the Central Asian context that 
households often vary in size and composition, since household members leave and 
join the household (e.g. through migration or the custom of child fostering). By 
contrast, household boundaries are also reinforced through agrarian production or the 
preparation and consumption of food. It is generally acknowledged that the household 
should thus be conceptualized as an ‘embedded unit’, which cannot be understood 
without an analysis of its social, economic and political links within and beyond a 
community. Such links may involve other social categories such as family, kin 
relations, tribal affiliations, neighborhood, or community, and  special attention must 
be paid during analysis to local categories and their respective denominations (Werner 
1998; compare 5.1.2). In addition, it is also evident that ‘the household’ per se cannot 
take any decisions, so terms such as ‘household strategy’ may be misleading. 
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Starting from the idea of the ‘embedded household’, I therefore had to scale up to other 
levels including the community, the regional and provincial level, but also to narrow 
my focus down to individual actors. On the one hand, the often mobile and multi-local 
character of livelihoods in rural Kyrgyzstan makes household boundaries dynamic and 
elusive, which made it necessary to extend my analysis beyond the local and the 
household level (Kandiyoti 1999, 502ff; de Haan and Zoomers 2003, 360). On the 
other hand, my focus on organizations, institutions and institutional change also forced 
me to widen my perspective. As I have detailed in section 2.3, organizations and 
institutions exist at or span across various levels. In accordance with Appendini and 
Nuijten (2002, 73), I defined the local institutional context as being “constituted by the 
specific manifestations of institutions and organisations in a given geographical area, 
even though these institutions might extend beyond the physical boundaries of that 
area.” 
 
The importance of the historical perspective 
 
An exclusively household focus cannot account for the wider structural constraints and 
opportunities influencing livelihood trajectories, the long-term consequences of what 
people did and do cannot be captured through single snap-shots. The concepts 
employed for this study – transformation, institutional change, organizing practices, 
and livelihood trajectories – all describe processes, the analysis of which obviously 
requires a long-term perspective. The real difficulty, however, was where to draw the 
line. On the one hand, it was neither necessary nor practicable to go back as far as 
Netting (1981), who reconstructed several hundred years of demographic change to 
study local livelihoods in an alpine community. On the other hand, 1991 (the year 
when the socialist system finally collapsed) was obviously an inadequate starting point 
for analysis, since it would foreclose everything that happened before, which – as I 
soon began to realize – had a considerable effect on what happened afterwards. In 
order to understand this path-dependency of transformation processes better (see 
2.2.2), I decided to expand my focus to the late socialist years, albeit without fixing an 
exact timeline. Some of the practical difficulties related to the collection of historical 
accounts are discussed in section 3.4. 
 
Embedded multiple-case study 
 
Informed by theoretical knowledge about transition trajectories, i.e. the many 
variations of post-socialist transformation processes, I had to assume that there is an 
equally countless amount of different organizing practices and diverse links with the 
local institutional context. It was therefore no realistic endeavor to strive for an all-
encompassing description of the effects of post-socialist transformation upon rural 
livelihoods and institutions governing resource use. Obviously, my subject of analysis is 
“a complex social phenomenon”, for which Yin (1994, 3) considers case study 
research ideal. Nuijten (2005, 9) also states that “the working of institutions and 
power relations can only be identified by making detailed case studies of the forms of 
organization around resources, conflicts or village projects.” Moreover, I wanted to go 
beyond a mere description of the current situation by analyzing long-term processes of 
livelihoods and institutional change and the actors’ perception of these changes. For 
Tellis (1997, no pagination), this merger of process and outcomes is one of the main 
strengths of case study research. I therefore decided to zoom in on particular localities 
to acquire what Flyvbjerg (2006, 223) calls a “nuanced view of reality”. 
 
In order to counter the frequent criticism that case study research does not allow for 
generalization, I decided to do an embedded multiple-case case study with strategic 
sampling of two main cases or units (Flyvbjerg 2006, 226f). According to Yin (1994, 
41f), the embedded multiple-case study makes it possible to involve more than one unit 
of analysis, because it pays attention to different sub-units (or embedded units) within 
a case. For my analysis, I chose two Kyrgyz villages as cases (or main units), and 
households, groups and individuals as sub-units. I also included what Yin calls ‘process 
units’, i.e. certain locations and events such as selected pastures and meetings. The 
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motivation for doing a multiple-case study was to observe certain forms of organi-
zation around various resources in two different local contexts. The sampling criteria 
for the two villages are described in section 3.3; those for households in chapter 5. 
 
Household typology and stratified random sampling 
 
Rural livelihoods, natural resource use and the role of the local institutional context 
are complex research subjects. As chapter 4 will show, rural livelihoods in the two case 
study villages are not only highly diverse, but there are also considerable 
socioeconomic disparities between the households pursuing them. Such disparities 
present a serious research challenge, since they have multiple dimensions which cannot 
all be taken into consideration for analysis. The only way to avoid ending up with an 
unfeasibly large number of contexts and cases is therefore to reduce complexity by 
focusing on a few dimensions which seem of particular relevance for the research 
question and which allow meaningful comparison of cases (Flick et al. 2007, 259). 
 I have already restricted the focus of my analysis to a comparison of two contexts 
(or main units in the sense of Yin 1994), i.e. two villages. However, given the available 
time and workforce as well as the main focus of my research, I was neither able nor 
willing to achieve a statistically relevant sample size of households for a numerical 
generalization at the village level. In order to increase the theoretical generalizability of 
my findings, I therefore decided to sample a small number of cases or sub-units, i.e. 
households, theoretically for further analysis. As Flyvbjerg (2006, 229) notes, “the 
typical or average case is often not the richest in information. Atypical or extreme cases 
often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic 
mechanisms in the situation studied.” In that sense, the absolute number of samples is 
less relevant than the diversity of cases chosen for analysis (see also Flick et al. 2007, 
260; Strauss and Corbin 1996, 148ff). 
 
A stratified random sampling of households suited this purpose best. To this end, I 
used the empirical findings from the household listing (see 3.3 below) to develop a 
typology of households. In a first step I grouped all households together along two 
main dimensions determined by my research focus, i.e. livestock ownership and 
availability of pastoral cash income sources (see 5.3). On the one hand, the formation 
of such real or empirical types (Kluge 1999, 60) helps to stratify the data and allows to 
control the proportions falling into certain subgroups of particular interest, so as not to 
end up with a large number of average cases. On the other hand, a typology also 
allows to detect certain regularities and correlations in the data which otherwise may 
be overseen (ibid., 69). However, since there are many different dimensions along 
which cases (here: households) can be grouped and classified, any typology needs to be 
well considered and firmly rooted in the research questions. In a second step, I selected 
the five groups I considered most revealing in regard to my research questions. These 
five groups included the households with the most livestock of their own as well as 
those without any, which helped me to compare two ‘extreme cases’ (see above). 
Within each of the five groups, I then carried out a random sampling to identify the 
households I had to re-visit for the qualitative in-depth interviews23. This random 
element in the sampling process helped me to avoid systematic biases in the sample 
(Olsen 1992; Flyvbjerg 2006). 
                                                
23 Random sampling was carried out with the SPSS software. 
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3.3 Research design and methods 
 
I conducted my field research for this study over a period of two-and-a-half years, from 
autumn 2006 until spring 2009, split into four stays, each of two to four months in 
duration, plus a short field visit by one of my Kyrgyz field assistants (Figure 3.1). The 
decision to divide my field research into several parts was mainly informed by my 
research question, i.e. by the seasonal variations in pasture use and the often mobile 
and multi-local livelihoods of the rural Kyrygz population. It was only during my 
research that I realized that not only do herders move constantly between different 
pastures and their village (which sometimes makes it difficult to track them down), but 
that also many people from the seemingly sedentary population were often moving 
between rural and urban areas, mainly due to labor migration. That is why, after a first 
exploratory visit, I split my field research into three seasonal slots, each dedicated to 
specific aspects of my overall research question and to different methodical 
approaches. This seasonal approach proved very useful to gain a better understanding 
of the agro-pastoral production cycle and of seasonal variations regarding domestic 
labor, migration, land cultivation and the like. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Research timeline with the four main phases of data collection and analysis (own graphic) 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase one: explorative research 
 
The first field visit (September to October 2006) was exploratory, dedicated to 
establishing first contacts with herders and key informants and to sorting out the main 
issues related to pasture use in the Kyrygz Republic. This was done during a research 
seminar organized by CAMP and on a short excursion to summer and autumn pastures 
in three different oblast (Chui, Issyk-Kul, Naryn). Interviews and group discussions 
were conducted, among others, with herders, local entrepreneurs, cooperative 
chairmen, as well as with experts in the capital Bishkek.24 Back in Switzerland, I then 
refined my research questions, continued the literature review and eventually finalized 
the research proposal. 
 
Phase two: quantitative household survey 
 
The second field visit (April to May 2007) was dedicated to the selection of the case 
study locations and to the collection of quantitative household data. In repeated talks 
with experts in Bishkek, I discussed my research plan and compiled a list of potentially 
                                                
24 For a summary of this first field visit, see Steimann and Weibel 2007. 
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interesting case study villages. I then visited these villages one by one, talking to 
herders, farmers and local government representatives in order to get a first impression 
of the different local contexts. I also used these meetings to pre-test and adjust the 
questionnaire for the subsequent household listing. After selecting two villages for my 
case study (see below for the selection criteria), four Kyrgyz university students helped 
me with the initial household listing. 
 
Based on a short quantitative household questionnaire, the listing method adapted 
from Strasser (2004 and 2007; see also Steimann 2005), allowed me to gain a quick 
overview of all households in the two case study villages and their various livelihoods. 
The one-page questionnaire included the main household characteristics such as the 
number of household members, the number and type of animals, the household’s 
access to and ownership of arable land, its access to pastures, and its main cash income 
sources (see Appendix 1 for the full questionnaire). I checked the completed 
questionnaires on a daily basis and discussed inconsistencies with the enumerator in 
charge. In the case of internal contradictions or missing data, the household was 
revisited for clarification. We thus listed 702 households within two weeks, (see 
chapter 5). The household listing was complemented and put in context by local key 
informant interviews. After finalizing the survey, I once more talked to provincial and 
national experts to share and discuss some of my preliminary findings (see Appendix 4 
for a list of expert interviews). Back in Switzerland, I analyzed the quantitative 
household data by using the SPSS package. The resulting statistical baseline for the 
household level eventually served to develop a typology of households (see 5.3). 
 
Phase three: qualitative research in the study villages and on the alpine summer pastures 
 
The focus of the third field visit (September to December 2007) was on qualitative data 
collection. After having visited and included those households that were not available 
during the spring survey, I sampled a number of households for both villages, using a 
stratified random sampling procedure (see 5.4). These households were then visited one 
by one for semi-structured, qualitative in-depth interviews, which lasted between 45 
minutes and three hours, depending on the respondents’ talkativeness. Though I 
sampled households, I did not sample individual respondents – we (my field assistant 
and me; see 3.4) just talked to those adult household members who were available and 
ready to share information. In most cases, these included either a couple with or 
without kids, the single male or female head of household, or another household 
member, such as the eldest daughter or son. In some cases, parents attended the 
interview together with their elder kids, which sometimes resulted in interesting 
discussions between two generations. The main topics discussed during these 
interviews included people’s experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
privatization program and the early 1990s; their access to and use of land, livestock 
and pastures; and their relation to institutions and organizations at various levels (see 
Appendix 2 for the interview checklist). In total, I conducted 53 household interviews 
(see 3.4 for a discussion of the interview method). 
 
In order to widen the historical perspective of the study, I also conducted four 
individual life history interviews with elderly people who were ready to speak about 
their life in the Soviet Union and the early years of the kolkhoz. I did not select these 
respondents strategically, but used the opportunity when someone was ready to talk 
about his life in more detail. It may be due to this arbitrary sampling procedure and my 
own role as a male researcher that all my life history respondents were men. I hardly 
moderated these talks, leaving it up to the respondents to tell their ‘story’. Most of 
them turned out to be great storytellers and were able to recall many details as well as 
to relate their own story to the wider political context of their time. In this way, their 
biographies additionally helped me to gradually aggregate upwards from the individual 
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and household level to the local, regional and national level25. With the respondents’ 
consent, all household and life history interviews were recorded and later transcribed 
into English or German. At the same time, I continued talks with key informants at 
local and regional level, including representatives of different state agencies, NGOs and 
private credit companies. Eventually, some respondents from the household interviews 
– both women and men – turned out to be very valuable key informants, whom I then 
visited repeatedly. 
 
After another stay in Switzerland, during which I had a first look at the interview 
transcripts, I set off for a fourth and last field visit (July to September 2008), during 
which I concentrated on the herders living on the remote summer pastures of the two 
case study villages. Due to the huge size of these pastures, I had to concentrate on 
certain areas and the herding families living there (compare Maps 10.1 and 10.2). 
Again, semi-structured individual interviews as well as opportunistic discussion groups 
(O’Reilly 2005, 131f) helped to raise issues such as the herders’ access and use of 
pastures, their possibilities to access markets, their social relations among each other 
and their opinion about the pasture legislation (see Appendix 3 for the detailed 
interview checklist). In total, I conducted 43 semi-structured interviews with herding 
families. In addition, I joined a two-day seminar on pasture management being held by 
CAMP on the summer pastures of one of the case study villages as an observer. I also 
revisited some of the respondents I had met in autumn 2007, and continued to discuss 
certain issues with key informants at local and regional level. Several interviews in the 
capital Bishkek with independent researchers and representatives of state departments 
and NGOs rounded off my data collection. 
 
Transcription and data analysis 
 
All recorded interviews have been transcribed and translated from Kyrgyz into English 
or German, depending on the field assistant’s proficiency. In case I could not record an 
interview or a group discussion, I took notes, then wrote up minutes  of the talk as 
soon as possible, and cross-checked with my field assistant whether I had taken down 
all the important issues mentioned. I then analyzed all transcripts and minutes with the 
help of TAMS Analyzer, an open source software package for qualitative text 
analysis26. I mainly based my qualitative text analysis on methods developed by the 
grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1996; Charmaz 2006; Böhm 2007; Kelle 2007), 
starting with an open section-by-section coding of the first transcripts during my third 
field visit. The constantly growing number of transcripts then helped me to rethink and 
refine my initial codes and categories, to sort out and synthesize certain data (focused 
coding). At a later stage of analysis, I tested various concepts and categories stemming 
from my theoretical approach, such as ‘uncertainty’ or ‘hybridity’ (theoretical coding), 
while trying to avoid a forced imposition of these concepts on the data and my initial 
codes (Charmaz 2006, 66). At the same time as these different steps of coding, I used 
memos to comment and critically reflect my codes and categories. In many cases, these 
memos were also an analytical continuation of the field notes, which I used extensively 
during the process of data analysis. 
 
Selection of the case study villages 
 
As described in section 3.2, I decided to do an embedded multiple-case study, with a 
strategic sampling of two villages as my main cases. I intentionally did not include 
more than two villages, because I did not only want to compare the two different local 
contexts, but also to explore each of them in detail, with special attention to their 
subunits (households, individuals, pastures, meetings). Although I had been looking for 
two contrasting cases, I wanted to ensure their comparability at the macro level 
(climatic conditions, availability of pastures, role of the provincial administration). I 
                                                
25 On historical anthropology and life histories in general, see Francis 1992; Miller 2000; Slater 2000; 
Fuchs-Heinritz 2005; Goehrke 2005; O’Reilly 2005; CPRC 2006. On the use of life histories for liveli-
hoods research, see also Bagchi et al. 1998; Messer and Townsley 2003; de Haan and Zoomers 2005. 
26 http://tamsys.sourceforge.net 
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therefore decided to select two villages from the same oblast (province). Considering 
my research focus, Naryn oblast seemed most appropriate: it has the largest total 
number of livestock, the largest total area of pastures, and – for climatic and 
topographic reasons and limited economic alternatives –animal husbandry played a 
highly significant role in rural livelihoods (Schuler et al. 2004)27. 
 
I then selected two villages in different rayons (districts) according to two main criteria. 
First, local livelihoods should differ in regard to the availability of alternatives to 
animal husbandry, such as crop and vegetable cultivation. Second, I was looking for 
two contrasting local institutional contexts. Since at this early stage of research I was 
able to identify this in a rather superficial way only, I decided to use the existence (or 
otherwise) of local NGOs, self-help groups, farming cooperatives and the like as a 
criterion. I thus selected the two villages Jergetal (Jergetal ayil okmotu (community), 
Naryn rayon) and Kyzyl-Tuu (Karakojun ayil okmotu, At-Bashy rayon) for my 
research. Chapter 5 describes the two villages in detail (see also Map 5.1). 
 
 
 
3.4 Some remarks on methodology and methods 
 
Author, student, son, donor: negotiating identities 
 
While I tried to be as open as possible about myself and my research, I constantly 
encountered what O’Reilly (2005, 60) calls “the difficult distinction between covert 
and overt research”. Heading for the field as a PhD student, I soon realized that 
depending on context and counterparts, I adopted or was given different – and often 
overlapping – identities. For in-depth household- and life history interviews, my 
research assistant often introduced me as an author writing a book on rural livelihoods 
and socioeconomic change, without mentioning every detail about my university 
background and the PhD program. If people wanted to know more, we gladly shared 
the necessary details, yet this was not always the case. Vis-à-vis local key informants – 
such as teachers, local government representatives, former kolkhoz managers or party 
leaders – we often explained my wider research context as a PhD student, since many 
of them took a lively interest and were happy to help me gain my PhD. When dealing 
with state representatives at regional, provincial and national level, using the term 
Swiss university researcher and disclosing my affiliations with CAMP (see 3.1) 
sometimes proved more successful than introducing myself as a student. However, this 
did not keep me from sometimes being accused of being a shpion (шпион; Russian for 
‘spy’) when asking for access to official maps and statistics. Compared to that, being a 
son was a very convenient role: since my research assistant and I always used to stay 
with the same local families, we eventually became accepted as part of them. This not 
only opened up several opportunities to participate in life-cycle feasts, but also to join 
in with the hay harvest, to water the cows or to take care of the sheep. In a very few 
cases, this close relation to particular families proved critical to establishing new 
contacts. Overall, it offered me very valuable opportunities for extensive observation 
and participant research.28 
 
Yet the most difficult aspect of negotiating my identity was to avoid being looked upon 
as a donor representative. While conducting interviews at people’s homes or making 
small talk in the street, I was repeatedly asked about the benefits of my work for 
people and the community. In such cases, I always tried to explain my university 
background, and that I was not involved in development projects. I usually argued that 
                                                
27 Personal communication with the Naryn rayon pasture expert, 24 May 2007. 
28 The frequency of feasts rapidly increased during my stay on the summer pastures, when proving my 
ability to ride a horse, admire local cuisine, eat large quantities of meat and dance wildly at herders’ 
parties became a crucial part of being accepted among herders – social control is high and news spread 
quickly on the summer pastures. That particular role may best be described as maladiets (Russian for 
‘capital fellow’). 
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writing a book about their situation was all I could do, and that I was trying my best 
to adequately present their views and concerns. The only indirect benefit I could offer 
was to raise people’s concerns during my discussions with state and donor 
representatives at the regional, provincial and national level, to which farmers and 
herders had only limited access. This was usually sufficient to gain people’s support, 
but hardly ever eliminated my own unease about the issue. Another way of ‘giving 
something back’ was to take my time to answer my respondents’ questions, usually 
about nature, farming and politics in Switzerland. This often resulted in long chats 
following the interviews.29 
 
Doing research in a post-socialist context: nostalgia and ‘the past’ 
 
During interviews I often made the experience that old and young, male and female 
respondents alike tended to idealize the Soviet past. I related this nostalgia to the fact 
that for many of them, the early years of independence were an extremely difficult 
time, with a rapid deterioration of living standards and the loss of guaranteed incomes 
and social securities. Although many have recovered since then, numerous people still 
live below former Soviet standards regarding nutrition, health, or education. However, 
since individual responsibility has become part of the new ideology, the state is neither 
willing nor able to adequately support them. In such a situation, current realities are 
often compared to the Soviet past (McMann 2005a; 2005b). During interviews I often 
had the impression that the harder the current realities, the brighter the Soviet ideal. 
Trying to figure out the differences and continuities before and after 1991, this posed a 
considerable challenge to me, which I could only address by constantly cross-checking 
information with key informants and repeatedly asking for more details about how 
exactly things used to be organized in the Soviet past.30 
 
A related problem arose from the respondents’ timing of certain events and their use of 
‘always’ and ‘in the past’. My experience was similar to Näscher’s (2009, 47), who 
notes that people would often say that ‘it had always been like this’: “In the process of 
data collection the suspicion arose that ‘always’ frequently referred to the post-Soviet 
era only.” Similarly, elderly people often referred to an undifferentiated past, in which 
it was difficult to distinguish between the 1960s and the 1980s. A considerable portion 
of many interviews was therefore devoted to putting events in a meaningful 
chronological order. Nevertheless, many inconsistencies may have remained.31 
 
Collecting and handling sensitive data 
 
According to Christensen (1992, 124), “information is sensitive when it can be used in 
a manner contrary to the interests or wishes of the informant.” This became obvious 
during the quantitative household listing, when asking people for the number of their 
livestock turned out to be a delicate issue. On the one hand, livestock is a pivotal point 
around which social relations are established and maintained, e.g. through inviting 
relatives, neighbors and friends to a feast. On the other hand, livestock is a highly 
visible form of property, and the Kyrgyz usually measure wealth and social status by 
the livestock someone possesses. This holds true not only for mutual assessment among 
neighbors, but also for social tax inspection. When determining a household’s 
entitlement to state child allowances, inspectors take its flock size into account. Since 
child allowances constitute an important cash income source for many households (see 
5.2.3), the real number of animals is often concealed32. Chapter 6 shows that this kind 
                                                
29 See also Francis (1992, 86ff) for further thoughts on repayment and obligation in fieldwork. 
30 Kuehnast (2000) notes that Soviet nostalgia was particularly evident among women, since they were 
among the main recipients of the socialist welfare system. According to McMann (2005a), also many 
ethnic minorities express a deep sense of loss, because they additionally experience a worsening status in 
society. 
31 For an excellent account of how to deal with respondents’ vagueness about dates and the nostalgia bias, 
see Francis (1992). 
32 Personal communication with social tax inspectors and statisticians, Jergetal and Karakojun ayil 
okmotu, 2007. Christensen (1992, 132) reports similar problems for West Africa. 
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of camouflage was widely practised in Soviet times, even though the reasons for 
deceiving the state administration were somewhat different back then. In order to 
address the problem, every respondent was informed about the research project and 
assured of full confidentiality. It proved especially important to tell people that the 
local tax inspector had no access to the data we collected. But also some key 
informants had to be assured of confidentiality, especially if they shared knowledge 
about informal practices of others or themselves. I therefore decided not to mention 
any names in this thesis unless my respondents explicitly allowed me to do so. This is 
why most quotes are only labeled with the respondent’s affiliation to a particular 
household group (compare 5.4), as well as with an internal household identification 
number33. In the few cases I tell personalized stories, I use pseudonyms. By contrast, I 
follow the general rule of naming most public officials since they can in any case be 
easily identified by their function (Guenther 2009). 
 
Another problem related to the household listing method is that its quick and short 
character makes it impossible to collect and consistently cross-check data at the same 
time (see also Strasser 2004). I addressed this problem at a later stage of research when 
I revisited some of the households for qualitative in-depth interviews. During these 
interviews, livestock numbers and income sources were discussed again and compared 
with the listing results. In most cases, these cross-checks confirmed our data. 
 
The qualitative interviews also often touched upon other sensitive issues such as 
poverty, credits, health problems, or conflicts with neighbors and local authorities. 
Besides assuring full confidentiality, I tried to address this by moderating the interviews 
as openly as possible, trying to follow the respondents’ narrative, while an interview 
checklist helped me to raise the sensitive aspects when I felt the time was right. My 
usual opener was about the respondents’ life in Soviet times, a topic which often 
proved to be an excellent ‘icebreaker’, since it did not directly touch on people’s 
current livelihoods. While some talks turned rather personal or even emotional after 
some time, other respondents remained tight-lipped. Another challenge was to deal 
with neighbors joining the conversation after a while, which often completely altered 
the character of the interview – not necessarily for the worse, however, as some 
interviews thus turned into excellent group discussions. According to tradition, most 
respondents invited us for tea after the interview and took the opportunity to ask me 
about Switzerland. Sometimes, these chats turned back to local issues after a while, 
which was a splendid opportunity to raise sensitive topics again in a more relaxed 
atmosphere. 
 
Translator, transcriber, counterpart 
 
Having hardly any knowledge of the Kyrgyz language myself, I had to work with 
translators. All in all, I worked with four different translators for this study, all of them 
women. This was not only due to their changing availability for long-time field 
research, but also because at a later stage of research, translation and transcription of 
in-depth interviews required different skills and more experience than conducting a 
household survey. The translation of interviews has undoubtedly caused some 
imprecision in my data. In-depth interviews were conducted in Kyrgyz and recorded 
with the respondents’ consent. Expert interviews were either recorded or noted down, 
depending on the respondent’s consent. During the interview, my field assistant 
continuously summarized people’s responses for me. With very talkative respondents, 
this sometimes proved rather difficult and getting the full meaning of what people said 
was not always possible during the talk. 
The subsequent transcription and translation (into English or German, depending 
on the assistant’s proficiency) took much more time than initially expected, especially 
                                                
33 Respondents from the two villages are labeled e.g. [1a17], designating district, quarter and household 
number. This system does not reflect administrative divisions, so outsiders cannot retrace a respondent. 
Herding households interviewed on the summer pastures of Arpa and Kumbel are labeled e.g. [#012], 
designating the order of interviews. 
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in the beginning, when the transcription rules and the translation of key terms had to 
be negotiated between me and my field assistant. Even then, sorting out 
misunderstandings and avoiding imprecisions in the transcripts took several months – a 
process, however, that also helped me to reflect on methodological issues and the 
everyday use of certain terms by various respondents. Thus, my field assistants played 
a key role in putting things in context. Their cultural and linguistic expertise often 
helped me to understand local customs and linguistic peculiarities better, and they were 
essential and critical counterparts to constantly discuss, challenge and complement my 
findings and interpretations. Last but not least, it was they who usually established the 
first contacts with respondents and key informants. Since all my assistants were 
women, they were particularly valuable door-openers to the many female respondents, 
as well as in the context of our (mostly female-headed) host families in the two villages 
and on the jailoos. 
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4 Political and economic reforms and the agrarian 
sector in socialist and post-socialist Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
On August 31, 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic offcially gained independence from the 
Soviet Union. However, the country’s dependence on subsidies from Moscow and its 
full integration into the all-Union market meant the Kyrgyz did not actively demand 
independence, but rather experienced it as a ‘burden of imposed independence’ 
(Mangott 1996). It soon became clear that the Kyrgyz economy was completely 
unprepared for the huge challenges of sovereignty and political and economic 
independence. The direct and indirect transfers and subsidies from Moscow quickly 
dried up, and the uncontrolled hyperinflation of the Russian ruble had a devastating 
effect. Arrears were rapidly accumulating between firms and states, not least because 
efforts to establish a functioning clearing system among the new countries had failed. 
The Kyrgyz industrial sector was hit immediately and particularly hard; between 1991 
and 1994, it decreased by nearly 60% (Stadelbauer 1996, 503). Agricultural 
production was similarly affected, since central subsidies to state and collective farms 
ceased to exist as did the fodder supplies so crucial to collectivized stock raising 
(Duncan 1994; Gumpel 1997; Abazov 1999; UNDP 2005a). The new Kyrgyz 
government therefore had little time to decide on its policy direction. There was no 
uniform approach across Central Asia: while the governments of Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan relied on state-led development and a gradual approach to cope with the 
economic crisis, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan opted for a swift change away from 
central planning towards market-led economic development. The fact that Russia soon 
embarked on its own ‘shock therapy’ certainly influenced the Kyrgyz government’s 
decision  to speed up its reforms as well (Abazov 1999, 200ff). 
 
Since then, the two guiding principles of privatization and decentralization have by and 
large informed the Kyrgyz reform agenda. These principles emanated to a considerable 
extent from conditionalities tied to the significant financial support the young republic 
received from the international donor community under the guidance of the World 
Bank and the IMF after 1991. However, the profound changes and simultaneous 
reworking of the economic, political and social sphere did not begin with the 
inauguration of the first independent government and the arrival of Western policy 
advisors. Much of what was implemented after 1991 had already been laid out in the 
late 1980s, when the Gorbachev administration tried to ‘rebuild’ the Soviet economy 
and open up it somewhat sclerotic society. There is therefore little point in seeking to 
identify the exact threshold between the last Soviet and the first Kyrgyz reforms, since 
this would disregard the many levels on which the latter are an extension of the 
former. 
 
In this chapter I describe the most important reform steps undertaken in the Kyrgyz 
SSR and the Kyrgyz Republic since the late 1980s, with a special focus on agrarian 
reforms. I do so to outline the formal aspects of the institutional and organizational 
context as well as the macroeconomic context in which rural Kyrgyz have had to make 
their living over the last 20 to 30 years. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 
4.1 describes the economy of the Kyrgyz SSR in the 1980s, the development of the 
collectivized livestock production, and gives a short summary of Gorbachev’s 
perestrojka in the agrarian sector. Section 4.2 describes the main principles and 
measures of the Kyrgyz transition politics after 1991, discusses its main effects on 
macroeconomic development and shows where 20 years of transition policy have taken 
the country. Section 4.3 then focuses on agrarian reforms since 1991. It explains the 
evolution of the legal framework for the dissolution of collective farms, the passage of 
modern land laws and the regulatory framework for the management and use of 
pastures, and outlines the reforms’ effects on the agrarian sector. Finally, particular 
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attention is paid to the recent reforms of the legal and organizational framework for 
pasture use and management. 
 
 
 
4.1  The Kyrgyz economy in the 1980s and early agrarian 
reforms 
 
4.1.1  Socialist economics in the 1980s 
 
By the late 1980s, the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (Kyrgyz SSR) was one of the 
poorest Soviet Republics. While Soviet heavy industry was mainly located in the Slavic 
western part of the USSR, a considerable part of Kyrgyz industry – metallurgy, 
machinery and light industry (mainly textiles) – had been built out of strategic rather 
than economic reasons in order to strengthen the Soviet Union’s remote border regions. 
Therefore, the Kyrgyz SSR –like other Central Asian Republics (CARs) – mainly served 
as a source of raw materials for the Union’s economy as a whole, namely wool, meat 
and crops, as well as uranium, gold and mercury. The republic’s economy was 
therefore predominantly agrarian, with a particular focus on livestock production (see 
4.1.2). Most Kyrgyz transport infrastructure had been developed only to serve the 
production and export of raw materials. This high structural dependency of the Soviet 
periphery on the center resulted in all CARs being relatively under-developed. By the 
late 1980s, there was a comparatively high proportion of people living below the 
official poverty line (33% in the Kyrgyz SSR in 1989), and the primary sector retained 
much of its importance (Duncan 1994; Stadelbauer 1996; Gumpel 1997; Spoor 1999 
and 2004; Schmidt 2006). 
 
Population growth and rural unemployment 
 
Between 1926 and 1989, Kyrgyzstan’s population had quadrupled from 1 million to 
4.3 million people. This growth rate was similar to that of neighboring republics and 
was mainly caused by the influx of migrants, especially from European Russia. During 
most of the 20th century, ethnic Kyrgyz were but a small minority in their own capital 
(Huskey 1995, 814f). The proportion of Russians, Germans, Tatars and other 
nationalities was lower in rural areas however, and only very few non-ethnic Kyrgyz 
lived in Naryn oblast in Soviet times. Nevertheless, rural areas suffered from an 
increasing rate of under- and unemployment. On the one hand, Moscow was reluctant 
in the 1980s to create new, labor-intensive industries in Central Asia; instead, the 
administration aimed at improving the efficiency of the existing industries. On the 
other hand, rural out-migration to cities remained low. According to Patnaik (1995), 
ethnic and cultural reasons dissuaded rural people from moving to the Russian-
dominated urban centers, although industrial wages were higher and the industry still 
suffered from labor shortage. 
 
The ‘second’ economy 
 
As the central administration showed no interest in developing processing industries 
and creating new income opportunities in rural areas, there was a rise in the 
importance of informal incomes. These were mainly generated through the so-called 
‘second’ (informal or unofficial) economy that developed alongside and within the 
centrally planned economy. Informal economic activity was widespread in all sectors, 
but especially pronounced in the agricultural sector. This not only included various 
forms of food production (small-scale cultivation and animal husbandry), but also 
construction and repair work, unofficial taxi services and the like (Verdery 2002, 5). 
Its most developed forms were found in the southern USSR, namely Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and the CARs. Efforts by the Khrushchev administration in the 1960s to fight 
private economic activity – for instance through the mass dismissal of farm leaders and 
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dispatching hundreds of thousands of party members into farm management jobs – 
yielded few results (C.Z. 1959). Instead, the formal and informal economies developed 
a symbiosis: state firms unintentionally subsidized the second economy (since the latter 
nearly always utilized materials from the former), while the second economy balanced 
the failures of the state economy (Verdery 2002, 5). Many state enterprises and 
cooperatives practised double-entry bookkeeping, producing both for the state and the 
private market. In 1988, the resulting losses for the centralized state economy were 
estimated at about 40% of total economic performance (Stadelbauer 1996, 109; 
Ronsijn 2006). Besides the ‘second economy’ there were other informal sources of 
income from bribes or from the embezzlement of public resources by party officials 
and others who had the opportunity to do so. According to Grossman (1989; cit. in 
Kandiyoti 1999, 514), such informal income was more prevalent in rural areas than in 
towns and cities. 
 
 
Box 4a    Socialist economics: rational redistribution and allocative power 
 
Socialist economies – at least before the first radical reforms in the second half of the 20th century – 
generally suppressed the market principle; instead, they based their basic mode of exchange on the 
principle of redistribution. Everyone had the right to work, while the state claimed the sole right to 
redistribute the produced wealth as welfare for all. Productive resources were therefore owned and 
controlled by the public, while the product was centrally appropriated and then reallocated along lines set 
by the central state, i.e. the party. The key instrument for production, appropriation and redistribution was 
the five-year plan (Nee 1989; Verdery 2002). 
 
The central legitimating principle of the socialist economy was therefore ‘rational redistribution’, i.e. the 
argument that the state was best placed to collect and redistribute resources in a fair and just manner. In 
this system, strengthening the bureaucracy’s capacity to allocate (but not necessarily the amounts to be 
allocated) was a means of maximizing power. Consequently, Verdery (1991) defines ‘allocative power’ as 
the basic law of motion of any socialist economy. This also explains why the Soviet state attempted to 
regulate private small-scale production strongly, e.g. through the kontrakt system (see 6.3). 
 
As a result, Soviet agriculture was vertically organized and an integral part of a system of processing and 
distribution chains scattered all over the USSR. This not only entailed large capital investments and 
transfers from the secondary to the primary sector, but also the heavy subsidization of input prices such as 
fuel, seeds and the like (Kerven 2003b, 22). 
 
 
4.1.2 Collectivized livestock production in the Kyrgyz SSR 
 
The rural Kyrgyz SSR was predominantly agrarian and specialized in livestock 
production for the all-Union market. By 1990, agriculture accounted for 33.6% of the 
republic’s GDP, one third of the Kyrgyz labor force was engaged in the agrarian sector, 
and livestock accounted for 57% of Kyrgyz agricultural production (ADB 2001; 
Lerman et al. 2003, 1003). Collectivized stock-raising in the Kyrgyz SSR34 started in 
the late 1920s, when livestock owners were forced to hand over their animals to the 
newly established kolkhozes35. At first, this confiscation of livestock met fierce 
resistance among the Central Asian population, often leading to violent conflicts. 
Many people preferred to slaughter their animals rather than hand them over to the 
Soviet administration. Others decided to drive their animals to China. The result was a 
severe drop in livestock numbers in Soviet Central Asia in the 1930s.36 Even by 1940, 
                                                
34 Kyrgyzstan was officially transformed into a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1936. Between 1926 and 
1936, it had the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) and was still part of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (Prokhorov 1982). 
35 Chapter 6 explains the functioning of collective farms [Russ. kolkhoz] in detail. 
36 Brill Olcott (1981) estimates that between 1928 and 1932, more than 1.5 million people died in 
Kazakhstan and nearly 80% of all livestock. 
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livestock numbers had not yet recovered to pre-collectivization levels (Holdsworth 
1952; Brill Olcott 1981; Stadelbauer 1996). 
 
Despite these setbacks, the socialist administration soon started to gradually replace 
the traditional fat-tailed sheep with wool breeds. Collectivized livestock production 
made use of certain elements of nomadic grazing systems such as seasonal pastures and 
annual migratory cycles, but with the goal of rapidly increasing the number of animals. 
Whereas in pre-Soviet times most families engaged in transhumance tended their own 
flock, kolkhozes employed a few professional herders to look after the farm’s livestock. 
Like all other economic production, pasture management and livestock production was 
planned according to centrally defined five-year plans (Brill Olcott 1981; Dienes 1975; 
van Veen 1995; Undeland 2005). 
 
By 1960, the number of sheep and goats had doubled compared to 1916 figures and 
the number of cattle had also exceeded pre-revolutionary levels (Figure 4.1). Fine-
fleeced and semi-fine-fleeced sheep now made up 90 percent of kolkhoz flocks. In 
order to constantly increase livestock and pasture productivity, the state developed 
scientific pasture improvement techniques, including aerial surface seeding and 
fertilization. In addition, collective farms were requested to intensify cultivation and 
storage of their own fodder crops. Despite these efforts, however, the Kyrygz livestock 
sector became increasingly dependent on feed and fodder imports from other Soviet 
republics (Dikambaev 1960, 13; Undeland 2005, 48). 
 
 
Figure 4.1   Development of 
livestock populations in the 
Kyrgyz SSR (Farrington 2005, 
174) 
 
 
But the rapid growth of the livestock sector had a detrimental effect on pastures. By the 
early 1960s, permanent overstocking had already become common practice, resulting 
in severe pasture degradation and a sharp decline in pasture dry matter production 
throughout the republic. By 1989, animal population levels were estimated at two to 
three times the maximum stocking capacity of winter, spring and autumn pastures 
(Fitzherbert 2000; Farrington 2005, 174; Undeland 2005, 45). 
 
 
4.1.3 Pre-independence reforms: perestrojka and the Kyrgyz 
agriculture 
 
In the late 1980s, Soviet food production was no longer able to satisfy people’s 
qualitative expectations, nor could it fulfil their quantitative requirements anymore. 
Confronted with these obvious shortcomings, the new Gorbachev-Ryzhkov 
administration officially acknowledged the balancing function of the ‘second economy’ 
and tried to strengthen the agrarian sector by partially formalizing private production 
through the perestrojka reforms. Thus, to some extent, perestrojka paved the way for 
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many of the economic reforms carried out by the Kyrgyz government after 1991 
(Wegren 1992). 
 
Strengthening private agrarian production and marketing (late 1980s) 
 
Until the late 1980s, only individuals had the right to sell products privately on so-
called kolkhoz markets [Kyrg. bazaar], while private enterprises did not. Instead, they 
had to deliver all their production to the state, which was in charge of redistribution. It 
was only in the last years of the USSR that perestrojka authorized the emergence of the 
first independent cooperatives and private enterprises. They were given the right to sell 
part of their production independently and at market prices, while the rest had to be 
delivered to the state at fixed prices. On the one hand, this ‘dual pricing system’ helped 
to create new rural markets, so that the number of bazaars in Kyrgyzstan increased by 
nearly 40 percent between 1980 and 1989. On the other hand, however, the measure 
more than ever allowed profit-seeking groups to sell state-subsidized goods at market 
prices, which had an adverse effect on the state economy. Finally, by 1991 it had 
become clear that only a single pricing system could help to solve these inconsistencies 
(Abazov 1999, 205). 
 
In order to increase the productivity of all-Union agriculture, the government also tried 
to create new incentives for individual farmers. This however meant limiting the 
powers of local and regional bureaucrats who had resisted all local initiatives up to this 
point. In principle, perestrojka offered two de facto ways of establishing an individual 
farm. The first possibility was the so-called ‘family contract’ – a contract on 
production tasks signed voluntarily between the kolkhoz management and a group of 
farm workers. To fulfill the contract, these workers were entitled to use the assets of 
the kolkhoz such as arable land and equipment. The second possibility was to lease 
land from the kolkhoz for private production. However, such early land share 
arrangements usually existed purely on paper and were not physically demarcated 
(Ronsijn 2006). 
 
First legal conceptualization of agrarian reforms (1991 – 1994) 
 
In October 1990, Askar Akaev was elected the first president of the – formally not yet 
independent – Kyrgyz Republic. Akaev, “a USSR people’s deputy and a champion of 
Gorbachev’s policies of measured reform” (Huskey 1995, 813) then united all those in 
favor of radical reforms to push perestrojka further. In early 1991, his government 
already passed a first legal basis for land reforms. The two laws ‘On Peasant Farms’ 
(February 2, 1991) and ‘On Land Reform’ (April 19, 1991) paved the way for the 
creation of private peasant farms. As a result, land commissions were established at 
kolkhoz level; they were responsible for the distribution of land-use shares to private 
farms. For the time being, however, restructuring was only permitted in inefficient 
collective and state farms and it remained completely voluntary; the law only obliged 
the farm management to allocate land-use rights to individuals or households wishing 
to establish their own peasant farm (Stadelbauer 1996; Giovarelli 1998; Eriksson 
2006). In addition, all transfers of land-use rights – except inheritance – were strictly 
forbidden. On the one hand, peasant farms stood to profit from very favorable 
conditions, as they were entitled to access markets and receive state inputs and credits 
at the same conditions as a kolkhoz. On the other hand, however, they had to fulfill 
numerous obligations, such as using the farmland in a prescribed manner and issuing 
labor contracts to workers at the same conditions as the kolkhoz. According to 
Duncan (1994, 86), such legal constraints revealed the state’s still ambiguous attitude 
to private trade: “Overall policy permit it, but a raft of regulations covering prices, 
taxes, entry into trade, and movements and exports severely restricts it. (…) there is 
clearly a pro-production, anti-trade bias in the minds of most policy-makers (…).” 
This and other administrative hurdles may have been the reason that mainly leading 
and specialized kolkhoz personnel – accountants, veterinarians, and brigadiers – seized 
the opportunity to start their own peasant farms, while ordinary workers often lacked 
the necessary capital or practical knowledge to do so. In addition, the existing 
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agricultural infrastructure was designed for large-scale farming under the Soviet 
command system, and did not suit the requirements of small farming units. Since legal 
hurdles excluded purchasing land from others in order to create farms large enough for 
efficient management and production, the effectiveness of this first step towards a 
privatized agriculture was rather limited. By 1994, only some 10,000 private farms had 
grown out of Kyrygz kolkhozes (Jones 2003, 263). Thus, the state was less and less 
able to offer competitive prices for agricultural goods, to pay on time or to provide the 
necessary agricultural inputs. Consequently, some kolkhozes and farmers started to 
ignore state orders in order to sell and barter goods on the private market, often 
against fuel or fertilizers (Bloch et al. 1996; Stadelbauer 1996; Trouchine and 
Zitzmann 2005; Ronsijn 2006). 
 
 
 
4.2  Independence and the Kyrgyz transition agenda 
 
4.2.1  Akaev’s reform program: liberalize, deregulate, privatize 
 
Soon after gaining formal independence in August 1991, the Kyrgyz government under 
president Akaev embarked upon radical reforms, which were supposed to lead to “one 
of the most radical programs of privatization in the region, (…) [and] one of the most 
liberal economic regimes (…)” (Abazov 1999, 218). The government quickly adopted 
the structural reform measures promoted by the international donor community37 
through conditional loans and grants. Working on the basis of the Washington 
Consensus (compare 2.1), international policy advisors promoted a ‘shock therapy’ i.e. 
a swift, market-led transition consisting of an immediate liberalization of prices, the 
privatization of most state property, and the withdrawal of the state from the 
economic sphere (Kerven 2003b; Trouchine and Zitzmann 2005). A gradual approach 
was ruled out from the very beginning, as most leading international advisors were 
convinced that recovery from the unavoidable fall of output and rise of unemployment 
“should be (…) under way in two years or so” (IMF, IBRD, OECD, EBRD 1990, cit. 
in Abazov 1999, 199). The reforms of the Akaev administration thus pursued three 
main objectives: 
 
a) Internal and external price liberalization 
 
The decision was soon taken to liberalize almost 90% of prices and to maintain state 
subsidies only for bread, meat, coal and public transportation. As a result, living 
conditions rapidly deteriorated, so that the state had to intervene again in 1993. The 
donor community then pressurized the Kyrgyz government into liberalizing prices 
again; this was in 1994. Nearly all limitations on imports to and exports from 
Kyrgyzstan were then eliminated (Duncan 1994; Abazov 1999, 205ff). 
 
b) Macroeconomic stabilization and introduction of national currency 
 
At independence, Kyrgyzstan still belonged to the ruble zone, having neither an own 
currency nor an independent banking system. When prices were liberalized, the 
republic lost control over its economy and inflation skyrocketed (Abazov 1999, 206). 
To regain control, Kyrgyzstan was the first country in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) to leave the ruble zone and introduced its own currency in 
May 1993. The immediate effect of the Kyrgyzstani Som (KGS) on the economy was 
adverse however, and the severe economic crises in Kazakhstan and Russia – at the 
time the two main markets for Kyrgyz products – further aggravated the situation. In 
1993, the Kyrgyz GDP was estimated at US $680, among the lowest in the CIS. After 
                                                
37 At that time mainly represented by the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
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1995, however, the Som developed into one of the most stable currencies in the region, 
and macroeconomic stabilization was achieved by 1996-97. Inflation had stabilized by 
1996 and this also attracted the first wave of foreign investment (Bloch et al. 1996; 
Abazov 1999). 
 
c) Privatization and restructuring of the economy 
 
Kyrgyzstan was the first of the Central Asian Republics to systematically privatize state 
property and deregulate the economy. But the introduction of a new currency, spiraling 
inflation, lack of capital or credit resources for newly privatized enterprises, and 
economic stagnation in other CIS countries made it a very long and tedious process 
lasting throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless, 41% of both the agricultural and the 
industrial sectors were already privatized between 1991 and 1993. By mid-1995, the 
Akaev administration had privatized more than 64% of all state property – faster than 
any other Central Asian Republic (Abazov 1999). 
Despite these efforts and massive financial aid from multilateral and bilateral 
donors, by 1995 the Kyrgyz GDP had dropped to 53% of the 1990 level. As a 
response, the president temporarily suspended privatization by a special decree in May 
1997, but resumed it in 1998, now turning to the energy, telecommunication and 
mining industries. By the end of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan had privatized most of the 
former state enterprises in the agricultural, industrial and service sectors (Gumpel 
1997; Abazov 1999; UNDP CBS 2005). 
 
 
4.2.2  Decentralization of governance and the state administration 
 
In the Kyrgyz SSR, local government consisted of Local Councils of People’s Deputies38 
at various levels, with the Supreme Soviet at their top. These councils were only really 
of a formal nature, and did little more than to implement central policies and 
programs. After independence, local government structures were therefore reformed 
along the three main tiers oblast (province), rayon (district) and ayil okmotu 
(community). The politico-administrative reforms at the local level went hand-in-hand 
with economic reforms, i.e. the dismantling of state and collective farms (see 4.3). This 
simultaneity made the local organizational framework of the 1990s fairly complex, 
with many overlapping actors, institutions and organizations (Giovarelli 1998; 
Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003). 
 
Development of new local government structures 
 
The Law on Local Self-Government and Local Public Administration, adopted on 19 
April 1991 first transferred government powers to the still existing Local Councils at 
the local (i.e. kolkhoz) level. However, in the absence of sufficient financial transfers 
from central government, they were virtually powerless to carry out the functions of 
local self-government (Wolters 2006, 3). In March 1992 therefore, the government 
adopted an amendment to the law to introduce a dual system. The new approach 
divided up local legislative and executive functions and powers between a local council 
and a rural executive committee. This dual principle was eventually officialized in the 
1993 constitution. It was only in August 1994, though, that the local community and 
its organizational, legal, financial and economic foundations were formally endorsed 
by presidential decree (issued 22 Aug 1994; cf. Appendix 5). 
 
In the beginning, the local executive, initially called ‘rural committee’ was placed under 
the authority of the rayon administration. The rayon could thus appoint the 
committee’s director as well as his deputy, who in turn appointed the other committee 
members. Needless to say, this meant that the new committees by and large reproduced 
socialist power structures at rayon and local level, so that most of them consisted of 
former kolkhoz chairmen, their accountants and other specialists, who were not always 
                                                
38 Also known as Local Soviet of People’s Deputies. 
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very supportive of the central 
government’s reform plans (Bloch 
1996, 89f). In January 1995, the 
national government therefore 
disempowered the local committees 
once more, replacing them with 
new committees responsible for 
implementing land reforms and 
reorganizing agricultural 
enterprises. In April 1996, another 
presidential decree finally abolished 
the rural committees, making way 
for the establishment of new rural 
executive committees [Kyrg. ayil 
okmotu], with an elected head of 
ayil okmotu (Giovarelli 1998; 
Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003). 
 
 The first elections for the local 
legislative, i.e. local councils [Kyrg. 
ayil kengesh] were held in October 
1994. These finally replaced the 
former Local Councils of People’s 
Deputies. However, since there was 
no concept of communal property 
at the time, the new ayil kengeshs 
had practically no power. It was 
only after a national referendum 
held on February 10, 1996 that 
local councils were given 
ownership rights over local 
property (Alymkulov and Kulatov 
2003). Communal property was 
itself only recognized as a 
constitutional form of ownership 
after a national referendum held on 
October 17, 1998. By that point, 
many former kolkhozes had already distributed or sold most of their valuable 
infrastructure such as machines and barns, and many public buildings had been 
ransacked by the people for construction materials (compare Figure 4.2). 
Consequently, it was mainly objects requiring substantial investment that remained in 
municipal ownership such as schools, healthcare institutions, kindergartens, libraries, 
clubs, and sports facilities (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003). 
 
Local government structures today 
 
Ayil kengesh literally means ‘local council’. It represents the legislative on the territory 
of a community, which may consist of several villages [Kyrg. ayil]. Deputies are elected 
by local inhabitants by a direct ballot for a term of four to five years, and meet once a 
quarter. The ayil kengesh‘s jurisdiction is exclusively local; it can make decisions on the 
management of municipal property and can issue normative acts that local inhabitants 
must comply with (Ibraimova 2009, 62f). 
 
Ayil okmotu literally means ‘village government’, and it has two main functions: first, 
to implement decisions made by the ayil kengesh, for which the ayil okmotu is 
accountable to the ayil kengesh; and second, to carry out delegated state powers, e.g. 
keeping local level statistics, renting out community land and pastures, and issuing 
pensions and allowances. For this, the ayil okmotu is accountable to the head of the 
 
 
Figure 4.2    After 1991, the former club of the Jangy Talap 
kolkhoz was ransacked and even the wooden floor 
disappeared. Today, the ruined building is one of the few 
items which remained in municipal ownership. Ironically, the 
ayil okmotu still employs a person to guard the club (photo 
by the author, 2008). 
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rayon administration [Kyrg. rayon akim]. The head of the ayil okmotu is the highest 
official in the territorial jurisdiction of a community. He or she is elected for a five-year 
term through communal elections and must be approved by the chairman of the rayon 
council and by the ayil kengesh 39 (Ibraimova 2009, 63f). Today, most people use the 
term ayil okmotu indiscriminately for the political entity (community), the municipal 
administration and the administration building, as well as for the head of the rural 
executive committee. 
 
The Akaev government has also created room for various bodies of local self-
governance below the ayil okmotu and the ayil kengesh. Rural communities have the 
right to form territorial bodies of public self-governance (TPS) to engage in social and 
economic communal development. A TPS must be registered as a private association 
with the ayil kengesh, which can then delegate certain functions or municipal property 
to the TPS. 
Several forms of traditional self-governance were formalized in the mid-1990s. The 
kurultai (open village assembly) can be called upon people’s request and can submit 
recommendations to the ayil kengesh. Aksakal councils – elder men’s councils40 – play 
an important role in social control and decision-making at communal level. Aksakal 
councils already existed in pre-colonial times, but the Soviet authorities limited their 
powers to conducting moral instruction of the public and making recommendations to 
the local state representatives (Geiss 2008, 240; Ibraimova 2009, 68). Today, they have 
the right to resolve minor conflicts at communal level through so-called aksakal courts, 
local arbitration courts. The cases they deal with include conflicts between individuals 
over land or rental fees and the settlement of divorce disputes. The court usually tries 
to solve a case within ten days and then sends a report to the rayon. If a case cannot be 
settled, the aksakals may ask the regional court for assistance. The ayil okmotu also 
has the possibility to take defaulters to the aksakal court. Aksakals are elected by 
public ballot every three years41. Women’s councils have the same status as aksakal 
councils, but usually have less influence at the communal level (Temirkuolov 2004; 
Ibraimova 2009, 67f). Other forms of local self-government include local self-help 
groups [Kyrg. jamaat], village development organizations, as well as associations of 
resource users. The latter – e.g. Water and Pasture Users’ Associations – are usually 
initiated by external development organizations; they will be discussed in more detail 
in the chapters 8 and 9. 
 
Communal revenues and expenditure 
 
Communal budget revenues consist mainly of local taxes on private and leased arable 
land as well as on pasture lease fees. There are also local taxes stipulated by the 
National Tax Code (e.g. on vehicles, tourism, or hunting and fishing), and deductions 
from national taxes and other revenues such as fines and surcharges. Land taxes 
usually represent the main source of communal revenues, while the collection of local 
taxes is hardly ever worthwhile for municipal administrations as revenue is often 
insignificant compared to the considerable organizational effort needed to calculate 
and collect them (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003; Young 2005). As for the deductions 
from national taxes, communities receive a de jure share of 35% but often receive less 
due to arbitrary decisions by higher authorities. According to Abazov (1999, 214), tax 
collection remains one of the most serious problems of the Kyrgyz state, which also 
experienced a steep decline in tax revenues in the 1990s. 
 
More than 60% of local expenditure is on wages for ayil okmotu staff; 22% are 
allocations to the SozFond (social fund), while the remainder includes expenditure on 
municipal services, transport and equipment. In short, local revenues are often just 
                                                
39 In recent years, the rules for the election or appointment of a head of ayil okmotu have changed several 
times. 
40 Aksakal literally translates as ‘white beard’ and is also used to address elder men. 
41 Personal communication with the head of the Jergetal aksakal court, 27 October 2007 
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sufficient to pay local government and administration staff42. According to Alymkulov 
and Kulatov (2003, 559), problems are endemic “to resolve issues of financing for the 
maintenance of municipal facilities, including water supply, roads and bridges, the 
surrounding environment and others”. 
 
Communal responsibilities regarding local development 
 
Despite the chronic shortage of funds at communal level, various functions have been 
devolved down from national and oblast authorities to ayil okmotu level since 1996. 
On paper, communal responsibilities include education (except teachers’ salaries, 
which are covered out of the national budget), social protection (calculation of 
entitlements to and distribution of pensions, child and other special allowances), 
healthcare (including first aid and partial financing of local hospitals), maintenance of 
municipal services and infrastructure (including electricity and water supply, roads, 
lighting, clubs, waste disposal etc.) and environmental protection. The latter includes 
the protection of pastures and the maintenance of related infrastructure, such as 
bridges and watering points. Since many ayil okmotus generate only meager revenues 
and have few additional financial means, they often fulfill only the most important 
tasks – pasture management and maintenance are seldom among their top priorities 
(Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003; Young 2005). 
 
Persisting confusion and personality politics 
 
All in all, as Alymkulov and Kulatov (2003, 529) note, the Kyrgyz government was 
very quick to begin  reforming local government structures, yet from the outset lacked 
a clear plan of how to do this. As a result, the legislative process to formalize local 
government in the Kyrgyz Republic and define the exact roles of ayil kengesh and ayil 
okmotu often lagged behind changes at local level. Eventually, this uneven 
development has left many of the new communal institutions in a rather weak position. 
It also seems that recent attempts to reform the local government structures further 
have led to considerable confusion between different state levels as to their precise 
responsibilities and the future division of taxes. Wolters (2006, 10) therefore describes 
the structural landscape of the Kyrgyz local government as “a conglomerate of 
different steps of implementation” (author’s translation). 
 
At the same time, local politics have remained largely based on personality. Both oblast 
governors and rayon akims are not elected democratically but appointed by the Kyrgyz 
president and the central government. This has fostered clientelism and patronage, 
since state representatives often feel more accountable to their superiors than to the 
inhabitants of their rayon or oblast (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003). This is further 
exacerbated by tribal and family structures, which lead many politicians to appoint or 
employ their kin. However, as Libman (2008, 5), notes “although one can hardly claim 
that traditional clans play no role in the administrations of Central Asian countries, it 
is probably necessary not to overestimate their importance”. However, the high degree 
of personalization in local politics again became apparent in April 2010, when after the 
ousting of President Bakiev, many oblast governors, rayon akims, and ayil okmotu 
heads were instantly replaced43. 
 
 
4.2.3 Macroeconomic development and recent reform adjustments  
 
By the end of the 1990s, a large portion of the Kyrgyz economy had been privatized, 
and formal decentralization of government structures had been substantially 
implemented. However, for much of the 1990s, the Akaev government had been 
unable to effectively tackle economic recession, to respond to growing socioeconomic 
disparities, and to counter mass impoverishment of the population. As a result, 
                                                
42 Personal communication, ayil okmotu staff, Kyzyl-Tuu, 22 May 2007. 
43 Personal communication, Rustam Tashtanov, Kyrgyz Academy of Science, 23 April 2010. 
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Kyrgyzstan experienced one of the severest economic recessions of all the CARs. It 
lasted for six consecutive years until 1996 and came as a surprise to many observers. 
 
The social costs of reform 
 
Obviously, the social costs of shock therapy were far higher than expected, taking the 
form of unemployment, poverty and social polarization. The industrial production 
declined heavily, leading to a rapid de-industrialization and mass unemployment. 
Many of those who lost their jobs in the industry moved into trade. The curtailing of 
the welfare safety net caused a further rise of poverty. By 1996, around 71% of the 
population lived below the official national poverty line (Abazov 1999, 215). Old 
people and women were the worst affected, because social welfare institutions such as 
kindergartens, paid maternity leave and old-age pensions were cut back or done away 
with altogether (UNDP CBS, 11). At that time, the persistence of the former kolkhoz 
markets and the ogorod more than ever protected the (rural) Kyrgyz population from 
famine. 
In 1998, the recession finally ended and the economy began to recover. Although 
the state remained heavily indebted, Kyrgyzstan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose 
from 34 billion KGS in 1998 to 75 billion KGS in 2002 (Kerven 2003b). Also the share 
of people living below the official poverty line decreased from 71% in 1996 to 41% in 
2003 – although this was still way above the official 1989 level  (33%). In addition, 
rural poverty ratios were consistently about 50% above urban levels, and income 
inequalities had become particularly apparent in rural areas (GovtKG 2001; Quigley 
2004; UNDP 2005). Spoor (2004, 34) also observed a “deepening feminization of 
poverty”, which he related to job losses in the health and education sector and the 
cutbacks in formerly state-sponsored child-related support services. Yet while there 
was an undeniable increase in poverty rates, the question as to whether income 
inequalities really increased after 1991 or just became more visible remains 
controversial (cf. Henderson et al. 2005 and 2008). I will take up that discussion again 
towards the end of this thesis. 
As a reaction to these developments, and in virtue of an altered development 
paradigm of the international donor community (compare 2.1.2), the Kyrgyz 
government in 2001 adopted a first Comprehensive Development Framework for 
2001-2010 (GovtKG 2002). The new program was mainly aimed at improving 
governance and tackling wealth disparities. The declared objective was to halve 
poverty levels by 2010 and to achieve sustainable economic growth on the basis of a 
market economy. The Akaev administration then tried to further decrease state 
interference in private sector activities and to eliminate administrative barriers to 
private entrepreneurship (UNPF 2004; UNDP 2005). 
 
Persisting problems and political turmoil 
 
However, nepotism and clientelism persisted, and eventually dragged people’s trust in 
their government down to an all-time low. By 2005, public disappointment about the 
slow economic growth and the government’s apparent inability to react became one of 
the main drivers behind the ‘tulip revolution’, which led to the ousting of President 
Akaev in March 2005. Unfortunately, however, things have not improved a lot since 
then. The new Bakiev administration has not been able to present a coherent 
development strategy, nor has it proved its ability or willingness to fight endemic 
corruption and nepotism. By the end of 2005, economic growth had slowed and 
people’s real incomes had begun to shrink again. In late 2007, Kyrgyzstan came close 
to a humanitarian catastrophe, when in the course of the global food crisis, prices for 
basic food items suddenly doubled, and inflation once more spiraled out of control; 
independent experts estimated inflation rates of up to 36% (UN 2008; Omarov 2009). 
By 2008, Kyrgyzstan’s basic development indicators presented a rather gloomy picture, 
even by CIS standards (Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Basic development indicators for the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008 (UN 2008, 3) 
 
 Kyrgyzstan CIS Average* 
   
Population 5.2 million (UNFPA 2007) - 
Under 5 mortality 4.1%  (UNICEF 2006) 3.7% 
Maternal mortality 150 per 100,000 (UNICEF, 2005) 29 per 100,000 
Life expectancy 65.6 yrs. (HDR 2007) 67 yrs. 
Gross national income per capita US $590 (World Bank 2007) US $2,699 
Population living below national poverty line 39.9% (NSC, 2006) n/a 
2006 UNDP HDI score 0.696 (rank 116 of 177) 0.750 
 
* Sources for CIS averages: HDR 2007; UNFPA SWP 2007; UNICEF www.childinfo.org; World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
 
The events of 2005 finally repeated themselves in early April 2010, when public 
disappointment about widespread nepotism, shady deals involving the president’s 
family, the rising cost of electricity and mobile phone connections, obvious press 
censorship and the like culminated in the toppling of President Bakiev and the ruling 
government. According to Reeves (2010, no pagination) it was “poverty, in an 
absolute sense, as much as inequality that brought people out to demonstrate” (see also 
Steimann and Thieme 2010). 
 
 
 
4.3 Agrarian reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian country to take major steps on the land 
question. In the face of a deepening national crisis in food procurement, the first legal 
reforms from spring 1991 (see 4.1.3) on private farming enterprises and land-use rights 
were soon amended and further developed. 
 
 
4.3.1 Early distribution orders for unprofitable kolkhozes (1991-
1994) 
 
A November 1991 presidential decree44 had already made the distribution of means of 
production compulsory for all collective and state farms producing less than 15% 
profit. The same decree also substantiated the rules for the first National Land Fund 
(NLF), created in April 1991, in which 50% of all arable land should be set aside for 
‘special distribution’ (Bloch et al. 1996; Giovarelli 1998; Jones 2003; Ronsijn 2006). 
 
The procedure for the distribution of arable land was formalized in 1992. Another 
presidential decree recommended that the unproductive collective and state farms 
divide their arable land into equal shares to satisfy every farm member’s right to use a 
plot of land 45. From 1992 onwards, responsibility for implementing these reforms at 
local level was passed to rural committees, which were formally controlled by the 
rayon administration (compare 4.2.2). They were made responsible for implementing 
national land reforms and for reorganizing collective or state farms locally, and 
apparently replaced the land commissions initiated by the first agrarian reforms of 
spring 1991 (compare 4.1.3). Through these committees, the rayon administration was 
also ordered to support local administrations with the measurement, division and 
distribution of land shares by providing experienced land-use planners [Russ. 
                                                
44 Presidential Decree No. VII-369, 10 November 1991. 
45 Presidential decree ‘On measures for further implementation of land and agrarian reform in the Kyrgyz 
Republic’, 10 December 1992. 
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sjemlestrojtel] (Bloch et al. 1996; Giovarelli 1998). In 1993, the first constitution of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (adopted on May 5, 1993) defined that land could be given to citizens 
and legal entities for private use but would remain in state ownership (Giovarelli 1998, 
11). However, the rural committees in charge of the distribution of land-use shares 
often consisted of former kolkhoz chairmen and other leading personnel from the 
socialist economy, who were often hostile to the central government’s reform plans 
(Bloch 1996, 89f). The early agrarian reforms of the Akaev government thus met fierce 
resistance and did little to change local realities. In addition, many national 
parliamentarians also opposed the dissolution of collective and state farms, so that this 
first round of agrarian reforms remained largely ineffective (Pope 1994). 
 
 
4.3.2 The heyday of privatization: the compulsory dissolution of 
kolkhozes (1994-1998) 
 
By two years later, things had changed. By late 1993, most of the remaining collective 
and state farms were bankrupt. In the absence of state subsidies, agrarian production 
had more or less collapsed, and the kolkhozes were unable to pay and supply their 
workers and their families anymore. In view of the rapid impoverishment of the rural 
population, the Akaev administration had therefore to seriously push on with reforms 
and decided in 1994 to make de-collectivization compulsory for all collective and state 
farms. In the meantime, the once fierce local and regional resistance to the 
government’s dissolution plans had also ceased, since it had become obvious that a 
formally state-led economy was economically unviable. A presidential decree46 thus 
entitled all members and workers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes to a 49-year land-use 
share. The decree also reduced the share of the National Land Fund to 25% of all 
arable land, and stipulated that pastures must not be distributed but could be leased 
from the state, with priority being given to kolkhoz herders and farm employees (see 
4.3.4) (Giovarelli 1998, 11; Bloch et al. 1996, 15). 
 
Rules for the distribution of land shares 
 
The distribution of land-use shares was defined in detail in Regulation No. 632, dated 
22 August 1994. With the exception of pastures, non-arable land, planned building 
plots and all land reserved for the NLF, all arable land within a collective or state farm 
had to be divided into equal land-use shares and distributed free of charge to all 
current and former farm workers living on a given farm, including all their household 
members. In addition, retired or disabled people, any people born on a given farm who 
decided to return for permanent living, and all people living on a given farm but 
working in other spheres such as health, education, commerce, culture and farm supply 
were eligible for a land-use share. Thus, virtually all people living on a farm were 
entitled to a land-use share47. Certificates had to be issued by the rural committees to 
the respective head of household and had to be registered in the land cadastre of the 
rayon land management office (GosRegistr) to become legally enforceable (Bloch et al. 
1996, 21). 
To implement these reforms, the national government disempowered the often 
reform-averse local committees in January 1995 and adopted a regulation ordering the 
creation of more broadly representative ‘committees for the implementation of land 
reforms and the reorganization of agricultural enterprises’. These new committees were 
no longer controlled by the rayon administration, and consisted of representatives from 
local up to national level (Giovarelli 1998, 17). In general, land-use shares were 
distributed in the same way on most collective and state farms. The size of shares 
depended on the farm’s total arable land and the number of people entitled to a share. 
Consequently, people living in areas with more arable land (e.g. Chui and Issyk-Kul 
                                                
46 Presidential Decree No. 23, 22 February 1994 
47 Nevertheless, there are cases where people did not receive any land-use shares, since they were not 
officially registered with their kolkhoz when distribution began. See 7.3.2 for an example from Jergetal. 
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oblast) or with a low population density (e.g. Naryn) received larger land-use shares 
than people living in areas with less arable land and/or a higher population density 
(e.g. Osh and Jalal-Abad). Although land use shares were calculated per capita, the 
certificates were issued per household – a practice which continues to cause 
considerable confusion regarding individual land rights up to the present day. In 
November 1995, land-use rights were extended from 49 to 99 years, while a coherent 
federal Land Code, defining rules for mortgaging land and registering user rights, had 
still not been drawn up (Giovarelli 1998). 
 
Rules for the division of livestock and non-divisible property 
 
Large common property items such as public bath-houses, clubs or irrigation systems 
was not intended for distribution but passed into the ownership of the newly 
established ayil okmotus (see 4.2.2). Smaller non-land assets, however, were to be sold 
off or divided up among farm members. This included all livestock, fruit trees and 
fodder reserves as well as machinery and smaller buildings such as stables and barns. 
The exact rules and procedures for the division of these assets were usually defined by 
the local commission in charge. In the case of divisible property such as livestock, each 
kolkhoz member received a certain number of sheep, depending on the kolkhoz’ total 
flock size. In addition, large animals such as cows, horses or yaks were divided 
according to household size. Due to the large number of animals in a kolkhoz and their 
division in many different flocks, the distribution of animals often took place in several 
steps and lasted for several months. As for the non-divisible property, barns and 
machines were usually allotted to local tribal leaders [Kyrg. uruu bas’chy], who were 
then responsible for negotiating the further division among their tribe. Barns and 
stables were often partitioned among all eligible households within a tribe, while many 
machines were sold or given to former mechanization specialists. However, as I shall 
show in chapter 7, much non-divisible property simply disappeared, either before or 
during the formal privatization process. 
 
 
4.3.3  Passage of modern land laws (1998 onwards) 
 
Once the distribution of land shares had been regulated and carried out in most former 
collective and state farms, the land-related political debates turned towards the land set 
aside in the Land Fund, as well as to the question of further specification of people’s 
long-term property rights over land resources. 
 
The Land Redistribution Fund (LRF) 
 
In November 1995, the National Land Fund was renamed the Land Redistribution 
Fund (LRF) and placed under the authority of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Agriculture. 
However, political struggles about the Fund’s designation and the rules for the 
allocation of its land reserves continued, reflecting an often contested land policy at the 
national level. Due to these struggles and delays, the legal adjustments of the LRF 
legislation often lagged behind the rapid changes at regional and local level. When 
clear and binding rules were finally issued, many communities had already distributed 
most of their arable land, often retaining less than the prescribed 25%, most of it 
barren and remote plots. This seriously affected the fund’s subsequent attractiveness 
and usefulness48 (Childress et al. 2003). Throughout the 1990s up to the early 
noughties, several observers therefore considered the LRF a significant source of 
tension (cf. Giovarelli 1998; Childress et al. 2003; Jones 2003). 
 
In early 2000, responsibility over the LRF passed from the Ministry of Agriculture to 
the 454 communities, which had meanwhile replaced the former kolkhozes as official 
local political entities. Responsibility was transferred under the condition that LRF 
                                                
48 Personal communication, former land-use specialist with the Naryn rayon administration, 24 May 
2007. 
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land was not to be sold into private ownership (Childress et al. 2003, 19). Since then, 
the LRF has been a land reserve fund at communal level. Communal authorities have 
the right to lease out LRF land to individuals and groups through a public auction 
process, to use it for the expansion of rural settlements or to give it to those in need 
free of charge. Chapter 9 discusses in detail the Fund’s local significance and the 
respective practices of local actors. 
 
Towards private land ownership 
 
In October 1998, the Kyrgyz people voted in favor of private land ownership, and a 
constitutional amendment converted the former 49-year land-use rights into legal 
ownership documents. The Land Code 1999 secured these ownership rights, but still 
included a moratorium on land sales. Again, the moratorium was a consequence of 
fierce parliamentary debates about land privatization, caused by the fear that a few 
wealthy individuals, including Uzbek or Chinese investors, may accumulate large land 
plots (Jones 2003, 264; Spoor 2004, 29). 
 
Another presidential decree marked the first step towards a gradual lifting of the 
moratorium. As of 1 September 2001, private purchase and sale of land became a 
reality, although several restrictions remained49. Amongst others, only Kyrgyz citizens 
who had lived in the respective rural area for at least two years were eligible to sell, 
purchase or inherit land. In addition, the maximum land holding per citizen was 
limited to 20 average land shares in a given ayil okmotu, or 50 ha in total. With these 
reforms, Kyrgyzstan became the only Central Asian Republic other than Kazakhstan to 
authorize private ownership of land (Eriksson 2006, 6). 
 
 
4.3.4 Legal and organizational framework for pasture allocation 
and management 
 
Unlike arable land, pastures have always been in state ownership in the Kyrgyz 
Republic50. However, coherent legislation on the allocation and management of 
pastures was missing throughout the 1990s. Various laws and regulations were 
partially relevant to pastures, but they were often inconsistent with each other, what 
led to misinterpretations. 
 
Definition of three pasture categories and assignment to communities 
 
The Land Code of 1999 was the first attempt to regulate pasture management 
nationally. The Code stipulated that all pastures shall remain the exclusive domain of 
the state and divided them into three legal categories according to their location and 
their distance from settlements. Each category was then put under a separate 
government authority (Table 4.2). 
 
                                                
49 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic ‘On Management of Agricultural Land’, 2001 
50 According to Art. 4-2 of the 1999 Land Code, the following types of land remain in exclusive state 
ownership: forests, water funds, special protected territories, frontier areas, LRF land, as well as all types 
of pastures. 
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Table 4.2 Different pasture categories, their designation and responsible authorities according to the Land 
Code 1999 
 
Category Designation Responsible authority 
   
Village-adjacent pastures 
[Russ. prisel’nye pastbyshcha; Kyrg. ički jai’it] To be used as winter pastures Ayil okmotu 
Intensive pastures 
[Russ. intensivnye pastbyshcha; Kyrg. ortonku jai’it] 
To be used as spring and autumn 
pastures Rayon administration 
Remote pastures 
[Russ. otgonnye pastbyshcha; Kyrg. alysky jai’it] To be used as summer pastures Oblast administration 
 
 
During this process, every rural community was assigned certain areas of village-
adjacent, intensive and remote pastures. In most cases, the new pasture boundaries 
were drawn on the basis of previous allocations to the former kolkhozes (Childress et 
al. 2003, 36). In addition, large sections of pasture land close to forested areas were 
placed under the authority of the State Agency for Environment and Forestry [Russ. 
leskhoz]. Last but not least, certain intensive and remote pastures were transferred to a 
special state land fund under the authority of the rayon administration, the so-called 
GosSemSapaz [Russ. ‘state land reserve’]. 
Different reasons seem to have led to this division of authority over pastures. On the 
one hand, many politicians considered the recently established local self-government 
bodies incapable of taking on full responsibility for the often vast areas of pasture. On 
the other hand, pastures represent a key natural resource in many oblasts, so that the 
division between different levels of administration must also be seen as a political 
move51. However, somewhat similar to the problems around the Land Redistribution 
Fund (see 4.3.3), the lengthy process for drafting laws on pasture use and management 
left much room for arbitrary decisions. The fact that there was no legally binding 
legislation throughout the 1990s created many loopholes for semi-legal appropriation 
of pastures (Childress et al. 2003). 
 
Introduction of a pasture lease system 
 
Finally, in 2002, the Regulations ‘On the Procedure for Providing Pastures for Lease 
and Use’52 provided the necessary details regarding the allocation and management of 
the three pasture categories. The regulations defined the responsibilities and powers of 
the different levels of administration regarding pasture allocation, the principles and 
restrictions of pasture use, and the leasing procedure. According to these regulations, 
which were still valid at the time of my research for this thesis, pasture use is based on 
territorial leases, to be obtained by individuals or groups from the various levels of 
administration in a (mandatory) competitive bidding process. Pasture leases for grazing 
can be given for five years and can be extended by another 10 and again by a further 
49 years (Undeland 2005, 51; Liechti and Biber-Klemm 2008). Due to the division of 
power between the three levels of administration, the legally defined rules and 
procedures for the use of pastures differ from village-adjacent pastures on the one hand 
to intensive and remote pastures on the other hand (see 10.3 and 10.4). 
 
Yet while the reforms of arable land ownership and use  had been more or less 
completed by the early noughties, the allocation and management of pastures has 
remained a subject of fierce debate up to the present day. Eventually, on 6 February 
2009, the Kyrgyz parliament passed a new law entitled ‘On pastures’, which came into 
effect by a government resolution dated 24 June 2009 (see 10.5)53. 
                                                
51 Personal communication with Anarbek Matysakov, former specialist at the agrarian department of the 
Kyrgyz Parliament, 15 September 2008. 
52 Govt. Resolution No. 360, June 4, 2002; amended September 27, 2004. 
53 Since I had already concluded my empirical field research when the new legislation became ratified, the 
evidence presented in this thesis does not focus on the new legislation. Nevertheless, section 9.5 reflects 
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4.3.5 Effects of the transition policy upon the agrarian sector 
 
The dismantling of collective and state farms and the subsequent privatization of land 
and other assets resulted in a dramatic collapse of agricultural output. Between 1990 
and 1996, the number of sheep and goats fell by 65% from 10 million to 3.7 million 
heads, mainly due to fodder shortage, disease and mass slaughter. At the same time, 
the number of cattle decreased by 33% from 1.2 million to 0.8 million head 
(Farrington 2005; Fitzherbert 2000, 13; Undeland 2005). Since then, flock numbers 
have increased again, but have not yet reached pre-independence levels (Figure 4.3)54. 
 
 
Figure 4.3   Livestock 
numbers in Kyrgyz–
stan, 1990 to 2009 
(Farrington 2005; 
NatStatKom 2009; no 
figures for 2000-2004 
available) 
 
 
Figure 4.4   Yields of 
major crops in Kyrgyz-
stan, 1993 to 2004 
(Christensen and 
Pomfret 2007, 39) 
 
 
Crop and fodder yields dropped to a similar extent after 1993, not only due to the 
partitioning of arable land, but also because of a lack of cash investment, fertilizers and 
working machinery. Thus, by 1994, most collective agrarian production had collapsed, 
and a large part of the rural population had to survive on their home gardens. This is 
                                                                                                                                       
how various actors’ perceived the new law at the time of research and describes their preventive 
strategies to cope with the announced changes. 
54 It shall be noted again that official statistics in Kyrgyzstan must be read with due reservation (see 3.2). 
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why potato production recovered earlier than production of most other crops. Wheat 
production recovered after 1995, but declined again after 1997 (Figure 4.4). In 
addition, the total area under crops has decreased since 2002, so that in 2007, only a 
quarter of all arable land was still in use for grain production (Mamytova and 
Mambetalieva 2008). Chapter 9 discusses the problems of land cultivation in more 
detail for the two case study villages. 
 
 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
Throughout the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was among the fastest reformers in Central Asia. 
The Akaev government implemented many of the international donor community’s 
suggestions and pushed ahead with a so-called ‘shock therapy’. The therapy’s 
prescription included rapid price liberalization, the introduction of a national currency, 
the decentralization of government structures and the state administration, and rapid 
privatization of former state property. After some initial difficulties and local 
resistance, the agrarian sector was soon subjected to a thorough privatization process, 
so that by the turn of the century, most former collective and state farms had 
disappeared. 
 
External pressure versus internal continuities 
 
International influence upon the Kyrgyz reform program was undoubtedly strong. 
From the very beginning, financial aid was often tied to conditionalities based on the 
neoliberal transition paradigm of the World Bank, the IMF and other international 
donor agencies. This was especially the case when in December 1998, Kyrgyzstan was 
the first CIS country to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). In order to comply 
with the organization’s rules, the Kyrgyz government had to follow liberal trading 
policies and further eliminate tariff barriers. However, it would certainly be wrong to 
interpret Kyrgyzstan’s agrarian sector reforms as a mere act of reproducing externally 
imposed, neo-liberal models. As I have shown in this chapter, the first agrarian reforms 
of the Akaev administration continued what perestrojka had begun in the late 1980s, 
namely to support private production and encourage local entrepreneurship. According 
to Abazov (1999, 209), the existence of “(…) a bazaar economy and abundant non-
state enterprise, especially in the agricultural and service sector (…) helped to make 
Kyrgyzstan’s people receptive to the process of privatization”. In the early years of 
reforms, there was also considerable pressure in favor of a restoration of property 
rights instead of equal distribution, and there were considerable differences of opinion 
about who should be entitled to shares of land and livestock. Paradoxically, these 
controversies may also have exacerbated the gap between the political debates on the 
one hand, and early agrarian reforms and changes at local level on the other (Hann 
2003; Spoor 2004). 
 
Transition policy versus processes of transformation 
 
Many of Kyrgyzstan’s major reforms were initiated in the early years of independence. 
As a result, several often highly complex reform processes unfolded at the same time, 
triggering parallel processes of change in the political, economic and social spheres. 
The Kyrgyz example thus illustrates well what Offe (1994) has described as the 
‘dilemma of simultaneity’ – parallel development processes which often develop 
asynchronously and were thus hardly ever harmonious. This chapter’s short review of 
Kyrgyzstan’s reform path and its many adjustments and corrective measures has shown 
that politico-administrative and agrarian reforms often overlapped and sometimes 
obstructed each other. For instance, the national government soon decided to 
strengthen representation at local level by establishing rural committees (see 4.2.2). 
However, when it turned out that these committees, which often consisted of former 
kolkhoz elites, were one of the main obstacles to rapid implementation of national 
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privatization policies, they were abolished again. In many cases, however, these and 
other reform adjustments came rather late so that local realities often changed faster 
than national legislation. The Land Redistribution Fund (LRF; see 4.3.3) is another 
excellent example of such disparities between national transition policy and local 
processes of transformation. When the national parliament finally agreed on a 
legislation prescribing that every ayil okmotu shall retain 25% of all arable land in a 
local LRF, most communities had already distributed much more than that. Thus, local 
processes not only often outpaced national transition policies, but sometimes also took 
a different direction from that envisaged by reformers and advisors at national level. 
 
By and large, these disparities and the resulting deviations from the prescribed reform 
path created many loopholes. In the agrarian sector, ineffective reforms before 1994, 
numerous legal adjustments and the apparent lack of control by higher administrative 
levels gave rural elites considerable ‘room for maneuver’. This eventually led to many 
violations both before and during the distribution of land and other assets, as well as in 
the appropriation of pastures. Although rapid, the Kyrgyz reforms were thus anything 
but transparent, fostering nepotism and corruption and a political system characterized 
by patronage and clientelism rather than public accountability. Karakulova and 
Mamytova (2008) thus conclude that “the effect was not to create a vibrant, diverse 
private sector, but simply (…) a new kind of monopoly where key assets passed into 
the hands of a few privileged regime insiders”. Parts B and C of this study analyze 
these processes and the role of local actors in the two case study villages both now and 
over the course of the abolishment of former kolkhoz structures. 
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5 Current livelihood disparities in the two case 
study villages 
 
 
Animal husbandry and pasture used to and indeed still do play a highly significant role 
in the livelihoods of the local population of Naryn oblast. The oblast not only has the 
most livestock and pastures in Kyrgyzstan, it is also home to some of the largest alpine 
summer pastures in Central Asia, including Ak-Say, Arpa and Son-Koel (see Map 5.1). 
However, as a remote rural area and a former outpost of the Soviet Union, the oblast 
was hit particularly hard by the collapse of the socialist economy. After 1991, rural 
poverty increased rapidly, as did the importance of subsistence-oriented livelihood 
strategies. 
 
Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu, the two villages selected for this study, reflect the recent 
development in the area very well. The two former kolkhozes55 have long struggled 
with the severe economic crisis after 1991 and recovered only slowly after 1996. 
Today, people in both villages face difficulties to access markets and paid jobs outside 
the still weak agrarian sector, so land cultivation and animal husbandry are still crucial 
to securing their subsistence needs. Despite these similarities, however, the two villages 
differ in various other aspects, especially regarding people’s access to arable land and 
pastures as well as in terms of the local institutional context. Last but not least, their 
transformation from a kolkhoz into an ‘ordinary’ rural community has followed 
different trajectories. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 gives a brief introduction to Naryn 
oblast and portrays the two case study villages in terms of their history, their 
endowment with arable land and pastures, and their administrative and economic 
structure. Section 5.2 builds on the results of the household survey carried out in 2007 
for a quantitative description and comparison of livelihoods at the village and the 
household level, with a particular focus on land use, animal husbandry and various 
cash income sources. In order to get a better grasp of the socioeconomic disparities 
observed at household level, section 5.3 develops a household typology. This typology 
is used to select and describe five household groups in section 5.4. These household 
groups will then be used for further qualitative analysis in the subsequent chapters. 
 
 
 
5.1 A brief introduction to Naryn oblast and the two case 
study villages 
 
5.1.1 Naryn oblast 
 
Naryn oblast is the largest and most mountainous province in the Kyrgyz Republic. It 
is located between 1,500 m and 6,000 m amsl, and more than 70% of its territory is 
mountainous. The valleys are characterized by a semiarid steppe climate with warm 
summers, cold and long winters and an average precipitation of 200 to 300 mm/year. 
This result in short annual growth periods of 60 to 120 days and a high dependence on 
irrigated farming. The natural vegetation is characterized by sub-alpine and alpine 
grasslands, alluvial forest along the main streams at lower altitude, and some 
coniferous forest in narrow valleys and gorges (Wilson 1997; GovtNaryn 2009; 
www.globalbioclimatics.com; accessed 12 Jan 2010). 
                                                
55 See 6.1 for a detailed description of the functioning of collective farms [Russ. kolkhoz]. 
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The oblast is very sparsely populated; its population is predominantly rural. Naryn is 
the capital and the only town in the oblast, which is organized in five rayons (districts). 
At-Bashy rayon covers the largest area and has the lowest population density; Naryn 
rayon is second largest, but with a considerably higher population density, since it also 
includes Naryn town (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1 General statistics for Naryn oblast, Naryn rayon and At-Bashy rayon, 2006 (GosRegistr At-Bashy 
and Naryn 2007; NarynStatKom 2007) 
 
 Naryn Oblast Naryn Rayon At-Bashy Rayon 
    
Total area [km2] 45,200 7,800 19,000 
Arable land [km2] a 1,325 n/a n/a 
Pastures [km2] b 26,263 6,547 6,973 
Population 268,672 43,400 49,500 
Average population density [people/km2) 5.9 5.6 2.6 
 
a arable land and hay meadows; b including all types of pastures 
 
 
Bordering China in the south, the oblast is crossed by a major trade route connecting 
China and Kazakhstan. However, in the absence of any large markets and trading 
hubs, the provincial economy is dominated by agriculture, which accounts for 63.3% 
of GDP, compared to only 7% from industry and 24% from services (UNDP 2005b). 
The agricultural sector is dominated by livestock production. 95% of all agricultural 
land is classified as pasture land, while only 3% is registered as arable land, including 
0.4% hay meadows (Table 5.1). Wheat, barley and sainfoin are the dominant crops, 
while a considerable amount of the plowed land is only used for haymaking, often due 
to the absence of a functioning irrigation system. Potatoes and vegetables are mainly 
grown in home gardens. The livestock sector is dominated by sheep and goats, cattle 
and horses, and poultry. Unlike in the socialist economy, sheep are now predominantly 
fat-tailed breeds with colored coarse wool and suited to meat production. Official 
figures report a considerable increase in the number of sheep and goats, while the 
number of horses and cattle has remained fairly stable (Figure 5.1)56. 
 
 
Figure 5.1   Livestock in Naryn 
oblast, 2002 to 2009 (NarynStat-
Kom 2007, 2008; NatStatKom 
2009) 
 
 
A poor transport infrastructure and the oblast’s general remoteness hinder producers’ 
access to national and international markets. Other than a large number of small local 
and regional food and livestock markets, the At-Bashy livestock bazaar is the only 
market with any wider significance, since it is also visited by Kazakh and Chinese 
traders. Common development indicators reflect the oblast’s slow economic 
                                                
56 On the reliability of official statistics, see 3.2. 
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development. In 2004, 66% of the provincial population lived below the official 
poverty line, of which 31% lived in extreme poverty57. The oblast’s HDI was 0.701 in 
2003, compared to a national HDI of 0.729 (UNDP 2005b). In late 2008, the UN 
reported that more than 30% of the provincial population suffered from severe food 
insecurity (UN Flash Appeal 2008). 
 
 
5.1.2 Jergetal village 
 
Jergetal village [Kyrg. ayil] is the main village in the Jergetal community [Kyrg. ayil 
okmotu], which is part of Naryn rayon. Two other smaller villages – Jalgyk Terek and 
Kyzyl Jyldyz – also form part of Jergetal ayil okmotu, but have not been included in 
this study. The village is located about 25 km from Naryn town at an elevation of 
2,150 m amsl, and stretches over a distance of three kilometres on both sides of a river 
of the same name (see Map 5.1). Survey results from May 2007 count 2,421 
inhabitants living in 404 households (including 211 absent migrants)58. This results in 
an average household size of 6 people (without absent migrants: 5.5). The households 
belong to different uruu [Kyrg. ’tribe’; see box 5a below], of which the largest ones – 
Mongoldor, Jetigen, Checheï – comprise 35 to 50 households. 
 
Jergetal village has 675 ha of arable land, most of it irrigated. About 65% of it is used 
to grow grass, forage and fodder legumes, while about 30% is used to cultivate wheat 
and barley. Vegetables and potatoes are mainly grown in home gardens (Jergetal 
Baseline Study 2008, 10)59. Jergetal ayil okmotu has been allotted a total of 91,597 ha 
of pastures, of which 18,140 ha are categorized as village-adjacent, 24,179 ha 
intermediate, and 49,278 ha remote pastures60 (communal statistics, 2007). 
 
Local government and non-governmental organizations 
 
Jergetal ayil okmotu was established in the mid-1990s within the boundaries of the 
former kolkhoz Jangy Talap (see 6.1.2). The formal decision to dissolve the kolkhoz 
was taken in early 1994 when the Kyrgyz government started to exert increased 
pressure on collective farms to carry on with privatization. Thus, between winter 
1993/4 and summer 1994, animals, arable land, barns and machinery were distributed 
to all the households in the kolkhoz61. At the same time, the kolkhoz was formally 
transformed into an ayil okmotu. 
 
Today Jergetal village is home to the municipal administration, where the head of the 
rural executive committee [Kyrg. ayil okmotu] and his staff have their offices62. The 
ayil okmotu staff includes a chief accountant, a land-planning specialist responsible for 
leasing out communal arable land and managing the village-adjacent pastures, a 
statistician and a social development specialist responsible for calculating and 
allocating pensions and child allowances. The municipality building also houses a 
meeting hall for the local council [Kyrg. ayil kengesh] and the Aksakal council. Since 
1992, Jergetal village has had its own Aksakal council with the authority to resolve 
minor conflicts at communal level through an Aksakal court. Council and court, which 
became legally formalized in the village in 1995, have different chairmen. 
                                                
57 In April 2009, the official poverty line was defined as a monthly income of 963 KGS (US$ 23) 
(Zentralasienanalysen 16/2009, 27). 
58 The 2007 community statistics count 2,980 inhabitants, including 73 migrants. The difference in the 
number of inhabitants can be explained by the fact that several houses were abandoned at the time of 
research. 
59 A direct comparison between the two villages regarding the area of arable land and pastures is not 
possible because official statistics refer to different levels, i.e. either village or community level. 
60 See 4.3.4 for the formal classification of pastures in Kyrgyzstan. 
61 Chapter 7 provides a detailed analysis of the privatization process. 
62 Most people use the term ayil omkotu indiscriminately to describe the political entity (community), the 
municipal administration, the administration’s building, as well as the head of the rural executive 
committee. 
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Since July 2003, Jergetal village has had its own Territorial Body of Public Self-
Governance (TPS). The TPS engages in social and economic communal development 
and interacts with external NGOs and aid agencies to implement local development 
projects and allocate micro-credit to local entrepreneurs. With the support of the 
World Bank-funded Community Development and Investment Agency (ARIS), a local 
Water Users’ Association (WUA) was established in 2003. Its objective is to jointly 
organize the irrigation of all arable land and to modernize and maintain the local 
irrigation infrastructure. The same idea stands behind the local Pasture Users’ 
Association (PUA), which was established in April 2007 with the support of the Swiss-
funded Central Asian Mountain Programme (CAMP). Unlike the WUA, the PUA was 
not yet legally formalized at the end of 2008 (The role of WUAs is discussed in chapter 
9; the Jergetal PUA is discussed in chapter 10.) In addition, there are a remarkable 
number of private associations: in 2007, Ibraimova (2009, 60) counted about 20 local 
self-help groups, micro-credit groups and neighborhood cooperatives, as well as 11 – 
often short-lived – village development organizations. 
 
Private service sector and access to agricultural markets 
 
A few, often short-lived small retail shops offer little more than vodka, cigarettes and 
ice cream. A few families sell mobile phone units on commission. Some people with 
their own car work irregularly as taxi drivers to Naryn and Bishkek. Those who own a 
tractor, truck or combine rent out their services to others during the harvesting season. 
There are also a few small, privately operated flour mills. Besides a veterinarian who is 
partly employed by the ayil okmotu, there are two privately operating veterinarians. 
There are two weekly livestock markets. Örnök bazaar, halfway on the road to 
Naryn, specializes in sheep and goats. Kyrk Bozüi, on the main road to Bishkek, is 
specialized in cattle and horses and is only open in summer. A little bit further, the 
daily bazaar in Naryn town is the largest agricultural market in the region. In addition, 
traveling traders visit people in the village or on the pastures directly to buy livestock, 
milk products, wool and skins at cheap prices. People who spend the summer on the 
alpine summer pastures often sell their milk products to traveling traders or to the 
salesmen at the Kyrk Bozüi trading post – or to the new mining company. 
 
The ‘Spektor’ gold mine: a new player boosting the local economy 
 
In 2006, a Chinese-owned mining company started to operate an open-cast mine called 
Spektor on Jergetal’s intensive pastures63. One year later, the Russian management 
began employing local people as miners, offering them 15-day shifts and daily wages of 
700 to 1,000 KGS (US $16-23), an exceptionally good salary for local and even 
regional circumstances. By summer 2008, around 70 people from the village had taken 
jobs at the mine, some of them herders who live close to the mine in summer. At the 
same time, an increasing number of herding households that spend summer close to the 
mine began to sell their produce – mainly milk, butter and yogurt – to the mining 
company. This not only allowed them to reduce transport costs; the mine also offered 
prices up to 25% above what the traders at Kyrk Bozüi pay. The appearance of the 
mining company has fundamentally altered the local economy, not only by creating 
new livelihood opportunities for the local population, but also by causing new conflict 
lines to appear at local level. Chapter 10 discusses this case in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
63 See 4.3.4 for the definition of formal pasture categories. 
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Box 5a Household, family, kin, tribe, kolkhoz, brigade 
 
Social identity and affiliation in post-socialist rural Kyrgyzstan are often constituted by different, 
overlapping frames of reference at various levels. The first frame of reference is kinship. The basic entity is 
üi-bülöö which stands for the nuclear family. This usually includes a married couple, their children and, 
depending on the situation, the husband’s parents living in the same household. Kuda denotes the 
parents-in-law of a married couple, kudachylyk describes the relationship between the parents-in-law, 
and in-laws are usually addressed as kudagyilar. Kuda is also used to describe customary life cycle feasts 
within the extended family. 
 
The second frame of reference is the tribal structure, which is also closely, yet not exclusively, related to 
kinship. According to Curtis (1996, no pagination), tribal identity “remains an important element of social 
status”. The lowest level in the tribal social structure is the so-called uruk [’seed’], an exogamic unit that 
includes close patrilineal relatives over seven generations. One or several uruk form an uruu [’tribe’], i.e. a 
network based on extensive kinship relations, which is headed by an uruu bas’chy [‘head of the tribe’]. 
The uruu is the largest grouping within a segmentary lineage system sharing a common genealogy. By 
contrast, tribal confederations, which consist of several uruus, are political units that need not have a 
common genealogy. Some of the largest Kyrgyz tribal confederations are the Bugu, Sary Bagysh, Solto, 
Adigine, or Saruu (Geiss 2003, 32ff). Each tribal confederation belongs to one of two ‘wings’, either sol 
[left] or on [right] wing. A third wing, ichkilik, contains a number of tribes from the South (Kreutzmann 
1995; Curtis 1996). 
However, there is considerable confusion about the boundaries and subdivisions of tribes, tribal 
confederations and wings. This is true of both the Kyrgyz people who often mix up or use the two terms 
uruu and uruk 64 indiscriminately, and also of existing literature on the subject. Not only is ’tribe’ defined 
in many different ways, but there is also an inconsistent usage of the terms uruu and uruk on the one 
hand, and of ’tribe’ and ’clan’ on the other65. Additionally, different authors link certain tribes and tribal 
confederations to different wings. However, as Geiss (2003) points out, this confusion also indicates that 
the concept of tribe does not relate to kinship alone (i.e. exogamic units), but has also been socially 
constructed through historical forms of social organization such as military units or communities at peace. 
 
A third frame of reference is constituted by residence. On the one hand, every Kyrgyz community [Kyrg. 
ayil okmotu] is divided into one or several ayils [‘villages’], each of which is headed by an ayil bas’chy  
[‘village head’; see also 4.2.2]. However, today the concept of ayil is less important than in pre-colonial 
times, when it denoted a group of several nomadic camps. On the other hand, elder people still refer to 
socialist concepts of residence, when every rural resident belonged to a particular collective [Russ. 
kolkhoz] or state farm [Russ. sovkhoz] , and was attached to one of its sub-units [Russ. brigada]. 
 
 
5.1.3 Kyzyl-Tuu village 
 
Kyzyl-Tuu (which, translated literally from the Kyrgyz, means ‘red flag’) is one of two 
villages of the Karakojun ayil okmotu, which belongs to At-Bashy rayon. Karabulung, 
the second village, has not been included in this study. It is located at an elevation of 
2,320 m amsl, about 38 km from the rayon centre At-Bashy and 100 km from Naryn 
town (see Map 5.1). Survey results of May 2007 account for 1,431 inhabitants living 
in 256 households (including 144 absent migrants). This results in an average 
household size of 5.6 people (5.0 without absent migrants). Most households belong to 
the tribe [Kyrg. uruu] of Asyk, while a small minority belongs to the uruu of Jeryk. In 
Kyzyl-Tuu, Asyk is further divided into 11 sub-tribal groups [Kyrg. uruk]66. 
                                                
64 Personal communication with Kalkan Kerimaliev, local historian, Kyzyl-Tuu, 16 Aug 2008; with 
Amantur Japarov, Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, 17 Sept 2008; and with Rustam Tashtanov, Kyrgyz 
Academy of Sciences, 21 Jan 2010. 
65 For instance, what Hvoslef (1995), Geiss (2003) or Gullette (2006) call a ’tribe’ is a ’clan’ in the words 
of Collins (2006). For the sake of clarity, I translate uruu as tribe in this thesis, the more so as the 
expression ’tribalism’ has become a commonly used term among the Kyrgyz themselves (Gullette 2006, 
22). 
66 Namely Aity Kara, Baikojo Baimyrza, Balbak, Beshkörük, Biirike, Böörübay, Esengeldy, Kemel, 
Kenjesh, Seyit, and Toi (Personal communication with the social inspector of the Karakojun ayil 
okmotu, 30 Jul 2008). 
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Karakojun ayil okmotu disposes of 2,328 ha of arable land, most of which is used 
either to grow fodder crops or as hay meadows. An additional 906 ha (356 ha 
irrigated; 99 ha rainfed; 451 hay meadows) are in the community’s Land 
Redistribution Fund (LRF). The ayil okmotu disposes of 70,635 ha of pastures, of 
which 16,809 ha are categorized as village-near, 17,854 ha as intermediate, and 
35,972 ha as remote pastures (communal statistics, 2007). 
 
Local government and non-governmental organizations 
 
Karakojun ayil okmotu was established in June 1996 within the boundaries of the 
former Karakojun kolkhoz (see 6.1.2). In 1991, the kolkhoz was formally transformed 
into a so-called ‘cooperative’. About 70% of all local households joined, while the rest 
claimed their private shares of land, livestock, barns and machinery. After three years 
of deepening economic recession and absent state support, the cooperative collapsed, 
and the remaining land, livestock, barns and machinery were distributed among all the 
households in early 1994 (see chapter 7). At the same time, the kolkhoz was formally 
transformed into an ayil okmotu. 
Today Kyzyl-Tuu village is home to the municipal administration of the Karakojun 
ayil okmotu. As in Jergetal, there is an ayil kengesh and an Aksakal council and court. 
The latter was established in 1991 and formalized in 1995. Council and court have the 
same nine members, but different chairmen67. Unlike Jergetal, Kyzyl-Tuu has no 
Territorial Body of Public Self-Governance (TPS), and there are few private 
associations. In 2002, ARIS initiated a Water Users’ Association (WUA) for Kyzyl-Tuu 
and the neighboring Kasybek ayil okmotu to build a joint pump system for drinking 
water and to manage the irrigation of arable land (see chapter 9). In 2006, Kyzyl-Tuu 
took part in an initiative by the oblast administration to foster small cooperatives in 
the areas of land cultivation, livestock breeding and social development. While they 
received small grants from the oblast administration, the technical assistance initially 
promised never materialized, and at the time of research, these cooperatives had 
virtually ceased to exist (Personal communication with a former cooperative member, 
15 August 2008). 
 
Private service sector and access to agricultural markets 
 
The private service sector in Kyzyl-Tuu consists of little more than a few small retail 
shops, a couple of taxi drivers and those offering their services as tractor and combine 
harvester drivers. One family has established a small restaurant/shop on the main road 
to China. In addition, there are four privately operated flour mills. The nearest 
agricultural market is the weekly livestock bazaar in the rayon centre At-Bashy, where 
there is also a large commodity market. From time to time, mobile traders roam the 
village in order to buy wool and skins at cheap prices. Many families spending summer 
on the alpine summer pastures sell milk products on a weekly basis to traveling traders 
or along the main road to China. Besides a veterinarian who is partly employed by the 
ayil okmotu, there are also two veterinarians in private practice. 
 
 
 
                                                
67 Personal communication with the head of the Kyzyl-Tuu Aksakal court, 25 November 2007. 
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5.2  Land, livestock and cash incomes 
 
5.2.1 Arable land 
 
Under Soviet rule, every rural household was entitled to a small piece of land to 
cultivate potatoes and vegetables. While the kolkhoz management concentrated on 
growing fodder crops, these home gardens [Russ. ogorod] were essential to the survival 
of the rural population. In the course of the privatization campaign of the mid-1990s, 
all arable land has been equally distributed among all residents of the former kolkhoz. 
The size of the land plots distributed depended upon the kolkhoz’ total area of arable 
land. Thus, people in Kyzyl-Tuu received larger shares (0.80 ha/capita) than the 
residents of Jergetal, where land resources are rather limited (0.27 ha/capita). 
 
Considerable disparities regarding land ownership also exist at household level. In the 
course of the privatization process, every individual in a former kolkhoz received an 
equal share of arable land, so that larger households were allotted more land than 
small ones. A ten-person household in Kyzyl-Tuu thus received eight hectares of land, 
while a two-person household got only 1.6 ha. In addition, land shares differ regarding 
the availability of irrigation, distance from the village and other factors. The survey 
results also indicate that some sort of redistribution of land has taken place since the 
initial distribution in the mid-1990s, since the current per-capita land shares per 
household are anything but equal (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 Per-capita ownership of arable land by household (own survey 2007) 
 
Owned land per capita [ha] Jergetal [n=387] % of HHs 
Kyzyl-Tuu [n=236] 
% of HHs 
   
none 1.3 0.8 
0.01 – 0.25 ha 55.0 10.2 
0.26 – 0.50 ha 33.3 23.3 
0.51 – 0.75 ha 7.5 29.7 
0.76 – 1.0 ha 1.6 15.7 
> 1.0 ha 1.3 18.8 
   
 Average = 0.28 ha Average = 0.79 ha 
 
 
One important reason for these disparities regarding per-capita land is the 
demographic changes that have taken place at the household level since 1994. Besides 
births and deaths among household members, this also includes the splitting of 
households through inheritance. Another reason is that many asset-poor households 
who cannot afford to cultivate all the land they received often do not consider remote 
fallow land as their own anymore (see section 11.1). Nevertheless, land sales are still 
very rare68. Households without any arable land are generally those who moved to the 
village after 1995. They are only entitled to own land for construction, not for 
agriculture. They can, however, lease land from others or from the municipal Land 
Redistribution Fund (LRF). However, only a few households lease in agricultural land 
from neighbors, kin or from the LRF, and if they do, they usually only lease small plots 
(Table 5.3)69. 
 
                                                
68 Transactions of private land shares were not allowed until 2000, when the nation-wide moratorium on 
land sales was gradually lifted (compare 4.3.3). 
69 Practices around land cultivation and land transfers are discussed in detail in Chapter 9. 
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Table 5.3 Rented land per household (own survey 2007) 
 
Rented land per HH [ha] Jergetal [n=395] % of HHs 
Kyzyl-Tuu [n=252] 
% of HHs 
   
none 93.2 87.7 
0.01 – 2 ha 3.9 3.2 
2.01 – 5 ha 1.9 7.2 
> 5 ha 1.1 2.0 
 
 
5.2.2 Livestock 
 
“There is no life without livestock in this village.” This statement, repeatedly voiced by 
many respondents, is a very good illustration of the importance people ascribe to 
animals’ role in their own livelihoods. Animals, especially sheep and horses, were at the 
core of the Kyrgyz nomadic lifestyle in pre-colonial times. In Soviet times too, sheep, 
cows and horses were not just kept for the sake of the kolkhoz, but also for people’s 
private needs. Then like today, animals not only served self-sufficiency purposes, but 
were also an important means of establishing and maintaining social ties among kin 
and neighbors, e.g. through gifts and the celebration of life-cycle feasts. In addition, 
livestock is important financial capital which can be converted into cash whenever 
need arises. Thus, only few households in both villages make a living without livestock 
– mostly against their will (compare 10.1). 
In late 1993 and early 1994, animals were distributed to all kolkhoz residents.  
Apart from a few households in Kyzyl-Tuu who claimed their private shares in 1991 or 
1992 already, most people in a village received the same amount of animals, although 
the type and condition of animals varied considerably. Most households then mixed 
these animals in with the ones they had already kept privately during Soviet times. 
However, the dissolution of the kolkhozes, by increasing rural poverty and problems 
with livestock diseases, led to a rapid, countrywide collapse of livestock numbers that 
lasted until 1996. Since then, the trend has generally been upwards (Figure 5.2), and 
many farmers are actively engaged in livestock marketing at local, regional and 
sometimes even national level. Unlike the land market, livestock markets were not 
restricted by the state after 199170. 
 
Figure 5.2 Livestock numbers 2002 to 2008 [in heads] (own graphic; NarynStatKom 2007, 2008) 
 
 
                                                
70 Chapter 7 discusses the collapse of the kolkhoz flocks in the early 1990s; Chapter 9 analyses people’s 
practices around animal husbandry and the use of pastures. 
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Today, the total amount of livestock is nearly the same in the two villages, while the 
average number of livestock units [LU] per capita71 is higher in Kyzyl-Tuu (Table 5.4). 
An average household in Kyzyl-Tuu owns 16.7 LU, but in Jergetal this is only 11.2 
LU.72  
 
Table 5.4 Flock size per household (own survey 2007) 
 
 
Livestock Units [LU] Jergetal [n=397] % of HHs 
Kyzyl-Tuu [n=254] 
% of HHs 
   
no livestock 9.6 7.9 
0.1 – 1.0 LU 6.8 5.1 
1.1 – 10.0 LU 54.9 41.0 
10.1 – 20.0 LU 14.4 24.4 
20.1 – 70.0 LU 11.8 18.5 
> 70.0 LU 2.5 3.1 
   
 Average per HH = 11.2 LU Average per capita = 1.83 LU  
Average per HH = 16.7 LU 
Average per capita = 2.96 LU 
 
 
However, remarkable disparities in flock sizes also exist at household level. About two-
thirds of all households own between 1 and 20 LU, while some households have no 
animals at all and others own more than 70 LU, which is more than 350 sheep or 
seventy cows. The share of those with more than 20 livestock units is larger in Kyzyl-
Tuu (22%) than in Jergetal (14%). 
As for the type of animals, an average household’s flock consists of around 80% 
sheep and/or goats, 5- 10% of each horses and cows, plus some poultry; wealthier 
households tend to keep more horses and cows than sheep. Nevertheless, sheep and 
goats are the predominant animal in both villages and account for 48% of all livestock 
units in Jergetal, and 56% in Kyzyl-Tuu. Since the early 1990s, indigenous fat-tailed 
sheep types, which produce a preferred quality of mutton, have widely replaced the 
fine-fleeced type preferred in socialist times (Fitzherbert 2000)73. Cows account for 25 
to 30% of all livestock units; horses for 15 to 20 %. Other animals – donkeys, yaks, 
camels and poultry – make up the rest (Figure 5.3). 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Share of animals by livestock units [in %] (own survey) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
71 1 livestock unit [LU] is equal to 5 sheep/goats, 1 cow or 0.8 horses. 
72 When the household listing was carried out in May 2007, the offspring season was already over, so that 
both adult and young animals were counted. This may at least partly explain the variation observed in 
the official data for the village level, collected by the local state administration every 1st January 
(Official statistics 2007 for Jergetal Ayil, received from the communal statistician, April 18, 2007). 
Another factor is that people tend to understate their real number of livestock during official surveys, as 
this largely determines a household’s entitlement to child allowances. In Jergetal, where livestock figures 
for the village level are available, the listing accounts for a total of 4,430.2 livestock units, which is 34% 
above the official statistics for 2007 (2,935 livestock units). In Kyzyl-Tuu, official figures exist for the 
ayil okmotu level only. 
73 Kyrgyz herders hardly ever distinguish between sheep and goats when counting their animals, and many 
consider goats the ‘sheep of poor people’ because goat meat is less appreciated by locals (cf. Jacquesson 
2003). 
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5.2.3 Cash income sources 
 
In the kolkhoz system, most rural households made a living from a combination of 
kolkhoz wages, premiums, and their own production from the home garden and their 
private flock. However, with the collapse of the socialist economy, central allocation 
schemes for jobs and wage labor ceased to exist, leaving the majority of the population 
unemployed. At the same time, subsidies for agrarian production and commodity 
prices dried up, so that many people faced increasing problems to make a living. Many 
then tried to make a living from the land and the livestock they received in the course 
of the privatization process, yet – as the subsequent chapters will show in more detail – 
not all succeeded to an equal extent. Sooner or later, many therefore sought to 
diversify their sources of cash income, exploring different income opportunities in the 
farm and non-farm sectors. Table 5.5 shows that social support, animal husbandry and 
regular salaried jobs are the three main sources of household cash incomes in the two 
case study villages today. 
 
Table 5.5 Main cash income-generating activity of households [in %] 
 
Main cash income source Jergetal [n=401] % of HHs 
Kyzyl-Tuu [n=255] 
% of HHs 
   
Social support 41.8 27.1 
- Old-age pension 25.4 15.7 
- Child allowances 16.2 11.4 
- Support by others 0.2 - 
Animal husbandry (meat, dairy) 27.6 38.8 
Regular salaried job 12.2 12.5 
Trade or other business 5.7 5.5 
Farming / Agriculture 5.0 5.5 
Herding for others 3.2 4.7 
Non-farm labor 2.5 3.1 
Agricultural labor 0.5 0.4 
Remittances 0.5 2.0 
Other 0.7 0.4 
 
 
Social support: old-age pensions and child allowances 
 
Social support is the most important source of cash income in Jergetal, where 42% of 
all households depend primarily on either old-age, disability and other pensions, child 
allowances or support by others (i.e. relatives, neighbors or friends). 27% of all 
households depend primarily on social support in Kyzyl-Tuu too. 
 
Old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions are paid to all former employees and 
members of collective or state farms at the age of 63 after at least 25 years of covered 
employment (men) or at the age of 58 with at least 20 years of covered employment 
(women). Old-age pensions consist of a basic element (530 KGS, but not less than 12% 
of the final year’s average wage) and an insurance element based on the number of 
years of covered employment and earnings (SSA 2009, 127f). In the two case study 
villages, monthly pensions vary between 670 and 2,000 KGS (US $16-48). This is 
hardly ever enough to make a living. Invalids, war and labor veterans and so-called 
‘hero mothers of the Soviet Union’ receive supplementary pension payments and get 
reductions on public transport, although this is of little practical use in the countryside. 
Deaf and blind people receive between 530 and 770 KGS (US $13-19) per month, as 
well as a 50% discount on electricity and coal. 
 
Child allowances [Russ. posobie] are determined on a yearly basis by the municipal 
social development specialist. Box 5b explains how the allowances are determined 
according to a household’s cash income. Since so many households depend on child 
allowances for their livelihoods, the fact that both livestock and arable land are part of 
the calculation seems highly interesting. On the one hand, the consideration of sheep 
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and goats may explain why many people are reluctant to talk about how much 
livestock they own. On the other hand, the fact that arable land is taken into account  
may persuade some households to disclaim ownership over land they cannot cultivate 
(compare 9.2.4). 
 
Box 5b Child allowances 
 
Every communal administration has to keep a ‘social passport’ for every single household. The passport 
not only contains a list of a household’s property, but also of its officially calculated income. A household 
is entitled to child allowances if its monthly per capita income does not exceed the guaranteed minimum 
standard of living (GM). In 2007, the GM was set at 175 KGS/month, and the per capita income was 
determined as follows: 
 
 - Per hectare of arable land (without home garden): 55.90 KGS/month 
 - Per sotik [0.01 ha] of home garden: 3.5 KGS/month 
 - If the household owns more than ten sheep: 2.5 KGS/month (e.g. 11 sheep = 27.5 KGS) 
 - If the household own more than one cow: 81.5 KGS/month 
 - In addition, cash incomes from regular salaried jobs, own enterprises and pensions 
 
Livestock other than sheep and cows are not taken into account. Per capita incomes are assessed on an 
annual basis. If people refuse to disclose their assets and incomes, the communal specialist for social 
development estimates an approximate value. Example: a household of five with 2.5 ha of land, 0.4 ha 
home garden, eight sheep, two cows and a monthly old-age pension of 1,000 KGS would have an official 
income of 288.55 KGS/month, and would thus not be entitled to child allowances. 
 
The amount of allowances per child depends on the child’s age and the household income. For every 
newborn child, a household receives a single birth grant of 525 KGS. After that, there is a monthly lump 
sum of 262.50 KGS up to the age of 18 months. From 18 months to 16 years (18 years if a full-time 
student), the allowances depend on household income. Unlike old-age pensions, which are co-funded by 
employees, self-employed people, employers and the state, child allowances are fully paid by the Kyrgyz 
state, i.e. the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. Communal administrations are in charge of 
disbursement (SSA 2009, 131; Personal communication with the Senior Specialist for Social Development, 
Jergetal ayil okmotu, 17 May 2007). 
 
 
Animal husbandry 
 
Animal husbandry is the most important cash income source in Kyzyl-Tuu, where 39% 
of all households depend primarily on the sale of live animals, meat and dairy 
products, as well as wool and skins. In Jergetal, 28% of all households primarily 
depend on this source of cash income. Thus, animal husbandry not only serves rural 
people’s subsistence needs; it is also an important means of generating cash. If 
secondary cash income sources (not tabulated in Table 5.5) are taken into 
consideration as well, even 43% of households in Jergetal and 65% in Kyzyl-Tuu 
depend on animal husbandry as a cash income source. This also means that farming – 
i.e. the cultivation of fodder crops – is of considerable importance for cash income, 
although its direct significance is very limited (see below). Cultivating fodder crops and 
hay is absolutely crucial to maintaining animal husbandry, since many people cannot 
afford to buy enough additional fodder to keep the animals stall-fed throughout 
winter. 
 
Regular salaried jobs 
 
After the collapse of the socialist state economy with its central job allocation schemes, 
regular salaried jobs and wage labor have become scarce in rural areas. In both 
villages, 12% of households depend primarily on a regular salaried job, mainly in the 
public sector, i.e. teachers, doctors, clerks, secretaries, cleaners or electricians at local 
or rayon level. Salaries in the public sector are usually very low: teachers in local 
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schools earn between 2,000 to 5,500 KGS/month (US $53 to 133), depending on 
seniority, while accountants or secretaries at the ayil okmotu earn between 1,600 and 
2,800 KGS/month (US $39 to 68). Thus, an average household can hardly ever survive 
on a single regular salaried job in the public sector, but alternatives in the private 
sector are very rare. 
 
Other cash income sources 
 
Trade and other business accounts for only 5.5% each. This includes the self-employed 
such as owners of small shops, traders, taxi drivers and operators of trucks, tractor and 
other agricultural machinery. A few women are engaged in sewing or produce 
handicrafts. Apart from its contribution to animal husbandry (through the cultivation 
of fodder crops), farming is of very limited significance to household cash incomes. 
This reflects not only the difficult environmental conditions in Naryn oblast (high 
altitude, little precipitation), but also the land user’s dependency on a functioning 
irrigation system if they want to cultivate something else than fodder and hay. The few 
households able to make an income from farming usually do so by selling hay, sainfoin 
and barley, as well as wheat and potatoes. While the market for fodder is 
predominantly local (among neighbors), a few people can sell wheat and potatoes on 
regional markets or to traders. Home gardens are usually used to cultivate potatoes 
and vegetables for subsistence needs. Local opportunities for paid (non-)agricultural 
and (non-)farm labour are very limited. While some comparably wealthy families can 
afford to hire paid workers for labor-intensive tasks, the less wealthy support each 
other through ashar, a traditional practice of (unpaid) mutual help among kin and 
neighbors (see 9.3.3). Herding, however, seems to have become an increasingly 
attractive job. Livestock numbers have increased in recent years and so has the number 
of households taking care of other people’s animals in return for payment in cash or 
kind. Most of these ‘herding households’ work from early May to late September, 
while a few do so the whole year round. Chapter 10 examines the role of herding 
households in detail. Very few respondents only mentioned remittances by labor 
migrants as the main source of their household’s cash income. This may indicate that 
many migrants leave for educational rather than for labor reasons, or that they do not 
remit much money. Another reason may be that many households receive remittances 
on an irregular basis, thus not considering them ‘real’ income. 
 
Lack of secondary cash incomes 
 
The analysis of secondary cash income sources (<50% of the household’s total cash 
income; not shown in Table XX) by and large reflects the income patterns discussed 
above – with the important exception that 20% of all households in Jergetal and 9% in 
Kyzyl-Tuu have no secondary cash income at all. Most of these households have their 
own animals, selling a few from time to time despite not perceiving this to be a cash 
income. Nevertheless, there are a few households in both villages without either a 
secondary cash income or livestock; they depend on social support as their main and 
sole source of cash income. 
 
The comparison of arable land, livestock and cash income sources reveals considerable 
disparities at village level. On average, people in Kyzyl-Tuu own more livestock and 
dispose of more arable land than people in Jergetal. This may explain why the 
importance of animal husbandry in generating cash income is higher in Kyzyl-Tuu, 
while there is a staggering dependence upon social support in Jergetal. But also at 
household level, the analysis of livestock numbers – a common wealth indicator in 
these parts – reveals significant socio-economic disparities. While some households do 
not have a single animal, others have more than 100 sheep and 20 cows. Likewise, the 
analysis of cash income sources reveals large differences in a household’s ability to 
generate cash income. All in all, such disparities call for an accurate distinction of the 
subject, i.e. the household. 
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5.3  Household typology 
 
In order to take into account the socioeconomic disparities observed at household level 
in further analysis, I have grouped households along two main axes that are 
particularly relevant to my research questions: the importance of pasture resources to 
the household’s cash income, and the number of livestock a household owns (see 3.2 
for a critical discussion of typologies). 
 
Pastoral cash income sources [x-axis, 4 categories] 
 
Out of the various cash income sources at village and household level examined in 
section 5.2, I consider the following to be specifically related to pastoral activity: sale 
of live animals, meat, dairy products, wool and skins, and herding other people’s 
animals in return for payment. Other potential income-generating activities related to 
pastures, such as tourism or the collection and sale of herbs, were not observed. The 
typology distinguishes between main and secondary cash income source. 
 
Livestock units [y-axis, 5 categories] 
 
Section 5.2 describes the distribution of livestock at village and household level, and 
discusses the potential bias regarding the number of livestock. To be able to compare 
different livestock holdings, I have converted all animals into livestock units (LU). 
Since ducks, hens and turkeys are usually kept in the yard and have but a negligible 
impact upon pastures, I omit them from further analysis. The typology distinguishes 
five layers of livestock holdings. The range of 0.1 to 1 LU helps to identify those 
households with no more than one milking cow, while the threshold of 70 livestock 
units is a result of the statistical spread in the empirical data. 
 
Eventually, the combination of the two dimensions livestock units and income sources 
results in 20 potential household groups. Figures 5.4 to 5.7 visualize the resulting 
household groups for the two villages. 
 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 Household groups, Jergetal village (own survey 2007) 
 
All in all, there are 13 different household groups in Jergetal village. The largest group contains 137 
households, or 35% of all households in Jergetal: these households own a small flock (1.1 to 10.0 LU) but 
have no pastoral cash income. The second largest group consists of 56 households, or 14% of all 
households in Jergetal: they own a considerable number of animals (10.1 to 70.0 LU), and their main cash 
income comes from the use of pastures. The third largest group consists of 52 households (13%): these 
households have neither livestock nor pastoral cash income. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the considerable socioeconomic disparities at household level in 
Jergetal. On the one hand, there are large differences in the number of animals per 
household: while there are a few wealthy households with very large flocks (above 70 
LU), even more households have no animals at all. Similarly, only a few households are 
able to generate both their main and their secondary cash income from pastoral 
activities (yellow), while more than half of all households can or do not generate such 
income (green). Overall, there is a predominance of smallholders with a flock size of 
between 1.1 and 10 livestock units. 
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Figure 5.4 Jergetal village, household groups [n=397]. Social support and no secondary cash income source 
(own data, 2007) 
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Figure 5.5 Jergetal village, household groups [n=397]. Own arable land per capita (own data, 2007)  
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Additional indicators from the household survey – lack of a secondary cash income 
source or dependence on social support – help to crosscheck to what extent the number 
of livestock reflects wealth disparities. Figure 5.4 shows that households with little 
livestock are more likely have no secondary cash income source than others. Similarly, 
the proportion who depend on child allowances or on help from relatives, neighbors 
and friends is much higher among households with little livestock than among those 
with an average or above-average flock size. By contrast, the proportion of households 
depending on old-age pensions is higher among those with an average or above-
average flock size. This indicates that there are many young households among the less 
wealthy. Last but not least, there are considerable disparities between the household 
groups in regard to their private arable land per capita (Figure 5.5). Obviously, 
households with a lot of livestock own considerably more arable land than households 
with few or no animals. Chapter 9 analyzes these disparities in detail. 
 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7     Household groups, Kyzyl-Tuu village (own survey 2007) 
 
14 household groups can be distinguished in Kyzyl-Tuu. The largest group consists of 68 households, or 
27% of all local households: they own between 10.1 and 70.0 LU and generate their main cash income 
with a pastoral activity. The second largest group contains 43 households (17%): just as in Jergetal, these 
households have a small flock (1.1 to 10.0 LU) but no pastoral cash income. Households in the third 
largest group (33 households; 13%) have the same amount of livestock, but derive their secondary cash 
income from pastoral activity.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the considerable disparities among households in Kyzyl-Tuu. As in 
the case of Jergetal, a small minority of eight households own very large flocks (above 
70 LU), while a much larger group (52 households) have no animals at all. Again, only 
a few households are able to generate both their main and secondary cash incomes 
from pastoral activities (yellow). Unlike in Jergetal, however, the group of households 
with a main pastoral cash income (blue) is larger than the group of households with no 
such income (green).  In general, there are more households with a mid-sized flock than 
in Jergetal, indicating that pastoral income-generating activities are more important in 
Kyzyl-Tuu than in Jergetal. Again, additional indicators can help to crosscheck the 
supposed correlation between a household’s flock size and its wealth. Figure 5.6 shows 
that, as in Jergetal, the proportion of households with no secondary cash income 
source is highest among those with little or no livestock. Similarly, households with less 
livestock are more likely to depend on child allowances and the help by others, while 
dependence on old-age pensions is higher among those with more livestock, indicating 
that there are more young households among the less wealthy. As for households’ 
private arable land per capita (Figure 5.7), the disparities are not as pronounced as in 
Jergetal; nevertheless, wealthy households have considerably more arable land per 
capita than their less wealthy neighbors. Thus, the typology doesn’t only reflect 
households’ different flock sizes and their ability to generate pastoral cash incomes, but 
also wealth disparities among the different household groups. The figures strongly 
suggest a clear livestock-wealth nexus – and seem to confirm an often-heard statement 
in the two case study villages, namely that ‘those who managed to keep hold of their 
animals since privatization are rich now’. 
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Figure 5.6 Kyzyl-Tuu village, household groups [n=254]. Social support and no secondary cash income source 
(own data, 2007) 
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Figure 5.7 Kyzyl-Tuu village, household groups [n=254]. Own arable land per capita (own data, 2007) 
Part B   Persistence and emergence of socioeconomic disparities 
 
 92 
5.4 Selected household groups 
 
Table 5.6 lists the five groups – no livestock, smallholders, mid-sized farms, large 
farms, and herders – selected for further analysis, their main characteristics as well as 
the number of households sampled randomly within each group (see chapter 3 for the 
methodological considerations behind a stratified random sampling.). The sample size 
represents the actual number of households analyzed in each group. For most groups, 
the initial sample was larger. However, when I felt I had reached theoretical saturation 
within a group, I stopped visiting the remaining sample households. The subsequent 
sections provide a short general description of each group and explain why they were 
selected for further qualitative analysis. 
 
Table 5.6 Selected household groups, group characteristics and sample size (own survey) 
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Jergetal        
        
’No livestock’ 52 13 0 (0) 0.19 No pastoral cash income source 5.3 4 
’Smallholders’ 137 35 1.1-10.0 (4.1) 0.25 No pastoral cash income source 5.9 8 
’Mid-sized farms’ 56 14 10.1-70.0 (24.9) 0.37 Main cash income source is pastoral 6.5 9 
’Large farms’ 10 3 >70.0 (103.3) 0.51 One or two pastoral cash income sources 9.1 3 
’Herding households’ 16 4 variable (10.2) 0.33 One cash income source is herding 5.7 4 
        
Jergetal Total 397 100 variable (11.0) 0.28 Variable 6.0 28 
        
Kyzyl-Tuu        
        
’No livestock’ 21 8 0 (0) 0.64 No pastoral cash income source 5.3 3 
’Smallholders’ 43 17 1.1-10.0 (4.5) 0.82 No pastoral cash income source 5.4 7 
’Mid-sized farms’ 68 27 10.1-70.0 (23.1) 0.94 Main cash income source is pastoral 5.9 6 
’Large farms’ 8 3 >70.0 (147.9) 0.89 One or two pastoral cash income sources 6.4 2 
’Herding households’ 13 5 Variable (12.9) 0.71 One cash income source is herding 5.7 3 
        
Kyzyl-Tuu Total 254 100 Variable (16.5) 0.79 Variable 5.6 21 
 
a including absent migrants 
 
 
5.4.1 Households without own livestock and no pastoral cash 
income (’no livestock’) 
 
Despite a commonly accepted and repeatedly expressed opinion that ‘there is no life 
without livestock in the village’, there are a considerable number of households 
without their own livestock in both villages. Most of these people were already living 
in the village at the time of privatization, and thus received their shares of land and 
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livestock. Obviously, they have lost or sold all their animals since then, and have not 
been in a position or willing to invest in livestock again. Others moved to the village 
after 1994 and have thus not participated in the distribution of assets. Last but not 
least, some households consist of young, recently married couples who have just left 
their parents’ home to establish their own family. 
Households in this group have only a small amount of arable land compared to the 
respective local average (68% in Jergetal, and 81% in Kyzyl-Tuu). Some households 
have no arable land at all even. Nevertheless, only one household in this group leases 
additional arable land. In spite of the apparent land shortage, this group has the largest 
proportion of households that derive a cash income from farming. They use their 
comparably small land holdings to grow wheat, hay and fodder crops. While wheat is 
mostly cultivated for subsistence needs, every fourth household in this group earns cash 
from selling potatoes (usually grown in the home garden), hay and/or fodder. The 
latter is usually sold to neighbors that have their own animals but cannot produce 
enough fodder on their own. 
More than 80% of all households without livestock depend on external support, 
either in the form of financial support from relatives, neighbors and friends, or in the 
form of old-age pensions, child and other state allowances. In Jergetal, income from 
seasonal labor is more common than from regular salaried jobs, while every third 
household in Kyzyl-Tuu draws upon a regular salaried job (e.g. teachers, librarians, 
electricians). Nevertheless, 30% of all households in this group have no secondary cash 
income, far above the respective local average. The same is true of the proportion of 
households that depend solely on a pension or child allowances. All of this suggests 
that households without their own livestock are among the least wealthy in the two 
villages. As they have no livestock to sell, they often cannot generate cash when the 
need arises. 
 
Box 5c Household biography of a household without livestock 
 
“I was born in 1979 and grew up with my grandparents. I still studied at school when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. In 1996, I graduated from school and started work as an electrician. I then spent six months in 
Bishkek, sometimes without a job. I also did some wrong things, and I sat in jail for two years. In 2005 I 
returned to the village, and soon after that my grandparents died. Six months later I married, and now I 
live here with my wife and my small daughter. My brothers and sisters all live in Bishkek. 
 
We do not have livestock anymore. In Soviet times, my family had five sheep, two goats, two cows and a 
horse, and we also received five sheep when the kolkhoz was dissolved – one sheep per person. But we 
have used all of them. We ate them or used them for funerals. Some others were killed by wolves and the 
rest died from various diseases. But we need animals. You cannot just wait for your salary; we don’t 
receive any pension or posobie, so it would be better to have our own livestock – why live in a village if 
you don’t have animals? It would be good to have a cow for the milk, you can give it to the kids or sell it, 
and if you have sheep you can sell the wool. Livestock is money, and my wife could do this kind of work. 
 
They also distributed barns and machines. Together with other people we received a tractor, but I do not 
know what happened to it. I just wasn’t interested in those things at that time. It was the same with the 
barn; we just tore it down and used the material elsewhere. There wasn’t much anyway. 
 
Nowadays I work as an electrician. People ask me whenever they have a problem with their TV or the 
counter. So I just work when there is something to do. I usually work in the morning and relax in the 
afternoon. People pay either in cash or wheat. We have some land of our own, but this year we couldn’t 
cultivate it because we didn’t have enough money. We use all the money I earn to cover our daily 
expenses. From time to time, my sisters come from Bishkek to help us. 
 
Many of my friends tell me to return to Bishkek, but I don’t want to leave my parents’ home abandoned. 
This house was built by my father – I think it’s good to build a house and leave it to your son. I would like 
to build a new house soon. But it is difficult to plan ahead for the next five years or so. I would like to live 
like others: to build a house, to have a car and keep livestock. We just need to stand on our own feet 
before our daughter goes to school, so that she will get a better education.” [JT 1a16] 
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5.4.2 Smallholders without pastoral cash income (’smallholders’) 
 
Smallholders without any pastoral cash income represent 35% of all households in 
Jergetal and 17% in Kyzyl-Tuu. They all have a small flock of their own, but cannot 
use it to generate a cash income. The flocks in this group usually consist of about three 
sheep, three to five goats, plus two milking cows, while only every second household in 
this group has an own horse. In Jergetal, many smallholders also keep poultry. In terms 
of per capita land holdings, households in this group are close to the respective local 
average (89% in Jergetal; 104% in Kyzyl-Tuu); only two households have none of 
their own arable land. 4% in Jergetal and 9% in Kyzyl-Tuu lease land from the ayil 
okmotu or from other people. Most smallholders use their arable land to grow wheat, 
barley and fodder crops or to make hay. While only one household (in Jergetal) 
produces sufficient wheat to sell part of it, every fourth smallholder earns cash by 
selling fodder or potatoes. 
However, the most important cash income source among smallholders is social 
support. 75% of all households in this group depend fully or partially on pensions, 
child allowances or the help by others. The importance of child allowances is 
particularly high in Kyzyl-Tuu (54%). In addition, 34% in Jergetal and 26% in Kyzyl-
Tuu have no secondary cash income. Only every fourth smallholder household has 
someone with a regular job; these are mainly teachers, doctors or technicians. At large, 
smallholders thus seem hardly better-off than households without animals. They 
cannot turn animals into cash since otherwise they risk depleting their small flock 
within no time. 
 
Box 5d A smallholder’s household biography 
 
“I got married in 1994 and came to this village to work as a teacher. At the time, we had lots of animals: 
some cows and thirty to forty sheep. It was hard for me to milk the cows, but it was a good time anyway. 
Then there was the distribution, and we received more sheep, an old horse and a young yak. 
 
A few years later my husband died, and I somehow had to make a living for my children and myself. Before 
that, we were cultivating barley and wheat – we did so well that people even came to buy from us. But 
now we just make hay, and even that is difficult. It is difficult to rent a tractor; you have to pay the driver 
and buy the fuel. Since I teach at a school and don’t want to miss my classes, I have to do the fieldwork 
early in the morning. In the beginning, I used to pay someone to irrigate my fields. But I was not satisfied, 
so I irrigate myself now. This year was particularly difficult. In recent years, we could always sell hay to 
others, but this year we may have to buy some ourselves in order to feed our animals through winter. 
 
When my husband was still alive, we sold lots of animals in order to build this house. Later on there were 
many feasts: first my husband died, then his brother and also my mother-in-law, and I spent a lot of 
livestock for the funerals. A couple of years ago I managed to save some of the child allowances to buy five 
goats. I then sold their wool and bought some more. Today we have 14 goats and three sheep. However, 
my salary is not sufficient, so we often need to sell an animal in order to buy a bag of flour or a pair of 
boots. In summer, I send the animals with a herder to the jailoo, but in winter I keep them in the village, 
because we need the dungcakes to heat the house. We used to buy coal in the past, but couldn’t afford to 
do so this year. Some people say it’s a shame to collect dung, but I don’t think so. You may have noticed 
that it’s cold in here. 
 
Sometimes I must buy flour on tick, or I must lend money from the neighbors if I am invited for a feast. 
There are lots of situations when you need money. Today, everything is expensive, money is needed 
everywhere, and everybody works on his own. Nevertheless, I still want to achieve many things in future, 
and I am trying as hard as I can.” [KT 2b15] 
 
 
 
Current livelihood disparities in the two case study villages 
 95 
5.4.3 Mid-sized livestock holdings with a main pastoral cash 
income (‘mid-sized farms’) 
 
Mid-sized farms with a main pastoral cash income source form quite a large group in 
both villages. Their flocks are comparably large, 2.7 times the local average in Jergetal, 
and 1.4 times the local average in Kyzyl-Tuu. An average flock consists of about 40 
sheep, 12 to 15 goats, two to three horses and about five milking cows. Poultry is not 
very common among these households. Nearly all of them earn their main cash income 
from selling live animals and/or meat. Only one household in Jergetal sells dairy 
products, while another household in Jergetal and three in Kyzyl-Tuu earn money by 
herding other people’s animals (and thus also belong to the cross-cutting group of 
herders; see 5.4.5 below). 
Mid-sized farms are also above the local average in terms of arable land per 
capita, with 1.3 times the local average in Jergetal, and 1.2 times the local average in 
Kyzyl-Tuu. There is no household without arable land in this group, and every fifth 
household leases additional arable land from the ayil okmotu or from other people. 
Arable land is mainly used to grow wheat and fodder crops and for making hay. The 
fact that only 10% make some cash income from farming indicates that land 
cultivation mainly serves for subsistence needs and fodder production. Instead of 
farming, secondary cash incomes thus mainly include old-age pensions (45% in 
Jergetal; 37% in Kyzyl-Tuu), regular salaried jobs (18%; 19% – mainly teachers and 
technicians), as well as self-employed business and trade (16%; 10% – mainly shop 
keepers, and tractor and truck drivers). The dependence on child allowances and 
support by others is below average. To sum up, mid-sized farms seem to have more 
secure income sources than households with less livestock. In addition, they own 
enough animals to generate cash whenever need arises. 
 
Box 5e Household biography of a mid-sized farm 
 
“I was born in 1935. When I came back from the army I began to drive tractors and combines for the 
kolkhoz. We received our monthly wages and, once a year, additional payment in the form of crops and 
hay. It was very nice back then; you can’t compare it with today. Then came Gorbachev and there was a 
mess. I am not sure whether it was planned or happened by accident. 
 
We were six people when they dissolved the kolkhoz, and we received 18 sheep, one cow and a horse. 
Most of them died soon, but we managed to increase their number again. There’s no living without 
animals, because you cannot live from land alone. If you have five sheep, they will have five lambs, so you 
have ten. You sell two and keep eight, and soon you’ll have sixteen sheep, and so on. We often sell in 
Tokmok; transport is expensive, but the prices there are much better than in Naryn. Today we have 50 
sheep, two cows and three horses. We always ask a herder to take our animals to the summer pastures, 
there are many of them. My youngest son would also like to go to the jailoo, but who would then look 
after the fields, and who would care for me and my wife? 
 
We also received 1.8 hectares of arable land. It is in three different places, up to six kilometers from here. 
We use all parcels, but we have problems with seeds and water. And once we solve the seed problem, 
there’s the expensive fuel. Some years ago, my son began to cultivate a hitherto unused piece of land not 
for from the village. He started cultivating it again, and as soon as the irrigation channels are repaired we 
will start to grow crops and fodder. We now pay taxes for that land too. Our youngest son lives with us, 
but he cannot do everything himself, so we sometimes hire people for irrigating our fields, or for cutting 
our hay. This is also why he can’t find any other job – there’s just not enough time for that. 
 
So we mainly sell animals to make a living, mostly in autumn when prices are good. I don’t like to take out 
loans, they are so expensive. I also receive an old-age pension, but 2,000 Som a month is not enough. The 
ayil okmotu does not care for people; they don’t work at all. Life is hard.” [JT 3a3] 
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5.4.4 Large livestock holdings with one or two pastoral cash 
incomes (‘large farms’) 
 
This group pools together the wealthiest households in the two villages. The average 
flock of a large farm in Jergetal contains about 150 sheep, 50 goats, 15 horses and 30 
cows. In Kyzyl-Tuu, such a flock consists of about 400 sheep, five goats, 20 horses, 18 
cows and two yaks. Thus, large farms in Kyzyl-Tuu seem to prefer sheep and horses 
(the largest sheep flock in Kyzyl-Tuu contains 700 animals), while also keeping a 
considerable amount of goats in Jergetal (the largest goat flock in Jergetal counts 120 
heads). Consequently, all households in this group generate their main cash income 
from selling live animals and/or meat. Secondary cash incomes are also often related to 
pastoral activity, e.g. through the sale of wool (30% in Jergetal; 63% in Kyzyl-Tuu). 
Others sell dairy products (Jergetal), wheat (Jergetal) or fodder and hay (Kyzyl-Tuu). 
Old-age pensions are a secondary cash income for another three households in Jergetal. 
As regards arable land per capita, large farms in Jergetal have 1.9 times the local 
average, while in Kyzyl-Tuu it is only 1.1 times the local average. Every fifth large farm 
in Jergetal and every second one in Kyzyl-Tuu leases additional arable land from other 
people or from the communal Land Redistribution Fund.  With land holdings between 
4 and 25 ha, the leased plots are quite large; some of them are also used as winter 
pastures. Large farms in Jergetal often cultivate wheat, barley and fodder crops, while 
those in Kyzyl-Tuu make only hay and grow a little barley. All in all, large farms are 
certainly among the wealthiest households in the two villages; their large flocks allow 
them to generate sufficient cash without risking falling below the critical limit for 
sustaining natural reproduction. Analyzing how they have managed to accumulate 
their large flocks may help to understand better why others have not been able or 
willing to do so. 
 
Box 5f Household biography of a large farm 
 
“I herded ewes from 1964 to 1994. I was a hard worker and one of the best herders. My parents worked 
as herders before me, and since I never finished school there was nothing else to do for me than to 
become a herder, too. So when the distribution took place in 1994, I knew what to do with all the animals 
we got, because I knew the pastures. There were many people who did not know how to handle the 
sheep; the paid workers had no experience, so some of them lost their animals. They even bartered away a 
sheep for only two bottles of vodka, that’s about 60 Som. 
 
There were 16 people in our family at that time, so we got about hundred sheep and 13 hectares of land. 
We only make hay; it’s too dry for anything else. Along with our relatives, we were also given a barn on 
the winter pastures. They all agreed that our family could use the barn, so we have it and keep our animals 
there during the winter. We now have about 300 sheep, 30 cows and 25 horses. In mid-June we move 
from the barn to the summer pastures where we stay until late September. We always go to the same 
place I used to go to in Soviet times. After 1994 we also tended other people’s animals for a few years, but 
we don’t do that anymore. Our livestock is sufficient for us, so why herd for others if we have more than 
300 sheep of our own? There are enough pastures for everyone. 
 
I never bought any livestock to increase my herd. We just kept the animals we had before and those we 
got in 1994. If we need money, clothes and other things, we sell some animals, but only in autumn when 
the animals are fat and prices are good. I do not take out loans. We mainly have wool sheep. The wool 
price increased a lot in recent years; there are several traders on the market. Maybe they work for the 
Chinese. 
 
I don’t plan to further increase the number of sheep; this is the limit. But maybe my sons have different 
plans. All we want is to live in peace and not to depend on others. We do not want to fly to the sun!” [KT 
1a4] 
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5.4.5 Herding households 
 
Herders play a key role in pasture use and management. They spend several months 
per year on the pastures, and often tend other people’s animals. Thus they not only 
directly influence livestock and pasture productivity, but also regulate other people’s 
access to pastures. The group of herding households cuts across all other household 
groups, since it pools together all households that generate their main or secondary 
cash income from herding other people’s animals. The average number of livestock in 
this group is close to the local average in both villages (95% in Jergetal; 78% in Kyzyl-
Tuu), which suggests that households with little or no livestock hardly ever work as 
herders. A herding household’s average flock in Kyzyl-Tuu consists of about 30 sheep, 
one horse and two milking cows, while herders in Jergetal keep more goats but less 
sheep. Keeping poultry is uncommon among herders. Their land holdings are average 
too, with 1.2 times the local average in Jergetal and 0.9 times the local average in 
Kyzyl-Tuu. There are no households without any of their own arable land in this 
group. Arable land is mostly used for haymaking or cultivating fodder. One herding 
household in Kyzyl-Tuu leases additional arable land from relatives to cultivate fodder, 
while another one in Jergetal leases village-adjacent pastures to compensate for 
insufficient fodder yields from his own arable land. 
As well as tending other people’s animals, 50% of all herding households depend 
on old-age pensions or child allowances as their secondary cash income. Another 30% 
earn their secondary cash income from selling live animals and/or meat. Only one 
herding household in Kyzyl-Tuu is able to earn some money from farming (sale of hay 
and potatoes). To a certain degree, herding households thus represent the local 
average: they are neither rich nor poor, they have a regular income for a few months a 
year, and they depend to a considerable degree on external support. 
 
Box 5g Biography of a herding household 
 
“My parents already worked as herders. When I returned from the army in 1985, they were old so I took 
over their job. I then worked as a kolkhoz herder until 1991. Our family left the cooperative in 1992. We 
knew that, sooner or later, we would have to work on our own anyway. There were eleven of us at that 
time, and everyone received eleven sheep. We also got three yaks and a horse. 
 
After that, I could continue to herd a rich man’s flock. He had 200 sheep and I had about 100, so that was 
fine. Unfortunately, the number of animals soon began to decrease – we sold them, or they died. In 1996 
we bought this house for 40 sheep. Then the other man also sold his remaining animals and left to town, 
so I had to stop to work as a herder. So I stayed in the village where I sometimes worked on construction 
sites, but most of the time there was nothing to do. After a time, life started getting difficult again, 
because our children grew up and wanted to have clothes and food. 
 
My father then helped me by giving us a cow. We sold the calf, bought goats, and that’s how we began to 
keep livestock again. Today we have fifteen goats, three cows, two calves, a horse and a foal, and a 
donkey. In 2004, we again started to herd animals for other people. We have six customers by now, the 
same people every year, so we don’t have to look for customers. We have chosen a place near the main 
road; it’s not too far from here, on the way to the summer pastures. It’s a good place because we can sell 
kymyz and butter to Chinese truck drivers. If we stay on the pastures, our children live with my sister-in-law 
for two months so they can go to school. And my two brothers help me to make hay during summer. In 
turn, we herd their animals for free. Fodder is the main problem here. Until now we have always had 
sufficient hay, but this year I had to spend 6,000 Som on additional fodder. If we had more fodder, we 
could keep more animals. There are also many diseases. 
 
So we mainly live from herding. It gets difficult when it rains or snows, but we earn quite a lot of money. 
Our eldest son works on a construction site in Issyk-Kul oblast, he also brings some money from time to 
time. In about four years’ time, we’ll have to wed him. That’s our plan.” [KT 2d10] 
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Having outlined the existing socioeconomic disparities at local level, the question 
remains as to how and when these disparities have emerged. In the next chapter 
therefore, I examine what kind of disparities existed in socialist times. Referring to the 
concept of path dependency (compare 2.2.2), I assume that what is observable today is 
not just a result of the privatization process and the transformation period, but to some 
extent also reproduces disparities and inequalities inherent in the socialist economy. 
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6  “Everything was linked with everything else”: 
working and living in the socialist economy 
 
 
“Everything was linked with everything else: we had Soviet currency, we were employed 
by the Soviet Union, and even the TV programs were about the Soviet Union.” 
 
Former mechanic, smallholder, Jergetal [2a33] 
 
 
In his recent study of an Uzbek kolkhoz74, Trevisani (2007, 100) notes that “the 
kolkhoz has always been more than just a large-scale collective agricultural enterprise. 
It pervaded the life of its rural inhabitants as a ‘total social institution’ that 
encompassed the whole range of their political, cultural, and economic relations.” And 
Caroline Humphrey, author of the most comprehensive analysis of a Soviet kolkhoz, 
describes the collective farm as “a massive economic and social experiment” 
(Humphrey 1983, 1). Obviously, the kolkhoz principle (see 6.1.1), which began to gain 
ground in the Kyrgyz SSR in the mid-1930s, eventually developed into a system that 
governed not only the production and redistribution of goods and services, but also the 
economic, cultural and social relations of the rural population. The biographies of 
those who grew up under socialist rule are thus often characterized by a high degree of 
state intervention and dependence on state institutions75. As Roy (1999) points out, 
Central Asian kolkhozes also governed people’s social life to such an extent because 
they were often established on the basis of local identity groups, in the case of 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan along tribal units [Kyrg. uruu; compare Box 5a]. They 
thus reinforced already existing social networks over several decades and have, in the 
words of Roy (ibid., 114), been little more than a “segmented society superficially 
reshaped along Soviet administrative lines (…)”.76 
The main focus of my research is however at the level of households and 
individuals, so I am more interested in structures and disparities within rather than 
between kolkhozes. In this chapter, I therefore explore the mechanisms and practices 
which allowed for a certain degree of egalitarianism within a kolkhoz, but at the same 
time created significant disparities between individuals and households in terms of their 
status and their endowment with financial, natural and power resources. With 
reference to the concept of path-dependence introduced in chapter 2, I argue that 
understanding these mechanisms and the resulting disparities is an essential 
prerequisite for any analysis of what has happened in rural Kyrgyzstan since 1991, i.e. 
the various processes of post-socialist transformation.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 explores the function of the kolkhoz 
within the socialist economy and describes its internal ‘modes of operation’, i.e. the so-
called ‘kolkhoz principle’. The subsequent sections focus on the power relations within 
a kolkhoz and people’s ways of making a living: while section 6.2 analyses the formal 
and informal income disparities within a kolkhoz, section 6.3 examines people’s 
practices regarding private agrarian production. Finally, section 6.4 discusses the role 
of the Communist Party within a kolkhoz and its influence on people’s livelihoods. 
                                                
74 The term kolkhoz (literally translates as ‘collective farm’ (see 6.1). 
75 Many of my respondents have been socialized during and after the Second World War, while the 
youngest ones have grown up at a time when the socialist system was just about to collapse. Of those 
with an active memory of the 1930s, when the Kyrgyz were forced to sedentarize and to hand over their 
private livestock to the newly established kolkhozes, only few have remained. Therefore, the focus of this 
chapter lies on the second half of the 20th century, and particularly on the 1980s. 
76 Besides the few ethnographic studies, there is a whole body of literature on the kolkhoz from the 1950s 
up to the 1980s focussing on economic aspects and the functioning of the kolkhoz principle (cf. Jasny 
1951; Whitman 1956; Wädekin 1975, 1989). 
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6.1  Functions and structure of collective farms  
 
The collectivization of the Kyrgyz agriculture started in the late 1920s, when the rural 
population was forced to settle down in newly established villages. Until then, the 
majority of the Kyrgyz population had practised transhumance, moving their livestock 
between winter, spring and summer pastures, with only provisional winter quarters, if 
at all. Although the sedentarization program met fierce resistance, by the late 1930s, a 
significant proportion of the rural population had abandoned its transhumant lifestyle 
and taken employment as specialized workers in the agricultural or industrial sector 
(Brill Olcott 1981; Farrington 2005)77. The new villages – which had usually been 
delimitated along tribal lines, so that people from the same tribe [Kyrg. uruu] settled 
besides each other – soon became reorganized into kolkhozes. The term ‘kolkhoz’ is a 
contraction of kollektivnoe khoziaistvo and literally translates as ‘collective farm’; it 
describes a form of collective farming in the USSR. Kolkhozes existed alongside 
sovkhozes (contraction of sovetskoe khoziaistvo), which literally translates as ‘state 
farm’ and usually describes larger, more industrialized farm units under direct state 
control. Kolkhoz members were paid a share of the farm’s product and profit 
according to the number of working days. They were also given land tenure [Russ. 
zemlepol’zovanie] over a small plot of arable land, i.e. a home garden [Russ. ogorod] 
as well as the right to keep a limited number of private animals. By contrast, sovkhozes 
employed salaried workers (Wädekin 1975; Feldbrugge 1973; Feldbrugge et al. 1985). 
Rather small entities in the early years of the USSR, many kolkhozes were gradually 
merged into larger units after the Second World War or converted into sovkhozes after 
1960. The two case study villages examined in this thesis both retained their status as 
kolkhozes up until the early 1990s. 
 
Modern Soviet agriculture soon became based on transfers from the industry as well as 
on heavy capital investment from the centre in the Union’s periphery. The market was 
highly protected and prices were subsidized, while production was organized vertically, 
with processing and distribution chains often far away from each other. By the mid-
1980s, about 40 million Soviet people were living in kolkhozes. In 1990, there were 
179 kolkhozes in the Kyrgyz SSR, each giving full-time work to about 1,100 
agricultural laborers and specialists and covering 40,223 ha of land on average, 
including pastures. Overall, livestock products – beef, veal, milk, mutton and wool – 
accounted for two-thirds, crops for one-third of the Kyrgyz farm outputs (Dienes 1975; 
Feldbrugge et al. 1985; Delehanty and Rasmussen 1996; Stadelbauer 1996; Kerven 
2003b; Christensen and Pomfret 2007; Ryazanov 2007). 
 
 
6.1.1 The kolkhoz principle 
 
Although established on an allegedly voluntary basis, kolkhozes were firmly 
incorporated into the centralized system of planning and control and subordinated to 
the union republican ministries of agriculture. All land in the USSR being state 
property, kolkhozes had the right to use the land allotted to them for an unlimited time 
period; all other assets – animals, machines and built infrastructure – were owned by 
the kolkhoz as cooperative property, but had to serve the purposes determined by the 
kolkhoz statute (Feldbrugge 1973, 377ff; Lindner 2009, 72ff). 
 
‘Kolkhoz democracy’ 
 
According to the 1969 model charter, amended in 1980, the organizational structure of 
the kolkhoz had to be based on the principle of ‘kolkhoz democracy’, with a general 
meeting of all kolkhoz members [Russ. kolkhozniki] as its highest formal decision-
                                                
77 Personal communication with Kalkan Kerimaliev, local historian, Kyzyl-Tuu, 16 Aug 2008. On pre-
Soviet Central Asia, see Geiss (2003). For a detailed description of the early years of the collectivized 
Soviet agriculture in Central Asia, see for instance Wheeler (1964), Dienes (1975) or Jacquesson (2003). 
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making body (Figure 6.1)78. At the age of sixteen, any person living on the territory of 
the kolkhoz automatically became a kolkhoznik, i.e. a formal member of the economic 
and political entity. Others could become a kolkhoznik through official application 
and the consent of the kolkhoz general meeting (Lindner 2009, 75). Being a 
kolkhoznik entailed particular rights and entitlements. On the one hand, every 
kolkhoznik received a small piece of land for a home garden and was entitled to receive 
a basic wage according to workdays, as well as additional social benefits (see 6.2.2). 
On the other hand, a kolkhoznik could also vote at the general meeting and stand for 
public positions within the kolkhoz (Lindner 2009, 75f). However, once registered, a 
kolkhoznik could leave his or her kolkhoz only with the consent of the kolkhoz 
authorities. Although being a kolkhoznik did not automatically mean that someone 
was a kolkhoz worker, considerable pressure was put on people to become one by 
requesting their own ‘workbook’ [Russ. trudovaya knizhka] (Humphrey 1983, 132f). 
 
The general meeting, which assembled about four times per year, could also elect an 
executive board and a chairman for three years – yet only with the prior consent of the 
local committee of the Communist Party, which was headed by a local party secretary. 
While formally responsible for public education in the spheres of labor, ethics and 
atheism, party secretary and -committee usually played a very important role; the main 
decision power at the local level was usually divided between the kolkhoz chairman 
and the local party secretary. In addition, every brigade had its own party branch and 
its own secretary (Personal communication with a former party secretary of the Tien-
Shan RayKom, 9 Nov 2007; Humphrey 1983; Feldbrugge et al. 1985). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Organizational structure of a kolkhoz (own figure; based on Lindner (2008, 76) and own data) 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizational structure 
 
A kolkhoz was usually divided into several production units, so-called brigades, which 
at the same time served as new social entities that should take the place of kin-groups 
and village structures (Verdery 2002, 6; compare Figure 6.1). Each brigade had its own 
brigade meeting and a brigadier, who was elected with the consent of the kolkhoz 
leadership. While having great powers within their own brigade, brigadiers were 
nevertheless completely dependent on the decisions of the kolkhoz chairman. Most 
brigades were sub-divided into several, often specialized farms, with their own farm 
leaders and several technical experts such as breeding specialists [Russ. zootechnik], 
                                                
78 The kolkhoz model charter applied to the whole territory of the USSR. According to Lindner (2009, 71) 
the charter had a harmonizing effect throughout the Union, although it often became renegotiated at the 
local level. 
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veterinarians, and herders. A herder was usually responsible for one atar, i.e. 500 to 
600 sheep. Every farm had its own stables and barns as well as land allotted to 
haymaking and forage production in order to keep the animals stall-fed throughout the 
winter. 
 
Box 6a People’s perception of state dependency 
 
Today, the state often occupies a very central – usually with positive connotations – role in people’s 
narratives of the past. Many acknowledge that the Soviet government and the related administrative 
institutions contributed a great deal to the improvement of rural livelihoods in their area. This holds 
especially true for those who witnessed the decades after the Second World War, namely the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, when rural Kyrgyzstan received massive support from Moscow to modernize and 
industrialize the agricultural sector. At that time, many Kyrgyz kolkhozes for the first time received their 
own machinery, and much of the rural infrastructure that is still visible today – roads, irrigation schemes, 
stables and barns – stems from that time. It was also in the early 1960s when many of the formerly small 
kolkhozes became merged into larger units. While this allowed to intensify the agricultural production, the 
ever-growing objectives of the five-year plans and the integration into the all-Union market eventually 
increased the rural areas’ dependency on subsidies from the centre. 
 
“Our region could only exist because of the Soviet Union, and because the 15 Union Republics were 
linked to each other. Tractor motors, for instance, were produced in Kazakhstan – but some parts we 
brought from Uzbekistan. We could also produce electricity – but the transformers were brought from 
Kazakhstan. Everything was linked with everything else, (…) and the Russians provided us with 
everything.” (Head of Karakojun ayil okmotu, 2007) 
 
The allocative power (compare 4.1.1) of the Russian-dominated central administration at national and 
regional level was equally reflected at the local level, where most decisions were taken by the – in the case 
of the two examined kolkhozes, ethnic Kyrgyz – kolkhoz management and the local party organization. In 
exchange for this monopoly over decision-making, the state ‘took care’ of its citizens by providing them 
with everything they needed to lead a decent life, including basic wages, cheap commodities, free 
education, social and health services, and subsidized recreation. 
 
“The Soviet state supplied us with everything. (…) Everything was linked with everything else: we had 
Soviet currency, we were employed by the Soviet Union, and even the TV programs were about the 
Soviet Union.” (Former mechanic, smallholder, Jergetal) [2a33] 
 
It seems that unlike other, mainly urban areas of the Soviet Union, Naryn oblast did not suffer from serious 
supply shortfalls in the 1980s. Many respondents told me that the kolkhoz shops were always full of a 
range of products and that prices were always very low.79 
 
 
Every kolkhoz had to abide by the central administration's five-year plans, according 
to which the kolkhoz general meeting could define annual production plans. The 
produce was delivered at fixed prices to state purchasing organizations; surplus could 
be used for the kolkhoz’ own needs (such as seeds, fodder) or could be sold on the so-
called kolkhoz markets (compare 6.3). The kolkhoz model charter also defined how 
the profits had to be distributed for paying the kolkhoz workers’ legally guaranteed 
minimal wages, paying income taxes and contributions to the all-Union health 
insurance fund, and enlarging the kolkhoz assets. 
 
 
6.1.2 Structure of the two kolkhozes Jangy Talap and Karakojun 
 
Jergetal village was part of the Jangy Talap kolkhoz. The kolkhoz was established in 
the mid-1960s, when the central planning authorities decided to merge eight smaller 
kolkhozes that had been set up in the 1930s. The kolkhoz consisted of the three 
                                                
79 Compare with section 3.4 about the potential nostalgia bias in people’s narratives of the Soviet past. 
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brigades Jangy Talap (today’s Jergetal village), Jalgyz Terek and Kyzyl-Jyldyz. Jangy 
Talap was the largest brigade with up to 25,000 sheep, 500 cows and 1,000 horses – in 
spring, when animals give birth, up to twice as much. About 80% of the kolkhoz’ 
production was meat, and 20% wool. According to various respondents, Jangy Talap 
was one of the richest and most successful kolkhozes of the Kyrgyz SSR as it 
concentrated all its efforts on livestock and forage production (various respondents 
2007/8; Eriksson 2006). The Jangy Talap brigade was further divided into four farms: 
Jangy Talap, Jergetal, Toguz Bulak, and Baskyia (compare Map 7.1; many respondents 
also referred to these farms as ‘brigades’ or ‘villages’). 
 
Kyzyl-Tuu village was part of the Karakojun kolkhoz, which was formally established 
in 1936, only six years after the formation of the At-Bashy rayon. In the beginning, 
Karakojun consisted of three kolkhozes, which were eventually merged in the early 
1960s. From that time on, the kolkhoz consisted of the two brigades Kyzyl-Tuu and 
Karabulung and specialized on sheep breeding. In the 1980s, the kolkhoz kept around 
45,000 sheep, 200 cows, 1,000 horses and 600 yaks, and up to twice as much during 
lambing periods. White merino wool was the main product. All in all, Karakojun was 
not one of the best Kyrgyz kolkhozes, but was still relatively wealthy. The Kyzyl-Tuu 
brigade was divided into four reproduction farms and one farm specialized in 
fattening. In addition, 30 to 40 agricultural workers were responsible for haymaking 
and forage production in order to keep the animals stall-fed throughout winter. 
Nevertheless, the management regularly had to buy additional forage from the Chuy 
valley.80 
 
 
 
6.2 Working in a kolkhoz: social stratification and income 
disparities 
 
The official socialist discourse strongly promoted an egalitarian society and valued the 
ordinary worker highly. In the Soviet Union, which declared itself a ‘workers’ state’, 
farmer and industrial worker were central motifs of state iconography. In reality, 
however, the strong hierarchies and power imbalances within a kolkhoz often resulted 
in social stratification and considerable income disparities. 
 
In general, about one-fifth of all kolkhoz members were leading and expert personnel, 
including the kolkhoz chairman, accountants and specialists with higher degrees such 
as veterinarians and breeding specialists [Russ. zootekhniky], as well as technical 
specialists [Russ. mekhanizatory]. The remaining four-fifths were ordinary kolkhoz 
workers, including field workers and herders. The large number of agricultural 
workers was a result of the fact that even by the late 1970s, 65% of all agricultural 
work in the Soviet Union was still manual. Most management positions on collective 
farms were occupied by men, while more than 70% of the agricultural laborers were 
women (Bridger 1987, 59f; see also 6.4 below). As the evidence presented below 
illustrates, this professional stratification was not only reflected in people’s 
differentiated access to formal wages and premiums, but also in power imbalances 
regarding the allocation of jobs and, consequently, opportunities to informally improve 
individual incomes. 
 
 
6.2.1 Central job allocation, blat and professional flexibility 
 
The kolkhoz principle established strong professional and social hierarchies through a 
strict division of labor. At the same time, the model charter allowed for considerable 
                                                
80 Personal communication with a former brigadier, Kyzyl-Tuu, 2007/8. 
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flexibility in the allocation of jobs and the level of wages (Lindner 2009, 79). Thus, it 
was usually the kolkhoz management – often together with the local party secretary – 
that decided about job allocation, e.g. whether someone should work as a herder or a 
machinist. 
 
“Later on, the kolkhoz leader could not find anyone to herd the livestock of the kolkhoz, so 
they gave me one shelter of sheep [kyrg. bir koroo; equal to 500 sheep] and told me to herd 
livestock. That’s how I became a herder in 1957.” (Former kolkhoz herder, large farmer, 
Jergetal) [1c23] 
 
Just as people were appointed to a particular position by their leaders, they could be 
dismissed, for instance if a herder lost too many animals or was generally not 
responsible. While this allowed for a high degree of planning flexibility and helped to 
ensure a certain level of professionalism, it also allowed arbitrary appointments and 
dismissals by the kolkhoz leadership and the party officials. 
 
“In 1961, our kolkhoz leader decided that another herder should take over my flock. I did 
not receive anything, although I was entitled to my salary. The reason for that was that the 
relationship between myself and the kolkhoz leader was pretty bad.” (Former kolkhoz 
herder, smallholder, Jergetal) [3c3] 
 
Good personal relationships with those in power were thus crucial to getting a good 
job, and this fostered clientelism and patronage within a kolkhoz (Trevisani 2007, 
101). The Russian language commonly describes such networks with the word blat 
[Russ. for ‘pull’ or ‘connections’]. Although it may include bribery to some extent, blat 
describes a form of cooperation based mainly on trust and mutual support and thus on 
effective social networks, rather than on monetary compensation alone (Kuehnast and 
Dudwick 2004)81. Humphrey (1983) has also shown that there were often more 
qualified workers than well-paid jobs in a kolkhoz, so that the local elite could only 
“retain their positions if they [could] persuade people to work in the very jobs which 
are avoided. (…) A complex bargaining between officials and workers ensues.” (ibid., 
300) 
 
However, the administrative allocation and re-allocation of jobs resulted in a 
considerable – although not always voluntary – professional flexibility of kolkhoz 
workers. Many changed jobs repeatedly, for instance when the arrival of new machines 
required new technicians or when the increasing number of animals called for more 
herders. Thus, while some remained accountants or herders for more than 25 years, 
others changed their profession several times. It was not uncommon to have a 
professional biography that involved moving from being an ordinary field worker to a 
mechanization expert, or from a coachman to an electrician. This was true of both men 
and women. 
 
“I herded animals for 11 years and I also worked at the kolkhoz storehouse. Then I worked 
as a horse farmer, as a salesman at the shop, and I was driving big trucks with goods, called 
‘auto shop’. So I did different jobs – one was also as an inspector at the rayon financial 
department. I worked for 20 years, and later on I retired.” (Former kolkhoz herder, mid-
sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a29] 
 
Nevertheless, changing profession within the kolkhoz was only possible with the 
consent of the kolkhoz management. Given that not only were the basic wages of an 
ordinary field worker far lower than a chief accountant’s but the latter usually had 
more opportunities to informally improve his/her official income, the importance of the 
kolkhoz structures to the livelihood trajectories of individuals and households can 
hardly be overestimated. 
 
                                                
81 Verdery (2002) notes that similar words indicating ‘connections’ occur frequently in everyday speech in 
many socialist societies. 
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6.2.2 Formal income disparities 
 
Along with cheap commodity prices, free health services and education, and a centrally 
administered social security system, the concept of basic wages was one of the major 
socialist achievements for the Soviet peasantry82. This concept, however, incorporated 
considerable income disparities. 
 
Ordinary kolkhoz workers 
 
Although formally a voluntary member of a cooperative, the real status of a 
kolkhoznik was very close to that of an employee. A member’s right to participate and 
speak up in meetings was therefore of little practical value, since the important 
decisions were usually taken by the central planning authorities, the kolkhoz chairman 
and the local party secretary (Lindner 2009, 77). Workers were paid a basic wage 
according to the workdays accomplished and could receive extra wages (depending on 
the kolkhoz’ performance) and premiums (depending on their personal performance). 
Apparently, this system left considerable room for arbitrariness. Even Soviet authors 
complained that “(…) cases are still not uncommon of the heads of certain kolkhozy 
and state farms illegitimately depriving people of bonuses and supplementary pay.” 
(Biryukov 1973, cit. in Wädekin 1975, 12). Compared to industrial and sovkhoz 
workers, kolkhoz workers had relatively poor salaries. Only leading personnel and 
specialists, including herders, were in full-time employment, while field workers were 
employed and remunerated on a seasonal basis only, usually between spring and 
autumn. Given the disproportionately high proportion of female agricultural workers, 
rural women were particularly affected by this seasonal unemployment, although the 
disparities were somewhat less pronounced in animal husbandry than in crop 
cultivation (Bridger 1987, 61f). 
 
However, the income situation in the Kyrgyz SSR was particularly problematic. 
Although the payment per day worked in a Kyrgyz kolkhoz was above the Soviet 
average, the income per family member was far below, since a Kyrgyz kolkhoz worker 
usually had to feed more family members than his Russian counterpart (Wädekin 
1975). 
 
“Clerks and employees, such as myself – I was an accountant – were richer than others. The 
kolkhoz workers, who did not receive pensions, were poorer than us. They got twelve Som 
[ruble] per month, which was only sufficient for one bag of flour.” (Former kolkhoz 
accountant, large farmer, Jergetal) [3b20] 
 
Additional income disparities resulted from people’s unequal incorporation into the 
state social security system. Until the mid-1960s, there was no central pension 
insurance fund for ordinary kolkhoz workers, so each kolkhoz had to organize its own 
old-age pensions. They therefore depended on personal decisions by the chairman, as 
McAuley (1964, 312) notes: “At the present time no peasants receive old-age pensions 
from the state. (…) The granting of old age pensions is entirely at the discretion of the 
kolkhoz chairman and administration. (…) It would appear that pensions are not often 
paid.” It seems that in many cases, only the most worthy kolkhoz workers were 
allocated a pension by the chairman. 
Finally, in 1965, all kolkhoz members became incorporated into a uniform social 
insurance system, while special allowances for families with many children were 
introduced in 1977 only83. But even then, the situation was anything but satisfactory. 
According to the rules, a kolkhoz worker still needed to have given 25 years’ 
                                                
82 According to a respondent from Kyzyl-Tuu, workers of the Karakojun kolkhoz received their first basic 
wages in 1953: 20 kopeyky per working day, an amount which gradually increased thereafter. 
83 From the mid-1970s onwards, an average kolkhoz had to pay social contributions of about 5 to 9% of 
its gross income to the All-Union pension insurance fund, plus 2.4% of its wages fund to the All-Union 
health insurance fund. Individual contributions were not required. The All-Union funds then again re-
allocated pensions and other payments to individuals through their respective kolkhoz administration 
(Feldbrugge et al. 1985, 412; Liu 1993, 315). 
Part B   Persistence and emergence of socioeconomic disparities 
 
 106 
continuous service to qualify for old age pensions, while approved activities such as 
party work could attract bonuses (Feldbrugge 1973, 616). Pensions were often 
inadequate for a decent living and were further devalued by hidden inflation. Some 
estimates assume that by the late 1980s, 90% of all Soviet rural pensioners were living 
in poverty (Feldbrugge et al. 1985; Liu 1993, 315). 
 
Kolkhoz herders 
 
Whereas in pre-Soviet times most Kyrgyz families engaged in transhumance by tending 
their own flock, the kolkhozes employed a few professional herders to look after the 
farm’s livestock. Herders often spent the whole year on the pastures, living with their 
family in a yurt [Kyrg. üi-bülö], tent or house provided by the kolkhoz. They tended 
the animals according to instructions from their kolkhoz management84 (Brill Olcott 
1981; Dienes 1975; van Veen 1995; Undeland 2005). Although they had no special 
vocational training, herders often occupied a privileged position within a kolkhoz. 
They were usually employed year-round on a basic wage and might receive 
considerable bonuses at the end of the year, when the kolkhoz rewarded them 
according to their output in terms of wool and live weight. Rewards were given in the 
form of cash, commodities or medals with impressive names such as ‘Lenin 100’ or 
‘Merit of the Red Flag’. 
 
“At the herders’ meeting they gave us furniture, carpets, and fabrics – and 1,000 Som 
[ruble]. At the time, 1,000 Som was a lot of money.” (Former kolkhoz herder, smallholder, 
Kyzyl-Tuu) [3b8] 
 
Herders were usually respected for the responsibility they bore for the kolkhoz’ key 
capital, i.e. the livestock. Accordingly – and because many herders spent the whole year 
on remote alpine pastures – the kolkhoz management supplied them with everything 
they needed to make a decent living in the high mountains. Trucks commuted on a 
weekly basis between the village and the pastures in order to supply the herders with 
fresh food, commodities and newspapers, and additional fodder for the animals, as 
well as transporting helpers (mainly students for the lambing season), doctors and 
other specialists if required. In the 1960s and 1970s, the rapid expansion of the rural 
transport infrastructure facilitated access to remote, hitherto unused summer pastures. 
Herders were then increasingly provided with social and health services in so-called 
cultural centers [Russ. kulturnyi zentr], while more and more barns were built to house 
the animals in winter. The Jangy Talap kolkhoz also maintained a cultural centre on 
the remote pastures of Ak-Say, close to the Chinese border. The small settlement 
consisted of a veterinarian’s practice, a shop and a club for herders, as well as a small 
hostel to accommodate visitors. 
 
“We, the herders, were like ministers. They transported flour and sugar to the pastures – 
almost everything. We did not go shopping, as we received the products at home. The 
herders were supported especially well . We didn’t go anywhere to buy clothes, as we 
received them at home.” (Former kolkhoz herder, mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [2c8] 
 
Salaries were usually paid at the pastures and in cash. According to a former sheep 
farm leader, the kolkhoz accountants came once in a fortnight to the remote pastures 
to pay the wages. If a herder or one of his family members fell seriously ill, the 
management tried to organize a temporary replacement so that people could seek 
medical treatment down in the lowlands. Many herders also profited from subsidized 
recreation stays in sanatoria. 
 
“The party had demands, yes, but at the same time they respected us. They valued our 
work, so we could go on holiday on time. They sent us to resorts, to Crimea and to Sochi. 
That is the life we led.” (Former kolkhoz herder, large farmer, Jergetal) [1c23] 
                                                
84 The kolkhoz management in turn decided according to detailed parameters provided by the central 
‘State and Land Management Committee’ [Russ. Giprozem], which was responsible for the scientific 
planning and monitoring of rotational grazing, pasture quality and carrying capacity (Meierhans 2008). 
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However, herding year-round was a tough job full of privations for the herders and 
their families. In summer, they often had to relocate their yurts (which was provided by 
the kolkhoz) and their whole household between different meadows. In winter, when 
temperatures on the remote pastures could drop to –40°C, they often lived in small 
underground cabins dug into the hillside. In addition, the kolkhoz management often 
sent them to different pastures every year. 
 
“We were moving to different pastures. We also went to the remote pastures in Ak-Say. 
There I gave birth to ten children, they grew up on the pastures. But they received an 
education. Winter was really difficult there.” (Wife of a former kolkhoz herder, mid-sized 
farmer, Jergetal) [1a4] 
 
 
6.2.3 Informal income disparities 
 
While most kolkhoz workers had access to different kinds of state services and 
performance-based bonuses besides their basic monthly wage, some jobs offered better 
opportunities than others to supplement one’s income through informal means. 
Wädekin (1975, 25) notes that full-time employees had less time to generate additional 
cash incomes from their home garden and their private livestock (compare 6.3 below), 
but often had better access to additional in-kind benefits such as feed or fertilizers. In 
addition, they often kept more private livestock than was officially allowed. The 
evidence presented below confirms this observation, illustrating the roles and powers 
certain actors could achieve in a redistributive bureaucracy (rather than pinning an 
inherent ‘desire to cheat’ on various actors). 
 
Being out of control: herders’ opportunities for informal incomes 
 
However, living on the remote pastures also had some undeniable advantages. To live 
and work far from the village and the kolkhoz accountants also meant greater 
independence and less surveillance and inspections. Apparently, many herders used this 
opportunity to increase the number of animals they kept privately, at the expense of 
the kolkhoz. 
 
“[Our salary] was not sufficient for ten children. (…) I herded 700 male sheep, [and] I 
received 76 Som [ruble] per month. Imagine – 76 Som for 12 people; of course that is not 
sufficient. So we sold livestock. As I was a herder, I kept more livestock than was allowed.” 
(Former kolkhoz herder, mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [1a4] 
 
According to the kontrakt system (see 6.3 below), no household was formally allowed 
to keep more than a certain number of sheep privately (usually ten to twenty), but 
many herders had far more private animals by simply mingling them with the kolkhoz 
flock. Each herder was usually responsible for 500 to 700 sheep belonging to the 
kolkhoz, so adding a few dozen of their own animals was no big deal. Supplemental 
fodder was usually available in abundance, too, so lots of private animals could be fed 
without raising suspicions. If there was an inspection by the kolkhoz management, 
herders usually had their own tricks to distract the inspectors, such as hiding surplus 
animals in remote valleys or in holes. Others brought their private flock to another 
kolkhoz’ pastures when there was an inspection – and this strategy seems to have 
operated on a reciprocal basis between herders of neighboring pastures. 
 
By and large, however, it seems that the herders’ informal practices were an open 
secret. In their attempt to evade the limitations set by the kontrakt system, many 
people from non-herding households entrusted some of their own surplus animals to 
one or more kolkhoz herders. In return for decent payment in cash or in alcohol, the 
herder would then take care of these animals during summer. Many divided their large 
private flocks into several smaller ones and entrusted small groups of 20 sheep to 
different herders. This was also practised in winter, when the private animals were 
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usually kept in the village. When I asked a former head of a rayon party committee 
how he had managed to hide his 70 private sheep, he replied: 
 
“I had friends who were herding, so I sent my animals with them. The herders themselves 
had 200 to 300 of their own sheep, and all were kept at the expense of the kolkhoz. The 
herders lived like kings at that time, they really did!” [2b7] 
 
Being in control: kolkhoz and party elites’ opportunities for informal incomes 
 
It seems that the kolkhoz and party elites were more often involved in informal, 
livestock-related practices than ordinary workers. A former kolkhoz chief accountant 
reports: 
 
“We usually kept our private animals at home, but gave them to the herders from time to 
time. There was enough fodder with the herders back then, and you could get fodder in 
exchange for a bottle of vodka. So our private animals stayed in the kolkhoz stables and ate 
the kolkhoz fodder. (…) Everything happened at the expense of the kolkhoz.” [JT 2b10] 
 
In another interview, a former brigadier listed all the jobs that offered particularly 
attractive ways of informally improving one’s regular income. A salesman could ask 
for higher prices; a bookkeeper could note down more stables than were actually 
constructed and pocket the money left over; or the murab (irrigation specialist) would 
irrigate less land than he accounted for. Breeding specialists, farm leaders, accountants 
and cashiers; it seems that they all had ‘their opportunities’ (he did not mention, 
however, the brigadiers). The brigadier ended by saying that it was important to note 
that, “there were also many honest people”. 
 
Obviously, those who were involved in the redistribution of goods and services often 
had more frequent and better opportunities to informally improve their wages. 
Kolkhozes constituted an intrinsic part of the socialist redistributive bureaucracy, in 
which the right to redistribute goods and services meant enjoying the power to allocate 
resources and determine the recipients and the rules of redistribution. Consequently, 
this also entailed the possibility to bend these rules to a certain extent (Verdery 2002). 
It was thus certainly less risky for kolkhoz leaders, party officials or chief accountants 
to circumvent the rules and regulations, since it was usually they who ordered 
inspections and inquiries. It can therefore be assumed that there was also a 
considerable gender bias regarding access to informal incomes, since most leading 
employees and specialists in collective farms were men (Bridger 1987). 
 
It would also seem that the central committees at national and Union level were aware 
of such informal practices. A former sheep farm leader from Kyzyl-Tuu reported that 
the farm leaders received less salary than others in comparable positions “since they 
[the government] knew that the farm leaders will use the kolkhoz livestock for private 
purposes.” [3b8] Informal practices therefore became an integral part of the 
redistributive bureaucracy. 
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Box 6b   “…and Dayrakunov cried”: the role of the kolkhoz chairman 
 
The kolkhoz chairman often occupies a central role in people’s narratives about the kolkhoz. In Jergetal, 
many respondents still remember and esteem their former kolkhoz leader, Dayrakunov, for his apparently 
good and wise leadership. Comrade Dayrakunov led the Jangy Talap kolhoz from 1957 to 1987, turning it 
into one of the most productive collective farms in the Kyrgyz SSR. According to some respondents, 
Khrushchev himself invited him to Moscow to praise him for his achievements. 
 
What seems particularly noticeable is that in several narratives, the kolkhoz’ development is directly linked 
with the person of the chairman himself. I often heard that “Dayrakunov built this electric station”, that 
“he brought all types of machines” (including the first off-road vehicle in the area) or that “he tarmacked 
the road”. My respondents often related the rapid development of their kolkhoz in the 1960s to the fact 
that their leader was “a hard worker” and that “he was really concerned” and “taking care of people”. A 
former kolkhoz herder even asserted that Dayrakunov gave free dairy cows to those in need. 
 
Such personalized accounts of socialist development obviously reflect the central role kolkhoz chairmen 
once occupied. None of my respondents ever related the kolkhoz’ achievements to decisions taken by the 
general kolkhoz assembly or to any other outstanding individual besides the chairman. Since the right to 
redistribute goods, services and jobs to the peasantry gave them allocative power, it was the chairmen  – 
at least as people saw it – who made community and individual development and wellbeing possible at all. 
Today, people often assess their heads of ayil okmotu according to similar expectations – only there is 
hardly anything left to be distributed. 
 
For unknown reasons, Dayrakunov fell out of favor with the party in 1987 and was eventually replaced. 
Soon afterwards, the disintegration of the socialist economy gathered pace and this certainly added to late 
Dayrakunov’s reputation as a capable and just chairman. As one respondent put it: “Dayrakunov was 
really concerned and he got sick when he thought about all that. ‘The work I did for the Jangy Talap 
kolkhoz was sufficient even for the small children of this village – and now all I’ve done is spread to the 
field [scattered to the four winds]’, Dayrakunov said, and he cried.” 
 
 
 
6.3 The ‘second’ agriculture 
 
In addition to the collective production, every kolkhoz household was officially entitled 
to a small home garden [Russ. ogorod] as well as to a limited number of private 
animals. This measure was intended to ensure the survival of the rural population 
through subsistence farming, as the first years after collectivization a time of low 
production and supply shortfalls. Although productivity in agriculture soon increased, 
the ogorod and private animal husbandry remained important pillars of the Soviet 
economy throughout the 20th century. In fact, this ‘second’ agriculture compensated 
for the central administration’s increasing inability to supply its population efficiently 
with basic goods such as meat, milk, eggs, vegetables and fruits (Rumer 1981; 
Feldbrugge et al. 1985; Ronsijn 2006). 
 
Private land cultivation: the ogorod 
 
The ogorod gained particular importance in Soviet Central Asia in the 1970s, when 
agricultural wages did no longer grow as much as in other Soviet Republics. At the 
time, the private farm sector began to grow about seven times faster than the collective 
sector. Since it was possible to sell surplus production from the ogorod on kolkhoz 
markets, the ogorod also contributed to some rural households’ cash income. Where 
prices were not fixed by the state but depended on supply and demand, kolkhoz 
markets had been tolerated by the state since 1932 and eventually even enjoyed official 
support. 
 
Women were mainly responsible for cultivating the family’s private plots, often in 
addition to bringing up their children, taking care of the housework and doing paid 
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labor for the collective farm (Bridger 1987, 60f). It seems, however, that private 
production in the ogorod was not sufficient to sell any surplus, either in Jangy Talap or 
in Karakojun kolkhoz. Instead, most households used their small home garden (0.15 
ha per households in Jangy Talap85, 0.25 ha in Karakojun) to grow carrots, cabbage, 
and, first and foremost, potatoes86. There was little point in growing wheat on such 
small plots and since fodder for the animals was usually available in abundance with 
the kolkhoz, most people simply cut the grass around the vegetable patches. 
 
Private animal husbandry: the kontrakt system and kolkhoz markets 
 
Besides the ogorod, each household was officially allowed to keep a small number of 
sheep and other animals. The limits differed between regions and kolkhozes and 
changed from time to time. According to a majority of respondents, the official limit in 
the Jangy Talap kolkhoz was ten sheep, one cow and one horse per household; the 
Karakojun kolkhoz allowed up to 20 sheep, one cow and one horse. In summer, people 
were entitled to entrust their private sheep to a kolkhoz herder of their choice, so many 
sent their animals up to the pastures with a relative or a neighbor. The milking cows 
stayed in the village and were taken care of by specially assigned ‘cowboys’.  In winter, 
private animals were usually kept in the yard. 
 
Most people used their private livestock to cover their subsistence needs and to serve to 
guests at large feasts such as weddings or funerals. As far as the commercial use of 
private animals is concerned, however, there are a wide variety of responses. Some 
respondents insist that there was no need to sell animals against cash, since the wages 
and pensions paid by the kolkhoz were sufficiently generous and commodities were 
affordable. Others, however, sold or bartered their animals from time to time at the 
kolkhoz markets or to their neighbors. But, irrespective of this, many households used 
to keep more animals than allowed, sometimes up to five times the official sheep limit 
(compare 6.2.3). Some even kept goats, even though this was officially forbidden by 
the kolkhoz management. 
 
There were three basic ways to sell private livestock. The first one was the compulsory 
kontrakt system, according to which excess private livestock had to be ‘sold’ to the 
kolkhoz at fixed prices per kilogram. In practice this meant that in autumn, the 
kolkhoz collected the offspring, i.e. lambs, calves and foals, to integrate them into the 
kolkhoz’ flock, which thus grew steadily. 
 
“To deliver an animal as ‘kontrakt’ means that the animal was weighed and paid for by the 
kilo. An animal hardly every brought in more than 150 rubles. So this was what ‘selling’ an 
animal meant.” (Former zootechnik, mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [3b18] 
 
Animals that did not have to be delivered as kontrakt – usually adult animals – could 
be sold in two ways. On the one hand, they could be delivered to governmental 
collection points. Such points existed in every rayon to deliver livestock to the large 
meat processing units. According to a former brigadier, they often paid better prices 
than the kolkhoz management. On the other hand, animals could also be sold at the 
so-called kolkhoz markets, for instance in Kochkor or At-Bashy. The market prices 
were more or less free and not necessarily higher than government rates. One 
respondent even told me that some people used to buy animals on the market in order 
to resell them to the kolkhoz at a better price. 
 
System failure or pragmatic compromise? 
 
In the early 1980s, private ogorod production accounted for 30 percent of the whole 
Soviet agricultural production despite covering only 1.6 percent of all arable land 
                                                
85 Due to population pressure, the initial size of the ogorod in Jangy Talap was reduced from 0.25 to 0.15 
ha (Eriksson 2006, 24). 
86 The importance of the potato for people’s subsistence in the socialist and the post-socialist era can 
hardly be underestimated. See Ries (2009) for a highly readable essay on the ‘potato ontology’. 
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(Eriksson 2006). About half of all vegetables and about one-third of all meat and milk 
was privately produced. Wädekin (1975, 25) assumed that private agricultural activity 
was especially attractive for those – often female – collective or state farm workers who 
were under- or seasonally employed and thus had enough time to cultivate their private 
plots. However, in the Kyrgyz SSR private cultivation was severely constrained by the 
limited availability of arable land and water for irrigation (Rumer 1981; Ronsijn 
2006). 
As it could hardly be explained by socialist ideology, many Western scholars in the 
Cold War period took the existence of this ‘second’ agriculture as evidence of the 
socialist system’s failure. More contextualized studies, however, reject the simple 
opposition between collective and private production. Instead, they interpret the 
complex and often blurred relations between the private and the public as a symbiotic 
relationship and as a constructive and pragmatic compromise. The ogorod, private 
animal husbandry and the kolkhoz markets played a significant role in the population’s 
food supply in the Kyrgyz SSR, but they would hardly have performed so well without 
the informal transfers of inputs from the state economy (Humphrey 1983; Stadelbauer 
1996; Hann 2003; Lindner 2009; Lindner and Moser 2009). 
 
 
 
6.4 Good worker, good communist: working in a highly 
politicized economy 
 
Kolkhozes were highly politicized economic entities. This is less due to the formal 
concept of ‘kolkhoz democracy’ described above, than to the fact that local 
Communist Party representatives had an important say in the appointment of kolkhoz 
chairmen and other leading personnel. From the 1950s on, no appointment of leading 
kolkhoz personnel could be made without Party approval (Bridger 1987, 81). This 
meant that usually only members of the Communist Party could get ahead within the 
socialist economy. Lindner (2009, 79) notes that around 1970 more than 90% of all 
kolkhoz chairmen were party members. At the same time, women were starkly 
underrepresented in the Communist Party so they were hardly ever promoted to 
leading positions. In 1980, only 1.9% of all kolkhoz chairpersons and 7.3% of all 
deputy chairpersons in the USSR were women. Even livestock brigade leaders were 
predominantly male (65%), despite the disproportionately high share of women 
employed in animal husbandry (Bridger 1987, 218). 
 
Often enough, kolkhoz chairmen were dismissed due to deviation from the ideals of 
socialist agriculture (cf. C.Z. 1959). It is thus impossible to separate the economic from 
the political sphere when talking about the livelihoods prospects of people living and 
working in a kolkhoz. The abovementioned examples of clientelism in the allocation of 
jobs and the nexus of allocative power and informal enrichment I have described 
inevitably raise the question of what kind of livelihood advantages ordinary 
kolkhozniki enjoyed from joining the Communist Party. 
 
Becoming a party member 
 
Not everyone in a kolkhoz was necessarily a member of the Communist Party. Those 
who were interested had to officially apply before passing through an elaborate entry 
procedure. The procedure included interviews by a special committee during which 
applicants were asked for their professional activities and their familiarity with socialist 
ideals. In addition, the committee gathered information at local and rayon level about 
the applicant’s professional performance and whether he/she had ever committed a 
crime (which made it virtually impossible to join the party). After that, applicants were 
given a one-year probation period before being accepted as a full party member. 
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“Not everybody could become a party 
member; they chose people who worked 
hard and who were really interested in 
working, who had a white heart [read: 
who were brave] and were honest.” 
(Former kolkhoz herder and party 
member, large farmer, Jergetal) [1c23] 
 
Thus, the decision about whether 
someone could enter the party or not 
was intrinsically tied to individual 
work performance. Consequently, 
those within the party considered 
themselves hard workers, while 
viewing others as lazy – a link that 
some people even uphold to the 
present day: 
 
“As a party member you had to work 
hard, and you got used to this, and this 
was good for your future life. Some 
people did not join the party – they 
cannot hold their boots now [read: they 
are lazy]. They still live in the same way 
as they lived before – they don’t work.” 
(same respondent) 
 
It is hardly surprising that non-
members perceive this differently. A 
former kolkhoz herder who tended 
livestock for 41 years but never 
applied for party membership told 
me: “They had so many meetings. 
After all, I had to herd livestock.” [JT 
2c8] 
 
Being a Party member 
 
Actually, participating in meetings was the fundamental right and responsibility of any 
party member, along with paying the compulsory membership fee. According to 
former party members, a Communist was considered a ‘respected person’ who was 
allowed to ‘speak out’ and who served as an example for others in terms of his/her 
commitment to work. 
 
“I had a party booklet in my pocket, so I was forced to fulfill the plans.” (Former kolkhoz 
herder and party member, large farmer, Jergetal) [1c23] 
 
Besides this personal appreciation, however, a party membership also entailed some – 
at least indirect – material benefits, especially with regard to education and jobs: 
 
“It was easier to get into university, have an education and find a job. If you wanted a better 
job, you had to be a member of the Communist Party.” (Former mechanic, smallholder, 
Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a3] 
 
Thus while party membership did not directly affect people’s wages, it nevertheless 
increased their chances of getting a better-paid job. One respondent, who had never 
finished school but nevertheless had worked in many different jobs before eventually 
becoming a brigadier, told me that he would never have had the chance to get so many 
different jobs if he had not been a party member. Others also said that they had 
received material support for private matters, for instance when their house had to be 
Figure 6.2   “Every kolkhoznik, every brigade, every 
MTS [machine station] must know the Bolshevist seeding 
plan” – Poster by V.N. Elkin, Moscow and Leningrad, 
1931 (www.russianposter.ru; accessed 29.4.2010)  
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repaired. On the whole, however, it seems that a party membership primarily entailed 
indirect benefits in the form of blat; those people who had allocative power over jobs 
could thus facilitate access to better formal and informal wages. 
 
* * * 
 
To sum up, people’s accounts of their life in the Soviet Union make clear that the 
socialist system of rational distribution and the kolkhoz as a ‘total social institution’ 
led to far less equality and social justice than was promised by the socialist ideals. 
Instead, existing hierarchies emphasized a close link between professional and political 
status and allocative power over resources, which allowed certain people to accumulate 
more wealth than others. As a result, socioeconomic disparities at local level were 
already in place when the Soviet experiment came to an end, although even the less 
wealthy could to some degree profit from the existence of a ‘second economy’. It can 
therefore be assumed that these disparities also influenced the distribution process of 
the early 1990s. 
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7 The dissolution of two kolkhozes 
 
 
“We entered this process without any preparation, without 
understanding what the reform is and how to go on, 
and we did not know our possibilities (…). 
They just gave us the livestock (…).” 
 
Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal [3a15] 
 
 
When the Kyrgyz government decided in the early 1990s to privatize the agrarian 
sector and to dissolve all collective and state farms, it initiated much more than a 
simple distribution of formerly state-owned means of production. Instead, it triggered a 
process of much wider social and political significance. I have shown in Chapter 6 that 
the Soviet kolkhoz was not simply an economic unit of agarian production but also a 
social and political entity governing the social relations of its members far beyond the 
agricultural production process. Despite the egalitarianism promoted by the official 
socialist discourse, there were many social and economic inequalities inherent in the 
kolkhoz system. While its elites such as chairmen, accountants and some technical 
staff, but also herders, could often profit from formal and informal benefits, many 
ordinary kolkhoz workers received only little wages and few additional benefits. Thus, 
the kolkhoz principle led to a stratification of rural societies through considerable 
disparities in livelihoods and distinct social relations between various groups and 
individuals. Hence, the redefinition of property rights over land, livestock and other 
resources after 1991 led to fundamental alterations in social relations locally. Former 
professional hierarchies were broken up, causing a redistribution of allocative power, 
which Verdery (1991) identified as the basic law of motion of the socialist economy 
(compare 4.1.1). This does not mean, however, that the privatization process did away 
with all former disparities and dependencies at local level. I have already argued in 
Chapter 4 that a considerable gap between the government’s official transition policy 
and what I call local processes of post-socialist transformation may be assumed. The 
resulting hybridity may have caused many internal contradictions and loopholes, 
paving the way for a sometimes illicit appropriation of resources. 
 
In this chapter, I therefore examine the local processes of transformation during the 
privatization period in the two former kolkhozes of Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu. The 
chapter is thus a further step towards a better understanding of the current livelihood 
disparities in the two case study villages as described in Chapter 5. I argue that a 
detailed analysis of the dissolution of the collective farms, with a focus on people’s 
practices and the role of different actors during that process, helps to understand better 
why rural livelihood trajectories have diverged so far since 1991. In this chapter, I 
therefore try to reconstruct what happened in Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu between 1991 
and the early noughties, i.e. between the time when Kyrygzstan gained independence 
and the formal end of the privatization process. The chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 7.1 focuses on the early years of independence (1991 to 1994), when only 
inefficient collective farms were allowed to begin with the distribution of assets to 
individuals and households. Section 7.2 analyses the heyday of privatization (after 
1994), when both kolkhozes examined for this study had to distribute all their means 
of production. Due to the complexity of the different processes, the section discusses 
the distribution of arable land, livestock and other means of production separately. 
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7.1  The early years of independence in Karakojun and 
Jangy Talap (1991-1994) 
 
In early 1991, the Kyrgyz government adopted the first legislative changes to allow for 
more private entrepreneurship at local level. Inefficient collective farms were allowed 
to distribute land-use shares and other means of production to those kolkhoz members 
who wished to establish their own peasant farm (compare 4.1.3). While Karakojun 
was an average, hence rather inefficient kolkhoz, Jangy Talap was among the 
republic’s most efficient farms. Consequently, the two collective farms followed a 
slightly different trajectory between 1991 and 1994. 
 
 
7.1.1 Karakojun: transformation into a ‘pseudo-cooperative’ and 
separation of first private farms 
 
The government obviously considered the Karakojun kolkhoz unprofitable enough to 
authorize voluntary privatization. At the same time, the then Minister of Agriculture, 
Talgarbekov, suggested transforming such collective farms into so-called cooperatives. 
Since the government promised continuing state support for these cooperatives, the 
formal transformation of the Karakojun kolkhoz was already accomplished by 1992. 
However, the change of corporate form was little more than cosmetic: the 
organizational structure remained more or less that of a kolkhoz, with the same 
chairman, the same professional hierarchies and the same unhealthy dependence on 
state support. 
 
“They had the idea not to distribute the livestock and the machines. I do not know whose 
idea it was. (…) We organized the cooperative and we changed the word ‘kolkhoz’ into 
‘cooperative’. We thought that we would carry on as in Soviet times, but there was no 
support from Moscow [anymore].” (Former mekhanizator and teacher, large farmer, Kyzyl-
Tuu) [1a7] 
 
While most people decided to join this ‘new cooperative’, about ten to fifteen 
households used the early opportunity to start their own farms and claimed their 
shares in land-use rights, livestock and agricultural machines in 1991. They then 
received 0.8 ha of arable land and twelve sheep per capita, plus some farm buildings 
and machines that they had to divide among themselves for further use. However, since 
this meant taking a considerable economic risk, it was mainly those who could rely 
upon a secure cash income and/or who knew about the desolate economic situation of 
the kolkhoz and the central state that decided to do so, among them many members of 
the kolkhoz elite. 
 
“I wanted to work on my own, because I knew that this cooperative would not work well. 
The kolkhoz was already in a poor condition when they decided to form a cooperative, as 
all state support had already ended.” (Former brigadier, large farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a9] 
 
A few other households left the cooperative in 1992. The majority, however, were 
neither ready nor able to take such a risk. Today many of those who stayed in the 
cooperative say that they did not really understand ‘what was going on’ at that time 
and that ‘everything happened very quickly’. Many people also did not trust the new 
official policy that suddenly permitted private entrepreneuership and feared that the 
state would sooner or later reclaim all the land and livestock. Some even thought that 
the collapse of the USSR was but a temporary crisis, and that Moscow would soon 
recover. Yet things were just about to get much worse. 
 
At national level, the effectiveness of this first step towards private agriculture 
remained negligible. Giovarelli (1998, 11) notes that “the process for restructuring 
farms and the rights of individual farm members were not outlined in detail (…) so 
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that people did not have clear choices or even an understanding of their options.” 
Many local bureaucrats also simply resisted the first orders from their new 
government. In addition, while the existing agricultural infrastructure, originally 
designed for large-scale farming under the Soviet command system, did not suit the 
requirements of small farming units, legal hurdles87 made it impossible to create larger 
and more efficient farms through the purchase of land from others. Thus, only about 
10,000 private farms had been established by 1994 (Jones 2003, 263). 
 
 
7.1.2 Rapid decline of the Karakojun ‘cooperative’ 
 
Despite the government’s initial promises of continued support, it soon became clear 
that subsidies for the agricultural sector and for rural public infrastructure were 
quickly drying up and that the state was increasingly unable to offer competitive prices 
for agricultural goods or to pay on time (Bloch et al. 1996; Stadelbauer 1996; 
Trouchine and Zitzmann 2005; Ronsijn 2006). As a result, the Karakojun 
‘cooperative’ soon found itself unable to maintain production and to keep the number 
of animals constant. The kolkhoz management could not supply its wage fund any 
more, the All-Union pension insurance fund88 dried up, and wages and old-age 
pensions could no longer be paid. In addition, the inflation quickly devalued people’s 
cash savings. What followed was a period of rapid economic decline and pauperization 
of the rural population. 
 
“The cooperative was barely able to survive for three years; there was no supply from the 
government. (…) The prices for the products [inputs] increased a lot and we could not sell 
livestock at good prices. We could not even buy a bag of flour for one sheep.” (Former 
mekhanizator and teacher, large farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a7] 
 
Having no fodder for the animals or cash to pay off the mounting debts, local leaders 
soon began to sell and barter away the cooperative’s livestock through different 
channels. It seems, however, that the sales revenues were not always used for the 
benefit of the cooperative but often served the personal enrichment of the local elite. 
 
“Before the distribution took place, some leaders used the livestock; they knew already that 
the kolkhoz would be dissolved. For example, these leaders said that the kolkhoz was in 
debt, and that they had to pay off these debts – but in reality there were no debts, so they 
used [the animals for] themselves.” (Head of Karakojun ayil okmotu, 7 Dec 2007) 
 
“The former kolkhoz leaders used the livestock of the cooperative – the brigadiers, the vets 
and the doctors. (…) They used the livestock and gave people various reasons, for example 
that they had bought fuel or tools needed for the machines. The people understood the 
situation only later on, in late 1994.” (Former brigadier and storehouse leader, mid-sized 
farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a29] 
 
Many other respondents give similar accounts, confirming that the years between 1991 
and 1994 were anything but transparent. It seems that local leaders in particular had 
an uneasy sense of the cooperative’s future and tried to make the most of this for their 
own family’s benefit. A former kindergarten teacher reported that the cooperative sold 
off the kindergarten’s furniture for very small amounts of money. According to a 
former brigadier, even well-respected Aksakals started to panic: 
 
“It was all haywire back then. In 1992 I was still a brigadier, and one day a few Aksakals 
asked me whether they could help us during the hay harvest; they knew that they would be 
allowed to keep some of the harvest for themselves. So they helped us, and in the end they 
brought the hay to the village. Five times they drove back and forth, and every time they 
piled the hay so high that in the end hardly anything was left. That was unfair, but it was 
the general mood before the dissolution: everybody grabbed as much as they could.” [3a9] 
                                                
87 Compare with 4.3 for the first reforms of the Kyrygz land legislation. 
88 For an explanation of the Soviet social security system, see 6.2.2. 
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All in all, the number of former kolkhoz animals quickly decreased, fodder yields 
declined and debts swell further so that, by early 1994, the only viable way was to 
dissolve the ‘cooperative’ and to distribute all the remaining means of production. 
 
 
7.1.3 Jangy Talap kolkhoz: unavoidable distribution 
 
Since it was considered an efficient and wealthy farm, the Jangy Talap kolkhoz was 
neither transformed into a ‘cooperative’ in 1991, nor was it allowed to distribute 
resource shares to those who wanted them. Nevertheless, the savings of the once 
wealthy kolkhoz were soon eaten up, and the management became unable to pay its 
workers and employees any longer. Pensions and child allowances, which had been 
paid in advance so far, suddenly ceased. As a result, the importance of private home 
gardens and flocks further increased. 
 
“In the beginning, life seemed more or less normal, but we soon got into the economic crisis 
that started in 1991. (…) Until 1995, people remained jobless; they just survived on their 
home garden and their animals. Everyone tried to eke out a living, nobody cared for us.” 
(Former party chairman at rayon level, mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [2b7] 
 
It seems that just as in Karakojun, parts of the kolkhoz and the local party elite made 
use of the general disorder and the lack of control from higher state levels to enrich 
themselves. Within two years, about a third of the once 72,000 kolkhoz sheep and the 
whole budget of the kolkhoz had disappeared. 
 
“The oblast and the rayon [party] committee and the kolkhoz leader (…) they used things 
for themselves, they sold livestock and other things. They only distributed the livestock 
afterwards. (…) The kolkhoz had four million Som [ruble] in its budget, but nobody knows 
where this amount was spent. Nobody ever asked for this money.” (Former kolkhoz herder, 
large farmer, Jergetal) [1c23] 
 
Many respondents also blame the former kolkhoz herders for not taking care of the 
kolkhoz animals anymore after 1991. Since they would have known that the kolkhoz 
was soon to be dissolved, they would have diverted the healthy and most valuable 
animals to themselves and their relatives, so that by 1994 there were only sick animals 
left over for the ordinary kolkhoz workers. It remains difficult, however, to 
substantiate such accusations – as in Karakojun, veterinarian services and fodder 
supply ceased to exist in the Jangy Talap kolkhoz, so that it became increasingly 
difficult keeping the animals in a good condition. 
 
 
7.2 Breakup of kolkhozes (1994 onwards) 
 
In view of the rapid decline of the agrarian sector and the rapid impoverishment of the 
rural population, the Akaev administration in early 1994 declared decollectivization 
compulsory for all collective and state farms (compare 4.3.2).  
 
In the case of Kyzyl-Tuu, however, a general village assembly in early 1994 decided to 
dissolve the recently created cooperative before the higher levels of the state 
administration began to exert pressure. By contrast, the final dissolution of the Jangy 
Talap kolkhoz only began after an order from the rayon administration, although the 
distribution of the kolkhoz livestock had already begun89.  
 
                                                
89 Personal communication, former chief kolkhoz accountant, 11 November 2007 
The dissolution of two kolkhozes 
 119 
7.2.1 Distribution of land use shares 
 
Distribution of arable land in Kyzyl-Tuu 
 
The distribution of land-use shares seems to have taken place without any major 
problems or conflicts in Kyzyl-Tuu. Shares were calculated and demarcated according 
to the legally defined procedure and every eligible individual90 was allotted a 0.8 ha 
share of arable land. The land was distributed along tribal structures so that people 
from the same tribe usually received parcels close to one another91. Many households 
received their cumulated land shares (e.g. a total of 4 ha for a household of five) in a 
single place; in some cases, however, the land was split into two or three parcels. All 
shares were basically defined as ‘irrigated land’ [Kyrg. sugat jer], although the 
irrigation infrastructure – concrete channels, locks and dams – was often in a 
deplorable state. 
 
The location of the distributed land parcels seemed of little importance; hardly 
anybody ever complained that his/her fields were too far away. This may be due to the 
fact that the area with arable land is rather compact and not too far from the village 
(compare Map 9.1). An example from the northern part of the village illustrates that 
the immediate vicinity of a plot of land to the settlement may even have a detrimental 
effect. In 2000, several households from the same tribe offered to the ayil okmotu to 
exchange their irrigated plots against other arable land far from the village. They did 
so because they had repeatedly suffered crop losses from trespassing animals that were 
kept in the village over the summer. The ayil okmotu accepted the deal and offered 
them other, still rain-fed land from the communal Land Redistribution Fund. Their 
previous land was then allotted to young families for housing construction. 
 
Distribution of arable land in Jergetal 
 
Things were much more complicated in Jergetal. Since the 1960s, the kolkhoz was 
organized in three brigades – Jangy Talap (today’s Jergetal village), Jalgyz Terek and 
Kyzyl-Jyldyz – each with its own allotted arable land. Therefore, land was distributed 
in each brigade separately. The Jangy Talap brigade was further divided into four 
different production entities, indiscriminately referred to as ‘brigades’, ‘farms’ or 
‘villages’ (compare with 6.1). Again, each of these entities had its own allotted arable 
land to grow fodder crops. However, since every inhabitant of the Jangy Talap brigade 
was legally entitled to the same amount of arable land, it was not possible to treat the 
four sub-brigades separately. 
 
Distribution was eventually carried out in autumn 1994. As a first step, the total 
amount of irrigated arable land available for distribution (745 ha) was arithmetically 
divided by the total number of kolkhoz inhabitants (2,759)92. Consequently, every 
eligible person was entitled to 0.27 ha of irrigated arable land, plus 0.09 ha of rain-fed 
land. As a second step, the land use shares were physically distributed. For unknown 
reasons, the local commission together with the land experts from the Naryn rayon 
decided to start with the two sub-brigades III (Toguz Bulak) and IV (Baskyja; compare 
with Map 7.1). As a consequence, most households from these sub-brigades received 
their irrigated land in one single plot close to the village. Then the inhabitants of the 
other two sub-brigades I (Jangy Talap) and II (Jergetal) received their land, but
                                                
90 See 4.3.2 for a definition of who was eligible to receive a land use share. 
91 It seems, however, that these tribal affiliations did not have much influence on the subsequent use of 
arable land (compare with Chapter 9). 
92 Figures according to the former chief accountant of the Jangy Talap kolkhoz who was responsible for 
the calculation and delimitation of land use shares. 
Part B   Persistence and emergence of socioeconomic disparities 
 
 120 
The dissolution of two kolkhozes 
 121 
hardly any large parcels close to the village were left, so many of these households 
received their irrigated arable land in several small, far-scattered parcels93. 
 
“We received land for seven people. But it is too scattered; it is located in six different 
places. In one place we have only seven sotik [0.07 ha]. It would be good if the land was in 
one place, not scattered [like this]. It is very difficult to do farming now and that is why 
livestock is very important.” (Teacher, mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [2f3] 
 
However, the distribution of irrigated arable land was also affected by the kolkhoz’ 
history. While the four sub-brigades of the Jangy Talap brigade were separate hamlets 
during the kolkhoz’ establishment in the 1960s, the settled area grew constantly, so 
that some arable land between the four hamlets had to be delimitated for construction. 
The concerned sub-brigade II (Jergetal) was then compensated with other arable land 
far from the village – not a serious drawback in times of subsidized fuel and transport, 
but the value of this property has depreciated considerably since 1994. Unlike in Kyzyl-
Tuu, where most fields are comparably close to the village, the arable land in Jergetal 
stretches over a distance of about ten kilometers along the Jergetal river. Some parcels 
are even as much as 35 kilometers from the village, in a place called Orus Bulak near 
the Naryn river. Consequently, many people nowadays complain about their scattered 
land property and the difficulties they face in cultivating it (see Chapter 9). 
Surprisingly, there were hardly any open conflicts over the apparently unequal 
distribution of arable land in Jergetal. According to the head of the Jergetal Aksakal 
court, most quarrels arose about the size of the distributed parcels, while their often 
unfavorable location was not a subject of legal disputes. In 1994 already, every 
household received a legal document defining the location, quantity and type of its 
land-use shares. In 1996, these provisional documents became replaced by official 
extracts from the land register. These are valid to the present day. 
 
However, quarrels did not only arise over the location of land parcels, but even over 
certain people’s eligibility to receive a land-use share at all. Thus, the committee in 
charge initially refused to allot a land use share to the wife of a former herder from the 
Jangy Talap kolkhoz. The man, who had worked in town for 25 years as a truck 
driver, returned in time to his former kolkhoz to take part in the distribution of arable 
land. He took along his children, but left behind his wife to look after the house. The 
committee then denied him his wife’s land-use share, insisting that she appear in 
person. Only after intensive debates, the committee gave in. 
 
“They did not want to give me my wife’s share. There were six of us in the family then. So I 
said to the people: ‘I’ll bring nine women tonight, and every one of them will say that I’m 
her husband. Will you then give all of them their share?’ After that, they gave me my piece 
of land.” (Former kolkhoz herder, smallholder, Jergetal) [3c3] 
 
While the anecdote gives vivid account of the quarrels related of the distribution of 
land use shares, it also contains a first reference to many (male) respondents’ 
perception of property rights over arable land. When talking about ‘my land’, the 
respondent is supposedly referring to customary law, according to which women are 
not seen as owners of the land, even though the national land legislation entitles them 
to their own individual share (see 9.2.2 for more details). 
 
People’s perception of the local commissions 
 
It remains unclear when exactly the local commissions responsible for the distribution 
of land shares were established in the two villages. According to a former rayon land-
use specialist who participated in various local commissions in the mid-1990s, most of 
them consisted of about 40 to 50 people, including former kolkhoz elites, aksakals and 
                                                
93 Unlike irrigated land, most rain-fed land is located far from the village and of little interest for most 
users, since the lack of irrigation infrastructure makes its cultivation virtually impossible. Therefore, the 
distribution of rain-fed parcels did not cause much excitement. Most respondents have not even 
mentioned their rain-fed land during the interviews. 
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other well-respected people from the village. Many kolkhoz agronomists joined the 
commission because they were best qualified to carry out the often complicated 
calculation and demarcation of land parcels94. It may be assumed that after three years 
of mismanagement and economic decline, the fact that so many of the former kolkhoz 
elite were now in control of the final distribution of assets raised suspicion among 
ordinary workers. This may at least explain why later on, when they realized that their 
land-use shares were of little practical value, many people in Jergetal started to 
complain about the distribution process and the commission’s work, an accusation, 
however, which the former chief accountant of the Jangy Talap kolkhoz who was a 
member of the land commission decidedly rejected: 
 
“That’s not true. Maybe the ordinary field workers said so, but they had no clue about the 
privatization. Everything was handled very justly and fairly, because we had a commission.” 
(Former chief accountant of the Jangy Talap kolkhoz) [3b20] 
 
 
7.2.2 Distribution of livestock 
 
Distribution of livestock in Kyzyl-Tuu 
 
Just as for land sharing, livestock was distributed in several steps in Kyzyl-Tuu. 
However, since the number of kolkhoz animals decreased significantly between 1991 
and 1994, those who claimed their shares in 1991 and 1992 received twelve – usually 
healthy – sheep per household member, whereas those who participated in the final 
dissolution of the ‘cooperative’ got only five – often sick – sheep per capita. The same 
was true of big animals such as cows, horses and yaks. In 1991 and 1992, every 
‘private’ household got at least one horse and up to six yaks or cows, while in 1994, 
there was usually not more than a single horse or a yak per household left. Apart from 
this dramatic drop in the quantity and quality of kolkhoz livestock in the space of just 
three years, the distribution seems to gone off without any major problems or conflicts. 
This does not mean, however, that the process was entirely fair. According to a former 
brigadier, some herders and members of the former kolkhoz elite managed to divert the 
young and healthy animals into their own yards, leaving the old and sick ones to their 
neighbors. This may explain people’s widely differing perceptions of what they 
received in 1994: 
 
“We received a small yak, but they told us that it was not possible to keep it in the village, 
so we slaughtered it. (…) We also received some sheep and a very old horse.” (Teacher, 
smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b15] 
 
“We received 90 or 100 sheep, and for ten people one horse was distributed. (…) They were 
healthy – the livestock which I have now is left over from that livestock. Some people were 
able to sustain the number of their animals, and some could not.” (Former kolkhoz herder, 
large farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a4] 
 
Although the 1994 distribution was carried out in early spring, most recipients did not 
send their animals to the spring pastures, often because they did not have anyone to 
take them there. Consequently, most people tried to keep their animals in their yards 
and around the village. The resulting fodder shortage not only killed many of the old 
and weak animals, but caused heavy losses during the lambing period that began a few 
weeks later.95 With the benefit of hindsight, the distribution of single yaks appears 
particularly questionable. Usually kept in large herds in the high mountains all year 
round, a single yak in the village is of little use. Therefore, nearly all people 
immediately slaughtered the yak they received, and the once large yak herd of the 
kolkhoz was lost in no time. 
                                                
94 Personal communication, 24 May 2007 
95 The practice of keeping the animals all year round on the village-adjacent pastures also led to a rapid 
deterioration of the pasture quality close to settlements (compare Chapter 9). 
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Distribution of livestock in Jergetal 
 
Even before the arrival of the official order from Naryn rayon to finally dissolve the 
Jangy Talap kolkhoz, the kolkhoz leadership decided in December 1993 to start the 
distribution of the remaining animals. It remains unclear, however, why distribution 
began in the middle of winter. It seems that the kolkhoz leaders felt increasingly unable 
to feed all the remaining animals through winter and considered the privatization of 
flocks as a last resort. Thus, between December 1993 and April 1994, all animals were 
distributed among the kolkhoz’ inhabitants along with the kolkhoz’ remaining fodder 
reserves. Unfortunately, most recipients were equally unable to take care of these 
animals and the distribution process soon turned into a debacle. 
 
Sheep were distributed per capita, while big animals such as cows, horses or camels 
were allocated to families. People’s accounts of the exact number of sheep received per 
capita vary from one to ten, while it seems that three to four animals was the average. 
The confusion may arise from the fact that the distribution of livestock took place in 
several steps, since the kolkhoz animals were kept in different brigades and farms, 
making it impossible to distribute all of them at once. Besides sheep, every family 
received a horse and/or a cow or calf, depending on the number of family members. 
Some also received a camel or a yak. However, it soon turned out that the exact 
number of animals received per capita and family was of little importance. In the 
middle of winter, people had no other choice than to squash their new sheep into the 
same small stables with the sheep they already had – with the result that by spring 
1994, most of their animals were dead. 
 
“The number of animals increased quickly, and they did not fit into the stables anymore. 
For instance, we had ten sheep before [the distribution], but then their number grew to 
forty; yes, about thirty to forty… I was about 17 or 18 years old then. The stables were full 
in winter – and by the beginning of spring there was a pile of dead bodies. The kolkhoz 
sheep infected our ten animals, too, and by the end we only had two or three sheep left.” 
(Young farmer without livestock, Jergetal) [1c9] 
 
The disease that killed so many animals that winter was mange, a contagious skin 
disease caused by parasitic mites. Obviously, the disease had already befallen a large 
part of the kolkhoz sheep when the distribution started, and afterwards spread quickly 
through the cramped barns among the often malnourished and weak animals. 
 
“Before I received this livestock, I had my own corral of 30 sheep, but I lost them, too. (…) 
All the animals died because of the mange; that year, even the dogs did not eat the dead 
bodies, and the skin was not valued. (…) The time was not right for distribution.” (Former 
murab, smallholder, Jergetal) [1a10] 
 
Under normal circumstances, such a disease could have been handled without much 
loss. In the absence of sufficient fodder and adequate medical treatment, however, the 
effect was devastating. The former kolkhoz veterinarians, who had not been paid for 
years, were not only overwhelmed with work; they were often simply unable to help, 
since there was no appropriate medicine available anymore. Many people reported that 
the only drug left, a Chinese product named ‘Gralin’, was of little help because it had 
to be diluted in water to dip the animals – a virtually impossible endeavor given the 
constant sub-zero temperatures. Most of the surviving animals were soon slaughtered 
or bartered away, often for very small sums of money or a few bottles of vodka. 
Deprived of their cash income and with a rapid inflation devaluing their savings, many 
households had no other choice than to exchange their livestock for cash and 
commodities. 
 
Advantages of herders and the kolkhoz elite 
 
People’s accounts indicate that the former kolkhoz elite and the kolkhoz herders had 
several advantages during the distribution of livestock. On the one hand, some of them 
had the possibility to divert the young and healthy animals to their own yards before 
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distribution began – or not to take any livestock at all, such as the son of a former 
kolkhoz chairman in Jergetal, who refused to take his share of kolkhoz animals: 
 
“I did not want to receive any livestock. The animals were all sick; they would just have 
eaten fodder for nothing. I knew that they were sick and that they would not survive.” (Son 
of former kolkhoz chairman, large farmer, Jergetal) [2d1] 
 
On the other hand, the herders’ professional knowledge and experience helped them to 
cope with all the difficulties related to animal husbandry after 1994. Unlike herders, 
many former ordinary kolkhozniki such as field workers, milkmaids, murabs and 
mechanization experts did not know how to keep a large number of animals, let alone 
how to fight against disease. After decades of collectivized livestock production, most 
of them were accustomed to a kolkhoz herder taking care of their private animals, to 
constant fodder supply from the kolkhoz, and to veterinarians being available in the 
case of diseases and injuries. By 1994, however, all former kolkhoz herders and most 
veterinarians had stopped working for others, since they had not received their salary 
for years and were now busy with their own flock. It was not until three to four years 
later that some of them began working as herders again (see 10.2). 
 
 
7.2.3 Distribution of immovable property: machines and sarays 
 
Distribution of immovable property in Kyzyl-Tuu 
 
In Kyzyl-Tuu, agricultural machines and sarays – barns and small houses on the 
pastures – were distributed along tribal lines. Every tribe [Kyrg. uruu; see Box 5a] 
received a certain number of machines and sarays according to its size. The tribe leader 
[Kyrg. uruu bas’chy] was then in charge of negotiating the further procedure within the 
tribe96. 
 
In the case of machines, most tribes decided to sell the tractors, trucks or combines to 
one or several of their tribe members and to distribute the money equally among 
themselves (usually according to the number of family members). In most cases, former 
kolkhoz drivers and mekhanizators bought the machines, since they also knew how to 
drive and repair them. In one case, people agreed on fixed prices for the machines and 
then drew lots among all those interested in buying. It seems, however, that the 
negotiations and the amounts agreed upon varied considerably among the various 
tribes. While some said they received a share of 1,500 KGS from the sale of a combine, 
others complained that they had received only 30 KGS from the sale of a tractor. 
 
By contrast, only a few tribes sold the sarays immediately after the distribution. 
Instead, they were divided into equal portions and every household received a couple 
of meters of one of the usually long buildings. Most people then dismantled their share, 
using the bricks and parts of the roof for renovations to their own houses in the village 
(Figure 7.1). The reason sarays were hardly ever sold within the tribes was that their 
material value was often close to zero. In addition, only few were interested in having 
their own barn, given the rather gloomy prospects for animal husbandry. Some, 
however, refrained from wrecking their share and tried to use it for their own animals. 
Again, this mostly included former kolkhoz herders who soon after privatization 
started to take their own animals to the pastures again. Later on, some of them also 
managed to take over their relatives’ (often destroyed) shares, either in return for 
payment or free of charge (compare with 10.4.5). 
                                                
96 In the case of the households who claimed their shares in 1991 and 1992, machines and barns were not 
distributed along tribal lines but according to the total number of individuals. The households then had 
to negotiate themselves about the further distribution. 
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Figure 7.1 A ransacked saray outside Jergetal: only the concrete walls remain (photo by the author, 2007). 
 
 
Distribution of immovable property in Jergetal 
 
The procedure was slightly different in Jergetal. Agricultural machines were not 
distributed among the tribes but remained with the ayil okmotu. Tribes or individuals 
could then lease a machine for common use for a period of five years (apparently free 
of charge). After that, the lessee – usually a former kolkhoz driver – had the right to 
buy the machine from the ayil okmotu. It seems, however, that the de facto procedure 
did not always follow this principle. Several respondents’ accounts indicate that they 
were not at all aware of that possibility, believing instead that the machinery had been 
given to their tribe for common use and had then suddenly disappeared. 
 
“As far as I know our tribe received one tractor, but it was not used. They stole it and then 
it somehow disappeared. (…) We did not use it, it did not [even] work for one year, then 
they drove it to the garage where it disappeared.” (Former tractorist and murab, 
smallholder, Jergetal) [1a10] 
 
Thus, many former drivers and mekhanizators sooner or later gained possession of a 
truck, a tractor or a combine and began to rent out their driving and harvesting 
services to their neighbors for cash. In many cases, however, the lack of fuel or spare 
parts forced them to resell the vehicle again, so that a few years later only a few 
functional machines were left in Jergetal. By contrast, sarays were distributed along 
tribal lines and usually wrecked by the recipients. In several cases, however, barns were 
stolen or destroyed before the legal owners had the possibility to use the material for 
their own purpose: 
 
“We [our tribe] also received a barn, and we asked one guy to look after it. He sold all the 
material, got drunk and finally burned the barn. We couldn’t complain to anyone – he had 
nothing...” (Former kolkhoz herder, large farmer, Jergetal) [1c23] 
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As in Kyzyl-Tuu, a few individuals later on started to purchase their neighbors’ shares 
in order to rebuild them for their own use (see 10.4.5). 
 
* * * 
 
To sum up, the privatization of the Kyrgyz agrarian sector not only reproduced but 
sometimes also aggravated pre-existing local disparities. Therefore, the following 
summary asks whether the collapse of the socialist economy can be seen as a 
continuous process of unequal resource allocation, rather than a ‘new beginning’ in the 
form of an equal and just distribution of private property rights. 
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8 Summary and conclusions 
 
 
Basing my analysis on survey data collected in spring 2007, I examined in Chapter 5 
the current situation in the two case study villages regarding the distribution of natural 
resources and cash income sources. The results show that socioeconomic disparities are 
often striking, especially at household level. On the one hand, there are many 
households that have no animals of their own, as well as numerous smallholders with 
only small private flocks. On the other hand, there are a few large farm households 
with large private flocks and access to more private arable land per capita than others. 
There are also considerable disparities regarding people’s dependence on external 
financial support. Results show that households without animals and smallholders 
more often depend on child allowances and/or support by relatives and neighbors than 
mid-sized or large farm households. 
 
These disparities make obvious that a neoliberal understanding of post-socialist 
transition as a linear, unidirectional process starting from scratch helps little to grasp 
what happened after 1991. The massive gap between rich and poor indicates that 
either the neoliberal transition policy itself failed to create equal chances for everyone 
or that disparities already existed at the outset of reforms, which would mean that the 
approach of a ‘tabula rasa’, upon which a new order could be erected, was completely 
wrong. Most probably, both are true, as the empirical evidence presented in the three 
preceding chapters suggests. 
 
In order to solve the puzzle, I have examined when and how the currently existing 
socioeconomic disparities emerged in the course of the late socialist period (Chapter 6) 
and the early years of independence (Chapter 7). The evidence presented suggests that 
local processes of transformation can best be described by referring to the concepts of 
path-dependency (cf. Pavlinek 2003) and hybridity (cf. Hopfmann 1997a; Koehler and 
Zürcher 2004; see 2.2.2) put forward by the ‘sociological transition critique’. 
 
 
 
8.1 The role of the socialist legacy 
 
On the one hand, the evidence presented in Chapter 6 illustrates how the communists’ 
“massive projects of social engineering” (Verdery 2002, 6), i.e. to end all forms of 
inequality and depression, managed to achieve a certain degree of egalitarianism. By 
the second half of the 20th century, the socialist economy and the kolkhoz as one of its 
main production units had established free healthcare and education, state-sponsored 
social security and the concept of basic wages. These social institutions have 
undoubtedly contributed to a general and massive improvement in living standards in 
rural Kyrgyzstan. Today, these are a substantial factor in many respondents’ generally 
positive appraisal of the Soviet Union97. Although some of these achievements did not 
materialize before the 1970s for many ordinary kolkhoz workers, most people still 
refer to the socialist era “as a kind of baseline in their constructions of their lives” 
(Hann 2006, 4).98 
 
                                                
97 See 3.4 on the potential nostalgia bias. 
98 Roy (1999) even argues that tribal and socialist structures on a collective farm often merged into what 
he calls a ‘kolkhozian collective identity’. According to him, this identity is still deeply rooted in post-
socialist rural societies, maintaining a minimum of social safeguards or political protection for former 
kolkhoz members in uncertain times. However, while this may be true in rural Uzbekistan, where many 
collective farms still exist, the dissolution of Kyrgyz kolkhozes (as described in chapter 7) seems to have 
seriously damaged such an identity. 
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The symbiotic relationship between state, collective and private economy may be 
another reason for many people’s positive retrospective attitudes. The excellent 
performance of private agrarian production in the ogorods, which secured the survival 
of the rural population, could only be upheld due to massive transfers from the state 
and collective economy to private production at household level. Not all of these 
transfers, such as the use of kolkhoz fodder or labor force (herders), were necessarily 
illegal. Instead, they took various forms, from informal arrangements between leading 
personnel and ordinary workers to outright robbery. Thus, the boundaries between 
state, collective and private property were often blurred (Lindner 2009). 
 
On the other hand, the mode of operation of the socialist agriculture and the kolkhozes 
caused and reinforced considerable inequalities among the rural population. The 
redistribution of goods and services as the pivotal point of the socialist economy and 
the allocative power bestowed to a few, mostly male individuals benefited a 
comparatively small rural elite, and thus fostered livelihood inequalities among 
individuals and households. Local Party elites and the kolkhoz management were  
entitled to reallocate the physical and financial resources provided by the central 
administration within their kolkhoz. This not only took place directly through the 
payment of wages, bonuses and in-kind benefits, but also indirectly through the 
allocation of jobs, which entailed different opportunities to formally or informally 
access additional resources or allocative powers. I have shown for instance that herders 
enjoyed various indirect benefits, first because they were in control of the kolkhoz’ key 
resource – livestock – and second because they were usually far from the eyes of the 
kolkhoz authorities. Consequently, many of them built up their own private flock at 
the expense of the kolkhoz and helped others to do so too by illicitly allocating them 
fodder for their animals. In addition, people’s accounts on the role of the Communist 
Party at local level suggest that the sphere of agrarian production was closely tied to 
the political sphere. This further disadvantaged women, who were poorly represented 
in the Party. Party members hardly ever received direct material benefits, but often 
benefited from better access to attractive jobs and from blat, i.e. good contacts with 
those holding allocative power. Thus, existing inequalities were to some extent due to 
differences in political power rather than to differences in production. 
 
Professional careers and allocative power 
 
It thus seems that – at least in the context of the two kolkhozes examined – social 
realities were far from the egalitarianism propagated by Soviet ideology, but were 
instead characterized by considerable socioeconomic disparities. Formal and informal 
income disparities not only existed between the few leading personnel and specialists 
on the one hand and ordinary workers on the other, they also existed between men and 
women because Party control, prejudice and overwork often barred the way to 
promotion for the latter (Bridger 1987, 81f). 
 
Consequently, it seems anything but far-fetched to assume that, by some means or 
other, these disparities have influenced the privatization process of the 1990s. Table 
6.1 lists all respondents’ professional careers in the socialist economy and sorts them 
according to their current socioeconomic status, i.e. to the household typology 
developed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 8.1 Professional careers and positions of respondents in the kolkhoz, by household groups. Jobs with 
a considerable degree of allocative power are underlined. 
 
 Professional careers of respondents in the kolkhoz 
  
No livestock Assistant kolkhoz accountant 
Tractor driver >> murab 
Tractor driver 
Student (2 respondents) 
  
Smallholders Tractor driver >> murab 
Mechanic & driver (3) 
Ordinary field worker >> mechanic & driver 
Baker >> saleswoman >> employee at the post office > sewer 
Ordinary field worker >> assistant murab 
Ordinary worker 
Teacher (3) 
Herder >> Komsomol secretary >> senior leskhoz accountant >> journalist 
Herder >> coachman >> combine driver >> military service >> tractor driver >> truck driver 
Herder 
Student 
  
Mid-sized farms Tractor driver >> herder >> murab 
Ordinary field worker >> murab 
Ordinary field worker >> electrician >> mechanic & driver >> murab 
Murab >> military service >> herder 
Mechanic & driver 
Driver >> drivers’ brigadier >> storehouse leader 
Teacher 
Lawyer 
Veterinarian 
Brigadier 
Herder >> storehouse worker >> salesman >> truck driver >> inspector at Rayon Financial Dept. 
  
Large farms Driver >> teacher 
Teacher 
Ploughman >> driver >> herder 
Driver >> student >> kolkhoz economist 
Kolkhoz chief accountant 
Herder 
Brigadier 
  
Herders Herder (5) 
Tractor driver >> military service 
Electrician 
 
 
This list is not statistically representative of the local level. It suggests, however, that 
households which are better-off today, i.e. mid-sized and large farms, often relied on a 
job in the socialist economy with certain allocative power, such as accountants, 
brigadiers, herders, or murabs. By contrast, smallholders and households without 
livestock are often those of former ordinary kolkhoz workers. Needless to say, there 
are also exceptions to the rule, such as a former assistant accountant of the Jangy 
Talap kolkhoz who lost all his livestock and lives in total poverty today. However, the 
socialist legacy in the form of people’s professional status and their allocative power 
gained in the kolkhoz became even more crucial when in the early 1990s, the state-led 
economy was dissolved and the final round of resource allocation was initiated. 
 
 
 
8.2 Privatization: path-dependent processes in a hybrid 
institutional context 
 
The events prior to the full dissolution of collective farms and the subsequent, locally 
diverse privatization processes indicate that it was not the collapse of the socialist 
economy alone that caused the rapid socioeconomic decline of the early 1990s. In fact, 
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the privatization process itself also contributed to the ensuing rapid rural 
pauperization, both in terms of its objectives and its implementation. 
 
Collapse of the kolkhoz as a ‘total social institution’ 
 
The collapse of the socialist economy and the dissolution of collective and state farms 
not only triggered economic transition, it also caused a fundamental transformation of 
social structures and of the institutional and organizational context. The collapse of the 
kolkhoz as a ‘total social institution’ affected former kolkhoz members and their 
families in many different ways. On the one hand, the state’s sudden inability to 
further pay basic wages left thousands of people unemployed and deprived them of 
their formerly secure access to production-related benefits such as cash and in-kind 
bonuses. This sudden income uncertainty was further aggravated when state subsidies 
for food items and other commodities dried up and rapid inflation quickly devalued 
people’s ruble savings.  On the other hand, women and old people were particularly 
affected when social welfare institutions such as old-age pensions and child allowances, 
kindergartens and paid maternity leave, were cut back or ceased (Spoor 2004; UNDP 
2005a, 11). Last but not least, the collapse of communist party structures, which had 
governed people’s access to jobs, in-kind benefits and social prestige in the socialist era 
(compare with 6.5), forced many individuals to reorganize their social and professional 
relations. 
 
At that time, the persistence of the former kolkhoz markets and the ogorod more than 
ever protected the rural – but also a considerable share of the urban – population from 
famine. The second economy thus stepped in where the formal state-led economy had 
disappeared (Ronsijn 2006). It would be wrong, however, to understand this 
transformation simply as a triumph of private over state-led agrarian production. I 
have shown in Chapter 6 how large-scale kolkhoz production and small-scale private 
production formed a kind of symbiosis. On the one hand, the often excellent 
performance of private animal husbandry under socialist rule could only be maintained 
due to constant, usually informal transfers from the state-led economy (e.g. the illicit 
use of kolkhoz fodder for private animals or the employment of kolkhoz herders to 
herd animals during summer). On the other hand, the kolkhoz system survived for 
more than 60 years only because private production ensured the survival of the rural 
population. Alexander Nikulin (2002, cit. by Lindner and Moser 2009, 6) therefore 
rightly points out that any analysis of transformation processes of former collective 
farms should start from the idea of mutual dependence between the state and the 
private economy rather than of rivalry between the two. 
 
Ineffective distribution aggravates uncertainties 
 
The government’s decision in early 1994 to make distribution of all means of 
production compulsory for all collective and state farms was meant to counter the 
rapid economic decline. In line with neoliberal thinking, the expectation was that a 
general and equal distribution of natural, financial and physical assets would empower 
rural households to take the lead in agrarian production and marketing and make the 
agrarian sector more efficient. Yet evidence from the two case study villages suggests 
that this aim was not always achieved. Instead, many individuals and households soon 
encountered increased livelihood and knowledge uncertainties (compare with 2.4.2). 
 
First, the distribution was often ineffective and badly planned. The allocation of 
livestock in Jergetal was done in the middle of winter and resulted in a disaster. Not 
only did most of the distributed kolkhoz sheep die within a few weeks, they also 
infected people’s own animals. In the end, many households had lost all their animals, 
and thus their most valuable financial capital in a time when hyperinflation devalued 
all forms of cash savings. Second, while timely, well-organized distribution of sheep 
could have worked out well in principle, the rapid distribution of other assets appears 
at best questionable. In Kyzyl-Tuu, the breakup of large yak herds resulted in a quick 
slaughter of most animals for people’s own needs, since yaks could not be kept alone 
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and at a low altitude. In a similar way, the distribution of land use rights – transformed 
into formal ownership rights only later on – and the resulting fragmentation of large 
fields into hundreds of usually small, far-scattered parcels, did not necessarily increase 
people’s food security in times of need. Third, the distribution of assets was also 
ineffective in the sense that people were anything but prepared to fulfill the new role 
the politicians and their neoliberal advisors had foreseen for them. Due to the division 
of labor in the kolkhoz economy, many of the newly endowed private peasants had 
very little experience of animal husbandry or land cultivation, let alone marketing 
skills. Their prospects of making a living were thus aggravated by considerable 
knowledge uncertainties. 
  
“We entered this process without any preparation, without understanding what the reform 
was and how to go on, and we did not know our possibilities as we do now. (…) It would 
have been better if (…) a seminar would have been held on how to go on and how to work. 
At least before the distribution, such as ‘Hey people, there will be a distribution, so do like 
this and this afterwards!’ That would have been better. But they just gave us the livestock 
(…).” (Farmer and entrepreneur, smallholder, Jergetal) [3a15] 
 
From this point of view, the privatization process certainly aggravated and accelerated 
rural pauperization in the short run and increased uncertainty for many. In only four 
months, a considerable proportion of rural people’s financial capital was ruined and 
many were forced to start again from scratch. Consequently, many respondents 
remember the years immediately after privatization as the most difficult time of their 
lives. 
 
Privatization in a hybrid institutional context 
 
Others, however, managed to benefit from their kolkhoz’ dissolution, because they 
were well positioned when the Soviet Union collapsed. The initially slow and 
ineffective reform process (compare 4.4) left considerable room for arbitrariness at 
local level, much to the former kolkhoz elite’s advantage. Many chairmen and chief 
accountants stayed in power until 1994, when the kolkhozes were definitively 
dissolved. According to many respondents both from Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu, much of 
their kolkhoz’ machines, money and livestock disappeared during that time. It seems 
that unlike the ordinary kolkhozniki, many of the leading staff knew quite well that 
their collective farm would no longer exist. Apparently, some of them then used their 
still existing allocative power over the kolkhoz’ remaining resources to secure their 
own livelihoods. Thus, being in a position of sufficient allocative power in 1991 
(compare Table 6.1) was undoubtedly a considerable advantage for coping with the 
difficult years to come. Later on, the same leading personnel often participated in the 
local commissions responsible for the allocation of land use shares and other assets in 
the early years of independence (compare 4.1.3). At least in its initial stages, the 
process of abolishing the old socialist system and of replacing it by new market 
mechanisms was thus to a considerable degree implemented and governed by the 
protagonists of the allegedly outdated socialist system. In other words, the 
implementation and enforcement of the new institutions was entrusted to those people 
who profited most from the old institutions. In the absence of effective controls from 
above, a minority of people was thus in a position to define the ‘rules of the game’ and 
to refer to those normative and cognitive frameworks that helped them best to lay 
claim on certain resources. Interestingly, though, similar practices were reproduced at a 
lower level: of the remaining machines and sarays passed from the local administration 
to the various tribes for further distribution, many were illicitly appropriated, too. 
 
From this point of view, the privatization of the Kyrgyz agriculture took place in a 
hybrid institutional context. Far from being a just and proper distribution of assets 
along neoliberal rules, it was rather a final round of resource allocation along practices 
and social networks inherited from the socialist economy, including the exertion of 
allocative power, hierarchical relations between people and groups, patronage and the 
use of blat. Consequently, some actors had more power than others to lay claim to 
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certain assets and to accumulate more or better resources than the rest. This hybridity 
even became reflected in colloquial Russian language, which soon came up with a new 
expression for a phenomenon that so many had witnessed in the early 1990s: 
prikhvatizatsia – ‘grab-itization’ – combining the Russian word for privatization with 
the verb prikhvati’t [Russ. ‘to grab’]. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, many respondents said that it would have been much 
better to distribute all land, livestock and infrastructure in 1991 already. Obviously, 
those residents of Kyzyl-Tuu who claimed their shares in 1991 or 1992 got a much 
better bargain, since they did not have to bear the costs of a minority’s often excessive 
enrichment between 1991 and 1994. Swain (2000, cit. by Hann 2003, 12) thus aptly 
comments that in addition to an economic weakening of the farm sector “(…) 
decollectivization (…) had perverse consequences for social differentiation, reinforcing 
barriers it was ostensibly supposed to eliminate”. The first decade of independence in 
rural Kyrgyzstan was thus a truly hybrid process. On the one hand, it brought an 
unprecedented array of new formal rules and a fundamental redefinition of property 
rights over resources, which also altered social and political relations at the local level. 
On the other hand, and somewhat contrary to the expectations of neoliberal reformist 
thought, people’s organizing practices, power relations and structural constraints 
inherited from the socialist era persisted and had a massive influence on the 
distribution process. At the turn of the century, however, the formal distribution of 
land and livestock in the two former kolkhozes was complete and people increasingly 
started to seek ways to make the best use of their new property rights over resources. 
Part C therefore concentrates on the actors, practices, organizations and institutions 
surrounding current agro-pastoral livelihoods in the two case study villages. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The provision of secure private property rights over resources was one of the key 
principles of the Washington Consensus, which considered private property a necessary 
prerequisite for rapid economic growth. However, the way in which the distribution of 
resources was carried out and the structural legacies of the kolkhoz as a ‘total social 
institution’ resulted in locally specific development trajectories. Eventually, these led to 
the reproduction of already existing and emergence of new socioeconomic disparities at 
the local level. Nevertheless, most households in the two villages are endowed with 
property rights over resources today. They own several plots of arable land, most of 
them still have their own livestock (some more, some less) and many households still 
own a few meters of a barn or stable. In addition, they have access to the various 
pastures which were officially assigned to their community and which are managed 
according to certain rules and regulations – at least on paper. In practice, however, 
people’s property rights over these resources often appear less secure than the term 
may suggest. As I have argued earlier (see 2.3), people’s property rights over arable 
land, pastures and infrastructure are not only regulated by legally defined ownership 
rights, but also by certain cultural norms, by social relations between various actors, 
and by the various practices people deploy to access and manage these resources. 
 
In the next three chapters, I therefore examine local property relations over land, 
livestock and pastures in more detail. For most rural households, these relations form 
the basis to earning a living through agro-pastoral production. For my analysis, I refer 
to the four layers of property as put forward by Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006; see 
2.3.3), as well as to Appendini and Nuijten’s (2002; see 2.3.4) conceptual distinction of 
organizing practices, institutions and organizations. I have argued earlier that property 
is a central institution in all societies and in the most general sense concerns “the ways 
in which the relations between society’s members with respect to valuables are given 
meaning, form and significance” (Hann 2006, 22). This is why I consider the analysis 
of property relations an adequate entry point for an analysis of the recursive 
relationship between actors and institutions in general, and thus also for the analysis of 
local processes of post-socialist transformation.  
 
Without aiming to be comprehensive, Table 9.1 provides an overview of assets, actors, 
organizing practices, organizations and institutions found relevant in regard to land 
cultivation (left column; Chapter 9), and livestock and the use of pastures (right 
column; chapter 10). The distinction between the two is mainly for the sake of clarity. 
Most rural households engage in agro-pastoral production, so that relevant assets, 
institutions, organizations and practices often overlap. In one way or the other, most of 
the issues listed are discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
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Table 9.1 Important actors, practices, organizations and institutions around land cultivation, animal 
husbandry and the use of pastures (based on Appendini and Nuijten 2002; see 2.3.4) 
 
 Important actors, practices, organizations 
and institutions around land cultivation 
Important actors, practices, organizations 
and institutions around animal husbandry 
and the use of pastures 
   
Assets / 
Capitals 
Natural: Arable land, irrigation water, seeds, crops, hay 
Physical: Machinery, means of transport 
Financial: Livestock, cash, credits, loans, savings 
Human: Labor, knowledge, experience 
Social: Networks, relations 
Natural: Pastures, fodder, hay 
Physical: Barns, means of transport 
Financial: Livestock, cash, credits, loans, savings 
Human: Labor, knowledge, experience 
Social: Networks, relations 
 
   
Actors Individual farmers 
Farming households 
Machine owners 
Flour mill owners 
Agricultural workers 
Murab 
Communal land use specialist 
Private credit providers 
Individual herders 
Herding households 
Livestock owners / ‘customers’ 
Naryn rayon pasture expert 
Rayon representative of the State Forest Department 
Rayon Akim 
Head of ayil okmotu 
Communal land use specialist 
Private and communal veterinarians 
Private credit providers 
Traders and middlemen 
 
   
Organizing 
Practices 
Cultivating land 
Irrigating land 
Selling output 
Purchasing and selling land 
Leasing out/in land 
Acquiring land (informally) 
Negotiating input prices (machinery, labor, irrigation) 
Harvesting crops / cutting hay 
Practising Ashar  
Taking out loans 
Cooperating with others 
 
Herding animals 
Moving to/from pastures 
Acquiring ‘customers’ 
Negotiating prices and terms for herding 
Selling pastoral products 
Concluding pasture lease contracts 
Acquiring pastures (informally) 
Building and using a saray 
Practising sherine among herders 
Slaughtering animals 
Celebrating life-cycle events 
Taking out loans 
Cooperating with others 
 
   
Organizations Rayon GosRegistr 
Ayil Okmotu 
Ayil Kengesh 
LRF commission 
Aksakal council & court 
Water Users’ Association 
Local cooperatives 
Territorial Body of Public Self-Governance (TPS) 
Commercial credit providers 
Local credit self-help groups 
NGOs 
National Pasture Department 
Rayon administration 
Rayon GosRegistr 
Rayon Architecture Department 
Rayon State Forest Department [Russ. leskhoz] 
Ayil Okmotu 
Ayil Kengesh 
Aksakal council & court 
Territorial Body of Public Self-Governance (TPS) 
Pasture Users’ Association 
Commercial credit providers 
Local credit self-help groups 
Private mining companies 
NGOs 
 
   
Institutions Household, family, kin, tribe 
Ashar / Adat / Tooganchilik 
Aksaskals 
Tülöö meeting 
Sherine circles; ‘black cashbox’ system 
Agricultural commodity market 
Labor market 
National Land Code 
Land Redistribution Fund (LRF) 
Property rights over land and water 
Tax regime; child allowances 
Micro-credit schemes 
 
Household, family, kin, tribe 
Ashar / Adat / Tooganchilik 
Aksakals 
Tülöö meeting 
Sherine circles; ‘black cashbox’ system 
Pastoral commodity market 
Labor market 
National pasture legislation 
Property rights over pastures 
Tax regime; child allowances 
Micro-credit schemes 
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9 Actors, practices, organizations and institutions 
around land cultivation 
 
 
”I can’t put the land into my pocket or take it home. The land stays…” 
 
Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal [3a3] 
 
 
In view of the neoliberal paradigm behind the land reforms, this chapter analyzes how 
the newly established small peasant households can access and make use of their arable 
land for their livelihoods, and whether or not they have become ‘powerful actors in a 
free market economy’. The main questions addressed in this chapter are as follows: 
how do local farm households cultivate their land, and what problems and 
opportunities arise for them by doing so? How do they transfer land within the 
household and between generations, if at all? How do they act within an emerging land 
market that – at least de jure – allows them to sell, purchase and lease land? Besides 
that, analysis also focuses on people’s access to other production factors, such as water 
for irrigation, workforce, machinery, and cash. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Before entering into the qualitative analysis of 
people’s practices around land use, section 9.1 describes the disparities regarding land 
holdings and cultivation patterns at the local and the household level. Section 9.2 then 
examines how people access arable land, how land is transferred within and between 
households, and what role the Land Redistribution Fund and the taxation of arable 
land play. People’s access to additional production factors – water for irrigation, 
machinery, workforce and cash – is analyzed in section 9.3. Section 9.4 then looks at 
the current state of agrarian commodity markets and examines whether and how rural 
producers can market their yields. Finally, section 9.5 asks why in recent years an 
increasing number of households have turned away from crop cultivation altogether. 
 
 
 
9.1  Land resources and cultivation patterns: disparities at 
the local and the household level 
 
The semiarid climate and the high average altitude of Naryn oblast result in a rather 
short annual growth period of 60 to 120 days and a general dependence on irrigated 
farming (compare 5.1). While Kyzyl-Tuu (2,320 m amsl) has more arable land, Jergetal 
(2,150 m amsl) not only profits from a longer growing period but also from a better 
irrigation infrastructure, due to its proximity to a river and to recent investments in 
maintenance. As a result, the two villages differ considerably in terms of the quality of 
their arable land (irrigated versus rain-fed land) and of the predominant cultivation 
patterns. 
 
Land resources 
 
In quantitative terms there are considerable differences between the two case study 
villages. According to local statistics, Jergetal village disposes over 675 ha of arable 
land. Since most fields are close to the river (compare Map 7.1), nearly all land is rated 
sugat jer [Kyrg. ‘irrigated land’]. For Kyzyl-Tuu, land data is available for the ayil 
okmotu level only. Together with the neighboring village of Kasybek, Kyzyl-Tuu has a 
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total of 3,234 ha of arable land. Some of this land is quite far from the next river, so 
that not all fields can be irrigated, but are rated as kairak jer [Kyrg. ‘rain-fed land’]99. 
 
Disparities at household level are equally significant. Table 9.2 lists the average land 
holdings of the five household groups and the proportion of households in every group 
that lease additional land from other households or from the communal Land 
Redistribution Fund (see 9.2.3). Obviously, households with a lot of private livestock 
also own comparably large areas of arable land per capita and lease land for 
cultivation more often than others. The figures thus highlight the important 
relationship between animal husbandry and land cultivation but also suggest that not 
all households in the two villages have been able to use their private arable land in the 
same way since the official land distribution in the mid-1990s. 
 
Table 9.2 Per-capita land ownership and share of households leasing in arable land by selected household 
groups (own data, 2007) 
 
 Jergetal Kyzyl-Tuu 
 Households 
[n] 
Average land 
[ha/capita] 
Share of HHs 
leasing in arable 
land 
Households 
[n] 
Average land 
[ha/capita] 
Share of HHs 
leasing in arable 
land 
       
No livestock 52 0.19 2% 21 0.64 5% 
Smallholders 137 0.25 4% 43 0.82 9% 
Mid-sized farms 56 0.37 21% 68 0.94 18% 
Large farms 10 0.51 29% 8 0.89 57% 
Herding households 16 0.33 0% 13 0.71 8% 
       
Village 395 0.28 7% 252 0.79 12% 
  
 
Cultivation patterns 
 
Land cultivation varies greatly between the two villages as well as among households 
in qualitative terms too. In Jergetal, about 65% of all arable land is used either as hay 
meadows or for the cultivation of fodder crops (sainfoin and clover). Wheat and barley 
are cultivated on the remaining land (Jergetal Baseline Study 2008, 10). However, not 
all household farms in Jergetal can use their arable land in the same way. Figure 9.1 
shows the cultivation patterns of all responding households in autumn 2007100. It 
indicates that most wealthier households can cultivate a larger variety of crops than 
their asset-poor neighbors. While many of the former cultivate hay, nutrient-rich 
fodder such as sainfoin and clover, and wheat and barley, most of the latter have only 
hay – if, that is, they can cultivate their land at all. 
 
                                                
99 For a description of irrigation practices, see 9.3.1 
100 Figures 9.1 and 9.2 do not include agricultural production in the ogorod [Russ. ‘homegarden’]. Since 
nearly all households in the two villages use their small ogorod to cultivate potatoes, cabbage and 
carrots for subsistence needs, I will not discuss ogorod production in this chapter. 
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Figure 9.1   Land cultivation patterns 
by household groups, Jergetal 2007 
(own data, based on qualitative 
interviews, autumn 2007) 
 
Reading example: all three large farm 
households examined in Jergetal use 
their arable land to cultivate hay; each 
one (33%) additionally grows sainfoin 
or clover; each two (66%) additionally 
grow wheat and/or barley. 
 
 
Cultivation patterns in Kyzyl-Tuu are rather monotonous by contrast (Figure 9.2). 
Nearly all households, whether wealthy or not, use their arable land exclusively as hay 
meadows, while only a few mid-sized and large farms can additionally cultivate barley, 
which is mostly used as nutrient-rich fodder supply. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2   Land cultivation patterns 
by household groups, Kyzyl-Tuu 2007 
(own data, based on qualitative 
interviews, autumn 2007) 
 
 
 
As the subsequent sections will show, the considerable disparities between the two 
villages regarding cultivation are not only due to differences in altitude and growing 
period. Similarly, the disparities at household level between the asset-poor and the 
asset-rich are caused by many different factors including access to and transfer of 
arable land is central. 
 
 
 
9.2  Access to and transfer of arable land 
 
Since the breakdown of common land management under socialist rule and the 
distribution of legal property rights in the mid-1990s, responsibility for organizing and 
securing physical access to the arable land has been delegated to households and 
individuals. Consequently, not all farming households use their private land shares in 
the same way. 
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9.2.1 Scattered, small land plots hinder access to land 
 
The lack of arable land is a general problem in Kyrgyzstan. Mainly due to its rugged 
topography, the country has the second lowest percentage of arable land among all 
Central Asian Republics (Jones 2003, 262). Of Kyrgyzstan’s total land area of 200,00 
km2, only 7% (14,000 km2) are arable; of this, 76% (10,700 km2) are irrigated (Bloch 
et al. 1996; Giovarelli 1998). However, there are considerable regional disparities. 
More than two-thirds of all arable land is located in the north of the country, where 
less than half of the population live, so that there is a particular shortage of land in the 
south101 (Peyrouse 2009). Yet as the situation in the two case study villages shows, 
there are also considerable disparities within oblasts and rayons. 
 
In Jergetal, every individual 
received 0.27 ha of irrigated 
arable land in 1994 (compare 
chapter 7). This is hardly 
sufficient to make a living from 
farming alone. In addition, the 
different parcels a household 
received are often spread over 
large distances. Sometimes, even 
individual shares were subdivided 
into several smaller parcels in 
different sites, so it is not 
uncommon to find tiny plots of 
less than 0.1 ha (compare Map 
7.1).102 As a consequence, many 
households cannot efficiently 
cultivate their arable land, since 
the input costs are often high (see 
9.3) and this renders the 
cultivation of tiny, widespread 
land parcels virtually useless. As a 
result, only a few households – 
mostly mid-sized and large farm 
households – actively cultivate all 
the arable land they own. The 
majority of them only use one or 
two parcels and cut grass on the 
remaining land, if at all. Some 
have also begun to lease out their 
abandoned fields to others, while 
so far there have hardly been any 
land sales (see below). 
 
“In one place we have only seven sotik [0.07 ha] of land. It would be good if the land was in 
one place, not scattered. It is very difficult to farm now (…) There is one hectare of land 
which is located in one place. I only use this land, not the remaining land. It is not possible 
to cultivate anything on five sotik [0.05 ha].” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [2f3] 
 
In Kyzyl-Tuu, the problem of land shortage is less evident. On the one hand, people 
profited from a better land-man ratio than in Jergetal and therefore received more 
arable land per capita in the early 1990s (0.8 ha/capita; see chapter 7). On the other 
                                                
101 Naryn oblast is usually seen as part of Kyrgyzstan’s ‘North’, together with Chui, Talas, and Issyk-Kul 
oblast, plus the capital city of Bishkek. The ‘South’ includes the three oblasts Osh, Jalal-Abad, and 
Batken. 
102 With the help of Landsat satellite images, Eriksson (2006, 27) illustrates the partitioning of arable land 
in Jergetal between 1993 and 2001 very well. 
 
 
Figure 9.3    Home gardens and arable land at the southern 
end of Jergetal village. In this place, the fields are large 
compared to other parts of the village (compare with Map 
7.1; photo by the author, September 2007). 
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hand, most arable land in Kyzyl-Tuu is located close to the village (Map 9.1), so the 
land allotments per household are less scattered than in Jergetal. Most households 
received their land in one or two parts. In addition, the average distance from the 
settlement to the fields is not as large as in Jergetal. Thus, the main problem regarding 
land cultivation in Kyzyl-Tuu is the lack of sufficient water and of a functioning 
irrigation system (see 9.3.1) rather than the size and location of the fields. 
 
One problem apparent in both villages is that fields close to the village often suffer 
from trespassing animals. It is especially cows staying in and around the village over 
the summer that often enter the cultivated fields and damage the crops or eat grass 
destined for winter fodder. 
 
“One of our land parcels is located in Aral, where we planted grass about four years ago. 
But we could not harvest, because the animals from the village ate all the grass before we 
came back from the mountains. Aral is not far from the village.” (Herder, smallholder, 
Jergetal) [4a39b] 
 
People who cannot afford to guard their fields themselves during the summer – such as 
the herder quoted above – encounter this type of problems most often. In another case 
in Kyzyl-Tuu, several neighboring households offered to their ayil okmotu to exchange 
their fields close to their houses for other land parcels far from the village, since they 
had suffered heavy losses due to repeated trespassing. Surprisingly, most people fence 
their home gardens but not their fields. When asked why he did not fence his land, a 
wealthy farmer in Kyzyl-Tuu replied that he tried to, but gave up after his wire was 
repeatedly stolen. 
 
 
9.2.2 Transfer of arable land within and between households 
 
Land inheritance and resource pooling within households 
 
The practice of land inheritance further reduces households’ land holdings in both 
villages. While land ownership certificates were issued per household (see 4.3.2), the 
Kyrgyz legislation since 2001 provides for every person’s right to claim the value of 
his/her individual land share, though not to demarcate or partition it (Bruce et al. 
2006, 73ff). Local inheritance practices, however, often follow customary law, which 
foresees no compensation but requires that the youngest son inherit the house as well 
as all the land so he can take care of his old parents. While Bruce et al. (2006) note 
that the written inheritance law was not followed in any of their Kyrgyz study villages, 
the land inheritance practices in Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu appear somewhat blurred 
between written and customary law. 
 
Several respondents reported that they had divided a considerable part of their arable 
land among their sons once they got married, but retained their own (parental) shares 
as well as the shares of their unmarried children and their married daughters. This is 
possible because, by customary law, women are not seen as owners of the land, 
although the Kyrgyz legislation entitles them to an individual share too. Thus, women 
hardly ever receive their land share or a financial compensation when they leave their 
parents’ house or when they divorce from their husband (Lindberg 2007, 59f). 
 
“My children weren’t yet married when the land was distributed to us. But today they are 
married, and we have to return their piece of land to them. (…) They need their land if they 
want to live independently, so I gave them their share. (…) Every person received 0.27 ha 
and you can’t do a lot with such an amount of land… So we have a problem…” (Mid-sized 
farmer, Jergetal) [3a3]
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However, the division of land property within a household does not necessarily mean 
that everybody begins farming his land on his own. In many cases, parents and their 
married sons continue to cultivate the parents’ land share jointly, while the sons take 
care of their (usually smaller) personal share themselves. 
 
“I have distributed it [my land]. They [my sons] all live in the village, and three of them got 
married. I have given two hectares to each of them, and eight hectares belong to everybody. 
The sons who live here work together, and the sons who are students also come and help.” 
(Large farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a7] 
 
As elsewhere in Kyrgyzstan (cf. Thieme 2008b; Schoch 2008), many young people 
from Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu migrate to Bishkek, Kazakhstan or Russia to look for 
employment or to study. Some of these migrants do not return to the village, but 
establish their own family in urban areas. However, since migrants cannot take along 
their individual land shares, all arable land remains with their parents and their 
youngest brother, who then hold it in trust and farm the household’s land shares. If the 
latter are not too scattered, this form of resource pooling (or rather holding resources 
together) allows for more efficient land use (Schoch et al., forthcoming). 
 
“Almost all [my brothers] are in the city, so I have all the land and the livestock. (…). They 
left home.” (Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b14] 
 
Despite these local practices of inheritance and the effects of migration, the problem of 
diminishing land assets and increased land shortage remains. Besides daughters-in law 
who join their husband’s household without bringing along their legally owing land 
share, children born after 1994 further exacerbate the shortage of land at household 
level. Thus, many households must care for additional people without any provision of 
additional land, so that pressure on land remains high – a problem which, with the 
exception of Kazakhstan, exists in all rural areas of Central Asia (Bruce et al. 2006, 74; 
Peyrouse 2009, 5). 
According to the land planning specialists of both ayil okmotus, there is no way of 
privatizing arable land from the Land Redistribution Fund (LRF), which is exclusively 
for lease (see 9.2.3). The only private land that young families can apply for to their 
community is a small plot to build a house and lay out a home garden103. Thus, the 
only way to cope with land shortage is to either lease additional arable land from the 
LRF or to lease or purchase land from other people. 
 
Sale, purchase and lease of arable land between households 
 
In 1999, the private use rights over arable land given to people in the mid-1990s was 
finally converted into constitutionally secured ownership rights. In 2001, also the 
moratorium on land sales was lifted, so that arable land became a legally secured and 
fully transferable asset (compare chapter 4). Nevertheless, sales of private land shares 
are still close to zero in both villages. Actually, only one smallholder from Kyzyl-Tuu 
said he had bought arable land from someone else: 2.4 ha from people who migrated 
to Bishkek, plus 1.2 ha from neighbors who did not use their land, at an average price 
of 7,000 KGS (US $170) per hectare. Apart from that, all land transfers between 
households are lease agreements. In nearly all cases, the lessees and lessors are either 
smallholders or households without livestock104. Lease agreements are usually 
concluded on an annual basis and for comparatively small pieces of land (up to 1.5 
ha). Lessors are usually paid in cash according to the quality and location of the field. 
Fees vary between 500 and 2,000 KGS (US $12 to 48) per hectare and year. 
Sharecropping or in-kind compensation is not common. All land transfers between 
households are concluded according to kyrgyz’cha [Kyrg. for ‘the Kyrygz way’]. People 
often use the term kyrgyz’cha to describe practices that help to solve a difficult 
                                                
103 Personal communication with land planning specialists, Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu A/O, 23 and 25 Oct 
2007; 22 Nov 2007. 
104 The only exception is one medium farmer from Kyzyl-Tuu who rents out 3 ha to relatives. 
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situation in a confident, often informal – though not necessarily illegal – way. In the 
case of land transfers, this means that agreements are concluded by handshake, 
without contract or registration with the ayil okmotu or the regional branch of 
GosRegistr. 
 
Yet such agreements are still few. Many of the land parcels available for rent are 
economically unattractive, since they are often small and widely scattered. One 
respondent from Jergetal also estimated that only 20% of the households unable to 
cultivate their land would be ready to lease out to others, while another wealthy farmer 
complained about the general unwillingness of small farmers to rent out their land. 
This confirms the findings of Childress et al (2003, 6f), which state that the majority of 
all small, asset-poor farms continue farming despite their relative inefficiency, and 
would not be ready to give away their land holdings. It seems however that many turn 
away from crop cultivation, using their land as hay meadows instead (see 9.5 below). 
In Kyzyl-Tuu, only one respondent rented 3 hectares of land – from his brother-in-law. 
All other respondents said that it was no use renting additional land, since the 
irrigation problem would be the same everywhere. 
 
 
9.2.3 Transfer of arable land between the state and households 
 
In general, there are two forms of land reserves within an ayil okmotu: the ‘Land 
Redistribution Fund’ (LRF), and so-called ‘re-cultivation land’. Evidence from the two 
case study villages indicates that the strategies of private and public actors to access 
and allocate land from these two pools often maneuver between the formal and the 
informal. 
 
Land lease from the ‘Land Redistribution Fund (LRF)’ 
 
Land Redistribution Funds were created in the course of the early agrarian reform 
policies. Today, they serve as land reserve funds at communal level, in which about 
25% of all arable land of the former kolkhoz is set aside for special purposes (see 4.3.3 
for details). Above all, LRFs are intended to generate revenues for the ayil okmotu. The 
communal authorities can lease out LRF land to private farmers and enterprises. De 
jure, land parcels applied for must be publicly announced for open auction and allotted 
to the highest bidder. Auctions have to be carried out by a special LRF commission 
consisting of representatives from the rayon GosRegistr, the head of ayil okmotu, 
members of the ayil kengesh (communal council), the ayil bas’chys (village heads), and 
the communal land-use specialist, plus some ordinary citizens. As a matter of fact, LRF 
revenues constitute a considerable share of the communal budget in regions with a lot 
of productive land, i.e. Chui and Issyk-Kul oblast. In Naryn oblast, however, where 
arable land is often scarce and of poor quality, local governments earn less though the 
LRF (Childress et al. 2003, 29). In addition, young families and newcomers are entitled 
to a small share of private land from the LRF to build a house and lay out a home 
garden, though not to private shares of arable land. De jure, communal authorities also 
have the possibility to support low-income households with LRF land and to right any 
potential wrongs of the initial distribution of arable land (Kadyrkulov and Kalchayev 
2000, 158; Childress et al. 2003, 21ff). 
 
The Jergetal LRF contains 574 ha of arable land, of which 59% were rented out in 
autumn 2007. Although all LRF land is irrigated, it is fairly unattractive to asset-poor 
households, since most of it is located very far from the village near Baskyia, Orus-
Bulak and Emgek-Talaa (see Map 7.1). This makes cultivation very cost-intensive. It is 
therefore hardly surprising that, with the exception of one smallholder, only mid-sized 
and large farmers are currently leasing LRF land. All of them lease comparatively large 
pieces of arable land ranging from 5 to 20 ha. According to the communal land-use 
specialist, 5-year lease contracts are awarded to the highest bidder in a publicly 
announced auction at a minimal annual price of 500 KGS/ha (US $12). He also said 
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that the ayil okmotu would not give away LRF land to poor families for free105. 
However, numerous other respondents asserted that they had never heard about any 
public auction and that lease contracts were probably agreed upon in secret. Two 
other, comparatively wealthy respondents also complained that the ayil okmotu’s 
management of the LRF was anything but efficient, and that the community would 
lose a lot of revenues that way. 
 
The Karakojun LRF contains 906 ha of land, of which 50% were rented out in autumn 
2007 (Table 9.3). Like all arable land in Kyzyl-Tuu, the LRF parcels are not too far 
from the village (see Map 9.1). Lease durations depend on the type of land; since 
communal officials interpret them as maximum rather than fixed terms, LRF land can 
also be leased for just one year. The thus far moderate demand for LRF land resulted 
in only two public auctions, each one in 2000 and 2003. Thus, most LRF land is 
currently leased out at the minimal price. This and the fact that most LRF land is not 
too far from the village may explain why more asset-poor households use LRF land in 
Kyzyl-Tuu than in Jergetal. 
 
Table 9.3 Structure of the Land Redistribution Fund, Karakojun ayil okmotu (Karakojun ayil okmotu 2007) 
 
 Irrigated land Rain-fed land Hay meadows 
    
Total land [ha] 356 99 451 
Minimal annual rental feea [KGS (US$)] 406 (9.8) 123 (3.0) 83 (2.0) 
Maximal lease duration 5 yrs 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Leased out [ha (%)] 156 (43%) 99 (100%) 200 (44%) 
Number of lessees 41 18 35 
Average lease area [ha] 3.8 5.5 5.5 
Minimum / maximum leased out [ha] 1.2 / 25 1 / 18 1.5 / 30 
 
a including land and social fund taxes 
 
 
However, according to the communal land-use specialist, the productivity of many 
private land plots is decreasing, either because people irrigate them improperly, or 
because of the absence of crop rotation. Apparently, this has led to increased demand 
for arable land, so that the area of leased LRF land increased from only 90 ha in 2000 
to 455 ha in 2007. Therefore, the Karakojun ayil okmotu budgeted a total income 
52,837 KGS (US $1,275) from LRF fees and taxes, plus 39,553 KGS (US $955) of 
LRF-related social fund taxes for 2007106. 
 
Informal acquisition of ‘re-cultivation land’ 
 
Besides the LRF, both ayil okmotus own additional, so-called ‘re-cultivation land’. 
Since it is rain-fed, this land needs massive re-cultivation work including the 
construction of irrigation channels before it can be used for crop cultivation. In Kyzyl-
Tuu, where access to LRF land is comparably easy, nobody is currently using re-
cultivation land. In Jergetal, however, re-cultivation land is an alternative to the remote 
LRF land – but only for those who can afford to invest time and money in re-
cultivation work. Among all households visited in Jergetal, only mid-sized farms were 
involved in the use of re-cultivation land. By doing so, several households profit from 
an exceptionally weak communal control over re-cultivation land by just acquiring it 
without any formal agreement. Two different respondents told me how they began to 
dig channels on apparently ‘unused’ land. After a couple of years, when the channels 
were ready and cultivation began, they formalized their claim with the communal land 
use specialist by concluding a formal lease contract. 
 
                                                
105 Personal communication, 23 Oct 2007. 
106 All figures according to personal communication with the Kyzyl-Tuu A/O land use specialist, 22 
November 2007. 
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“I did not tell the ayil okmotu, I had no agreement with them. Later on I went to the ayil 
okmotu, when I already had cultivated the land. So they said that I can rent in this land. We 
made a one-and-a-half meter wide canal by hand.” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [1b9] 
 
Asked why we had chosen this specific piece of land, the same farmer replied that he 
had been responsible for irrigating it in Soviet times. Therefore, people would approve 
his recent claim because they remembered what a good kolkhoz worker he was. The 
farmer thus legitimized his claim to arable land by referring to his professional 
performance and his reputation as a good proletarian in the socialist economy. 
According to an assistant at the Jergetal ayil okmotu, such retroactive formalization of 
land claims by kyrgyz’cha is the rule rather than the exception, even though it is 
informal (see 9.2.2 above). 
 
 
9.2.4 Direct and indirect taxation of arable land 
 
Although the land taxation system is not an integral part of land markets, a basic 
understanding of the fees and charges estates are burdened with may help to 
understand some peoples’ practices regarding owned and leased land. Tax avoidance, 
for instance, may be one reason for the informal acquisition of re-cultivation land and 
for the short-term lease agreements among households. 
 
Land-related taxes 
 
Irrespective of whether they use all their arable land or not, households are obliged to 
pay land taxes to their ayil okmotu (Table 9.4). In Jergetal, the total annual tax for 
irrigated land is 98 KGS/ha (as per 2007; US $2.4), plus a lump sum for communal 
pastures107. In Kyzyl-Tuu, the annual tax for irrigated land is 95 KGS/ha (as per 2007; 
US $2.3), including a lump sum of 17 KGS (US $0.4) for communal pastures. These 
taxes also apply to LRF land, which is another reason why many cannot afford to rent 
land from the fund. 
 
“If you rent in ten hectares of land, you have to pay taxes to the ayil okmotu. You need 
money to cultivate.” (Smallholder, Jergetal) [1a10] 
 
There is also an annual tax of 4 KGS (US $0.1) per 0.01 ha on home gardens. It may 
seem surprising that the lump sum for pastures is thus connected to a household’s 
arable land estate and not to the number of animals or the amount of pastures in use. 
Needless to say, many respondents complained about this taxation system (see also 
10.3.3). In addition, arable land also serves as a calculation basis for taxes to the state 
social pension fund (‘SozFond’; old age, disability and survivors), since only few people 
in the rural area have a taxable regular income. 
 
Table 9.4 Land tax system, Karakojun ayil okmotu (Karakojun ayil okmotu 2007) 
 
 Irrigated land Rain-fed land Hay meadows 
    
Annual land tax per hectare [KGS (US$)] 95 (2.3) 27 (0.7) 14 (0.3) 
Annual Social Fund tax per hectare [KGS (US$)] 191 (4.6) 54.3 (13.1) 21.7 (5.2) 
Total annual tax per hectare [KGS (US$)] 286 (6.9) 81.3 (19.6) 35.7 (8.6) 
 
 
                                                
107 The pasture tax remained a true mystery throughout my research in Jergetal. To my surprise, none of 
the various land-use specialists that took over from each other at the A/O were able to explain how 
pasture taxes were calculated. 
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Private land as a basis for calculating child allowances 
 
Besides direct taxation, arable land also serves as a basis for calculating a household’s 
entitlement to state child allowances (compare Box 4b). According to the 2007 rules, a 
household is entitled to child allowances if its monthly per capita income is below the 
guaranteed minimum standard of living of 175.01 KGS (US $4.2). For the calculation 
of incomes, the social inspector of the ayil okmotu considers not only a household’s 
livestock and regular cash incomes if available at all, but also its land holdings, 
including the ogorod. For every hectare of arable land – whether it is in use or not – a 
monthly per capita income of 55.90 KGS (US $1.4) is assumed (for the ogorod it is 3.5 
KGS/month/0.01 ha)108. 
 
Thus, many rural households are taxed and assessed on the basis of land assets that 
many of them are unable to use. However, not all households actually pay the land 
taxes they would have to. The cadastral map of Kyzyl-Tuu village (Map 9.1) shows 
that land taxes have not yet been paid for an estimated 35% of all land parcels (similar 
figures for Jergetal were not available at the time of research). As a consequence, the 
regional land registration office has not yet issued legal ownership certificates to the 
respective households. This not only results in a considerable loss of revenue for the 
communal budget, but also in a lack of legal security for those cultivating the land. 
 
 
 
9.3 Access to other production factors: water, machines, 
labor, and cash 
 
Land shortage is not the only reason that cultivation is hardly ever profitable in the 
two case study villages. Besides the limited availability of arable land, other crucial 
assets such as water for irrigation, machinery for seeding and harvesting, sufficient 
labor and other inputs such as seeds and fertilizers are often difficult to come by. Last 
but not least, many people also struggle because of their lack of knowledge and 
experience of proper land cultivation. 
 
 
9.3.1 Irrigation: ecological and institutional constraints 
 
Due to the highly continental climate and the resulting little annual precipitation in 
Central Kyrgyzstan (see 4.1), agriculture in Naryn oblast is highly dependent on 
irrigation. However, ecological and institutional factors make irrigation a difficult and 
often contentious issue. 
 
General lack of precipitation 
 
From an ecological point of view, sufficient snow in winter and rain in spring are 
crucial for the supply with water for irrigation during the sowing and cultivation 
period. This became especially clear after 2004, when three consecutive years with 
unusually dry winters and extraordinarily warm summers caused a dramatic decline in 
yields, as many farmers in both villages reported. 
 
“Nobody from the whole village could make fodder this year, because of the dry climate and 
the lack of water. We could cultivate more fodder if there was snow or rain. They could not 
even cultivate fodder on the irrigated land this year. (…) We have to pay attention to the 
snow. It depends on the snow – there’s no use in having clean channels but no snow,.” 
(Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2c23] 
 
                                                
108 Personal communication with the social inspectors at the Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu A/O, 17 and 22 May 
2007. 
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This situation lasted until 2009, when sustained rainfall in spring and summer finally 
resulted in a good harvest again. Yet water shortage is likely to increase in future, since 
average temperatures in Northern Kyrgyzstan have constantly been on the rise over the 
last 130 years (Bolch 2007; UN 2008). 
 
From open access to new institutional arrangements 
 
However, sufficient precipitation alone does not guarantee sustainable irrigation. The 
sophisticated, but often technically intensive systems of irrigation channels, ditches, 
dams and locks constructed in socialist times received very little maintenance from the 
very beginning. Thus , a considerable part of the irrigation infrastructure was already 
in bad shape by the end of the 1980s, not only in Naryn oblast, but in Central Asia as 
a whole (Obertreis 2006; Larue 2008). In the two villages, many of the large concrete 
channels were broken or carried away after the dissolution of the kolkhozes, while the 
small ditches between the fields were often blocked or overgrown. Together with the 
fact that there were no kolkhoz murabs (water managers) anymore to plan and execute 
common irrigation, this led to a decade of privately executed, often poorly coordinated 
and inefficient irrigation after 1994. In both villages, most people started to divert the 
water to irrigate their own fields, only occasionally seeking the help of a murab in 
return for direct payment, which was subject to bilateral negotiations. As a result, there 
was no common investment in infrastructure maintenance for many years. 
 
In the early noughties, the World Bank addressed the problem by introducing 
participatory local water management through the concept of Water Users’ 
Associations (WUA; Lindberg 2007; Larue 2008). Kyzyl-Tuu officially registered its 
WUA in 2002, Jergetal in 2003. Since then, people are formally obliged to pay a fixed 
per hectare fee to the association, after which an official WUA murab allocates the 
water to their field during a defined time slot (see Box 9a for detailed procedure and 
fees). People then still have the choice of doing the irrigation themselves or hiring an 
independent murab (usually a former kolkhoz murab). Those who can spare the time 
and workforce usually prefer to irrigate themselves, since professional water managers 
charge up to 200 KGS (US $5) per hectare. Nevertheless, irrigation is hard work and 
requires a lot of experience, as a female farmer from Kyzyl-Tuu recounts: 
 
“Before, I was asking someone else, and I paid 1,600 Som. But they did not irrigate well; I 
was not satisfied. So I had to irrigate myself. (…) After this I got very sick and I had 
backache. The first year was very difficult; the second year I went with my son, but (…) I 
was the only lady there, so I did not help them to divide the water. (…) This year my sons 
went there and they irrigated the land. It was great that this year we got [our time slot] in 
the daytime. This time we were experienced and prepared.” (Teacher, smallholder, Kyzyl-
Tuu) [2b15] 
 
Many however criticize that the overhaul of the channels and dams, which began in 
both villages a few years ago, has not yet been completed. Although the Jergetal WUA 
has constantly raised the irrigation fees in recent years in order to pay the local 
contribution towards the construction work (compare Box 9a), many channels are still 
in a bad shape, and not everybody can irrigate their fields sufficiently and on time. The 
general dissatisfaction about the irrigation issue was also expressed at a meeting of 
local residents with their new rayon akym on 13 November 2007. 
 
“Almost nobody cultivated wheat this year, not even the wealthy people, because there’s no 
water. They have been repairing the channels for the last two years, but have not finished 
yet, so it is difficult for the people. We could irrigate neither the fields nor the kitchen 
garden.” (Smallholder, Jergetal) [1c34] 
 
Also in Kyzyl-Tuu, the head of ayil okmotu named irrigation the most important 
problem in 2007, “because if we had water, many problems would be solved: we could 
harvest well and we could make more hay and vegetables.” 
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Box 9a    Water Users’ Associations in Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu 
 
In 1999, the Kyrgyz government embarked upon a World Bank-initiated irrigation sector reform that 
consisted of a “complete devolution and transfer of management, maintenance, and irrigation 
investment tasks from government institutions to community based farmer’s organizations” (Larue 2008, 
1). As a result, most Kyrgyz communities had to establish a local Water Users’ Associations (WUA). Kyzyl-
Tuu officially registered its WUA in 2002; Jergetal in 2003. Both associations have a director, an 
accountant, one hydro-engineer, and several murabs (water managers) who are each responsible for a 
defined quarter of the village. The selection procedure for the WUA office bearers is not uniform; some 
WUAs elect their staff in general meetings, while others divide the command in different sections of the 
village. The WUA director and the accountant receive a constant salary; the engineer is paid for eight 
months per year; the murabs from April to August. According to Ul Hassan et al. (2004), the 
organizational set-up of many WUAs is very hierarchical and resembles the structural model of the 
collective farm – which means that many WUA directors enjoy considerable discretionary power. 
 
Irrigation fees and procedure   Every WUA has a list of all member households and their land 
property. Those who want to irrigate their land must first pay a defined per hectare fee. They then receive 
a receipt against which a WUA murab will allocate water to their fields. The per hectare fee includes the 
salaries of the WUA staff as well as a contribution to infrastructure maintenance and reconstruction. The 
Jergetal WUA has constantly raised the fee over recent years, from 45 KGS/ha (US $1) in 2005 to 186 
KGS/ha (US $4.5) in 2007. In Kyzyl-Tuu, the official fee is 50 KGS/ha (US $1.1) for land close to channels 
and 25 KGS/ha (US $0.5) for land far from channels, while every household must pay an additional 100 
KGS/year (US $2.2) for the WUA’s overheads and to maintain the channels (Näscher 2009, 63). 
 
Improvement of the irrigation infrastructure   In April 2006, the Jergetal WUA entered an 
agreement with ARIS109 to rehabilitate the irrigation system. Costs for the credit are shared between the 
local population (25%) and the Kyrgyz Ministry of Agriculture (MAWRPI; 75%). For this, every household 
in Jergetal had to pay a single installment of 10 KGS/person (US $0.25), while the irrigation fee was 
raised, too (see above). With the same financing scheme, the Kyzyl-Tuu WUA has already completed a 
series of new reservoirs. A second step, including the cleaning of four kilometers of channels, began in 
2007.110 
 
 
Institutional weaknesses of participatory water management 
 
The establishment of WUAs and the reconstruction of infrastructure have undoubtedly 
improved public coordination of irrigation and joint control over water resources. 
Some accounts, however, indicate that the established rules and procedures still leave 
some room for negotiation and sporadic misuse. Several respondents complained for 
instance that they received too little water for their money or that their time slot was 
too late in the year, rendering irrigation virtually useless. Since people must line up for 
water, delays or inconsistencies in the allocation of water can cause considerable losses 
for those who come last. In Jergetal, one farmer complained that others misused his 
time slot, so that he received less water than what he had paid for; another one assured 
that he still irrigates his fields without paying a single Som to anyone. In addition, the 
director of the Jergetal WUA said that those who pay their fees regularly and on time 
would be allowed to irrigate once for free – an apparently arbitrary rule that seems to 
conflict with the defined standards of WUAs. Näscher (2009, 63) reports for Kyzyl-
Tuu that the de facto fees are anything but fixed, so that the defined time slots may be 
extended against additional payment. This may also explain the considerable variations 
regarding fees (50 to 130 KGS in Kyzyl-Tuu (US $1.2 to 3.1)) and time slots (five 
hours to two days in Jergetal) recorded during interviews. The fact that the Aksakal 
                                                
109 ARIS is the Kyrgyz Republic’s Community Development and Investment Agency, co-financed by the 
World Bank and the Kyrgyz government. 
110 Personal communication with the director of the Jergetal WUA, 18 May 2007; and with the executive 
secretary of the Kyzyl-Tuu A/O, 22 May 2007. 
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court in Kyzyl-Tuu regularly deals with irrigation-related conflicts also indicates that 
the WUAs do not yet fulfill their intended role111. 
 
These accounts confirm the findings of various authors who have critically examined 
Water Users’ Associations and irrigation practices in the Kyrgyz Republic in recent 
years (cf. Ul Hassan et al. 2004; Bichsel 2006; Lindberg 2007, Larue 2008). In her case 
study from Northern Kyrgyzstan, Lindberg (2007) depicts various methods of illicit 
water use and concludes that, irrespective of WUA rules and procedures, access to 
irrigation water is still governed by social status, wealth and personal connections. As a 
result, well-connected head-end users are often able to take considerably more water 
than tail-enders. However, as Larue (2008) shows, financial and social considerations, 
such as kinship ties or interventions by elders, often prevent WUA staff from effectively 
sanctioning offenders, which adds to the institutional weakness of many WUAs. Most 
authors therefore agree that the original intention of WUAs – i.e. to deal with equity 
problems regarding the allocation of water – was only partially successful so far. 
 
 
9.3.2 Machinery: unequal prices and high transaction costs 
 
With the dissolution of the kolkhozes, most machinery passed into private hands (see 
7.3.4). Since then, many trucks, tractors and combines have been sold or have broken 
down, so that functioning machines have become much sought-after goods at the local 
level. Most households must bring in their hay at least once a year, while some also 
need a combine to harvest their wheat. Therefore, most of the few machine owners 
now rent out their services to non-owners against cash. 
 
Non-owners must cope with high transaction costs 
 
Prices are usually negotiable and often depend on the personal relation between owner 
and client. Especially kinship seems to play a decisive role. In Jergetal, Eriksson (2006) 
observed that non-relatives sometimes pay up to three times more than relatives. 
Depending on the distance of the field from the village, plowing or harvesting, one 
hectare costs between 1,000 to 1,300 KGS (as per 2007; US $24 to 31); and one tour 
to bring in hay 100 to 150 KGS (US $2.4 to 3.6). In addition, the fuel to run the 
machine must always be contributed by the clients themselves. This means considerable 
additional costs, which are not negotiable and difficult to calculate in advance. 
Between spring and autumn 2008, for instance, the diesel price in Naryn oblast rose by 
50% from 26 to 39 KGS/l (US $0.7 to 1.1). 
Thus, on the one hand, the small group of machine owners can now generate 
income by renting out technical services to others. While most of them just rent out an 
old tractor or truck they acquired from the former kolkhoz, one mid-sized farmer from 
Jergetal is actively tying to expand its machine pool to offer a whole range of technical 
services to customers. Non-owners, on the other hand, must often cope with high 
transaction costs related to the use of machines: they not only spend a lot of money on 
rent and fuel, but must also constantly (re)negotiate the terms of use with the owners. 
 
“There are more than ten tractors in the village, but they all are private, so you have to go to 
all of them. We prepare the money and the fuel, and then you have to get up very early. (…) 
The machinery is the problem. When I ask [the drivers] they say ‘okay okay’, but they do 
not always keep their promise.” (Female smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b15] 
 
In Jergetal in particular, rental costs and high fuel prices have made it economically 
unattractive for many among the less wealthy to cultivate land parcels that are far from 
their home, the more so as many of these parcels are often small. 
 
                                                
111 Personal communication with the head of the Kyzyl-Tuu Aksakal court, 25 Nov 2007. 
Actors, practices, organizations and institutions around land cultivation 
 151 
“We used our land in Emgek-Talaa for one year only, for barley and wheat. After that, we 
estimated the expenses and realized that it’s not profitable at all. (…) Only people with 500 
to 600 sheep can use that land.” (Herder, smallholder, Jergetal) [4a39b] 
 
Attempts to (re-)establish a common property regime 
 
In view of the shortage of functioning machines and the unequal rental prices, both ayil 
okmotus tried to re-establish a common property regime for machines, either by 
regaining control over machinery or by regulating the formation of prices. However, 
the undertaking failed in both cases. In Kyzyl-Tuu, the ayil okmotu decided to recollect 
all distributed machines a few years after privatization in order to establish a 
communal machine centre. But in view of the owners’ resistance and rising fuel prices, 
the idea was soon dropped112. 
In Jergetal, the ayil okmotu retained a few kolkhoz machines to rent them out to 
private farmers. However, since most of these machines were old and in urgent need of 
repair, this central scheme soon ceased to exist. In a second attempt, the ayil okmotu 
then issued an official price list for technical services. By 2007, the price for harvesting 
one hectare was thus fixed at 1,000 KGS (US $24). In addition, technical services were 
subject to 4% local tax. According to a local machine owner, however, most drivers 
ignored both price list and taxes, agreeing instead on prices among themselves. Finally, 
in 2008, nine machine owners from Jergetal decided to form a cooperative. In order to 
win over new customers, they sought to reduce the apparent price insecurity by abiding 
by the communal tariffs and by paying the 4% local tax to the ayil okmotu. In return, 
the ayil okmotu started to provide them with fuel at reduced rates113. It remains to be 
seen, however, to what extent such local initiatives can actually help to lower 
transaction costs for the general public in the long term. 
 
 
9.3.3 Labor: social, human and financial capital governs access to 
workforce 
 
The transformation from large-scale kolkhoz production systems to small farm units at 
the household level led to a rapid de-mechanization of the Kyrgyz agrarian sector. The 
breakdown or sale of machines and other technical infrastructure as well as rising fuel 
prices have fostered the demand for human workforce (Peyrouse 2009). 
 
Pooling of labor within households and families 
 
In times of lasting rural underemployment, most of the workforce is recruited within 
the household and the family. Since many people have no regular paid job, they can 
invest a lot of time into their own farm, so that in nearly all households, two to three 
generations participate in joint farming activities. Male adults who left their parents’ 
house but still live in the same village often continue to cooperate with their parents 
(compare 9.2.2). Migrants who have the possibility to do so usually return to the 
village during labor-intensive times to support their family, i.e. for harvesting crops 
and hay, but also for lambing and shearing. Otherwise, their absence can often be 
compensated for with the help of their remittances, which are sometimes used to hire 
additional labor (see below). 
 
“During the hay harvest my sons also come and help – when they have time. If they have no 
time, they send money.” (Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a16] 
 
Schoch et al. (forthcoming) report similar practice for Southern Kyrgyzstan. In general, 
large families can thus rely on a larger potential workforce and can often afford to 
cultivate more land and/or more labor-intensive crops such as wheat or barley. By 
                                                
112 Personal communication with the head of Kyzyl-Tuu A/O, 7 Dec 2007. 
113 Personal communication with cooperative leader, 30 Aug 2008. 
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contrast, those with little of their own workforce are often restricted to cultivating 
small pieces of land and to less labor-intensive crops. 
 
“My children are small and I cannot cultivate barley and wheat. I make hay (…) When my 
husband was still alive, we grew barley. I do not remember exactly, but I think on more than 
2 ha of land – and on 1 ha [we had] wheat. (…) I spend two months for harvesting the hay 
from these 4 ha of land. Can you imagine? So now it’s getting very difficult. (…) For the last 
two years I have been doing this work together with my three children.” (Teacher, 
smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b15] 
 
In a similar way, many herders and their families who spend the summer far from the 
village hardly ever have the capacity to take care of their arable land. Since most of 
them cannot afford to buy all the fodder they need, herders often ask relatives or 
friends to look after their fields, herding their animals for free in return. 
 
Hiring labor through ashar 
 
Another way of mobilizing human workforce beyond the own household is through 
ashar. Especially less wealthy neighbors and relatives engage in this inherited practice 
of voluntary pooling of labor based on reciprocity to assist each other with various 
tasks. Although ashar is mainly practised for construction work, people also revert to it 
for irrigation, during harvest or for shearing sheep. The term ashar denotes two 
different, yet related practices of mutual assistance without monetary reward. It exists 
throughout Central Asia and other parts of the Muslim world as hashar in Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, assar in Kazakhstan, or asher in Pakistan (Babajanian et al. 2005; 
Bichsel 2006; Nikonova et al. 2007; Shahbaz 2009). On the one hand, ashar is 
practised among relatives and neighbors as a voluntary pooling of labor to help each 
other in the construction of a house, the preparation of a funeral or in labor-intensive 
fieldwork. This type of ashar works on a reciprocal basis. On the other hand, ashar 
also refers to joint labor at communal level, such as cleaning irrigation channels or 
carrying out other infrastructure maintenance. In this case, every tribe [Kyrg. uruu] has 
to provide a certain number of workers according to its size; these are usually 
mobilized by elders [Kyrg. aksakals] or tribe leaders [Kyrg. uruu bas’chys]. 
 
Ashar is based on a set of rules and norms of the Kyrgyz religious and customary law 
[Kyrg. adat]. Adat is a system of social control built around respect towards parents, 
elders and ancestors. It is also the basis for the important role of aksakals in decision-
making at the local level. One of the basic principles of adat is tooganchilik – the 
obligation of each individual to help his community members (Temirkoulov 2004, 96). 
On the one hand, the principle has been internalized in the everyday solidarity between 
relatives and kin, while on the other hand it finds an obvious expression in the two 
forms of ashar, which thus “cannot be seen outside other forms of reciprocity and 
mutual aid” (Bichsel 2006, 113). Adat also requires that those who refuse to 
participate in ashar be sanctioned and punished by the society through censure and 
shame [Kyrg. uiat]. Aksakals usually play a key role in both mobilizing people and 
sanctioning wrongdoers. 
 
The socialist authorities actively integrated the concept of ashar into the Soviet system. 
In the early years of the Soviet Union, regional authorities often manipulated ashar to 
mobilize the population for the (forced) construction of roads or irrigation systems. 
Later on, it was mainly used to maintain kolkhoz infrastructure and for other unpaid 
work at communal level. The latter practice is usually referred to as subbotnik [derived 
from the Russian work for Saturday, subbota], and still exists today, e.g. in the form of 
schoolchildren cleaning streets and parks (Koehler and Zürcher 2004; Bichsel 2006). 
Under the Akaev government, the role of aksakals and thus of ashar has been 
strengthened and institutionalized as part of the state’s decentralization strategy. 
Today, many donor organizations make use of ashar as a legitimate form of 
‘traditional’ institution to implement their development goals at local level. This has 
raised some concerns over the reproduction of unequal local power relations between 
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dominant aksakal leaders and more marginalized social groups (cf. Babajanian 2005; 
Bichsel 2006; Lindberg 2007). Nevertheless, findings from Uzbekistan (Rasanayagam 
2002) indicate that people spend less and less time to ashar and that only those who 
maintain close social relations still support each other in this way. In Southern 
Kyrgyzstan, however, Schoch (2008, 76f) has observed that ashar has grown in 
importance, because it can help to compensate for the lack of workforce that results 
from the absence of a large part of the male working population. 
 
Hiring labor against payment 
 
Wealthier farmers often prefer to hire additional labor in return for payment rather 
than calling relatives for ashar. They mostly recruit less wealthy non-relatives from 
within the village who are looking for seasonal wage employment; the employment of 
close relatives is usually frowned upon. Such practices are also common in other rural 
areas in Kyrgyzstan (cf. Lindberg 2007; Shigaeva et al. 2007). In Jergetal, the price for 
the manual cutting of one hectare of hay or sainfoin was around 1,500 KGS (US $40) 
by 2007. 
 
“Sometimes we pay people to irrigate our fields and cut the hay. (…) I am old, I am not 
strong enough. My children [grand-children] are too young. My sons sometimes help to 
make hay bales, or in other ways… But they have their own families.” (Mid-sized farmer, 
Jergetal) [3a3] 
 
Hiring paid laborers also prevents the employer from having ashar obligation to 
reciprocate. According to a young, large farmer from Kyzyl-Tuu who regularly hires 
friends and former classmates, taking on paid day laborers has become more popular 
in recent years because people are increasingly unwilling to work for free. This is 
confirmed by the experience of a widowed smallholder who tried to call in her relatives 
for help during the hay harvest: “Everybody promises to help, but they don’t always do 
it.” When it comes to communal ashar, the same wealthy farmer prefers not to 
participate. Instead, he offers money or vodka to those who have also been selected by 
the tribe leader [Kyrg. uruu bas’chy] “(…) so that they work for one person more”. 
Apparently, this is enough to avoid uiat, i.e. sanctions by the community. Such practice 
confirms what Kuehnast and Dudwick (2004) have observed, i.e. that wealthier rural 
Kyrgyz households are increasingly able to use cash to supplement or even substitute 
for social capital in the form of (reciprocal) relations with kin and neighbors. 
 
“Today, everybody works on his own”: from failed cooperation towards paid labor 
 
People’s varying practices to pool and mobilize workforce thus provide a good 
example of the current state of cooperation at local level. In general, people cooperate 
within the boundaries of their own household and with close relatives. Beyond that 
however, mutual help and assistance have diminished and often given way to 
indifference and mistrust. 
 
“In the past, they [neighbors] supported each other, but now we cannot even ask for bread. 
(…) Every family is individual now, and not everything is sufficient. There are feasts and 
other things, and that’s why people can’t support each other. (…) Everybody takes care of 
his own business, and all are becoming selfish these days – especially the rich people.” 
(Smallholder, Jergetal) [2d7] 
 
Most respondents from all sorts of households share an impression that people 
increasingly abstain from common work: "Today, everybody works on his own” is an 
often-heard statement nowadays. However, what at first sight seems to be an 
exemplary internalization of neoliberal principles is more often the result of personal 
experiences during the mid-1990s. At that time, many people got involved in small-
scale cooperation. Within their neighborhood or uruu they tried to farm the fields they 
had received jointly and which often lay side by side. Sooner or later, however, 
mistrust grew and most of these experiments failed. 
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“At the beginning [after the distribution], we tried to work together within the tribe. (…) 
For one or two years we worked jointly, we prepared fodder for the barns. So we tried to 
work, but we had disagreements. Some worked more, some worked less, [and] there were 
lazy people who did not work at all. So we all decided to stop it and started to work 
individually.” (Smallholder, Jergetal) [4a29] 
 
Today, most respondents show little interest in working with others again. On the one 
hand, many think that the large wealth disparities between households make it 
impossible to become partners again. On the other hand, wealthier farmers in 
particular have lost interest in cooperating with others, since their financial resources 
usually allow them to compensate for the lack of workforce or other inputs. Today, 
one of the few forms of more formalized cooperation beyond the household level exists 
is agricultural group credits, a concept which has proven at least partially successful in 
Jergetal (see 9.3.4 below). By contrast, a recent state program to promote cooperation 
in rural areas yielded little result, but rather increased people’s skepticism, as the 
example of Kyzyl-Tuu shows (Box 9b). 
 
“There is no cooperation between the families. The government says that there should be 
cooperation, but nobody is working jointly.” (Smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2a10] 
 
As a consequence, labor-related relationships between people have increasingly taken 
on a monetary form. In order to make a living, many asset-poor people now work for 
their wealthy neighbors for cash. 
 
“These [poor] people work for others to survive. (…) Those who keep livestock, like 
Myrzabek [his neighbor] or me, do not suffer. But these poor people are having a difficult 
time, they must work like slaves.” (Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a29] 
 
Such dependencies between the asset-poor and the asset-rich are more pronounced in 
the non-farm sector, where many of the asset-poor make a living from casual or 
seasonal construction work, rather than in the farm sector. The comparison with 
slavery may be exaggerated. Although wealthy farmers usually hire the same workers 
repeatedly, there is – with the exception of long-term relationships in animal 
husbandry (see 10.2.3) – no indication of exploitation or sustained economic 
dependency between employees and employers. 
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Box 9b “20,000 Som is what a rich man spends on lunch”: failed state  
 attempts to promote cooperation in Kyzyl-Tuu 
 
In the mid-noughties, the Kyrgyz government began to regard cooperatives as the panacea for rural 
development and started a nation-wide program for the promotion of agrarian cooperatives in rural 
areas. In 2006, rayon representatives called on people in Kyzyl-Tuu to organize themselves in groups, 
write their own business plans and apply for group loans. However, the initial euphoria quickly ebbed 
away when the loans provided were much smaller than promised, and the announced backstopping 
never substantiated. A farmer who participated in the program recounts: 
 
“At that time, the then head of ayil okmotu informed us about the possibility of forming cooperatives 
and create new jobs. They defined three topical directions in which we should work: land cultivation, 
animal husbandry, and social issues. For each of these issues, we were to establish one cooperative, 
each made up of ten young families, write a business plan and then receive an interest-free loan and 
professional support from specialists. At least that’s what a representative from the rayon 
administration promised us. So we joined the animal husbandry cooperative, although we didn’t really 
know the other nine families – they were neither our relatives nor our neighbors. First we agreed on a 
name for our cooperative – Asyk [Kyrg. ‘future’] – and then we opened a joint fund to which every 
family contributed 250 Som. Finally we started drafting a business plan: we wanted to invest one 
million Som in increasing and diversifying our flocks. 
 
In 2007, our business plan was finally accepted. But they allocated only 100,000 Som to the whole 
ayil okmotu, 60% of which went to our village, and Asyk received only 20,000 Som, which is more or 
less what a bay [Kyrg. ‘rich man’] spends on lunch. So we had to drop our initial plan to buy calves 
and bought nine lambs instead. Five families left the cooperative immediately – they lost interest – so 
we distributed the nine lambs among the rest of us. We also never received any of the promised 
support from specialists – they just never came. Instead, the ayil okmou offered us a piece of barren 
land at the end of the village, but it was of no use for us, so we refused. 
 
I don’t really know what the other four families are doing now. We all work on our own again and 
only talk to each other to coordinate the repayment of the loan. I never heard of the other two 
cooperatives again either. For my own family, things went well. The two lambs have grown into sheep; 
we sold them but kept the offspring. I would like to invest more in animal husbandry, but in a different 
way. If I cooperate again, then only with responsible people whom I know. I think the whole program 
was an experiment. After all, it was a state program, so I think the governor reported hundreds of 
cooperatives and pocketed the rest of the money.› 
 
According to Almaz Tschonov, a specialist for agrarian cooperatives at the Agrarian University in Bishkek, 
regional state representatives would often make do with establishing cooperatives only on paper, so that 
the program’s overall effect was rather counterproductive114. However, the failed ‘experiment’ in Kyzyl-
Tuu also shows that, for the time being, promoting cooperation and the formation of credit groups 
beyond people’s immediate networks of trust is a difficult endeavor. Approaching people through 
household, family and kin networks may therefore be more promising than through the ayil okmotu, in 
which people put little trust anyway. 
 
 
 
9.3.4 Cash: access to loans and credits  
 
The practices around the access to irrigation water, machines and workforce show that 
land cultivation today is closely linked to monetary exchange. In addition, cash is also 
required to buy fertilizers115, pesticides, or seeds. New seeds, for instance, are often 
expensive and hard to come by. In 2007, barley seeds cost 10 KGS/kg, wheat – 13 
KGS/kg, sainfoin – 25 KGS/kg, and clover up to 50 KGS/kg. Thus, sowing one hectare 
                                                
114 Personal communication, 29 May 2007. 
115 The application of mixed manure still seems uncommon in both villages. At the time of research, only 
one farmer in Jergetal produced sufficient compost to manure his own ogorod. 
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of wheat or barley, for which about 250 kg of seeds are required, amounts to 2,500 to 
3,250 KGS (US $60 to 80) 116. This is equal to a local teacher’s monthly salary. 
 
In short, things that used to be allocated by the kolkhoz chairman or the brigadier in 
the socialist past are now often subject to negotiation and/or financial compensation. 
Anyone who wants to efficiently cultivate arable land needs either sufficient social 
capital to have access to inputs at reduced rates or sufficient financial capital to pay for 
the requisite sums. However, even wealthier households do not always have sufficient 
cash at hand to pay for larger investments, such as renting a combine to harvest their 
fields (up to 1,300 KGS/ha (US $31) plus fuel; see 9.3.2), or paying for a tractor 
bringing in the hay from their meadows (up to 150 KGS/turn (US $3.6) plus fuel). 
Therefore, they must raise the required sum elsewhere. 
 
Access to local loans and ‘black cash boxes’ 
 
There are different ways to raise small sums of money within a village. In order to 
avoid interest rates, most people first try to borrow from relatives or neighbors. Many 
people become lenders or borrowers depending on their liquidity, or they lend and 
borrow at the same time. 
 
“Sometimes I lend money to other people, and sometimes I ask other people [for money].” 
(Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a29] 
 
However, interest-free borrowing is only practised among kin and good friends, and 
for small amounts of money. If people need more than a few hundred Som, they 
usually approach a local credit self-help group [Russ. gruppa samopomoshch’]. At the 
time of research, Jergetal had about ten to fifteen such groups, while the number of 
groups in Kyzyl-Tuu was reportedly smaller but could not be determined. Credit 
groups usually organize themselves within a neighborhood or a family. The fees of all 
group members were pooled and are given as a loan to either a group member or to 
applicants from outside the group. The loans provided range from 300 to 2,000 KGS 
(US $7 to 48); they are limited to a period of one month and charged at an interest rate 
of 20% (sometimes lower for group members). Usually, no collateral is required; 
people know each other in the village and judge an applicant’s creditworthiness 
according to his/her number of livestock or the existence of a regular wage or 
pension117. According to Jangyl Kozhomuratova, financial expert with CAMP, credit 
self-help groups have become very popular in recent years. From a juridical 
perspective, however, they are termed illegal, because they are not officially registered 
and do not pay taxes, but make a financial profit118. 
 
Another way to obtain a small loan is through individual money-lenders. These are 
comparably wealthy people who lend money to others if opportunity arises. Private 
money-lenders usually apply the same interest rates and credit durations than groups, 
and lend comparable sums of up to 2,000 KGS (US $48) for one month. Some of them 
however prefer a collateral, such as a passport or another official document119. 
 
Last but not least, there is the concept of ‘black cash boxes’ [Russ. tschornaya kassa]. 
These are rotating savings associations based on social get-togethers within a 
neighborhood or kin group. All members of such a network pay a fixed sum of around 
50 to 100 KGS (US $1.2 to 2.4) every month, which they receive when it is their turn 
to invite the others to a gathering at their own home. Thus, all members receive a 
considerably large sum of money once, which they could not raise otherwise. The 
concept is also highly popular on the jailoo, where it blends with the social practice of 
                                                
116 Personal communication with a farmer, Jergetal, 7 Nov 2007; and with the head of Kyzyl-Tuu A/O, 7 
Dec 2007. 
117 Personal communication with a member of a women’s credit group, Jergetal, 14 November 2007. 
118 Personal communication with Jangyl Kozhomuratova, financial expert with the Central Asian Moun-
tain Partnership (CAMP), Bishkek, 30 May 2007. 
119 Personal communication with a private money lender, Kyzyl-Tuu, 10 December 2007. 
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sherine (see 10.4.2). Kandiyoti (1999, 4) assumes that rotating savings associations in 
rural Uzbekistan account for the largest volume of cash in circulation based on private 
transfers. Nevertheless, tschornaya kassas often escape formal detection of money 
transfers due to their social embeddedness. From a juridical point of view, however, 
they are absolutely legal since they do not generate any profit. 
 
Individual access to regional credit schemes 
 
However, loans and donations provided locally are usually not enough to cover large 
investments of several thousand Som. In such cases, people must either sell livestock 
(see 10.1.2) or apply for a loan from a regional credit institute or support program. At 
the time of research, the most popular rural credit institute in Naryn oblast was 
FINCA, a global micro-credit provider with several regional branches in Kyrgyzstan120. 
FINCA provides agricultural loans to individuals and groups, starting at 12,500 and 
rising to 1,000,000 KGS (US $300 to 24,125). Individual applicants must provide 
sufficient collateral in the form of physical (house, car, TV set) or financial assets 
(livestock). Annual interest rates vary between 24 and 42%, depending on the type of 
loan and the risk involved. The maximum duration is 18 months for individuals and 
12 months for groups121. Although FINCA has simple procedures and actively seeks to 
approach the rural population, households with little or no livestock and without other 
valuable assets often hesitate about applying for such credits. During interviews, many 
smallholders and people with no livestock repeatedly expressed their fear of being 
unable to repay a loan. 
 
“How will we pay back [a loan] without a salary? In the end we anyway will have to sell 
livestock to pay back the loan. There is no other income, so it is better to sell livestock.” 
(Smallholder, Jergetal) [1c34] 
 
Many respondents expressed their unease about the idea of using their own house as 
collateral, fearing that they might lose it if they failed to repay a loan in time. 
 
“I once thought about taking out a loan. But to get one you need to have animals or you 
have to mortgage your house. Now I don’t have any animals, and I don’t dare to mortgage 
the house, because it’s very risky. So I’d rather get by without loans.” (Retired accountant, 
no livestock, Jergetal) [2b10] 
 
Even public servants with a regular income are not necessarily able to take out loans, 
since their salary does not allow them to put something aside. 
 
“I do not take out loans – how should I repay them? The child allowance is 800 Som, which 
is not even sufficient for a bag of flour. (…) My salary is 3,000 Som – it’s not sufficient. I 
spend half of the money on clothes for them [her children], and with the other half I must 
buy products.” (Female teacher, smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b15] 
 
Others again consider the application procedure too demanding or lengthy. A herder 
from Jergetal who spends summer and winter on the pastures told me that he had once 
tried to apply for a loan but gave up when things became too complicated: “You aren’t 
well versed in these things if you spend all your time on the jailoo.” Last but not least, 
there are also people who mistrust formal financial institutions in general. 
 
Wealthier farmers more often make use of credit offered by FINCA and others, such as 
the regional ayil bank (village bank) or a rural UNDP-funded micro-credit program. 
According to Sergey Kim, FINCA representative in Naryn, 90% of all agricultural 
loans are invested in livestock or fodder production, while only 10% are invested in 
cash crops or other farm-related activities. The respondents’ accounts in both villages 
confirm this estimation: with one exception, all interviewed debtors used their loans to 
buy animals or additional winter fodder (see 10.1). Only one mid-sized farmer in 
                                                
120 www.finca.org; accessed 16 March 2010. 
121 Personal communication with Sergey Kim, FINCA representative, Naryn town, 19 November 2007. 
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Jergetal had taken two credits of 70,000 and 80,000 KGS (US $1,689 and 1,930) to 
buy more agricultural machines, which he now rents out to others (see 9.3.2). 
 
“There is no life without money. (…) The only way is to take out loans. It is very important 
to prepare the fodder for the animals.” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [1a4] 
 
In general, mainly mid-sized farmers make use of credit on offer at regional level: they 
do not usually have enough livestock to raise the required sum themselves, but can 
nevertheless afford to furnish sufficient guarantees. By contrast, large farmers with 
more than 70 livestock units apply less often since they can usually sell the required 
number of animals to raise cash (see 10.1.2). 
 
Common access to regional credit schemes 
 
For the less wealthy, agricultural group credits are thus often the only way to finance 
larger investments. A joint application lowers the individual risk, but requires people to 
trust each other. Yet as described above (9.3.3), there is often little trust beyond the 
household and immediate kin, so cooperation among non-relatives is the exception 
rather than the rule. However, finding enough co-applicants within a household can be 
difficult when most children have already left the village. 
 
“I could apply for loans with my sons, but they aren’t here. (…) And my neighbors don’t 
join in.” (Retired accountant, no livestock, Jergetal) [2b10] 
 
Nevertheless, there are a few successful examples, especially from Jergetal, where a 
UNDP-funded project trains people on how to apply for group credit from the ayil 
bank. At the time of research, seven such groups with each about six families were 
active in Jergetal122. However, according to a member of the credit group Iigilig [Kyrg. 
‘success’], the ayil bank’s loans would be bound to investments in livestock only. By 
contrast, a similar yet state-run program to support local cooperatives and promote 
micro-credit in Kyzyl-Tuu did little to foster investments in the agrarian sector (Box 9b 
above). 
 
 
 
9.4 Access to agrarian commodity markets 
 
Only a few households in the two villages are able to generate any cash income at all 
from farming (cf. Table 5.5). Overall, 16% of all households in Jergetal and 12% in 
Kyzyl-Tuu earn some money from selling hay, sainfoin or barley, as well as wheat or 
potatoes. In both villages, the proportion is highest among households without any 
noteworthy pasture-related cash income (including households without livestock and 
smallholders): in these groups, about every fourth household can sell part of its 
harvest. Since most households cultivate at least a small piece of land, this means that, 
on the one hand, the bulk of local production serves people’s subsistence needs 
(including fodder cultivation for animals). On the other hand, it may also indicate that 
some of the exchange of food and fodder crops takes place outside the capitalized 
economy, to which many rural producers still have only limited access. 
 
Difficult access to capitalized commodity markets 
 
In order to foster competitive market structures after the socialist collapse, the Kyrgyz 
government quickly freed prices in the farm sector and eliminated most subsidies by 
the mid-1990s (compare 4.2). At the beginning, however, the effect was detrimental for 
many farmers, since output prices rose less quickly than key input prices. In general, 
the process of establishing integrated, well-functioning rural markets in Kyrgyzstan has 
                                                
122 Personal communication, Sulaika Mambetalieva, Naryn representative of the UNDP Poverty Reduction 
Programme, 19 November 2007. 
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been very slow. On the one hand, the national market is poorly integrated and hardly 
connected to external markets, so most farmers still respond to local prices. On the 
other hand, local and regional commodity markets are still characterized by high 
domestic transaction costs, including expenditures for transport, middlemen and bribes 
to officials. In addition, many rural producers face difficulties in accessing up-to-date 
information about market prices, which are subject to considerable seasonal and long-
term fluctuations (Christensen and Pomfret 2007; Ryazanov 2007; GEF 2008, 5). 
According to one farmer from Jergetal, many of his neighbors also fail to understand 
the basic market principles of supply and demand: 
 
“If I cultivate wheat this year, and the harvest and the market price is good (…) then they 
[the neighbors] cultivate wheat too. They do not know what the price will be like next year, 
whether there will be any demand – they do not bear it in mind.” (Smallholder, Jergetal) 
[3a15] 
 
Many producers thus face serious obstacles to entering capitalized commodity markets 
beyond the local level. Evidence from the two case study villages shows that this is 
especially true for crops and vegetables, while the situation regarding animal 
husbandry is somewhat different (see 10.1). 
 
Marketing of wheat, vegetables, hay and fodder crops 
 
Marketing of crops in Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu is mostly local. The exception was in the 
early noughties, when Jergetal was regularly visited by traders who bought large 
quantities of potatoes for the Kazakh market. This market outlet, which provided a 
valuable income for many otherwise asset-poor households, collapsed after a few years, 
when positive tests for golden nematodes led the Kazakh government to impose an 
import ban on Kyrgyz potatoes. Since then, the cultivation of potatoes and other 
vegetables has remained at the small scale of the ogorod.123 
 
The few households who can harvest sufficient wheat and barley usually sell their 
surplus to their neighbors who cannot cultivate their own grain. One mid-sized farmer 
from Jergetal whose customers lack the necessary cash to pay for his wheat also gives 
away part of his wheat as in-kind loans. Although not all of his borrowers are able to 
repay the annual 20% in-kind interest rate, he plans to extend this kind of business. In 
addition, he built a flour mill where people can mill their own grain in return for cash. 
 
Many households with little or no livestock cultivate fodder and hay in order to sell it 
to their neighbors with large herds of their own. For many smallholders and 
households without livestock, this is a highly valuable source of cash income. While 
some sell the readymade hay by the truckload, others let their customers cut the hay 
themselves, which reduces the price by around 50%. Due to the constant drought of 
the early noughties and the resulting general fodder shortage (see 9.3.1), prices for 
fodder rapidly increased in Naryn oblast. In addition, the fodder market is subject to 
considerable seasonal price fluctuations. Within only three months, for instance, the 
price of one big truck of hay in Kyzyl-Tuu rose from 5,000 KGS (US $120) in 
September 2007 to 8,000 KGS (US $230) by December 2007 – a difference equivalent 
to a local public servant’s monthly salary or to the price of an ordinary sheep. Most 
respondents expected prices to rise further in the near future. 
 
“This year the price for hay was very high, about 5,000 Som. Now we see the expensive 
prices – before, we thought ‘that’s very expensive’, but now it’s really expensive.” 
(Smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2a10] 
 
                                                
123 In May 2008, Kazakhstan eventually lifted the potato ban under the condition that all Kyrgyz potatoes 
pass plant quarantine border outposts having laboratory equipment necessary to test golden nematode 
(AKIPress News Agency, 8 May 2008; www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-179290415.html; accessed 18 
March 2010). 
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Unfortunately, many small producers soon weren’t able to profit from the rapid price 
increase when their own decreasing fodder harvest no longer exceeded their domestic 
need. In autumn 2007, several of these households had to buy additional fodder, either 
from neighbors or from regional markets. As a result, they not only lost a hitherto 
important cash income but suddenly had to cope with additional expenses, for which 
many had to either sell livestock or to borrow from others. 
 
“This year was very difficult. I think we may buy the hay (…). This year I have to buy one 
truck of hay; in other years I could sell some in order to buy coal or dung cakes. (…) So we 
have to buy a truckload of hay for 5,000 Som.” (Teacher, smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b15] 
 
As a consequence, the same respondent was forced to cut down his expenditure on 
heating (compare Box 4d ‘A smallholder’s household biography’). Those with 
sufficient productive land, however, reported a very profitable business in 2007. One 
large farmer from Jergetal who cultivates several hectares of private land plus 20 
hectares of LRF land earned 50,000 KGS (US $1,210) from the sale of hay to other 
livestock owners, even from neighboring villages. The example shows that despite 
prevalent environmental uncertainties, access to sufficient arable land and the use of 
efficient cultivation techniques can be a highly effective way of securing a household’s 
livelihoods. 
  
The fine line between producers and buyers 
 
The examples from the two case study villages show that to some extent, even asset-
poor households can participate in an (even purely local) agrarian commodity market 
by selling fodder crops and hay. However, autumn 2007 made clear that under 
worsening environmental conditions, the less wealthy quickly fail to sustain their 
production and generate sufficient surplus for sale or even cover their domestic needs. 
While under ‘normal’ conditions, their cultivation techniques may generate sufficient 
output, they often lack the necessary means to cope with the unexpected. As has been 
discussed above, gaining access to irrigation water, machinery or to more and better 
land requires considerable cash inputs, even if many people can rely on their good 
networks to bring down transaction costs. Since the less wealthy do not have the same 
possibilities as others to turn livestock into cash or to access larger sums of money 
through credit schemes, for them the line between being a net producer or net buyer 
can be very fine. 
Thus, the current lack of financial assets among the less wealthy may eventually 
result in a further widening of the gap between those can afford to cultivate their land 
and improve farming techniques, and those who cannot. Last but not least, the general 
shortage of cash also places a strain on municipal budgets. With very little income 
from local taxation, communal authorities can hardly ever invest seriously in local 
infrastructure or resource protection (compare 4.2.2). 
 
 
 
9.5 Reasons to turn away from land cultivation 
 
By and large, there are lots of different reasons why after the collapse of the kolkhoz 
economy, many people have found farming extremely difficult. However, the situation 
today is somewhat different from during the early years of independence when 
property rights over land and other production-related assets still had to be redefined, 
and agrarian production collapsed almost completely. Since that time, most rural 
households have tried by some means or other to make use of their private fields, but 
not all have succeeded in making farming an integral part of their livelihoods. 
 
Today, some continue to struggle and try to improve their land use practices, while 
others have capitulated and turned away from crop cultivation once more. Instead, 
many rural households now increasingly focus on animal husbandry, considering it a 
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more secure way of making a living (see Chapter 10); and/or they have begun to rely 
on remittances sent home by labor migrants, whose number have greatly increased 
throughout the country in recent years (cf. Thieme 2008b). Nationally, this 
development has not only resulted in declining wheat yields since 1997 (compare with 
section 4.3.6), but also in a sharp decrease in the area under crop cultivation since 
around 2002. As a result, only 25% of the 1.5 million hectares of arable land were 
used for grain production in 2007 (Mamytova and Mambetalieva 2008). 
 
At the local level, the reasons why people turn away from crop cultivation are often 
similar and result from a vicious cycle of the production-related difficulties discussed 
above. 
 
Environmental uncertainties and financial risks 
 
Many respondents consider the economic risks involved in farming much higher than 
those facing animal husbandry. This perception is certainly influenced by the difficult 
environmental conditions at the time of research. In response to the sustained period of 
drought and the resulting endemic shortage of irrigation water, many households 
refrained from cultivating wheat and barley in 2007 and produced only hay instead.  
 
“I have 1.5 hectares of land (…). In total, the costs of cultivation would amount to about 
15,000 Som [US $363]. If the harvest is bad, I’ll go bankrupt. The risk is very high and that 
is why I don’t do it. You have to pay for irrigation, plowing, transport, seeds – for 
everything. And then if you can’t harvest in the end… If you have animals you’ll get young 
ones, you can always sell them (…).” (Smallholder, Jergetal) [3c3] 
 
Ironically enough, grain prices skyrocketed only a few months later from an average of 
140 US $/t to 300 US $/t, which badly affected a large part of the rural Kyrgyz 
population and severely aggravated the food situation (UN 2008; Mamytova and 
Mambetalieva 2008). 
 
“We didn’t grow wheat this year. Almost nobody in the village grew wheat, because of the 
dry climate. (…) Only a few people cultivated the land this year. Nobody knew that the 
prices for flour would go up.” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [2f14]) 
 
The large financial investments required to farm land, the insecure economic prospects 
and the environmental uncertainties thus constitute an important push factor in 
people’s increased investments in livestock. Although most respondents acknowledge 
the necessity and the advantages of an integrated production combining land 
cultivation and animal husbandry, most of them assert that the first thing to do if cash 
was available was to increase the number of livestock, while hardly anybody envisages 
improving their land cultivation practices. Chapter 10 will show that such behavior 
also results from the high socioeconomic and symbolic value ascribed to animals in 
general. 
 
Maladjusted cultivation techniques and decreased productivity 
 
Some respondents, however, acknowledge that the low land productivity is not only a 
result of the difficult environmental situation but also of their own inappropriate 
cultivation techniques. On the one hand, these are caused by the general shortage of 
land and water, and the difficulty of gaining access to machinery, labor and cash, 
which led to many people repeatedly cultivating the same varieties on the same plots of 
land. Only a few manage to grow several different crops at a time or to leave part of 
their land intentionally fallow. On the other hand, most people who became land-
owners after the socialist collapse had no experience of farming before their kolkhoz 
was dissolved. As Table 8.1 shows, many of those who are now farmers were once 
mechanics, herders or drivers, breeding specialists, accountants or journalists. Thus, 
many lack the necessary knowledge to cultivate the land in an effective and sustainable 
manner; they just do what everybody else does. 
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“Nobody rotates their crops. People look at each other and grow the same as their 
neighbor.” (Smallholder, Jergetal) [3a15] 
 
According to several respondents, the lack of rotations and other sophisticated 
cultivation techniques has led to decreasing land productivity and diminishing yields. 
This has eventually forced some of them to give up growing any wheat and barley at 
all. 
 
“The productivity is not good – that is why we decided not to cultivate the land anymore. 
(…) The land is not in a good condition because we grow the same things every year.” (Mid-
sized farmer, Jergetal) [2f3] 
 
“After the dissolution of the kolkhoz (…)  we cultivated wheat and barley. Then, after 
2000... we never fertilized the land, we just planted. And that is why nothing grows 
anymore. Since last year we only grow grass.” (Farmer, no livestock, Jergetal) [1c9] 
 
Consequently, the question arises as to whether people’s endowment with private 
arable land after the collapse of the socialist economy has really been a blessing for 
everyone. I will take up that thought in Chapter 12, after having examined animal 
husbandry and the use of pastures in the next chapter. 
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10 Actors, practices, organizations and institutions 
around animal husbandry and the use of 
pastures 
 
 
“There would be no real life here without animals. You cannot live from the land.” 
 
Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal [3a3] 
 
 
In the same way in which some people benefited more than others from the often 
unequal distribution of arable land in the mid-1990s, the allocation of former kolkhoz 
animals was typified by fraudulence and cheating (Chapter 7). As a result, far from all 
households that set out into the emerging market economy did so with the same 
chances of success, even though they had received secure, private property rights over 
livestock. This was already obvious during and immediately after the privatization 
process, when the number of animals began to fall steeply and many of the less wealthy 
lost their private flocks. Despite these hardships, however, livestock rearing has 
remained a key pillar of rural livelihoods to the present day. In recent years, many 
people in the two case study villages have even more than ever turned towards animal 
husbandry, thus responding to the difficulties related to commercial land cultivation 
(Chapter 9). Nevertheless, there are still striking disparities between households. While 
a few wealthy households own large flocks of sheep, horses, yaks and cows, many 
struggle even to keep a few animals. These disparities are also reflected in the 
household typology developed in Chapter 5. 
 
Given these persistent disparities, and in view of the initial political intention to 
empower rural households by endowing them with private livestock, I look in this 
chapter at how households and individuals in the two case study villages can make a 
living from animal husbandry. Why do people value animals so highly, how do they 
make use of them for their economic and social wellbeing, and how do they organize 
animal husbandry within and beyond their household? In this context, questions 
regarding the access to and use of pastures come to the forefront of my analysis. Since 
pastures are indispensable for animal husbandry and pastoral production, analyzing 
the institutional context and people’s organizing practices in relation to this resource is 
key to gaining a better understanding of the role of livestock in rural livelihoods. I 
therefore also ask how different types of households access and use pastures, and how 
they interact with other private and public actors. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.1 examines the economic value and the 
socioeconomic significance of livestock for rural households and analyzes when and 
how animals are converted into other forms of capital, such as cash or social relations. 
Section 10.2 then describes the different ways in which herding is negotiated and 
organized at local level and how it can contribute to the livelihoods of rural 
households. After that, analysis concentrates on the access to and the use of pastures in 
the two case study villages. Section 10.3 looks at the Kyrgyz pasture legislation and the 
organizing practices of state representatives, while section 10.4 focuses on local herders 
and their households, and describes existing conflicts over pastures. Finally, section 
10.5 examines how various actors anticipated the 2009 reform of Kyrgyz pasture laws, 
about which only vague rumors were circulating at the time of research124. 
                                                
124 On 6 February 2009 the Kyrgyz parliament passed a new law ‘On pastures’, which came into effort by 
a government resolution dated 24 June 2009. I had already completed the empirical fieldwork for this 
study by then. 
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10.1 “There is no life without livestock here”: the role of 
livestock in rural livelihoods 
 
 
”We use livestock everywhere – we sell it, we slaughter it, we use it as a gift.” 
Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal [2f14] 
 
 
After 1996, livestock numbers started to increase again and developed more or less 
constantly in Naryn oblast and the two study villages (compare with Figures 5.1 and 
5.2). The role of livestock in the rural Kyrgyz economy and its significance for rural 
livelihoods can therefore hardly be overestimated, and people have good reason to say 
that “there is no life without livestock here”. However, the often-heard statement 
refers to more than just the economic value of animals. As evidence shows, livestock 
also has an important social function for the rural Kyrgyz. 
 
 
10.1.1 The socioeconomic value of livestock 
 
Livestock for self-sufficiency 
 
Meat and fat are essential elements of the Kyrgyz diet. Although potatoes and bread 
dominate everyday meals, wealthier household in particular often supplement them 
with smaller or larger quantities of meat. Most households slaughter one or several of 
their animals at the onset of winter to store the meat in a dry and cool place and use it 
by and by125. Thus, most households have a constant basic demand for animals for self-
sufficiency, which is one of the reasons why less wealthy households often have 
difficulties sustaining or increasing their flock size in the long run. 
 
“The number did not increase a lot because (…) we also use animals for our own 
consumption.” (Farmer, smallholder, Jergetal) [2a33] 
 
Milk products are just as important as meat. They mainly include butter, milk, yogurt, 
cream and dried yogurt, as well as kymyz (fermented mare’s milk) which is mainly 
consumed on the summer pastures [Kyrg. jailoo]. Between May and September, when 
the animals are usually on the jailoo, most households retain at least one cow in their 
yard to have a constant supply of milk. 
 
Livestock as financial stock and investment fund 
 
The rural financial service system has improved somewhat in recent years, and Naryn 
town meanwhile offers a variety of banks and credit providers. However, people’s trust 
in the financial sector seems to be generally low, and many are not yet accustomed to 
making use of its services. Instead, nearly all respondents prefer to invest in livestock 
whenever they have some surplus cash. Although animals require care and entail 
further investments for fodder, shelter, medicine and herding fees, most people prefer 
to keep sufficient livestock because they can convert it into cash whenever they need to 
(10.1.2 explains when, why and how people do this). Thus, rich and poor people alike 
equate animals with money: 
 
“It is possible to take out loans, but we are not interested in doing so. I have credit in hand 
already – it is livestock.” (Large farmer, Jergetal) [1c23] 
 
“If you keep sheep you [can] sell the wool – livestock is money.” (Electrician, no livestock, 
Jergetal) [1a16] 
                                                
125 In Kyrgyz, this practice is called sogum soyuu, which literally translates as ‘to prepare meat for winter’. 
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In a similar sense, animals are often equated with financial security. Although most 
credit grantors do not accept animals as collateral, people who apply for loans often 
rely on their flock as a last resort to pay back the debt if they cannot find the money 
elsewhere. But there are also very few alternative ways of investing money locally. I 
have shown in Chapter 9 that land cultivation is associated with numerous obstacles, 
especially for less wealthy households. By contrast, animal husbandry offers much 
better prospects. People can often make a profit in less than a year (fattening offspring 
during summer and selling it in autumn), although the risks involved are considerable, 
too: animals may be stolen or die from diseases, they may be eaten by wolves or get 
lost on the jailoo. Nevertheless, most people consider animal husbandry the only viable 
way of making a living in the village. 
 
“If there weren’t any animals here, if we had no animals, there would be no real life. You 
can’t live from the land.” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [3a3] 
 
Consequently, most households in Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu consider animal husbandry 
one of their most important cash income sources (compare 5.2.3). When asked about 
their future plans, nearly all respondents said that their main goal was to increase their 
household’s number of animals. 
 
“More animals means more money – if possible, we will try to increase their numbers.” 
(Herder, smallholder, Jergetal) [5a1] 
 
Only a few wealthy respondents say they have a sufficiently large flock, and that 
keeping more animals would not be profitable anymore126. 
Livestock generates jobs for professional herders 
 
Besides these direct economic benefits, livestock also indirectly generates rural income 
opportunities. The growing number of animals in rural areas has also led to an 
increased demand for professional herders to take care of other people’s animals 
during the summer or throughout the whole year. In both villages, up to 30 herders 
and their households spend summer on the jailoo herding other people’s animals in 
return for payment in cash or in kind. Thus, herding has become one of the few income 
opportunities to be found locally (see 10.2.2 for details). 
 
Livestock as a pivotal point for the maintenance of social relations 
 
Livestock also constitutes an important pivotal point around which rural Kyrgyz 
organize their social relations. Social status and wealth are first and foremost measured 
by the quantity of livestock a person or a household possesses. Households with little 
or no livestock are usually considered poor, while local definitions of middle-class and 
wealthy households vary considerably. For instance, households with comparably large 
flocks (large farmers) are usually considered ‘rich people’ [Kyrg. bailar] by others, but 
often call themselves ‘middle rich’ [Russ. srednji bagatyi]. In qualitative terms, hens 
and goats are often associated with poverty, while wealthier households can afford to 
invest in more expensive animals such as merino sheep, horses and yaks127. This wider 
social significance of livestock results from the fact that households do not only eat and 
sell animals, but also use them to establish and maintain social relations with others. 
Parents usually endow their children with livestock once they marry and start their 
own household, and animals are an important part of the dowry. If a young man 
migrates to an urban area and cannot take along his share of animals, his parents or 
brothers often pool all their children’s livestock and manage it jointly. Such joint flocks 
form the pivotal point of many multi-local households (Schoch 2008; Schoch et al. 
forthcoming). 
 
                                                
126 When her assignment was over, one of my local research assistants immediately invested her salary in 
four sheep and entrusted them to her family. 
127 Personal communication with former brigadier, Kyzyl-Tuu, 19 Apr 2007. 
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Kyrgyz also have a distinct tradition of life cycle feasts [Kyrg. toi] such as weddings, 
birthdays, funerals and commemoration days, as well as social gatherings such as 
sherine (neighborhood circles; see 10.4.2), which are used to reaffirm social networks. 
In such feasts, food and drinks play a central role, and whoever invites his relatives, 
neighbors and friends is expected to serve large quantities of meat. This entails two 
fundamental problems for the less wealthy. First, many smallholders and households 
without livestock say that repeated expenditure on feasts was one of the main reasons 
why they have not succeeded in building up their own flock since 1994. Although poor 
households usually receive monetary and in-kind support from their kin to pay for a 
funeral, many of them say they used up their last few animals when they had to bury 
one of their family members. 
 
“As you know, Kyrgyz people have many feasts involving lots of expenses. Later on my 
husband died and his brother, too, so now I have [only] one cow with a calf. When my 
husband died there were three sheep left. We used a lot of livestock for the funeral. After the 
funeral almost nothing was left, only the cow. Later on my mother-in-law died, so we again 
spent livestock.” (Female smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b15] 
 
The second problem is that participating in a feast usually means bringing along a gift, 
which can put considerable pressure on guests. Kuehnast and Dudwick (2004) show 
that the cost of gifts has considerably increased after 1991, so less wealthy people 
increasingly have to refuse invitations. This can strain their social networks in the long 
term: “At the same time, the non-poor increasingly refrain from inviting poorer 
relatives (…) to spare them the burden of purchasing gifts” (Kuehnast and Dudwick 
2004, 4). 
 
Thus livestock is used either directly or indirectly as a gift to establish and maintain 
social relations with others. During my stay on Arpa jailoo in summer 2008, a wealthy 
livestock owner from Kyzyl-Tuu came to visit his herder. Realizing that there was a 
herders’ gathering the same day, he donated a lamb from his flock as a prize for ulak 
tartysh, a traditional horse game. A few days later, the winner invited his jailoo 
neighbors for a feast, during which the lamb was served and the wealthy sponsor was 
praised for his benevolence and was showered with good wishes. 
 
 
10.1.2 Sale of animals, meat and wool: the role of markets 
 
In the absence of a regular cash income, many households regularly sell animals to 
cover their daily expenses. Expenditures include food items, clothes, shoes, school fees, 
books and uniforms for children, but also the cost of gifts or organizing feasts. The 
need for cash is particularly acute in autumn, when the school year starts and most 
feasts are organized. Land cultivation – seeds, means of transport and fuel (compare 
9.3) – and animal husbandry also cause a constantly recurring demand for cash. Many 
livestock owners have difficulties to produce sufficient winter fodder. Therefore, they 
must repeatedly sell animals in order to purchase additional hay and other forage and 
thereby ensure the survival of the remaining flock.  
 
“At the moment, we are selling livestock in order to keep the livestock. For example, we 
have to buy medicine and fodder.” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [1a4] 
 
The same is true of herding households, who often sell part of their flock in spring in 
order to cover the costs of pastoral mobility such as food and transport (compare with 
10.2.2). In the case of households with only few animals of their own and little natural 
reproduction, such practices may engender a vicious cycle, resulting in a stagnant or 
decreasing flock size in the long term. 
 
Actors, practices, organizations and institutions around animal husbandry and the use of pastures 
 167 
”In the past there were only few [households without livestock], but today there are more of 
them… because it is not easy… no help… no seeds… the flour price has increased. And if 
you sell animals, the price is bad. Because of the sale of animals there are more people today 
who have only land. It’s not easy.” (Farmer, no livestock, Jergetal) [1c9] 
 
Similar practices exist in connection with credits. Several respondents who borrowed 
money from a commercial credit provider had to sell sold part of their flock in order to 
repay the credit and the often high interest rate. 
 
”I have taken 40,000 Som [as a credit; US $965]. I sold a lot of livestock in order to pay it 
back, so I decided not to take credits anymore in future. (…) It was with 26% [interest rate]. 
I regret that I took this credit, it would have been better not to take it and just live by selling 
livestock.” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [1a4] 
 
Livestock is also sold for specific, large investments such as machines or houses. 
Several respondents have sold several dozen animals to renovate their old house or 
build a new one in the village. Some wealthier livestock owners have even invested the 
sales revenues in building a second house for their children living in the capital city of 
Bishkek. Last but not least, many people also sell an animal when they realize that it 
has contracted a disease. Näscher (2009) describes how many livestock owners in 
Kyzyl-Tuu try to get rid of a sick animal so that it cannot infect the rest of the 
household’s flock. From an epidemiological point of view, this practice appears highly 
problematic, as it fosters the spread of highly infectious diseases such as Brucellosis or 
foot-and-mouth disease. 
 
When to sell what 
 
The different needs which cause people to sell their animals also influence when and 
where they sell. In general, the less wealthy sell more often. With few cash savings and 
hardly any income-generating alternatives at hand, they cannot wait for livestock 
prices to increase, but must sell an animal whenever the need for cash arises. 
 
“We sell [livestock] whenever we need money, even in spring or winter, just any time. (…) 
When we need to go somewhere, for instance to feasts. (…) If it is really necessary we ask 
for a loan and we sell livestock to pay it back.” (Smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3b26] 
 
By contrast, wealthier households often observe price fluctuations and sell only when 
prices are high. Thus, some of them fatten their animals during winter in order to sell 
them in spring, when prices are up to 25% higher than in autumn128. 
 
“It depends on the market price. If it is good, then we sell livestock and keep the money.” 
(Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3b6] 
 
The ability of wealthy households to react to market demands and take advantage of 
price fluctuations is also reflected in their strategic thinking about flock compositions. 
In recent years, several of them have begun to diversify their livestock holdings by 
investing in new types of animals. These include merino sheep, whose wool is 
increasingly sought-after by Chinese traders, as well as horses, which can be sold at a 
great profit to Kazakhstan. 
 
“If the price for wool is high, then maybe the meat price will be low. So it is important to 
keep both. (…) [That is why] I am also interested in keeping wool sheep and increasing their 
number.” (Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [2b14] 
 
Since wool prices do not fluctuate seasonally but year to year, producers sometimes 
store their wool for another year, hoping that prices will increase. This requires dry 
storage facilities, which less wealthy farmers are often unable to afford. By contrast, 
the quality of other wool types does not meet industrial standards, so households with 
                                                
128 Personal communication, representative of Karakojun ayil okmotu, 22 May 2007. 
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goats and fat-tailed sheep usually sell the whole skin of an animal after slaughtering it. 
Skins are sold to traveling traders who visit the village, but prices fluctuate widely and 
may drop by 50% within a few weeks only (Table 10.1). 
 
Table 10.1 Market prices for animals and pastoral products, Kyzyl-Tuu (own survey, 
various respondents) 
 
 KGS US $ 
   
Livestocka   
Calf (one year) 10,000 240 
Cow 20,000 - 30,000 480 - 725 
Bull 25,000 - 30,000 600 - 725 
Horse 21,000 - 40,000 510 - 965 
Sheep, fat-tail breed 2,500 - 3,000 60 - 70 
Sheep, pure breed 3,500 - 6,000 85 - 145 
Yak 17,000 - 20,000 410 - 485 
   
Skinsb   
Sheep skin, Nov 2007 70 - 80 1.9 - 2.2 
Sheep skin, Oct 2007 150 3.6 
   
Woolc   
1 kg Merino wool, 2007 40 0.96 
1 kg Merino wool, 2006 31 0.75 
1 kg Merino wool, 2005 ~45 ~1.1 
 
a Average autumn sales prices for the At-Bashy livestock market, 2007 
b Prices paid by traders in Kyzyl-Tuu 
c Prices paid by traders in At-Bashy; one sheep produces between 3 to 5 kg wool per year. 
 
 
Where to sell 
 
Marketing opportunities for animals, meat and wool exist at all levels. At local level, 
neighbors buy animals from each other, and middlemen and traveling traders regularly 
visit the village to purchase animals, wool and skins directly from their owners. In 
summer, some traders also visit the jailoo to purchase animals or milk products (see 
10.4.2). Interestingly, it is not only the less wealthy who use this opportunity to sell, 
although the prices offered by neighbors, middlemen and traders are usually below 
regional and national standards. If opportunity arises, even comparably rich livestock 
owners sometimes conclude a deal with a trader or with their neighbors. 
 
There are various livestock bazaars at regional level. Many people from Jergetal visit 
the weekly Örnök bazaar on their way to Naryn, where sheep and goats are traded 
every Saturday. Also on Saturday, but only during summer, horses and cows are traded 
in Kyrk Bozüi, on the way to Bishkek and the Kumbel jailoo (see Map 10.1). Both 
places are easy to reach from Jergetal, so animals can be driven there and there is no 
need to pay for a truck. In addition, livestock can also be sold on the large daily bazaar 
in Naryn town. In the case of Kyzyl-Tuu, most people sell and buy in At-Bashy, where 
one of the country’s largest livestock bazaars is held every Sunday and where even 
Chinese and Kazakh middlemen mingle with the other visitors. Transport is usually 
organized by local truck drivers, who charge around 50 KG (US $1.2) per sheep or 
goat and up to 250 KGS (US $6) per cow or horse. The country’s largest livestock 
bazaar is held every Sunday in Tokmok. Located only a few kilometers from Bishkek 
and a few hundred meters from the Kazakh border, the market usually offers the 
highest prices for cows and horses. While people from Kyzyl-Tuu hardly ever travel to 
Tokmok, there are weekly transports from Jergetal costing around 600 to 700 KGS per 
cow or horse (US $14 to 17), depending on the number of animals. Selling animals in 
Tokmok thus only pays off for those who want to sell more than one animal, since 
otherwise the transport costs outweigh the better sales revenues. A few households also 
use their personal relations with household members, other relatives or friends living in 
the capital to sell directly at the large urban bazaars of Bishkek. This mainly concerns 
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the sale of mutton, beef and yak meat, which can be sold at high profit to an urban 
clientele. One labor migrant from a comparably wealthy family from Kyzyl-Tuu 
regularly sells yak meat from his household’s herd at Osh bazaar in Bishkek and 
among his urban friends. If prices are high, he also buys and resells his neighbors’ 
animals. Thus, migration to urban areas and the resulting multi-locality of households 
can open up direct market access for rural producers. 
In general, less wealthy households prefer local traders and regional markets, where 
access  – i.e. transport – costs are lower than on the national market. By contrast, 
wealthier households often sell at every level, since they can afford to take a decision 
depending on the situation and current prices, and because they can also make use of 
generally better social networks. 
 
 
10.1.3 Practices to increase flocks 
 
When asked for their household’s main long-term objective, most respondents said that 
increasing the number of animals was their main aim. Evidence from the two case 
study villages shows that people invest in livestock in different ways, and how they try 
to build up their flock. Wealthier respondents in particular are often proud that they 
have managed to build up their private flock through professional stockbreeding and 
without resorting to credits. Many of them are former kolkhoz herders, brigadiers or 
breeding specialists, who have used their knowledge and practical experience of animal 
husbandry to keep reproduction rates high and thus constantly increase their flock. 
 
“It depends on each person’s effort. (…) Today we have about 150 sheep, 30 horses and 
about 15 cows. Life is good now. (…) I tried to keep the offspring, but I never bought 
livestock.” (Former brigadier, mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a16] 
 
Experience is especially needed in spring-time, when the ewes give birth and 
professional handling helps to minimize fatalities among the offspring. Other livestock 
owners stress the importance of selective sale and purchase. Whenever they sell an 
adult animal, they use part of the revenue to buy another young animal. 
 
“We usually sell a calf and buy a sheep, [and] some money is left for living. We continued 
like this for several years, selling one animal and buying another, and breeding.” (Herder, 
smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a23] 
 
Another way to increase a private flock is to reinvest revenues from the sale of wheat, 
barley, hay or potatoes in animals. However, since less wealthy households produce 
neither large quantities nor a large variety of crops (compare 10.1), only a few wealthy 
farmers have been able successful in combining farming and animal husbandry, and in 
reinvesting the revenues from one sector to balance seasonal losses of the other one 
(and vice versa). Less wealthy households often put aside part of their child allowances 
for months and years to buy animals. Although people hardly ever mention it 
explicitly, it can be assumed that remittances from labor migrants are often used to buy 
new animals. In her case study from Southern Kyrgyzstan, Schoch (2008) shows that a 
large part of the remittances sent back by labor migrants is invested in livestock. Given 
the importance of livestock and the lack of alternative investment opportunities, it can 
be assumed that in Naryn oblast also, remittances are one of the backbones of animal 
husbandry. 
Those who do not have sufficient cash savings or who lack other reliable cash 
income sources to buy animals often take out loans from professional lenders. 
However, as in the case of credit for land cultivation, neither very poor nor very 
wealthy households are among the borrowers – the former cannot furnish sufficient 
guarantees and the latter have sufficient savings of their own. At the same time, loans 
provided by wealthy villagers and local credit self-help group are usually too small to 
buy animals. Therefore, it is mainly middle-class households that make use of credit to 
develop their flocks. In the case of Jergetal, several of them have benefited from a 
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UNDP program in the early 2000s that taught livestock owners to draft a business plan 
and eventually provided them with group credits. Those who repaid in time later 
received another loan on more favorable terms (see 9.3.4 for details on credit and 
loans). 
Many of the less wealthy can only establish, increase or keep their own flock 
because they receive support from their own family and kin. Young families in 
particular often depend on their parents’ and relatives’ giving them animals as a 
present when a child is born. Yet even established households sometimes require 
support from their parents. In one case, a herder from Kyzyl-Tuu sold all his remaining 
animals when his only paying customer moved away. After four years without 
livestock and with no regular job, he received a cow from his father and eventually 
decided to work as a herder again. 
 
 
 
10.2 Herding: practices, preconditions and negotiations 
 
Already in Soviet times, numerous local households made a living from working as 
employed kolkhoz herders (compare 6). After 1991, however, the centrally 
administered livestock sector disintegrated and many herders suddenly found 
themselves deprived of once attractive wages and premiums. This – and the fact that 
livestock numbers collapsed in the early 1990s – caused many kolkhoz herders to stop 
moving to the remote summer pastures during summer. There was nobody to pay them 
for their work and they did not have enough own livestock to practise transhumance in 
a profitable way. Moreover, the trucks that were once used to support the herders 
throughout the year had been sold off, the cultural centers on remote summer pastures 
had been privatized, and the roads and bridges that once linked the highlands to the 
lowlands were no longer maintained. Only a few, therefore, carried on moving to 
jailoo every summer, either because they managed to keep sufficient livestock after the 
dissolution of the kolkhoz or because they found someone who would entrust them 
with enough animals. The majority, however, remained in the lowlands all year round, 
herding their private flock in the vicinity of the village. Consequently, the village-
adjacent pastures soon began to show signs of serious overuse, especially after 1996 
when livestock numbers began to rise again (Fitzherbert 2000; Ludi 2003; Undeland 
2005). At the same time, people began to use their private plots of land and to engage 
in agro-pastoral activity. As a consequence, the private cultivation of crops around 
villages increased – and so did the need to re-organize animal husbandry at local and 
household level (Farrington 2005). Thus, in the late 1990s, new herding and pasture-
use practices emerged, both in terms of first attempts to regulate relations between 
herders and customers, and in the form of central orders to coordinate agricultural and 
pastoral activities. Some of these organizing practices have become more or less 
institutionalized since then, either informally through repeated behavior or formally 
through centrally defined (and contested) herding fees. 
 
 
10.2.1 Common and private herding practices 
 
Depending on the season, herding practices are either based on neighborhood, family 
and kin, or other personal relationships. 
 
Common herding on village adjacent pastures (mal kesüü) 
 
In winter, when most animals are kept in and around the village, the majority of 
households now participates in mal kesüü129, a neighborhood-based rotational herding 
scheme. Every morning, a herder collects together all the animals in a neighborhood, 
                                                
129 Mal translates literally from the Kyrgyz as ‘livestock’ and kesüü – as ‘herding by turns’. 
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takes them to the village-adjacent pastures and brings them back to the village in the 
evening, where they spend the night in the stables. According to mal kesüü, every 
household in a neighborhood – about 15 to 20 households – has to appoint a herder to 
take care of the neighborhood flock for one day. Depending on the size of the 
neighborhood, every household thus has to herd the flock once every two to three 
weeks. In both villages, all households with livestock within a neighborhood 
participate in mal kesüü, except those with large private flocks and/or a private barn 
outside the village (compare 10.4.5). These households usually herd their animals 
themselves or employ an own herder (see below). 
In summer, when most animals are sent to the summer pastures, mal kesüü is only 
practised to herd the few animals left behind in the village. These are mainly milking 
cows or weak animals. 
 
Common herding among relatives 
 
During the summer, most people prefer to entrust their animals to someone from their 
own family or kin who – in most cases together with his own household – spends the 
summer months on the alpine summer pastures (hereinafter referred to as ‘herding 
households’). In such a case, remuneration mostly takes place in the form of reciprocal 
help. “You can’t take money from your relatives” is often heard among herders who 
take care of their relatives’ livestock. Instead, their relatives in the village take care of 
their arable land during summer and provide support during labor-intensive times. 
Cutting hay for the herding household is the most widespread reciprocal service. In 
most cases, relatives also contribute to the transport costs to and from the summer 
pastures, or provide their own truck or tractor if possible. 
 
Herding for paying customers 
 
Those who have no herder among their close relatives usually look for a reliable herder 
in their neighborhood or hamlet who is ready to tend their flock during summer. 
Meanwhile, more than 20 households in each of Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu offer their 
professional herding services to others during the summer; a few of them also do so 
during the winter. Just like private entrepreneurs, these herding households are in open 
competition with one another. While newer ones must actively look for customers, 
more experienced herders often work for the same clients every year. However, since 
flock sizes often fluctuate, even the latter must constantly secure their clientele. 
 
“As a herder, you have to look for new customers every four to five months.” (Herder, Arpa 
jailoo) [2b3] 
 
Some herders work for only one or two households, others for up to seven, depending 
on how many animals they and their clients have. Clients pay a monthly cash fee per 
animal. These herding fees vary from year to year and are subject to a complex 
negotiation process between the communal authorities, herders and clients (see 10.2.4). 
Horses are usually herded free of charge, because the herding household has the right 
to use and sell the mares’ milk. Agreements between herder and client are generally 
verbal and also stipulate that the herder must compensate his customer for every lost 
animal, unless it dies from a disease or is killed by wolves. In the latter case, the herder 
must present the dead body to the owner to prove that the animal has not been lost or 
slaughtered. Compensation is usually done in kind by replacing a lost animal with 
another one (Figure 10.1). 
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Figure 10.1 A dead sheep hanging on a pole on Arpa jailoo. The herder keeps the dead body to prove that the 
animal died of disease so that the owner does not ask him to compensate for the loss (photo by 
the author, 2008). 
 
 
Herding for a single employer 
 
Some herding households work for one single client. Most of these constellations take 
the form of employer-employee relationships, since the flock owners are usually 
comparably wealthy households with several hundred private animals. If they have a 
large flock but do not have the necessary human capital or will to move to the summer 
pastures themselves, rich livestock owners often prefer to employ someone else directly. 
In many cases, the herding household is asset-poor and sometimes does not even have 
any animals of its own. These relationships usually have their own specific conditions 
of remuneration. In some cases, the herding household receives a monthly or annual 
lump sum instead of a monthly fee per animal. In other cases, the monthly herding fee 
is lower than usual because the employer covers all the costs of transport, food, 
accommodation and the like. Usually, herders prefer this kind of agreement because 
they do not like having to negotiate with many different livestock owners. 
 
“You get the money from one person, as a salary. And the animals are all marked the same, 
and all the sheep are white. When you take livestock from different households, some people 
pay late – sometimes you have to wait for two months. But when there is only one, he will 
count and give you the money on time, without any delay.” (Herder, smallholder, Kyzyl-
Tuu) [1a23] 
 
In such a relationship, the herder and his family usually spend winter in a saray [Kyrg. 
‘barn’] belonging to their employer so they can take care of the animals throughout the 
year. Working for a single patron thus brings with it many in-kind benefits, but can 
also result in a strong economic dependency on the employer. Such relationships may 
thus also be seen as a direct expression of the increasing socioeconomic disparities in 
rural areas. 
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Herding exclusively own livestock 
 
In most of the abovementioned constellations, herding households mingle their own 
animals with those of their relatives, paying customers or employers. Only a very small 
number of herding households have no livestock of their own – mostly those working 
for a single employer. There are, however, also some households that move to the 
summer pastures to herd just their own animals. Most of them have at some stage 
herded other people’s animals, but have stopped doing so when their own herd 
increased to the extent that they either became unable to take care of other animals or 
did not need the additional income from herding fees anymore. 
 
“For the last two years we have not been herding anymore for other people. The livestock I 
have is sufficient for me – why should I herd for others if I have more than 400 sheep?” 
(Herder, large farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a4] 
 
Most of these private herders are thus comparably wealthy and are able to cover the 
expense of spending summer on the pastures on their own (compare 10.2.3 below). 
That is why they are often called ‘rich people’ [Kyrg. bailar] by other herders who 
work for relatives and/or other customers and who consider themselves ‘simple people’ 
and ‘true’ herders [Kyrg. karapaim el]. Many herders also say that the number of bailar 
on Arpa has significantly increased in recent years; in summer 2008, there were three 
of them on Arpa jailoo, and one on Kumbel jailoo (see Table 10.2). 
 
Table 10.2 Different types of herding agreements on Arpa and 
 Kumbel jailoo, summer 2008 (own survey) 
 
 Arpa [n=21] 
Kumbel 
[n=21] 
   
Only own animals 14% 5% 
Own and relatives’ animals 14% 33% 
Own, relatives’ and clients’ animals 24% 29% 
Own and clients’ animals 29% 19% 
Single employer’s animals 14% 10% 
Other 5% 5% 
 
 
The boundaries between the different forms of herding arrangements are therefore 
often fluent, and relations between professional herders and their customers – and 
between employers and their employed herders – often change. This is also because 
herding agreements are concluded by kyrgyz’cha, i.e. verbally, and on a seasonal basis. 
People may change herder for a variety of reasons. First, a client may not be satisfied 
with his herder’s performance if he has lost too many animals or if the sheep were not 
fattened enough. Second, people usually prefer to entrust their animals to a relative 
whenever possible, and will do so as soon as the opportunity arises. Third, livestock 
numbers in the two villages have increased constantly in recent years, as has the 
number of herding households; therefore every year there are new herders offering 
their professional services. Fourth, established herders often stop herding other 
people’s animals if their own flock reaches a critical size. 
 
Some herding households thus reorganize their income-generating activities every 
season – they work for different paying customers during summer, but start working 
for a single employer as soon as the jailoo season is over. The result of this constant re-
organization and professional flexibility is a high degree of household mobility 
between different seasonal pastures, various sarays, the village and other places. As a 
consequence, household and herd mobility can often not be easily dissociated. The 
example presented in Box 10a illustrates that herders and (some) members of their 
households hardly ever stay in the village, where most of them still have their homes. 
The movements of herding households thus do not simply follow herd movements, but 
also reflect the constantly changing organizing practices and arrangements around 
(agro-)pastoral livelihoods at local and household level. 
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Box 10a Movements of herding households 
 
Maps 10.1 and 10.2 trace the movements of several herding households between summer 2007 and 
summer 2008. 
 
Map 10.1: Herding household No 40, which takes care of its own and its relatives’ animals, left Kumbel 
jailoo at the end of September 2007 and moved directly to a saray south of Jergetal, which belongs to the 
herder’s brother. There the family stayed over the winter, taking care of the same animals as during the 
summer. In late April, the herder and his household moved to the spring pastures of Tektyr Saz, where they 
put up their yurt, but repeatedly encountered problems with the herders living in the nearby sarays. In early 
June, they moved back to Kumbel jailoo. By contrast, herding household No 42 only moved a short 
distance. On 10 September 2007, the household left Kumbel jailoo and moved back to its private saray on 
the spring pastures of Börülü. There, the animals of relatives and customers were taken care of until 
December, then sent back to the village. In May, the relatives and customers brought their animals back to 
the saray, from where the herding household took them to the jailoo in early June 2008. 
 
Map 10.2: Herding household No 3 left Arpa jailoo at the end of September 2007, distributed all the 
animals to the different clients and then spent two months in the village. At the end of November, they 
again collected some clients’ animals and took them to the Botosh winter pastures, where they spent the 
winter in a barn belonging to an uncle of the head of household. On 15 March 2008, they moved back to 
Kyzyl-Tuu and distributed the clients’ animals to them. They then spent one month in Bishkek. By the end 
of April they were back in Kyzyl-Tuu, sealed a herding agreement with a single patron and drove his flock 
to the Botosh spring pastures on 1st May, where they put up their yurt. From there, they finally moved back 
to Arpa in mid-June 2008. 
 
 
Yet despite the fact that people often switch between herding practices, and that the 
boundaries between these different practices are sometimes blurred, they must not be 
seen as spontaneous, ad hoc practices. Today, local livestock owners have a clear 
choice between different forms of common and private herding, which are embedded 
in their social and economic relations. Thus, the different forms of herding provide an 
excellent example of how local organizing practices have become institutionalized over 
time, while still being able to adapt to a constantly changing socioeconomic context. 
 
 
10.2.2 Herding as a livelihood strategy: opportunities, risks and 
obstacles 
 
In recent years, herding animals has thus become one of the few income opportunities 
at local level. The first to exploit this opportunity were mostly former kolkhoz herders 
who resumed work by the late 1990s and began to offer their knowledge and 
experience to others in exchange for payment in cash or kind. In order to find better 
grazing grounds than the overused village-adjacent pastures and prevent potential 
conflicts with farmers, they began to use easily accessible intensive pastures (compare 
with 10.3.1; and Maps 10.1 and 10.2). Many of them already had their own saray on 
these pastures, which they had received or acquired during the privatization process 
and which they could now use as shelter for the animals. 
 
In recent years, more and more people who had often never worked as herders before 
followed their example. Many of them were young people who realized that herding 
was one of the few viable ways of making a living without having to migrate to urban 
areas. Many also realized that they could not increase their own flock as long as they 
hired others to herd their animals during the summer. 
 
“We wanted to increase the number of animals we had – and that works best if you herd 
them yourself.” (Herder, mid-sized farmer, Kumbel) [#032] 
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“We would also like to have more animals of our own, but so far we haven’t managed to. 
(…) If we had stayed in the village, we would not have any more animals. Going to the 
pastures is the only way we can make a living.” (Herder, smallholder, Arpa) [#009] 
 
However, not every household is able to embark upon herding as a livelihood strategy. 
Evidence shows that only those households with sufficient financial and human capital 
allied to the right knowledge can make a successful go at herding. 
 
Key asset I: Financial capital 
 
Apart from the few herding households who work for a single employer, only 
households with sufficient financial means can afford to herd. On the one hand, 
herding requires a considerable input of cash. A new yurt costs up to 100,000 KGS (US 
$2,890), and there are annually recurring costs for transport and food items. Since 
most clients do not pay their herding fees before autumn, a herding household without 
sufficient financial means of its own – e.g. livestock that can be converted into cash 
before the jailoo season starts – cannot move to the pastures in spring. On the other 
hand, herding other people’s animals entails considerable financial risk, since every lost 
animal must be compensated for in kind or cash. 
 
“We don’t have a horse, and we don’t have any more livestock. If we herded for other 
people and lost [animals], then how are we supposed to pay them back?” (Former kolkhoz 
herder, smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1c11] 
 
Asset-poor households can thus only start herding if they find a rich employer who is 
ready to cover all the necessary expenses. By contrast, households with an average or 
above-average number of livestock often start to think about herding themselves when 
the cost of hiring a professional herder exceeds a certain amount. 
 
“In the end, it’s all about money. (…) Ten Som per sheep makes 1,000 Som for a hundred 
sheep; 1,000 by six – because they stay on the jailoo for six months – makes 6,000 Som. 
And then you think that it would be better to go to the jailoo yourself.” (Mid-sized farmer, 
Jergetal) [3b18] 
 
Key asset II: Human capital 
 
Human capital is another critical asset required to herd animals. On the one hand, 
spending summer on the jailoo means staying away from the village for at least five 
months. If the household's arable land is to be irrigated and cultivated, and the crops 
and hay meadows taken care of, a household must either split up or ask relatives or 
neighbors for help. That is why many herders offer to tend relatives’ animals for free 
and ask them to look after their fields in return. Another obstacle related to human 
capital is that many elder people are no longer able to live on the jailoo or farm the 
fields during the absence of their son and their daughter-in-law. 
 
“It would be good if I could go to the jailoo, because I have enough animals to do so. But… 
my parents are old. If I go to jailoo, they would stay behind on their own, and the fields 
wouldn’t be taken care of. So it’s better I pay a herder.” (Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [3a3] 
 
Many younger families also have the problem that their children have to leave the 
jailoo once the school vacations are over. Therefore, they must find relatives who are 
ready to take care of their children. The same is true if household members already 
have a regularly paid job or have migrated (see also Schoch 2009). 
 
“We will herd our animals (…) in the future. But we don’t have the opportunity right now. 
Our daughter-in-law is a teacher; she doesn’t have any time. And two of our sons are in the 
city; they can’t come at the moment.” (Mid-sized farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) [3a16] 
 
On the other hand, working and living on the jailoo requires a sizable labor force and 
places particular demands on a herder and his wife. Herding animals is an exclusively 
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male occupation, carried out by he head of the herding household, a male relative or – 
in wealthier households – a paid helper. They follow the flock all day long, look after 
horses and cows and take care of sick animals. If possible, men also commute between 
the jailoo and the village to look after their fields when necessary and to make hay in 
early autumn. By contrast, women are responsible for maintaining the household on 
the jailoo under often-difficult circumstances. This includes cooking, heating, cleaning, 
washing clothes, fetching water and looking after the children. In addition, they milk 
the mares – usually five times a day – and process the milk, a time-consuming task. 
 
This often results in an unequal distribution of work between men and women which 
can not only be felt on the jailoo itself, but is also apparent in people’s narratives about 
life on the pastures. The following notes of an informal talk over tea with Kuban and 
Burul, a young but comparatively wealthy couple from Kyzyl-Tuu, may serve to 
illustrate this. I wondered why they did not move to the jailoo themselves, despite 
apparently having the financial wherewithal to do so130. 
 
“There’s too much to do here”, Kuban says. “I have to cut the hay, irrigate the fields, and 
look after the potatoes, That’s why we have taken on a relative to look after our animals.” – 
“What if you had the choice?” – “If I had the choice, I’d go immediately. All that work – 
hay, irrigation, potatoes – sometimes gets boring. It’s the same every year. Herding sheep 
would be much easier, and much more convenient.” But Burul disagrees: “No, I prefer to 
stay in the village, to live in a house. Life on the jailoo is very hard for women, there’s much 
more to do than here at home, and you have to process all the milk. By contrast, men only 
graze the sheep, from morning to evening.” – Kuban’s only response is to smile whimsically. 
 
Key asset III: Professional knowledge 
 
Besides savings and workforce, herding also requires a lot of experience and 
knowledge. On the one hand, a herder must know the different types of pastures and 
plants and how to move a herd around. In her study on pastoral knowledge systems, 
Meierhans (2008) shows that herders’ decisions are usually informed by numerous 
ecological factors (see also 10.4.2). On the other hand, a herder must know how to 
protect a flock, and must be able to treat sick animals, since veterinarians hardly ever 
visit the jailoo. 
 
“I know quite a lot about livestock. I know all the different types of sheep, and I also know 
how to treat the animals. When I was working as a herder, the veterinarians taught me how 
to treat them.” (Herder, large farmer, Jergetal) [1c23] 
 
This is why many of those who herd now used to herd for the kolkhoz or learnt to do 
so from their parents. For others, becoming a herder from scratch has become all the 
more difficult because competition among herding households has certainly not 
decreased in recent years. Some livestock owners will only entrust their animals to 
former kolkhoz herders, and a herder who loses too many animals during the summer 
will inevitably lose his paying customers once the jailoo season is over. 
 
Unfortunately, the Kyrgyz state has done nothing so far to improve herders’ 
professional knowledge. The recent modernization of agricultural vocational schools’ 
curricula has been limited to land cultivation and marketing, while pasture use and 
management have been neglected131. Thus, the vast array of pastoral knowledge is still 
predominantly reproduced within herding households and families – but hardly ever 
shared with others. 
 
 
                                                
130 The discussion was noted down; it is not a transcript of an audio recording. 
131 Personal communication with the director of the At-Bashy agricultural vocational school, 21 Sept 2006. 
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10.2.3 Herding as a negotiation process: setting herding fees 
 
Making a living from herding does not only require the right assets; herding as a 
livelihood strategy also involves negotiating with clients, other herders and state 
authorities about terms and procedures. A central event in regulating pasture use 
locally is tülöö, a traditional village meeting that takes place in April each year. On the 
one hand, tülöö is a religious feast, where people from the whole village gather near 
the local mosque to sacrifice animals and express their gratitude if the past year was a 
good one or to pray for more rain and for people’s health and happiness if things have 
not gone so well. On the other hand, tülöö is also the most important formal and 
regularly held meeting between communal authorities (head of ayil okmotu, ayil 
kengesh representatives), village heads (ayil bas’chy) and local (male) citizens to discuss 
and agree upon the terms and conditions for herding animals during summer. Besides, 
the meeting also serves to assign someone to guard and protect the arable land from 
trespassers over the summer. The prices that herders can charge for different types of 
animals are often one of the most important topics of discussion. The head of ayil 
okmotu announces the monthly herding fees for sheep, goats and cows, which have 
been defined in a ayil kengesh session prior to tülöö, and by which all herders are 
asked to abide. According to the head of ayil okmotu in Jergetal, members of the ayil 
kengesh talk to different herders and livestock owners before taking a decision on the 
fees. During tülöö, people are then invited again to comment and discuss. Needless to 
say, herders often try to raise prices, while non-herders prefer to keep them low. 
Neighboring villages often have different fees, which can lead to fierce discussions 
during a tülöö. The following example dates from 20 April 2009, when the people of 
Kyzyl-Tuu met for their annual tülöö and discussed the herding fees for the next 
summer season. The chairman of the rayon kengesh attended the meeting as a guest132. 
 
Herder: “About the herding fees for cows – I don’t agree.” 
 
Head of ayil okmotu: “What’s unclear about them? People have to pay 80 Som per month, 
plus 5 Som per cow and season as [new] pasture taxes.” 
 
Herder: “Some people herd their animals for 100 Som per month. If the fees in Kyzyl-Tuu 
and Karabulung [the second-largest village of Kyzyl-Tuu ayil okmotu] were the same, 
things would be fine.” 
 
Chairman of rayon kengesh: “If someone’s not satisfied, he’s free to take his animals back.” 
 
Herder: “If the ayil okmotu decides accordingly, I’ll herd cows for 100 Som.” 
 
A man: “But no decision has yet been taken.” 
 
Another man: “We should agree on 80 Som per cow; otherwise, the herders will have to pay 
the pasture tax themselves.” 
 
Head of ayil okmotu: “Okay then, we’ll set a monthly fee 80 Som per cow! If someone 
wants to pay 100 Som per cow, that’s up to him.” 
 
A man: “Why 80 Som!?  I thought we agreed on 70 Som?” [70 KGS was the official cow-
herding fee in 2007.] 
 
Another man: “We should agree on a price and pay the pasture tax ourselves.” 
 
Chairman of rayon kengesh: “Who wants to herd cows!?” 
 
Herder: “Me. Shall we agree on 90 Som?” 
 
Another man: “You can also live from 80 Som!” 
 
Head of ayil okmotu: “Okay, this is how we’ll do it: 80 Som per cow, 15 Som per sheep and 
30 Som for rams.” 
 
Herder: [Not satisfied, grumbles] 
 
Head of ayil okmotu: “If you don’t herd the animals for this price, someone else will. Who 
agrees? [People raise their hands, and the suggestion of the head of ayil okmotu gets a 
majority vote.] Fine, now let’s talk about irrigation.” 
                                                
132 The discussion was noted down; it is not a transcript of an audio recording. 
Part C   Actors, practices, organizations and institutions around agro-pastoral livelihoods 
 
 178 
In this case, the head of ayil okmotu successfully defended his position, although he 
mentioned himself that herders may ask for higher prices if they can find clients willing 
to pay more. One participant at the 2008 tülöö in Jergetal even reported that the head 
of ayil okmotu had to threaten herders with a new 4% tax on livestock if they did not 
accept his price proposal133. Apparently, though, many herders nevertheless seem able 
to charge higher fees. As a matter of fact, only part of the local population participates 
in tülöö, and not all herders accept and apply the herding fees agreed upon during the 
meeting. 
 
“Not all herders participate in this meeting [tülöö]. It is mainly older people that participate. 
The herders decide; they meet each other when they are herding the livestock. The price for 
herding didn’t use to be high, but now it has increased because the prices for products are 
high.” (Herder, smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [KT 5a7] 
 
It thus seems that the ayil kengesh, the head of ayil okmotu and the tülöö can only set 
some sort of lower price limit, while many herders use less formalized ways to agree on 
herding fees they consider appropriate. Herders often complain that the official fees are 
too low to make a living, and that the ayil okmotu does not take sufficient account of 
constantly rising living costs. In the tülöö cited above, for instance, ayil kengesh and 
ayil okmotu set the official sheep fee for summer 2009 at the same level (15 KGS; US 
$0.3) as the summer 2008 fee (compare Table 10.3). Needless to say, herders would 
like to earn more than a year ago, since most commodity prices have not decreased 
since then. Asked whether he intended to take action against the herders who had 
raised the officially defined fees from 12 to 15 KGS for sheep, and from 80 to 100 KGS 
for cows, the head of Jergetal ayil okmotu replied: 
 
“You can’t do a lot about that. Market prices are high right now, life is expensive.” (Head 
of Jergetal ayil okmotu, 29 Aug 2008) 
 
In addition, many herders perceive the officially defined price as not having been set 
democratically by the tülöö, but as an order from the ayil okmotu. They openly 
question the legitimacy of their communal authorities to regulate the herding fees. 
Many argue that setting prices was the herders’ own business, and complain that 
defining such inappropriate fees was all their ayil okmotu did for them. 
 
“If somebody came to me and said 12 som [per sheep], and [argued] that this was the prize 
the ayil okmotu decided upon, I would ask him to go to the ayil okmotu and give his 
livestock to them, at 12 som per sheep. Because they [the ayil okmotu)] won’t help me cover 
my expenses.” (Herder, smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a23] 
 
“The ayil okmotu does not have any influence upon the herding fees. We do not receive 
anything from the ayil okmotu, we do not even need them – they only waste money.” 
(Herder, mid-sized farmer, Kumbel jailoo) [#032] 
 
It seems that more experienced and better-known herders have more influence over 
fees than younger ones. One comparably wealthy herder from Jergetal said that, 
irrespective of the decision taken at tülöö, the more experienced herders would decide 
on the herding fees and the younger and less experienced herders would then adopt 
them. However, despite such formal and informal price agreements, individual herders 
still have some room for maneuver. While the fee for sheep and goats only vary by one 
or two Som, there is considerable room for negotiation in fees for cows. On the subject 
of sheep and goats, one herder from Jergetal stressed how important it is that no 
herder works for less than the fixed fee, since that would inevitably cause trouble with 
others. Asked about the differences of cow fees, he replies: 
 
                                                
133 Personal communication with the Jergetal TPS leader, 28 Aug 2008. 
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“Well, there are adult cows, calves and young cows. (…) So we bargain, just like at the 
bazaar. If you want to buy a kilogram of pears, and they cost 60 Som, you start to bargain 
and then buy them for 55 Som. That’s exactly how it works here. If I say 70, people start 
bargaining and we agree on a price which is good for both parties.” (Herder, smallholder, 
Jergetal) [4a39b] 
 
Interviews with different herders during and after the 2007 and 2008 jailoo seasons 
revealed that there were price differences, but they were moderate. Among those 
herders who work for several different customers, price differences are usually small 
and concern mainly herding fees for cows (Table 10.3). 
 
Table 10.3 Actual monthly herding fees in KGS per animal of herders with 
several paying customers, summer 2007 and 2008 (own survey) 
 
 Jergetal Kyzyl-Tuu 
 2007 2008 2007 2008 
     
Sheep 10-12 12-15 10 15 
Goats 15 12-18 10-12 15-16 
Cows 50-60 100 50-100 65-70 
Horses 0 100* n/n 70* 
Yaks n/n n/n n/n 70 
 
* Horses are mostly herded for free, but herders can dispose over the mares’ milk 
 
 
At a first glance, a price difference of one to two Som for sheep and goats may appear 
negligible. However, given the fact that sheep and goats amount to about half of all 
animals in the two villages (compare with 5.2.2), a small variation in fees can be 
crucial to a herding household’s budget. For example, a household that looks after 600 
sheep for a period of five months can earn 45,000 KGS (US $1,300) at a rate of 15 
KGS, but only 36,000 KGS (US $1,040) at a rate of 12 KGS. The difference of 9,000 
KGS is equal to about two months of a teacher’s salary and is enough to cover all 
transport costs to and from the jailoo (see below). 
 There is thus evidence of various local approaches to fixing the terms and 
conditions of herding animals, and it shows that not all actors have the same 
negotiating power. On the one hand, local state authorities have the right to call public 
meetings and lead the formal decision-making process about herding fees. On the other 
hand, however, older and more experienced herders in particular have the necessary 
means – such as a big enough clientele, authority over younger and less experienced 
herders – to override formal decisions and define their own conditions. At the same 
time, however, many herders expect a lot of their local state representatives. They 
usually argue that it was their ayil okmotu’s task to build better roads to the remote 
summer pastures, repair bridges or support them with veterinary medicine. By doing 
so, many respondents often directly refer to the head of ayil okmotu, whom they 
expect to use his personal connections to support his village. Keeping these insights in 
mind, the next section examines how state representatives and herders try to regulate 
and negotiate access to pastures, which are the second key resource needed to make a 
living from herding animals after livestock. 
 
 
 
10.3 Access to pastures: formal law and the role of state 
representatives 
 
The Kyrgyz Land Code of 1999 divided all pastures into village-adjacent, intensive and 
remote pastures, and placed them under the authority of the communal, rayon and 
oblast administration. In 2002, additional regulations stipulated that herders had to 
lease intensive and remote pastures from the state, while communal authorities could 
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either lease out the village-adjacent pastures, too, or handle them as common property 
resource (see 4.3.4). Evidence shows, however, that not all intensive and remote 
pastures by any means are leased out and there is a considerable gap between formal 
rules on the one hand and the practices of state representatives on the other. 
 
 
10.3.1 Formal allocation and lease of pastures 
 
Map 10.1 shows the boundaries of village-adjacent, intensive and remote pastures 
assigned to Jergetal ayil okmotu, as well as the pasture area under the authority of the 
State Agency for Environment and Forestry [Russ. leskhoz]. The village-adjacent 
pastures more or less entail the foothills around Jergetal ayil okmotu, and reach from 
1,850 up to 3,500 m asl. The two areas of intensive pastures are located to the north, 
at altitudes between 2,500 and 3,800 m amsl. Only a small parcel of remote pastures is 
directly accessible from the village. It is located at the southeastern end of Lake Son-
Koel, between 3,000 and 3,400 m amsl. The reason for this is that most of the remote 
pastures assigned to Jergetal are located in the Ak-Say valley, one of the country’s 
largest summer pastures near the Kyrgyz-Chinese border, and more than 100 km 
southeast of the village (not on the map). However, the map also shows that in many 
places, the pastures under the authority of the Naryn leskhoz often overlap with the 
intensive pastures assigned to Jergetal ayil okmotu (see 10.3.4 below). 
 
Map 10.2 shows the approximate boundaries of the pastures assigned to Karakojun 
ayil okmotu. The exact boundaries could not be identified for two reasons.While the 
communal authorities do not have a single map of the pastures assigned to them, 
GosRegistr At-Bashy repeatedly denied access to its map archives. Nevertheless, based 
on interviews with various herders and local state representatives, it seem clear that the 
village-adjacent pastures of Kyzyl-Tuu are located around the village at an altitude of 
about 2,300 m amsl. The intensive pastures are located around two to three kilometers 
northwest of the Torugart road (Botosh) and around the military check-post on the 
way to China (Ak-Beyit, Kurgon Tash), at altitudes between 2,500 and 3,400 m amsl. 
Also the remote pastures are split in several parts. While some are located at the 
northern and southern tips of the relatively easily accessible Arpa valley, at altitudes 
between 3,200 and 3,600 m amsl, others are beyond Lake Chatyr-Koel, or even further 
east in the far-off Ak-Say valley (not on the map). 
 
According to official figures, only a minority of pasture users in the two case study 
villages had a valid lease agreement at the time of research (Table 10.4). From the 
normative perspective of state officials, many herding households thus access and use 
the intensive and/or the remote pastures illegally, i.e. without the formal consent of the 
Kyrgyz state, the rightful owner of the pastures.  
 
 
Table 10.4 Total area of leased pastures in Jergetal and Karakojun ayil okmotu (GosRegistr Naryn 2007, 
GosRegistr At-Bashy 2008) 
 
 
 Jergetal Ayil Okmotu [2007]a Karakojun Ayil Okmotu [2008] 
 Total area [ha] 
Rented out 
[ha] 
Revenue 
[KGS]b 
Total area 
[ha] 
Rented out 
[ha] c 
Revenue 
[KGS]b 
       
Village adjacent 18,140 0 0 16,809 0 0 
Intensive 24,179 5,824 (24%) 48,400 17,854 200 (1%) n/n 
Remote 49,278 1,600 (3%) 8,480 35,932 0 0 
TOTAL 73,457 7,424 (10%) 56,880 53,786 200 (0.4%) n/n 
 
a In addition, 4 people from Jergetal lease in a total area of 296.7 ha of pastures from the Naryn leskhoz 
b Expected  revenues from pasture lease contracts for 2007/8 
c Since the only lease agreement in Kyzyl-Tuu was concluded informally, estimations of revenues were not available (see below). 
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The two case study villages thus reflect the national situation. In 2008, the Kyrgyz 
Pasture Department estimated that only 12% of all pastures in the country were 
formally leased out. At the same time, an unknown, yet presumably much larger, share 
was used without a formal agreement134. From this perspective, Naryn oblast 
performed rather well in 2008, when about one third of all pastures were formally 
leased out, while only 20% of all pastures were used without formal agreement, and 
the rest was not used at all. However, there are again considerable variations between 
rayons. While the Naryn rayon expected pasture revenues of 700,000 KGS (US 
$16,890) in 2007, At-Bashy rayon expected only 20,000 KGS (US $480)135. The figures 
thus suggest considerable disparities in the enforcement of pasture-related rules at 
communal, rayon, and oblast level. 
 
 
10.3.2 Village-adjacent pastures: rules and practices 
 
Village-adjacent pastures have two main functions: first, to graze the animals during 
the winter, snow cover permitting; second, to graze the few animals that have not been 
moved to the summer pastures – mainly milking cows and horses used for fieldwork – 
from spring to autumn (see 10.2.1). As it has legal authority over village-adjacent 
pastures, the ayil okmotu can decide jointly with the ayil kengesh about the rules for 
pasture allocation. 
 
Common or private property? 
 
According to the law, communities have the option of defining village-adjacent 
pastures as common property and levying a general user fee through the local land tax, 
or they can lease them out to individual applicants for a defined time period. In the 
latter case, the lease must be approved and eventually be registered by the Rayon 
GosResgistr. 90% of the lease revenues go into the local budget, while 10% have to be 
transferred to GosRegistr as a service fee. 
 
Evidence shows that the communal authorities in the two case study villages handle 
these powers differently and that local implementation of the pasture legislation varies 
considerably. In Kyzyl-Tuu, village-adjacent pastures are exclusively handled as 
common property. The communal authorities do not rent out the pastures to 
individuals and groups, but levy a lump sum for pasture use, as part of the per-hectare 
tax on arable land (17 KGS/ha in 2007; compare 9.2.4). In practice, this means that 
every household with arable land automatically pays for the use of village-adjacent 
pastures, irrespective of whether the household has any livestock or not and how many 
animals are grazed for how many days per year. Several respondents – both with and 
without livestock – complain about this practice, saying that it favors people with large 
flocks (compare 10.4). Also in Jergetal, the communal land tax includes a lump sum 
for the village adjacent pastures. Despite that, however, the communal authorities in 
1995 began to offer lease agreements of up to 50 ha to individuals with a private saray 
or house on the village adjacent pastures. This way, a large proportion of the village-
adjacent pastures became leased to several, mostly wealthy households. Apparently, 
these lease agreements, of which many were still valid at the time of research, were not 
officially registered with the Rayon GosRegistr: The agency’s official record (compare 
with Table 10.4 above) for Jergetal lists zero leaseholders and no revenues for the 
village adjacent pastures. This way, the Jergetal ayil okmotu earns twice for the same 
pastures, since non-leaseholders – even those who have no livestock at all – must pay 
taxes for pastures that are leased by some of their wealthier neighbors. Needless to say, 
this has caused discontent among local people. 
 
                                                
134 Personal comunication with Abdymalik Egemberdiev, director of the Kyrgyz Pasture Department, 11 
Sept 2008. 
135 Personal communication, Naryn rayon pasture expert, 24 May 2007. 
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“Now there are people who use the land and people who do not. So we pay the tax twice; 
for example, those who lease pay, and we [who do not lease] pay. The government has to 
control this; it should be done by the ayil okmotu. So we have many complaints and regrets 
concerning pastures.” (Member of the Jergetal ayil kengesh, 21 Oct 2007) 
 
By 2007, the ayil kengesh finally realized the increasing imbalance between 
leaseholders and non-leaseholders, and eventually decided to abolish the lease system 
for village-adjacent pastures. 
 
“There were too many people who leased village-adjacent pastures, built a barn and then 
didn’t let others use their territory. (…) The [lease] system turned out to be of little use, so 
we decided to stop it.” (Member of the Jergetal ayil kengesh, 9 Nov 2007) 
 
Since then, the communal authorities have begun to refuse to extend expired lease 
agreements for village-adjacent pastures, allowing only the lease of small parcels for 
barns and houses (around 0.1 ha). 
 
Regulation of grazing periods 
 
Communal authorities also have the right to regulate grazing periods for village-
adjacent pastures. This can be done by issuing binding dates when all animals (except 
milking cows, sick animals and horses used for transport; compare with 10.2.2) must 
leave the village-adjacent pastures in spring and when they are allowed to come back in 
autumn. The communal authorities are also allowed to define sanctions for those who 
ignore these dates, and can also appoint and hire individuals to guard arable land over 
the summer to protect the harvest from trespassing. 
 
These dates are fixed separately in the two villages. In Kyzyl Tuu, movement dates are 
usually defined and communicated by the communal land use specialist. In 2009, 
herders from Kyzyl-Tuu thus had to leave the village at the latest on 1 May, and were 
not allowed to return before 25 September. In order to inform herders who did nott 
participate in the tülöö, the land-use specialist usually visits every one of them and gets 
them to sign a document saying that they are aware of these rules and potential 
sanctions (i.e. fines), just in case they break them. According to the head of the Jergetal 
ayil okmotu, flock movement dates are usually agreed upon in an ayil kengesh session 
and are then communicated in the annual tülöö (compare with 10.2.3). In 2008, the 
respective dates were set as per 25 May and 25 September. Having realized that many 
ignored these orders, the ayil kengesh also decided to fine not just herding households, 
but also any truck drivers offering their transport services to herders before 25 
September. 
 
 
10.3.3 Intensive and remote pastures: rules and practices 
 
The Kyrgyz pasture legislation foresees the use of intensive pastures in spring and 
autumn, i.e. to graze flocks on their way from the village adjacent to the remote 
pastures and back. Remote pastures are meant to be used in summer, i.e. from early 
June to late September, depending on how far above sea level they are. The same 
legislation stipulates that the use of these two types of pastures be based on territorial 
leases, that have to be obtained by individuals or groups from the rayon (for intensive 
pastures) and the oblast (for remote pastures) administration respectively (compare 
4.3.4). 
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Official procedure for the lease of intensive and remote pastures136 
 
The formal procedure to obtain a lease contract is more or less the same for both 
categories of pastures. First, applicants – individuals or groups – must obtain a 
document from their ayil okmotu indicating the exact number of animals they own. 
With this document they must travel to the rayon or oblast centre, where they can 
apply for a particular pasture plot. The responsible official then checks whether the 
pasture plot asked for is not already leased out to someone else, and calculates how 
many hectares the lessee is entitled to, given the number and type of livestock indicated 
on the document issued by the ayil okmotu. By law, one sheep entitles its owner to 0.4 
ha, one horse to 2.0 ha, and one cow to 2.8 ha of intensive or remote pastures. If the 
desired plot is available for rent, the applicant must write an official application to the 
rayon or oblast land commission. This commission consists of representatives from 
GosRegistr and other departments at rayon or oblast level, and it decides about the 
application. If the decision is positive, the commission can either entitle the responsible 
rayon or oblast official to issue the lease contract to the applicant, or it can order a 
public auction. In the latter case, a public auction is announced and the plot must be 
granted to the highest bidder. 
 
As soon as a contract is issued, it must be registered with the rayon branch of 
GosRegistr before it becomes legally binding, and the applicant is then ordered to pay 
the pasture rental fee through a local bank branch. In 2007 and 2008, the annual per-
hectare rental fee in Naryn oblast was 7.95 KGS (US $0.2). Applicants can usually 
decide whether they want to pay the full fee at once or in annual installments; most 
applicants prefer the latter. First-time rental contracts are issued for a term of five 
years. After that, they can be extended by another ten years, and then again by 49 
years137. 90% of the lease revenues are then redirected to the budget of the responsible 
administrative level – either rayon or oblast – while 10% are transferred to the 
GosRegistr account. 
 
Rights and responsibilities of lessor and lessee 
 
A lease contract consists of a small map indicating the borders of the leased parcel, 
plus a written agreement defining the exact location and size of the area, the duration 
of the lease agreement, and the rights and responsibilities of lessor and lessee. On the 
side of the lessor – the rayon or oblast administration – the most important rights and 
responsibilities include recommending modern pasture use techniques to the lessee, 
monitoring whether the lessee uses the pastures according to the law, and fining 
offenders. This means that rayon and oblast representatives not only have to 
coordinate the issuing of lease contracts and the collection of revenues, they also need 
to monitor the actual use of pastures. 
 
Lessees are not only entitled to use the leased pasture plot for grazing but also to 
construct barns or other small buildings on the leased plot (which is again subject to a 
special application process, see 10.4.5). At the same time, lessees are obliged to prevent 
pasture degradation on the leased plot and respect certain pasture-use rules. These 
include practising regular pasture rotation, establishing yurts and corrals at least 100 
meters from rivers and brooks, and relocating them once in two weeks. In addition, 
lessees must allow other pasture users to use defined water points or livestock 
migration routes, and they are not allowed to sub-lease their pasture plot to others. 
Lease contracts can only be renewed if all these obligations are fulfilled. 
On the one hand, the complex procedure requires representatives at all three levels – 
ayil okmotu, rayon and oblast – to cooperate with each other and to exchange relevant 
                                                
136 At the time of research, pasture leasing was only done in Jergetal, not in Kyzyl-Tuu. Therefore, the 
terms and procedures described here are based on accounts of the Naryn rayon pasture expert gained in 
several interviews between May 2007 and July 2008. 
137 There are different lease rules and contract durations for non-grazing use, e.g. for tourist operators or 
hunters. Since no such rental agreements existed for the two villages at the time of research, I shall not 
discuss them. 
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information about livestock and pastures. On the other hand, it also demands a high 
degree of professional expertise from the involved officials. However, evidence shows 
that what state representatives at the three levels actually do often has very little to do 
with these formal rules and procedures – or even runs counter to them. 
 
Communal level: Lack of expertise and local re-negotiation of rules 
 
In Jergetal, the communal authorities issue the necessary document if someone wants 
to apply for a lease contract with the rayon or the oblast. However, they do not 
actively encourage people to enter into agreements, although it is obvious that many 
use the pastures illicitly. At the same time, local expertise about different pasture issues 
in general and the rental plots in particular appears to be highly limited. Not only was 
the communal land-use specialist replaced three times during my research for this 
thesis, but not a single map of the pastures was available at the Jergetal ayil okmotu. 
Therefore, people always have to travel to Naryn to find out whether or not a 
particular plot is available for rent. 
 In Kyzyl-Tuu, local expertise does exist in the person of the communal land-use 
specialist, who has been in charge for many years, but does not have a map either. 
According to him, the ayil okmotu and local people decided in a village meeting in 
2004 not to lease out any of the intensive and remote pastures assigned to Kyzyl-Tuu. 
The open opposition to national pasture legislation arose from a general concern that 
leasing out pastures would lead to unnecessary conflicts among local pasture users. 
 
“Before 2004, herders in other villages began to lease pastures, and some people from our 
ayil okmotu wanted to do so too. But most people here didn’t agree with that, because they 
feared that only the rich would get the pastures and would control them in future.” 
(Communal land-use specialist, Karakojun ayil okmotu, 4 Dec 2007) 
 
It seems however that a lack of financial incentives was another reason for the local 
resistance to national pasture legislation. Obviously, the ayil okmotu was dissatisfied 
with the division of revenues between rayon, oblast, GosRegistr and the communal 
budget, and therefore decided to prevent pasture lease at all. By 2004 the communal 
authorities therefore stopped issuing application documents. So far, this local 
‘renegotiation’ of nationally defined rules never caused any open conflict with the 
rayon or the oblast state administration (which is hardly surprising given the endemic 
shortage of human resources at these levels). According to the communal land-use 
specialist, only one person from Kyzyl-Tuu managed to conclude a deal for intensive 
pastures after 2004, obviously by misinforming the communal authorities (200 ha; 
compare Table 10.4 above). 
 
Instead, the Karakojun ayil okmotu in 2008 started to regulate the rotation between 
intensive and remote summer pastures. The reason for this was that many herders 
spent the whole summer season on the intensive pastures, but did not move on to the 
remote summer pastures of Arpa or Ak-Say. In view of this apparent under-utilization 
of remote pastures, the ayil okmotu feared that people from other villages might 
occupy and lease the pastures initially assigned to Kyzyl-Tuu. In spring 2008, the ayil 
okmotu therefore issued an order saying that herders must move directly to Arpa in 
early summer and are not allowed to return to the intensive pastures before 15 August. 
In order to enforce this order, the ayil okmotu appointed one elderly herder to stay on 
the intensive pastures and guard them against trespassers from Kyzyl-Tuu and other 
villages. In addition, and in order to increase his credibility, the head of ayil okmotu 
even convinced his own parents – experienced and well-respected former kolkhoz 
herders – to move further away than usual and thus to serve as an example to others. 
By contrast, the Jergetal ayil omotu did not issue any comparable regulations. 
 
Oblast and rayon level: Lack of means to enforce the law 
 
Given that Naryn oblast contains about 2.6 million ha of pastures and more than 
268,000 inhabitants (compare Table 5.1), the rayon and oblast representatives require 
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considerable human and financial resources to carry out their tasks. However, these 
are hardly ever provided by the responsible authorities. At oblast level, the oblast 
branch of the Kyrgyz Ministry for Agriculture, Water and Processing Industries 
(MAWPRI) is responsible for pastures although it apparently suffers from a lack of 
workforce to meet all its tasks and responsibilities. 
 
“There are just three of us in our department here,– but we‘d need about twenty of us!” 
(Director of MAWPRI in Naryn oblast, 24 Sept 2007) 
 
The same goes for the At-Bashy rayon state administration, where three MAWPRI 
representatives cannot handle the many tasks assigned to them and eventually lose 
sight of the pasture allocation procedure138. This is also why there are hardly ever any 
public auctions for pasture lots. Both at oblast level and in At-Bashy rayon, sole 
responsibility for the pasture rental process thus rests with the respective GosRegistr 
branches. 
 By contrast, the Naryn rayon state administration in the early noughties hired an 
expert from the Kyrgyz Pasture Department. The senior expert, who used to wor for 
the State Pasture Department of the Kyrgyz SSR, has its own office in the rayon 
administration building, where he receives applicants and drafts pasture lease 
contracts. However, drafting contracts is all he can do, as he has  no car and no budget 
to pay for public transport. 
 
“In Soviet times, every officer had an own car to visit the pastures and get an impression of 
the real situation. Today, I don’t have a car, so all I can do is to check whether or not the 
applicants regularly pay their rental fees. I try my best to go to the pastures, but it is 
impossible for me to visit remote places.” (Naryn rayon pasture expert, 24 May 2007) 
 
According to the deputy director of the Kyrgyz Pasture Department, there is only one 
car for the whole Department, and it is at the disposal of the director in Bishkek139. As 
well as lacking a car, the expert also has no proper map of all the pastures within his 
jurisdiction. In order to check whether an area has already been leased out or not, he 
must go to the local branch of GosRegistr where all pasture maps and cadastres are 
stored. It is therefore no surprise that he expresses general discontentment at his 
working conditions. He blames not only the Kyrgyz Pasture Department for a lack of 
interest and support, but also the communal authorities for their disinterest in 
motivating people to use pastures in accordance with the law. As things are now, he 
more or less depends on people’s own motivation to come to Naryn and sign a 
contract. He therefore assumes that only comparatively wealthy people with large 
private flocks would come to lease pastures, while herders with small flocks would 
hardly ever sign a contract (compare with 10.4 below). Similarly, he only learns about 
pasture-related conflicts if people come to Naryn to report them and complain. As a 
result, sanctions against offenders are the exception rather than the rule. Consequently, 
most of the interaction between local pasture users and the authorities in Naryn rayon 
takes place at a tiny desk in a gloomy office in the oblast capital, remote from what is 
going on in the villages and even further from the remote summer pastures. From this 
perspective, the revenues the Naryn rayon pasture expert collected for the intensive and 
remote pastures of Jergetal ayil okmotu in 2007 appear rather remarkable (see Table 
10.4 above). 
 
Leskhoz: defining specific rules and procedures 
 
The State Agency for Environment and Forestry [Russ. leskhoz], which governs 79,000 
ha of intensive pastures in Naryn rayon, follows a slightly different procedure and 
offers different terms than the rayon and oblast administrations. The leskhoz leases out 
intensive pastures at an annual price of 13 KGS/ha (US $0.4), which is nearly twice the 
amount charged by the rayon. In return, it offers a 49-year contract extension at the 
                                                
138 Personal communication with a MAWPRI representative  in At-Bashy rayon, 5 Dec 2007. 
139 Personal communication, 8 May 2007. 
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end of only five years. 70% of the revenues stay at the leskhoz, while 25% are passed 
on to the rayon state administration, and 5% paid into the account of the rayon 
GosRegistr140. 
All in all, there is evidence that, in most cases, the ayil okmotu, rayon and oblast 
level have neither the necessary human capital nor the requisite expertise to carry out 
the highly demanding process of pasture allocation properly. In addition, the 
communal authorities of Kyzyl-Tuu decided to ignore the pasture legislation. The 
result is often a striking discrepancy between de jure (the pasture legislation) and de 
facto (the actual practices of the involved state actors), and this has been highlighted in 
other studies (cf. Undeland 2005; Liechti and Biber-Klemm, 2008). As the next section 
shows, it would however be wrong to ascribe this discrepancy purely to the behavior of 
state representatives. 
 
 
 
10.4 Access to pastures: herders’ practices 
 
The fact that some herders are ready to pay for a formal pasture lease contract while 
others are not indicates that not all herding households share the same opinion of how 
pastures should be used and managed. Instead, evidence from the two case study 
villages points to a variety of alternative, often locally specific, and sometimes 
conflicting practices by which herding households gain and defend their access to 
pastures. In many cases, these practices incorporate and combine both formal and 
informal institutions and organizations. 
 
 
10.4.1 Actual pasture use in the two case study villages 
 
Along with the official pasture boundaries, Maps 10.1 and 10.2 also show the location 
of yurts in summer 2008, as well as the location of barns [Kyrg. saray] on the village-
adjacent and intensive pastures. Two things are striking in the case of Jergetal (Map 
10.1). First, there are lots of sarays on the intensive pastures of Tektyr Saz, Teshik and 
Akai, large sections of which are leased to different individuals. This is also the area 
around which most pasture-related conflicts have arisen in recent years (see 10.5). 
Second, many herding households have established their yurt on the Kumbel jailoo, 
which is not included in the pasture categories formally allocated to Jergetal. Instead, it 
belongs to the GosSemSapaz, a state land fund under the direct authority of the rayon 
administration (compare with 4.3.4). According to the Naryn rayon pasture expert, 
Kumbel was originally assigned to the Jergetal ayil okmotu but was not used by local 
citizens after 1991, so the Naryn rayon administration eventually re-allocated it to the 
neighboring Kochkor rayon until 2027. It seems, however, that Kochkor never 
exercised its user rights, so herders from Jergetal began to occupy the jailoo in the late 
1990s. Interestingly, Kumbel is the same place where the mining company started its 
operations in 2007 (compare with 5.1.2). According to various respondents, two to 
three households from Jergetal moved to the remote pastures near Lake Son Koel in 
summer 2008, while one household has been living in a saray on the remote Ak-Say 
pastures. 
 
The discrepancy between formal and user-defined categories is less apparent in Kyzyl-
Tuu than in Jergetal. There are several barns both on the village adjacent pastures and 
on the intensive pastures around Botosh. In summer 2008, many herding households 
established their yurt on the remote pastures of Sö’ök, Kuzkhon Tash and Kyzyl Döbö, 
all located in the southeast of Arpa valley. Only a few households remain on the 
intensive pastures along the main road, either near the military check-post of Kurgon 
                                                
140 Personal communication with Azamat Sabyrbekov, representative of the State Agency for Environment 
and Forestry, Naryn rayon, 16 Nov 2007. 
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Tash or further north in a place called Ak Beyit. According to various respondents, 
two other herding households have established their yurt on the remote pastures near 
Lake Chatyr Koel, while six others moved to the northern part of Arpa valley. 
According to the communal land-use specialist, only one household moved to the 
remote Ak-Say pastures in summer 2008. 
 
Multiple, overlapping pasture categories 
 
The two maps show a striking discrepancy between the formally defined pasture 
categories (compare 10.3.1) and actual pasture-use patterns. This discrepancy is also 
reflected in the terminology used by different actors. The formal division into village-
adjacent, intensive and remote pastures is a static one, with defined boundaries and 
clearly assigned rights and responsibilities for different state authorities. By contrast, 
most local people distinguish pastures by the way they actually use them, i.e. by the 
season their animals graze them: Kyshtoo [Kyrg. ‘winter pastures’], jaztoo [‘spring 
pastures’], jailoo [‘summer pastures’], and kyztoo [‘autumn pastures’]. 
 
For a herder, jailoo is thus where he spends summer with his flock, irrespective of 
whether or not the administration has declared it a remote pasture and plans it to be 
used during the summer. Similarly, kyshtoo is where animals graze during winter, be it 
on village-adjacent or intensive pastures. This also means that the herders’ mental 
appropriation of pastures does not fit the rules and regulations related to these 
territories (Liechti and Biber-Klemm 2008). Consequently, many herders not only 
ignore the formal designation of certain pasture categories for seasonal use (compare 
with Table 4.2), but also ignore the legally defined need to lease intensive and remote 
pastures from the state. In addition, the mismatch between formal and user-defined 
categories can cause considerable confusion and often leads to misunderstandings and 
dissent between herders and state representatives. 
 
However, since every herder has his own definition of what he considers a kyshtoo or a 
jailoo, even herders from the same village have different ideas. While one herder may 
use a certain place in spring and therefore call it a jaztoo, another herder may use it in 
summer and call it a jailoo. This means that the boundaries of the user-defined 
categories not only differ from the formal pasture categories, they often overlap and 
are highly volatile (Figure 10.2). 
 
Figure 10.2 Administrative and user-defined categories of pasture overlap (own sketch) 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, again, the herders’ mental appropriation of pastures does not necessarily match 
the usually unwritten rules and regulations governing these user-defined categories. As 
a result, even herders from the same village do not always agree on the ‘proper’ use of 
a certain place. Since the user-defined categories refer to seasonal use, most quarrels 
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arise over seasonal flock movement patterns. Yet, before I describe existing disputes 
among herders in more detail (10.4.6), I ask how herders and their households select 
certain pastures for seasonal use. I do so because understanding such selection 
processes can give us a better understanding of the various differences of definition and 
opinion among herders, as well as those between herders and state representatives. 
 
 
10.4.2 Pasture selection criteria of herders 
 
Evidence shows that herding households select pastures according to a set of economic, 
ecological, social and institutional criteria that cannot always be neatly separated (see 
also Meierhans 2008). 
 
Economic criteria 
 
Herding is a predominantly economic activity that can help to secure the livelihoods of 
a whole household or even a family (compare with 10.2.2). Thus, economic 
considerations strongly determine what a herder thinks is an appropriate place to stay. 
A herding household’s revenues are mainly derived from herding fees (if they herd for 
others) and from the increased value of livestock fattened on the summer pastures. In 
addition, the marketing of pastoral products such as kymyz or süzmö represents 
another important source of income during the summer. Market access is therefore an 
important pasture selection criteria for many. 
 
A common way of selling pastoral products is through traveling traders. Traders visit 
the herders once or twice a week to buy milk products in exchange for fruit, tea, 
cigarettes and alcohol. They usually go to places where there are many yurts close to 
each other; they will not visit a household that settles a long way from the others. This 
is why many herders from Kyzyl-Tuu raised their concerns in 2008 when their ayil 
okmotu ordered them to move further away to Arpa valley. Many would have 
preferred to stay on the intensive pastures along the Torugart road (around Ak-Beyit 
and Kurgon Tash), where products could be easily sold to traders and truck drivers. 
Eventually, however, a sufficient number of herding households obeyed the order and 
moved away to Arpa, and one of the traders decided to follow them. The lady now 
visits Arpa once a week with a car and a small trailer to buy kymyz at 5 KGS/l and 
süzmö at 3 KGS/kg. In mid-summer, some herding households can sell up to 100 liters 
of kymyz and around 40 kg of süzmö every week, earning up to 620 KGS per week 
(US $15). 
Traveling traders also visit the Kumbel summer pastures. However, since the jailoo 
is not far from the Naryn-Bishkek road, many herders regularly ride to Kyrk Bozüi, a 
place where a dozen small traders live in yurts and old caravans (compare with Map 
10.1). 
 
“The best thing about Ichke-Suu [a part of Kumbel jailoo] is that (…) it is close to the main 
road.” (Herder, smallholder, Jergetal) [3a15] 
 
On Kumbel jailoo, some herding households have also begun to sell their milk 
products to the mining company that started open-cast mining in 2007. Since the 
mining company usually offers one or two Som more than traders, households living 
close to the mine’s headquarter much prefer to sell there. 
 
Besides optimizing their income, herders also try to minimize expenses. One of the 
main expenses during a jailoo season is transport to and from the pastures. While 
herders usually drive the animals to the summer pastures in one or two days, the rest of 
the household – women and children, yurt, tents, food items, and various tools – is 
transported by truck or tractor. Since only a few households have their own means of 
transport, most of them are obliged to hire a driver with a truck. But fuel must be paid 
for extra, and the state of the roads and bridges usually deteriorates the farther they 
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are from the village. Thus, the difference between intensive and remote pastures is not 
least a financial one, which is also why many of the households who first moved to 
Arpa jailoo in 2008 complained about the excessive transport costs. Hence, covering 
long distances to remote summer pastures such as Ak-Say is only profitable for herding 
household with large flocks. 
 
“Simple people can’t go there [Ak-Say] because the transport costs are far too high. (…) You 
can’t go there with 50 or 60 sheep – it’s just not profitable.” (Farmer during tülöö, Kyzyl-
Tuu, 20 Apr 2009) 
 
In order to save transport costs, many households with a private saray on the intensive 
pastures remain in the vicinity of their saray all year round. In Jergetal, this has already 
caused considerable conflicts (see 10.4.6). Many herders also think that it is up to their 
ayil okmotu to regulate transport to and from remote pastures better and to improve 
the roads and bridges – a discussion which has gained particular attention in 
conjunction with the highly controversial new pasture law and taxes (compare 10.5). 
 
Ecological criteria 
 
Economic considerations cannot be separated from ecological criteria. Most herders 
want the animals to stay healthy and to fatten quickly so that they can satisfy their 
paying customers or employer and can sell their own animals at a good price. This is 
why herders follow a set of criteria to find ‘good’ pastures. 
 
Most herders agree that a ‘good’ pasture area is characterized by the availability of 
water. Enough water means good vegetation, and proximity to a spring, river or brook 
reduces the time needed to provide humans and animals with drinking water. In the 
semiarid Naryn oblast, however, water-abundant places are scarce and  few rivers and 
brooks run throughout the year. Places with sufficient water may dry up from one year 
to the next, depending on the weather and temperatures. 
 
“Before we used to stay near Kumbel[-Suu]. But suddenly the water disappeared because of 
the drought.” (Herder, mid-sized farmer, Kumbel jailoo) [#031] 
 
Lack of water is one of the main reasons for a herding household looking for a new 
place to put up its yurt. The availability of water also determines the type of vegetation 
in a given place. Meierhans (2008, 69) shows that most herders know clearly where 
what kind of plants are to be found and that they are usually aware of the complex 
dynamics between vegetation cover, stocking densities and other environmental 
aspects. Another important criterion is topography. In early summer, herders usually 
drive their flocks to sunny places [Kyrg. küngöy] where the grass ripens earlier. 
Towards autumn, when the sunny slopes dry out and the grass turns yellow, they 
prefer shady hillsides [Kyrg. teskey]. But flat areas are also welcome, since they make it 
easier to guard the flocks. 
 
“There is water here, it is flat, and we can see the animals even if we are having a break.” 
(Herder, mid-sized farmer, Arpa jailoo) [#010] 
 
Since most herding households prefer not to relocate their yurt during the summer, 
they try to put up their yurt in a place from where herders can reach both küngöy and 
teskey slopes, but also plain pastures. As a result, many establish their yurts at the 
intersection of plains and steep slopes. Herders from Kyzyl-Tuu thus prefer places like 
Kuzkhon Tash and Sö’ök at the foot of the Torugart range, while most herders from 
Jergetal spend the summer just below the Kumbel range (compare Maps 10.1 and 
10.2). 
 
Other ecological criteria include the local climate and weather conditions. People and 
animals do not like it if a place is too windy, and some animals are better suited to the 
cold than others. Cows in particular do not like the cold weather and often run back to 
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the lowlands, while yaks need to stay at high altitude all year round. Herders thus 
often refer to their animals’ habits when arguing in favor or against a certain place. A 
herder from Kyzyl-Tuu who was forced by the ayil okmotu to move to the remote 
Arpa pastures at 3,500 m altitude said: 
 
“We will stay in Ak-Beyit again in 2009. It is too cold up here and the animals don't like the 
place.” (Herder, large farmer, Arpa jailoo) [#001] 
 
Last but not least, the large flocks, often containing up to 600 animals, need sufficient 
room to graze. If the same area is used by too many herders, the vegetation cover starts 
to deteriorate. In addition, the risk of mixing different herds is greater. Although most 
herders say that the jailoos are large enough for everybody, increased competition for 
pasture resources has nevertheless prompted several of them to move in recent years. 
 
“First we were alone, but then more and more people came. The same happened in both 
places – and it is the same here. We would like to have a valley for our own. The fodder 
already gets scarce here.” (Herder, mid-sized farmer, Kumbel jailoo) [#032] 
 
The slowly increasing competition on the remote summer pastures has not yet resulted 
in any open conflicts among herders. In most cases, common law ensures that herding 
households that have been coming to the same place for many years or even 
generations are not directly challenged by others. Nevertheless, ‘newcomers’ who put 
up their yurt a few hundred meters away may cause discontent and tension. 
 
Social criteria 
 
Although a household’s motivation to herd may be first and foremost to secure its 
livelihoods, herding is also an important social practice. The jailoo is not only 
associated with fresh air, pure nature and healthy food, but also with mutual help 
among neighbors, large gatherings and joyous feasts, i.e. the reproduction of social 
relations (Liechti 2008). Many herders and their household members repeatedly affirm 
the importance of having good neighbors and that people have to be able to rely on 
each other to make a living on the summer pastures. That is why two to three yurts are 
often established in sight of each other so that visiting is easy. Neighborhood is 
therefore a central criteria when selecting a pasture. In many cases, neighbors on the 
jailoo are also neighbors in the village; they know and trust each other, and many 
share transport to and from the jailoo. 
 
“In Bel-Kara-Suu [intensive pastures] there are too many people and the road is nearby, so 
there is more thieving. On Arpa nobody steals animals; there are hardly any strangers here.” 
(Herder, mid-sized farmer, Arpa jailoo) [#003] 
 
Stealing is not the only reason why most herding households stress the importance of 
good and reliable neighbors. A group of four to five neighboring yurts usually practices 
sherine, i.e. one or two rounds of reciprocal invitations to dinner141. These are usually 
combined with a tschornaya kassa [Russ. ‘black cashbox’], i.e. a revolving fund 
(compare with 9.3.4). Neighborhood on the jailoo is thus closely related to monetary 
exchange and temporary financial dependencies, and requires a high degree of trust 
among neighbors. All in all, neighborhood seems to be a far more important point of 
reference for many herding households than tribal affiliation [Kyrg. uruu]. All 
respondents assured me that the selection of pastures has nothing to do with tribes and 
that people did not mind which uruu their jailoo neighbors belonged to. The 
apparently random distribution of uruus on the summer pastures backs up the 
conclusion that tribes and their local leaders [Kyrg. uruu bas’chy] have no influence on 
how people access pastures. 
 
                                                
141 There is no literal translation of the Kyrgyz word sherine. According to Karataev and Eraliev (2000, 
508), sherine is an old Kyrgyz tradition already practised during pre-colonial tribal meetings. 
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On the contrary, family and household strongly determine where a herder and his 
household spend the summer. The cildren of former kolkhoz herders often use the 
same place as their parents and so certain jailoo neighborhoods are reproduced over 
two or more generations. Consequently, seasonal migration patterns and the location 
of the yurt hardly ever change, even if brothers or close relatives and their households 
take over from each other on the jailoo.  
 
“We have been coming here for the last eight years. Before that, my parents-in-law had used 
the same place since 1991. People always go to the same place out of habit.” (Herder’s wife, 
large farmer, Arpa jailoo) [#002] 
 
Thus, contemporary seasonal migration patterns often reproduce pasture use practices 
from Soviet times, as children do as their parents did when the centrally planned 
rotational grazing schemes of the kolkhoz were still in place. On Arpa jailoo, several of 
the 20 herding households put up their yurt on the very same spot that their parents in 
socialist times. The exception are herders who work for a single employer – he usually 
tells them where they have to go, e.g. because he leased in a particular pasture lot. 
 
Institutional criteria 
 
Last but not least, herding households must also come to terms with a set of 
institutional constraints. One of them is the formal requirement laid down in the 
pasture legislation that there be a lease contract; this will be discussed in more detail 
below. Other institutional constraints include for instance recent attempts by the 
communal authorities in Kyzyl-Tuu to regulate flock movements between the village-
adjacent, intensive and remote pastures. Given that most herding households stayed on 
Arpa jailoo in summer 2008, this communal measure appears to have been rather 
effective. 
 
“We only came to Arpa because the ayil okmotu told us to; otherwise we would have spent 
summer on Botosh [intensive pastures] again.” (Herder, Arpa jailoo) [#014] 
 
Most herders I met in summer 2008 accepted the new communal regulations. 
Nevertheless, many complained that their animals were not used to spending long 
periods at high altitude, saying that it was difficult to prevent sheep and cows moving 
down before mid-August. In addition, many complained that moving further away 
caused much higher transport costs, but that the ayil okmotu did not care about that. 
In the course of a group discussion with several herders on Arpa jailoo, many therefore 
said that they would remain on the intensive pastures in 2009, since paying the fines 
would be less expensive than moving to remote Arpa. 
 
“Renting a truck up here [to Arpa] costs 7,000 Som – one way. So it's better to stay down 
there [on the intensive pastures] and pay the fine. Transport to Ak-Beyit costs only 3,000 
Som. So the fine does not even represent the difference.” (Herder, Arpa jailoo, group 
discussion, 7 Aug 2008) 
 
Nevertheless, only one herder ignored the ayil okmotu’s order and set up his yurt on 
the intensive pastures near Kurgon-Tash (compare with Map 10.2)142. Interestingly, the 
elder herder appointed as a guard by the ayil okmotu did not take any action against 
him, but focused on trespassing animals from other villages instead. When in mid-July 
the head of ayil okmotu and the oblast governor came to see whether people were 
abiding by the rules, the guilty herder quickly moved further away – only to return a 
few days later. In the end, no fines were imposed in 2008. In Jergetal, the communal 
authorities only issued movement dates, but no spatial restrictions on flocks. 
Nevertheless, many herders were not aware of the exact movement dates, and several 
of them were unaware that the ayil okmotu had announced anything at all. 
                                                
142 The other two yurts near Kurgon-Tash belong to the appointed guard and to an old woman who had 
received permission to stay on the intensive pasture for health reasons. Another yurt near Ak-Beyit 
belongs to a communally appointed herder of rams who was ordered to stay away from the sheep flocks. 
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“The ayil okmotu does not fix any migration dates, and people decide themselves when they 
leave. People in the village tell us when the crops have been harvested, and we can also see 
that ourselves.” (Herder, Kumbel jailoo) [#035] 
 
Various respondents reported conflicts between farmers and herders when the latter 
returned too early and caused considerable damage to fields and hay meadows. Yet 
although the communal rules demand that guilty herders compensate farmers up to 
1,000 KGS (US $24) for the damage, it remained unclear whether or not such 
compensation had been paid in 2008. 
 
 
10.4.3 The perspective of leaseholders 
 
Despite the importance of other factors in selecting pastures, and the apparent 
inefficiency and weakness of formal (state) organizations and institutions, herding 
households have to deal with the legal framework in one way or the other. Although 
only a minority of pasture users makes formal lease contracts, most herding 
households trade off the advantages of the pasture lease system against its 
disadvantages. In addition, they also comment on other people’s practices143. 
 
Village-adjacent pastures 
 
While most lease agreements in Jergetal concern intensive pastures (see below), a 
number of people also lease village-adjacent pastures. However, since the communal 
land-use specialist had no respective list, the exact number of such agreements could 
not be determined. This confirms the impression expressed above that these agreements 
were concluded illicitly and without the involvement of the Naryn rayon GosRegistr as 
formally required. Apparently, most agreements for village-adjacent pastures were 
concluded around the year 2000. According to a local councilor, most leaseholders of 
village adjacent pastures have their own comparatively large flock and/or private barn 
or small house in the vicinity of the village144. It seems that their motivation for 
concluding a lease agreement – despite their guaranteed right to use village pastures 
along with others – was to secure their long-term access to sufficient winter forage for 
their ever increasing number of livestock. Thus, the lease of village-adjacent pastures in 
Jergetal appears to be closely linked to problems of arable land use. As I have shown in 
Chapter 9, private arable land is often scattered and thus difficult to cultivate. At the 
same time, neighbors and relatives hardly ever lease or sell their unused land, while the 
arable land in the communal Land Redistribution Fund (LRF) is also far from the 
village. Thus, leasing village-adjacent pastures is an alternative for those who want to 
secure their fodder needs on their own without having to buy expensive additional 
fodder. 
 
“0.89 ha of [arable] land is not sufficient to prepare fodder, so I decided to rent some 
pastures and graze my livestock there. It is better to rent pastures; I live there [in the saray] 
in the winter and the summer. (…) There are just a few people leasing out their [arable] 
land. And if you rent [arable] land, it is quite far from here. It’s very difficult, so it is better 
to rent pastures. And if you rent arable land you have to pay rent, and you never know 
whether or not the barley will grow; you cannot rely on the weather. And in autumn, before 
the harvest, the animals graze [on the fields].” (Herder, smallholder, Jergetal) [1b10] 
 
According to this respondent, farming arable land is much too difficult and risky, 
whereas leasing pastures does not involve as many imponderables. By contrast, another 
livestock owner, who concluded a contract over 50 ha of village-adjacent pastures 
around his saray near Baskyia (compare Map 7.1) in 2003, said that he made the 
agreement ‘just in case’ and also because his neighbors did the same. Nevertheless, the 
                                                
143 As the lease of all types of pastures has been suppressed in Kyzyl-Tuu since 2004, the leaseholders’ 
perspective presented in this section relies on evidence from Jergetal. 
144 Personal communication, 9 Nov 2007. 
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fact that most leaseholders lease pastures around an already existing saray or start to 
build one as soon as the contract is signed indicates that leasing village-adjacent 
pastures is often part of a long-term livelihood strategy. The contract and the building 
alike help to secure access to forage, which is a key resource if a household wants to 
further increase its flock size. Interestingly, however, at the time of research none of the 
current leaseholders of village-adjacent pastures knew yet that the ayil kengesh had 
decided not to extend their contracts. 
 
Intensive pastures 
 
In 2008, there were 43 lease agreements in Jergetal ayil okmotu for intensive pastures 
and the average leasehold was 135 ha. However, since many leaseholders leased several 
lots and thus concluded more than one contract, the exact number of leaseholders was 
unclear145. In addition, there were at least four lease agreements with the leskhoz and 
the leaseholds were for between 40 and 111 ha. Nearly all of these agreements concern 
the pastures located halfway between the village and the Kumbel pastures, i.e. 
Mongoldor, Sary Mambet, Teshik, Tektyr Saz and others (see map 10.1). In Soviet 
times, these places were used as spring and autumn pastures, i.e. as stopovers between 
the village-adjacent and the remote summer pastures near Son-Köl. Several sarays 
remain from that time and have all been privatized since 1991. Most of them are now 
occupied by households from Jergetal who managed to acquire their relatives’ or 
neighbors’ shares in these often small buildings, either by bartering or purchasing them 
(see 7.2.3). Most of them now reside there from autumn to spring, while others live in 
their saray all year round. 
 
In the late 1990s, most of these households began to lease the pastures around their 
saray to graze their own livestock on them. Due to the overall decrease in livestock 
numbers following the dissolution of the kolkhoz, competition among pasture users 
was still moderate at that time. In addition, there were as yet no proper rules for the 
allocation of pastures, so these early applicants could often lease large pastures of up to 
400 ha, which often was (and in most cases still is) far beyond the actual needs of their 
flocks. For instance, one household with 27 livestock units that has resided in a small 
house on Teshik for the last 20 years still has a contract for 400 ha of intensive 
pastures – although the official law fixing a household’s private livestock entitlement, 
would only permit it to have 45 ha (compare 10.3.3). Similar cases were reported by 
the current director of the Jergetal Territorial Body of Public Self-Governance and 
other respondents. The main reason why most of these households have retained their 
lease agreements is that the secured access to large areas of intensive pastures allows 
them to stay in and around their saray all year round. Thus, they can save the 
potentially high cost of spending summer on the jailoo (compare 10.4.1). 
 
Other leaseholders concluded their contract only later on, when they noticed there was 
growing competition for intensive pastures. In 2001, for instance, one herder who grew 
up in a private saray on Tektyr Saz suddenly realized that others intended to occupy 
the intensive pastures around his parents’ saray, so he quickly signed a contract for 35 
ha to secure his own access rights. 
 
“In 2001 we had to lease the land [the pastures]. That was problematic. Somebody wanted 
to buy this land. That is why we leased it, so that we would not lose our house. If somebody 
else would have leased it [the pastures], we would have been forced to move away.” 
(Herder, smallholder, Tektyr Saz) [5a1] 
 
As in the case of village-adjacent pastures, most lease agreements for intensive pastures 
are concluded by mid-sized and large farmers. One reason for this is that concluding a 
contract generates considerable costs including administrative fees for official 
documents and repeated trips to meet the rayon pasture expert and the GosRegistr 
specialists in Naryn town. It may also be assumed that applicants must sometimes pay 
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bribes to speed up official procedures, outbid other prospective leaseholders or make 
the issuing of a contract possible at all. In one case in 1998, a herder who applied for 
140 ha of intensive pastures presented rayon officials with animals in order to outbid a 
competitor who applied for the same lot146. Another herder said he paid his annual 
rental fee in cash to a unidentified rayon representative who visited the pastures once a 
year – a practice that obviously conflicts with the formal payment procedure described 
above. At the same time, however, an official list available with GosRegistr Naryn 
shows that more than 15 leaseholders from Jergetal have not yet paid a single lease fee 
to the bank since they concluded their contract – some of them already have nine years’ 
worth of arrears. To put it carefully, the existence of informal payments between 
leaseholders and state representatives may be an important factor. 
 
Remote pastures: hardly any lease agreements 
 
Table 10.4 also shows that only 3% of all remote pastures assigned to Jergetal ayil 
okmotu are leased out. The main reason for this is that only a tiny part of Jergetal’s 
49,278 ha of remote pastures are located within less than 50 km of the village (on the 
south-eastern shore of Lake Son Koel). The rest is located in Ak-Say valley close to the 
Kyrgyz-Chinese border and separated from Jergetal by two high mountain passes, 
more than 100 km of mostly poor roads, and an arduous application procedure for a 
permit [Russ. propusk] to enter the border zone. Seasonal migration to the remote 
pastures of Ak-Say is therefore too expensive for most herding households, which is 
why only one household from Jergetal lives in Ak-Say at all, and all  year round. 
Consequently, most herding households use the easily accessible intensive pastures in 
Kumbel as jailoo. 
 
 
10.4.4 The perspective of non-leaseholders 
 
Apart from the few leaseholders on village-adjacent pastures and the households who 
reside all the year round in a saray on the intensive pastures, most herding households 
from Jergetal have never so far concluded a pasture lease contract and have thus never 
paid any lease fees for intensive or remote pastures. Of the 21 households I visited on 
Kumbel in summer 2008, only three said they had a valid lease agreement for the 
pastures they used. However, none of the other households have ever encountered any 
problems, although from a normative point of view, they have been using the pastures 
illegally. In Kyzyl-Tuu, only one household has ever concluded a pasture lease contract, 
for the reasons detailed above. Thus, experiences with and opinions about the lease 
system differ considerably between the two villages – and also between individual 
herders. Analysis shows that there are several reasons why non-leaseholders generally 
disapprove of the pasture lease system. 
 
First, many herders think that an open-access regime for pastures would be the best 
solution for the jailoos. They argue that there was sufficient space for everyone, and 
that leasing particular lots would only lead to unnecessary conflicts. 
 
“It is good to have open access to the pastures. If I leases the pastures, I would not allow 
others to come onto my pastures, and other people would not be able to use these pasture – 
and what will they do then?” (Herder, smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu) [1a23] 
 
Second, no respondent has ever seen a state representative on the jailoo – at least not 
one who came to check lease contracts. As a result, most people do not feel impelled to 
conclude a contract to avoid potential sanctions. Consequently – and third – many 
people argue that concluding a contract would be of no use. 
 
“Today, nobody is renting pastures anymore – it's only spending money without getting any 
benefit.” (Herder, mid-sized farmer, Kumbel jailoo) [#032] 
                                                
146 Personal communication with herder’s sister, 11 Oct 2007. 
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The main argument in this case is that, since there is no sanctioning authority around, 
a contract does not help to prevent others from breaking the rules, i.e. trespassing on a 
leased pasture lot. As a matter of fact, even those living close to genuine leaseholders 
do not know the boundaries of their neighbor’s pasture lot, nor do they really care. 
 
“We don’t lease pastures, we use them all jointly. Only one household leases, and he 
reminds us from time to time about that. But we don't care and we put our yurt wherever 
we want.” (Herder, Kumbel jailoo) [#037] 
 
Needless to say, this can lead to conflicts between leaseholders and non-leaseholders 
(see 10.4.6 below). A fourth and oft-heard argument against formal pasture lease is 
that local people already pay lots of different fees and taxes, including a lump sum for 
pasture use as part of the land tax. Many therefore complain that the state levies too 
many fees and taxes and that their moderate incomes do not allow them to pay for 
pastures, too. 
“No, we don’t pay anything. Why pay? We pay money for herding in summer and we pay 
taxes for land and for the SozFond [social fund] and also for electricity.” (Mid-sized farmer, 
Jergetal) [2f14] 
 
Fifth, some respondents are also convinced that paying the lump sum for pastures 
entitles them to free access to all types of pastures. In addition, some are convinced 
that jailoos are not leased out anyway, a misunderstanding that points to a 
communication gap between lawmakers and resource users, as well as between the 
different levels of the state administration. As shown above (10.3.3), there is often a 
striking lack of professional expertise at the communal level, and many local 
authorities are unable to correctly explain the formal pasture lease procedure to 
potential applicants. Sixth, herders often move to the same places every year, 
sometimes even reproducing their own or their parents’ practices and pasture use 
patterns from Soviet times (compare 10.4.1). 
 
“I thought it was a good place for the livestock, and we went there the first year, and then 
the second year we went to the same place again. (…) So this place has actually been 
privatized, but without any agreement being made.” (Herder, large farmer, Arpa jailoo) 
[1a7] 
 
In this particular case, customary rights – although not passed down for several 
generations – and the resulting concept of private property are favored over the public 
system of pasture lease. The example thus illustrates that not all pasture users 
necessarily share the normative concepts of the lawmaker, i.e. that pastures are in the 
sole ownership of the state, and that private ownership of pastures is not foreseen. 
 
The herders’ arguments against lease contracts thus reflect several different issues. On 
the one hand it is obvious that the formal system of pasture lease hardly offers any 
incentive to conclude a contract. Not only is there no sanctioning authority to fine 
those who ignore the rules, but there is also no one to help leaseholders enforce the 
property rights they have paid for. On the other hand, people’s reluctance to abide by 
the rules also reflects a general lack of trust in state representatives, whom they 
consider incapable of handling the collected fees and taxes effectively. Last but not 
least, herders do not necessarily share the state’s concept of property rights over 
pastures, preferring open-access regimes and/or customary rights instead. Evidence 
shows that sarays play an increasingly important role in these differing concepts of 
property in both villages. 
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10.4.5 Constructing a claim: the role of sarays for pasture 
appropriation 
 
In both villages, barns and small houses on the pastures play a central role in securing 
access to pastures. In Jergetal, these sarays are mainly located on the village-adjacent 
pastures as well as on the intensive pastures of Tekytr Saz and Teshik (Map 10.1). As 
discussed above, they play a crucial role in pasture leases, since people often lease a 
pasture lot close to their saray. In Kyzyl-Tuu, there are 36 sarays on the village-
adjacent and intensive pastures along the Torugart road, plus 15 on the intensive 
pastures of Botosh (Map 10.2). According to the communal land-use specialist in 
Kyzyl-Tuu, nine sarays were built between 2006 and 2008, mostly on the intensive 
pastures147. However, since the Karakojun ayil okmotu stopped leasing pasture in 
2003, people cannot lease pastures adjacent to their saray. Nevertheless, sarays have 
become an important means to secure access to pastures in Kyzyl-Tuu too, in the sense 
of a constructed, physical claim. 
 
Livestock owners have several good reasons for building a saray. On the one hand, 
having a building on the kyshtoo [winter pastures] – be it on village adjacent or 
intensive pastures – allows them to graze their animals even during the winter. As long 
as the snow is not too deep, sheep, goats, horses and yaks have no trouble grazing on 
snow-covered pastures. Only cows need to be fed most of the time during winter since 
they cannot find the grass below the snow. A saray where herders and animals can 
spend the night thus improves access to winter pastures and potentially helps to reduce 
a household’s expenditure on additional fodder. Sarays have become even more 
profitable after recent price increases for winter fodder (see 9.4). In addition, a saray 
also helps to reduce the workload for herders, because the flocks do not have to be 
driven between the village and the pastures every day. However, not all sarays are 
equally profitable. Places with running water nearby can basically be used all year 
round, while a so-called ‘dry’ saray without water can only be used when there has 
been some snowfall. 
 
After having wrecked most barns and shelters after 1994 (see 7.2.3), more and more 
people began to realize the economic advantages of having a saray when, after 1996, 
the number of animals and consequently pressure on the village-adjacent pastures 
started to rise again. Since then, many have tried to acquire the unused shares of other 
households in old and demolished sarays in order to reconstruct them and use them 
again. However, buying shares and reconstructing a building is very expensive; one 
respondent estimated the costs for material and workers at around 20,000 KGS (US 
$483), which is equal to about five months of a teacher’s salary. Thus, it is generally 
wealthier households that can afford to build their own saray. 
 
De jure terms and procedures for construction 
 
According to the Kyrgyz Land Code, every individual has the right to build and register 
one saray. Doing so requires an official permit and involves various fees. According to 
the GosRegistr representatives in Naryn and At-Bashy148, someone who wants to build 
a saray must lease the land needed for construction. For this, the applicant must first 
get an official permit from the responsible authority (e.g. the ayil okmotu for village-
adjacent pastures etc.), which checks the selected location and eventually writes a 
recommendation letter. This allows the would-be builder to contact the rayon’s 
Department of Architecture, which assesses the project again. Step number three is the 
rayon’s Department of Ecology, which makes sure that the construction does not affect 
ecologically sensitive areas. Once all these permits have been issued, GosRegistr 
registers the saray and the respective plot, then collects the service and lease 
                                                
147 Personal communication, 1 Aug 2008. 
148 Personal communication, 18 Aug and 2 Sep 2008. 
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Figure 10.3    Construction of a new saray on the intensive pastures of Botosh, Kyzyl-Tuu (photo by the author, 
2007) 
 
 
fee. The service fee is around 1,000 KGS (US $24) per permit. The lease fee is 
calculated per sotik [0.01 ha] of land and ranges from 2,000 to 10,000 KGS/sotik (US 
$48 to 241). Since the fee depends on a plot’s geo-botanical qualities, the cheapest way 
is to build on the remnants of an old kolkhoz saray. The land size for construction 
ranges from 0.05 to 0.15 ha. GosRegistr offers two different models to lease 
construction land for a saray. The first one, referred to as a red booklet, grants a 99-
year lease after which the plot can be privatized. Such land can also be sold or 
bequeathed to others, but the lease fee for the whole 99 years must be paid at the 
beginning. The second model, called the green booklet, follows the same time intervals 
as pasture lease, with contract renewals after 5, 10 and 49 years. 
 
De facto practices 
 
In practice, the service fees for construction permits vary considerably. One farmer 
from Jergetal said that he paid only 370 KGS (US $9) to Naryn GosRegistr for the 
permit  plus 1,104 KGS (US $27) for a map of the construction site. Another farmer 
from Kyzyl-Tuu who built a new saray on the remnants of an old semljanka [Russ. 
‘earthhouse’; a shelter dug into a hillside] had to pay service fees of 3,000 KGS (US 
$72) to the Department of Architecture plus 2,500 KGS (US $60) to GosRegistr. 
However, different fees for similar procedures seem to be daily practice in public 
administration, and may be related to arbitrary decision-making and nepotism as well 
as a lack of professionalism among civil servants. From an organizational point of 
view, it seems more interesting that GosRegistr, the main responsible agency for 
pasture lease in At-Bashy rayon, does not require that applicants lease the intensive 
pastures around the plot for the saray. After all, it seems obvious that someone who 
builds a saray intends to use the adjacent pastures for grazing. The reasons for this are 
unclear; it may simply be an expression of negligence and a striking lack of 
communication within GosRegistr regarding the registration of sarays and pasture 
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lease agreements. Anyway, far from all pasture users apply for an official permit when 
renovating or constructing a saray. GosRegistr officials from At-Bashy estimated that 
50% of all existing sarays were built illegally. They also said that many people would 
come in to legalize their saray after a couple of years because they wanted to use it as 
security for credit. In this case, offenders are fined 500 to 2,000 KGS (US $12 to 48). 
In order to extend the grazing period further, some households have also begun to 
obtain or construct more than one saray. This is possible because the law only 
prohibits individuals for constructing more than one building, not households, so a 
new saray can simply be registered under another household member’s name. Besides, 
the purchase of already existing sarays and the land on which they stand is 
unregulated. 
 
So far, nobody has ever tried to build a saray on the jailoo. Yet while the communal 
land-use specialist in Kyzyl-Tuu dismisses this idea as futile, some respondents have 
already begun to think about this option. 
 
“In about five years, we may reach the upper limit of animals on the the kyshtoo. Maybe 
then it will become necessary to have a saray on the jailoo.” (Large farmer, Kyzyl-Tuu) 
[1a18] 
 
The reason why I am looking at these processes in detail is that the purchase of an 
existing saray or the construction of a new one is an important means of gaining access 
to pastures in a situation where the pasture lease system has either been suppressed by 
the communal authorities (as in Kyzyl-Tuu) or cannot guarantee secure and exclusive 
access to pasture resources (as in Jergetal). Even if someone cannot lease the village-
adjacent or intensive pastures around a saray, the mere presence of a private building 
on the pastures constitutes a physical claim to the surrounding area, all the more so 
since customary rights play an important role in access to pastures (compare with 
10.4.3). Such claims may present a considerable challenge as soon as the authorities 
decide to change the ‘rules of the game’, e.g. through the planned reform of the pasture 
legislation (see 10.5 below): A household that has invested a lot of money in building a 
saray to use the adjacent winter or spring pastures will hardly agree to move away and 
let others take its place. This has circumvented the Karakojun ayil okmotu’s intention 
to avoid wealthier people appropriating pastures by suppressing lease contracts; this is 
because it is mainly wealthy households that have built a saray in recent years. Existing 
sarays on the village and intensive pastures of Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu may thus form 
some kind of precedent and thereby make the implementation of the new pasture 
legislation a difficult endeavor, all the more so as they have already led to conflicts 
among pasture users in Jergetal. 
 
 
10.4.6 Existing conflicts over pastures 
 
Many of the issues described above – the mismatch between formal and user-defined 
pasture categories, the different criteria of herders for selecting pastures, the 
controversies between leaseholders and non-leaseholders, and the role of sarays in 
resource appropriation – contain a certain potential for conflict. 
 
Conflicts between leaseholders and non-leaseholders 
 
Open conflicts between state representatives and pasture users are still the exception, 
since the former are often in a weak position and hardly able to enforce formal rules. 
Instead, most conflicts have broken out between pasture users themselves, usually over 
disagreements about intensive pasture use in Jergetal. Since most intensive pastures 
around Jergetal are currently leased out to households with their own saray, it has 
become difficult for non-leaseholders to use them on their way to and from the Kumbel 
summer pastures. According to the rotational grazing system practised in Soviet times, 
herders and their flocks would usually spend a few weeks on the jaztoo before moving 
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further to the summer pastures, and would do the same in autumn. However, as things 
are now, they are only allowed to cross the jaztoo but not stay there, since this would 
violate the leaseholders’ exclusive pasture use rights. This is why many non-
leaseholders complain about the current situation, since they risk getting into conflict 
with leaseholders every spring and autumn. 
 
“There is a problem with the jaztoo. Every time we come there in spring, we have to look 
for a new place for our yurt. Some people have rented the jaztoos, and they usually send us 
away when we put up our yurt on their pastures. However, it is not possible to control the 
animals and stop them from trespassing others' pastures.” (Herder, Kumbel) [#037] 
 
The director of the Jergetal TPS who tried to initiate a public debate about pasture use 
at the local level confirmed that the lack of access to the jaztoo is a major problem. He 
also complained that the communal authorities have done little so far to find a solution 
and that there was no transparency about the lease agreements concluded with the 
rayon administration. 
 
“The jaztoo is an endless problem. Most of it is on Tektyr Saz, where everything is leased 
out. Nevertheless, the ayil okmotu forces people to leave the village on time and move to the 
jaztoo. Unfortunately, we don’t exactly know how long some of the lease agreements will be 
valid.” (Director of the Jergetal TPS, 28 Aug 2008) 
 
By contrast, leaseholders blame non-leaseholders for not respecting their legal claims. 
While they usually invite relatives and friends to graze their flocks for some time on 
‘their’ jaztoo, they blame others for overusing the same pastures. Nevertheless, most 
leaseholders decide not to act against trespassers for different reasons. While some shy 
away from conflicts in general, others do not know the exact borders of their pasture 
lot and prefer not to risk a dispute. Yet the majority thinks that the rayon 
administration would not help them anyway. 
 
“There is trespassing, but you can’t do anything about it. The lease contract doesn’t help.” 
(Herder, mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [#036] 
 
Others again argue that the pastures are still owned by the state and that it would be 
up to the respective authorities to monitor and regulate people’s access to pastures. 
 
“I can’t say to people ‘you mustn’t come here’, because that’s none of my business. This isn’t 
my property. The pastures belong to the state, to the ayil okmotu. Sure, there are people like 
me who use the pastures by contract. (…) [But] there is lawlessness here.” (Large farmer, 
Jergetal) [2d1] 
 
Some leaseholders nevertheless try to defend their rights by writing complaint letters to 
the rayon. In a few cases, this has resulted in penalties against the trespassers, which 
are determined according to the number of trespassing animals. 
 
“We do control things, because we pay money for these pastures. (…) If you don’t have an 
agreement, they [other people] will get the land. We have documents from all levels. (…) 
Otherwise, anybody would live here.” (Herder, mid-sized farmer, Jergetal) [1a4] 
 
Last but not least, there are also leaseholders who do not mind trespassers because they 
think that there is still sufficient pastureland for everyone. The question then arises 
why they conclude a lease agreement if they do not insist on the user rights they pay 
for. The reasons are manifold. While one herder said that he wanted to have some sort 
of security in case there was a serious conflict over pastures (apparently trespassing is 
not considered a serious offense), another one somewhat pathetically stated that he just 
paid for some ‘peace of mind’. Others again concluded a contract because their 
neighbors did so, too, or because they inherited a contract from their parents. 
 It thus becomes obvious that the pasture legislation and the related organizational 
framework cause much discontent and many conflicts among pasture users. At the 
same time, however, they offer little scope for mediation. Many leaseholders opt not to 
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contact the rayon pasture expert, since they do not expect any help from him and 
mistrust formal juridical procedures in general. Also the local aksakal council and 
court have never been involved so far, although the Kyrgyz state established these 
institutions to solve minor local conflicts (compare with 4.2.2). Even decisions taken at 
the locally institutionalized tülöö gathering are not necessarily respected, even though 
it is the most important annual meeting of the communal authorities, herders and other 
livestock owners. Instead, more influential herders often renegotiate the terms and 
rules for herding and adjust them to their own needs (10.2.3). During research, 
pasture-related conflicts are increasingly a topic of discussion at public meetings of the 
Jergetal TPS, which were organized to raise local awareness about the establishment of 
a communal Pasture Users’ Association (see 10.5.2 below). However, since 
leaseholders and saray owners from Teshik or Tektyr Saz hardly ever participated, 
these meetings could not help to solve these conflicts. 
 
So far, disputes between leaseholders and non-leaseholders, and between saray owners 
and other herding households have thus often been solved bilaterally. In practice, this 
means that the less powerful party had to move on to another place and/or had to 
adapt its seasonal mobility pattern for good. However, if it comes to more 
fundamental conflicts about pasture use, the apparent lack of functioning, widely 
respected conflict resolution mechanisms is a major problem – all the more so in 
conjunction with widespread nepotism and corruption149. This kind of more 
fundamental conflict may arise between herding households as a whole and other 
stakeholders such as commercial hunting groups or – as in the case of Jergetal – a 
mining company. In the absence of an independent jurisdiction at all state levels, the 
more powerful party can usually enforce their terms and conditions upon the others. In 
the case of Jergetal, this happened twice when two mining companies began to dig for 
gold, silver and other precious metals on the intensive pastures of Tektyr-Saz and 
Kumbel (see Map 10.1). 
 
Conflicts between mining companies and herders 
 
In the first case, a Chinese-funded company exploited a pasture lot on Tektyr-Saz 
without an official mining permit. In summer 2007, it became obvious that the small 
open-cast mine, located in a narrow gorge, severely polluted a small tributary of the 
Jergetal river, i.e. the main drinking water supply for the local population. Obviously, 
personal relations with the rayon state administration enabled the operator to obtain 
an informal right to exploit the site. As a consequence, local people’s resistance to the 
open-cast mine was ineffective for a long time, since neither the rayon akym nor the 
rayon court were ready to accept their complaint. At the same time, interventions by 
local authorities, including aksakals and representatives of the ayil kengesh, remained 
without effect due to their limited authority and power beyond the communal 
jurisdiction. Consequently, even the formal leaseholder of the respective pasture lot 
had to realize that his pasture lease contract was of little practical value. The conflict 
was eventually ‘solved’ when the Chinese operators did not return to the site after the 
winter break. 
 
The second case relates to the Spektor mining company mentioned at the very 
beginning of this study (see chapters 1 and 5.1.2). The company, which is Chinese-
owned but operated by Russians, and which locals use to call the kombinat, started 
open-cast mining on the Kumbel jailoo in 2006 (Figure 10.4). After two years, the 
mine had expanded its activities over a large area, affecting the pasture lots of at least 
two leaseholders and starting to spoil several tributaries of the Jergetal river. Yet unlike 
the smaller company on Tektyr Saz, the Spektor management did have all the necessary 
licenses from the national and the oblast level to secure a five-year mining right for a 
                                                
149 In 2007, Transparency International ranked Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system 142nd among 163 countries 
(Transparency International 2007, 330). 
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Figure 10.4 Part of the Spektor open-cast mine on Kumbel jailoo (photo by Gregor Beer, 2009). 
 
 
perimeter of 21,458 ha in total (see Map 10.1)150. The company also soon began to 
improve the existing roads from the next highway to the mineral deposits so that large 
trucks could access the mine. Although people generally appreciated this investment – 
something their government had not yet been able to provide – they soon realized that 
the new mine was also starting to spoil their drinking water by contaminating several 
tributaries of the Jergetal river with dangerous chemicals. Again, several local people 
started to protest against the company and tried to rally support at local and rayon 
level. However, they could not attract the interest of rayon state representatives, nor 
did they manage to find an independent laboratory to test water samples taken from 
several tributaries.151 
 Eventually, the conflict was ‘solved’ in a different way. When local protests 
increased, the Russian manager decided to pay the ayil okmotu a first installment of 
100,000 KGS (US $2,300) in compensation for the damage152. After this, the local state 
representatives stopped campaigning against the mining company. Soon after that, in 
2007, the management began to employ local people as miners, offering them 15-day 
shifts and daily wages of 700 to 1,000 KGS (US $16 to 23) – an exceptionally good 
salary for local and even regional circumstances. By summer 2008, around 70 people 
from the village had taken up employment in the mine, also including some herders 
living close to the kombinat during the summer. Apparently, ordinary mine workers 
did not receive a work contract and often did not know whether they would still be 
employed at the end of their shift. In addition, nobody exactly knew how long the 
kombinat would operate for. Since then, local protests against the kombinat have 
calmed down, although many people both on the summer pastures and in the village 
continue to complain about polluted water and destroyed pastures (Steimann 2008; 
2009). 
                                                
150 Personal communication with a representative of the Naryn Oblast leskhoz, 2 September 2008. 
151 Personal communication, local ayil kengesh councillor, 21 Oct 2007. 
152 Several local respondents said that the ayil okmotu also received a lamb and several bottles of vodka. 
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10.5 The 2009 pasture legislation reform: formal 
adjustments and preventive practices 
 
In reaction to the low effectiveness of the pasture legislation, various state departments 
began to draft new pasture legislation in association with a number of donor agencies. 
Many of the responsible authorities had meanwhile realized that the state 
representatives at oblast, rayon and ayil okmotu level were hardly ever able to carry 
out all the tasks defined by the pasture laws (Childress et al. 2003; Undeland 2005). 
Apparently, the administrative division of pastures between different state levels as well 
as the leasing procedure failed to make pasture use more efficient and sustainable. In 
addition, the malfunctioning system generated very little revenue for the Kyrgyz state, 
while at the same time the leasing process was increasingly criticized for discriminating 
against the less wealthy (Liechti and Biber-Klemm 2008). Thus, in 2008, even the 
director of the Kyrgyz Pasture Department stated: 
 
“Today, everybody – farmers, rayon, oblast – is convinced that the old document 
[legislation] has turned out to be bad.” (Abdymalik Egemberdiev, Director of the Kyrgyz 
Pasture Department, 11 Sept 2008) 
 
The increasing criticism from local pasture users, as well as Kyrgyz and foreign experts, 
eventually resulted in a broad effort to revise pasture legislation. 
 
 
10.5.1 The new law ‘On Pastures’ 
 
Under the guidance of the World Bank, various donor and implementing agencies, 
ministries and departments began work on a new pasture law. Finally, after long and 
fierce debates between the organizations and institutions involved (mainly about the 
future distribution of pasture revenues between local communities and state 
departments), the Kyrgyz parliament passed a new law ‘On Pastures’ on 6 February 
2009 and it came into effect by a government resolution dated 24 June 2009. The new 
law introduces three fundamental changes in pasture management. First, it abandons 
the administrative classification of pastures into village-adjacent, intensive and remote 
pastures. Second, it devolves authority over all pastures assigned to an ayil okmotu to 
the communal authorities – with the important exception of all leskhoz pastures, which 
remain under the authority of the State Agency for Environment and Forestry. In turn, 
the communal authorities are asked to delegate the respective powers to a newly 
established organization of local pasture users (see below). Third, the law abolishes the 
area-based pasture lease system and replaces it with a fee-per-animal system called a 
‘pasture ticketing system’. 
 
The implementation of the new legislation, including the introduction of the new 
pasture ticketing system, is supported by the World Bank’s ‘Agricultural Investments 
and Services Project’ (AISP), launched in 2008. The Kyrgyz Republic’s Community 
Development and Investment Agency (ARIS) is responsible for local project assistance, 
including training local people to plan and monitor pasture management, and for 
establishing local conflict resolution mechanisms. The project plan aims to cover all 
475 Kyrgyz communities and rural towns within three years (World Bank 2008; 
Bolotbaeva 2009). 
 
In order to establish a comprehensive system of local pasture management, the AISP 
developed a detailed organizational framework to be implemented at community level. 
The project appraisal (World Bank 2008) gives a detailed account of election 
procedures, roles and responsibilities of the different organizations to be established 
within a community and relations between them. These include a ‘Pasture Users’ 
Association’, several ‘Pasture Users’ Groups’ as well as a ‘Pasture Management 
Council’. The predefined set-up should secure democratic procedures and balanced 
Actors, practices, organizations and institutions around animal husbandry and the use of pastures 
 203 
power relations at local level and should allow for quick and standardized 
implementation in all 475 target communities. It builds on experience in a few pilot 
villages, where different implementing agencies such as CAMP Ala-Too and UNDP 
have been establishing initial, informal groups of pasture users since May 2007153. 
 
At the core of the proposed framework and its major decision-making body is the 
‘Pasture Management Council’ (PMC). It is made up of local pasture users, members of 
the ayil kengesh, the head of the ayil okmotu, and others. Its task is to prepare a 
medium-term community pasture management plan as well as an annual pasture-use 
plan based on local needs and requirements. The community pasture management plan 
provides information about the number of animals, grazing times and duration, 
rotation schemes and pasture improvement measures, and is the basis for monitoring 
and assessing the use and condition of pastures. In addition, the PMC also collects 
pasture user fees, part of which is then to be reinvested in pasture improvement 
measures. 
 
 
10.5.2 Coping strategies of state representatives 
 
When the new pasture legislation came into effect in summer 2009, I had already 
completed the empirical field research for this study. However, the preparatory phase 
for the new law extended over several years, and various rumors and half-truths about 
the prospective changes had spread to the countryside. Thus, local state representatives 
and pasture users alike formed their opinions about the reforms and sometimes even 
adjusted their practices preemptively. In an attempt to increase revenues and strengthen 
the oblast’s role in regulating the use of remote summer pastures, in 2008 the oblast 
state administration decided to promote the pasture expert for Naryn rayon and to 
make him responsible for allocating all remote pastures. Although it had already 
become clear by that time that the oblast and the rayon state administration would lose 
their authority over intensive and remote pastures, the pasture expert immediately 
began visiting different pastures and signing as many lease contracts as possible. Since 
he knew that the lease system was to be abandoned soon, he began to issue one-year 
contracts, despite being aware that the existing pasture legislation explicitly prohibited 
contract periods of less than five years. At the same time, the expert had a rather 
negative attitude towards the legal reforms. He denied that the local communities 
would be in a position to allocate and manage pastures properly and sustainably in the 
future. 
 
“It is a pity that the money [the pasture revenues] is not invested in pastures – nobody is 
interested in pastures, neither the rayon akym nor the ayil okmotus. Nobody in Bishkek 
cares either.” (Naryn oblast pasture expert, 30 July 2008) 
 
Having little trust in communal pasture management, the expert thus continued to 
pursue his own plans to establish a strong central pasture authority to manage and 
control all pastures within the boundaries of Naryn oblast. This was to be financed by 
pasture revenues and donor support. His prospects for success were rather gloomy 
though, not only because his plans contradicted the government’s plans to further 
decentralize the state administration but also because most major donors funding 
natural resource management had long since rallied behind the legal reforms. 
 
The example of the ‘lonely expert’ nevertheless illustrates how, in a malfunctioning 
system, individual actors can create considerable room for maneuver for themselves. In 
his function as Naryn rayon pasture expert, he obviously managed to conclude a fairly 
large number of pasture lease contracts. However, many of these leaseholders never 
paid their lease fees to the rayon state administration. Instead, evidence suggests that 
many of them paid informally, although it remains unclear where the money went 
                                                
153 Personal communication with Erlan Karbai Uulu, ARIS Project Manager, 16 Sep 2008. 
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(compare with 10.4.2 above). One assumption may be that, at the absence of effective 
supervision from his superiors and from GosRegistr, the pasture expert managed to 
establish his own small niche within the system to earn his own livelihood. When the 
announced reforms threatened to put an end to his presumably informal livelihood 
strategy, he tried to make the best of it by signing as many short-term contracts as 
possible and by putting forward his idea of a central pasture authority. 
 
However, in view of the announced decentralization, communal authorities began to 
look at their new possibilities as well. According to the Naryn oblast pasture expert 
(and much to his discontent), many communities began to advise their citizens against 
concluding or extending lease agreements with the rayon and the oblast state 
administration. In view of the conflicts between leaseholders and non-leaseholders, the 
Jergetal ayil kengesh even considered suspending all lease agreements for the intensive 
pastures154. By contrast, the communal authorities of Kyzyl-Tuu realized that 
abolishing their moratorium on the lease of intensive and remote pastures would 
enable them to generate revenue for the communal budget.  
 
 
10.5.3 The perception of herders 
 
Although the preparatory work for the new legislation lasted several years, the state 
and involved donor agencies did little to raise awareness among the rural population. 
Until 2008, local pasture users were often discussing a variety of rumors and half-
truths. This was also the case in Jergetal, although CAMP Ala-Too started a pilot 
project in spring 2007 to test the concept of Pasture Users’ Associations (PUA). 
However, since most pilot workshops were held in the village, active herders were 
hardly ever able to take part and therefore only had the vaguest of ideas about the 
institutional reforms. When asked how things could be organized better in future, 
many herders nevertheless had very firm opinions. On the one hand, most current non-
leaseholders argued against any form of pasture lease in the future and referred to their 
problems accessing the intensive pasture around Teshik and Tektyr-Saz in spring. 
Thus, many welcomed the idea of devolving authority over all types of pastures to the 
ayil okmotu in the hope that this would enhance transparency of allocation and 
management procedures. On the other hand, several leaseholders of intensive pastures 
extended their contracts with the rayon administration or the leskhoz. Apparently, they 
tried to extend their exclusive access rights beyond the date the new legislation was to 
be ratified, although it was still unclear at that time what would happen with their 
contracts under the new law155. 
 
In Kyzyl-Tuu, where pasture lease had been abandoned many years previously, there 
was a greater range of opinions. Wealthier herding households in particular hoped for 
a swift introduction of area-based pasture lease, as they were unaware that the new 
legislation would abolish it. For instance, one herder who did not move to Arpa but 
instead remained on the intensive pastures near Kurgon Tash was desperately looking 
forward to leasing the lot he had been using for years already, although he knew that 
this might cause problems for his current jailoo neighbors. 
 
“Our neighbors here can come in future, but they will have to pay me something as I plan to 
lease these pastures in 2009. Soon everything will be rented out and those who do not pay 
will not be able to herd their animals anymore.” (Herder, mid-sized farmer, Kurgon Tash) 
[#019] 
 
                                                
154 Personal communication with a member of the Jergetal ayil kengesh, 9 Nov 2007. 
155 As a matter of fact, existing lease contracts with the rayon or the oblast administration were abandoned 
after June 2009. At the same time, all lease contracts with the leskhoz remained valid. This has caused 
considerable discussions in the case of Jergetal (Personal communication with Ulan Kasymov, former 
director of CAMP Ala-Too, 7 May 2010). 
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His neighbors, a less wealthy, elderly couple, seemed anything but enthusiastic about 
his intentions. Aware that they would be unable to reimburse their neighbor, they 
feared for their future livelihoods. For the same reason, they also rejected the 
introduction of pasture tickets foreseen in the new law. In addition, they challenged the 
state’s normative conception of pasture ownership by questioning the necessity of 
paying for a resource that belonged to people already. 
 
“Selling off the pastures is not good – they already belong to us! (…) God gave the land and 
the grass to us, and if we didn’t come here, who else would use these pastures? There should 
be no pasture lease and no taxes on pastures in the future. We don't need that to improve 
our lives! Land taxes and taxes for water are okay, but we shouldn’t have to pay more than 
that. If a tax per animal is introduced, we will be forced to reduce our number of animals.” 
(Herder, smallholder, Kurgon Tash) [#021] 
 
Many other herding households who consider themselves ‘simple people’ (compare 
with 10.2.1) shared this view. They generally rejected the idea of levying a tax on 
people’s most precious asset, i.e. livestock, because it would directly affect their 
livelihood prospects. Those herders who tended the animals of paying customers and 
relatives in particular feared that they would not be able to afford the cost for their 
large herds. Referring to their difficulties to collect herding fees from their customers in 
time, they argued that they would simply be unable to collect the money for such 
additional expenses. 
 
“Simple people cannot pay such fees. (…) Our customers are not always able to pay us in 
the autumn, so we have to wait until winter until we get our salary. So how are we supposed 
to pay these fees?” (Herder, mid-sized farmer, Arpa jailoo) [#014] 
 
People also raised very different ideas about the future role of their ayil okmotu. Some 
of the wealthier herding households welcomed the introduction of animal-based user 
fees, thinking that the community could reinvest the money to improve irrigation, 
roads and bridges. Others rejected any kind of fees, as they doubted whether the 
communal authorities would be able to invest them in a useful way. Referring to their 
ayil okmotu’s current difficulties in regulating herding fees and pasture rotation 
through tülöö, many of them wondered how the same authorities would manage and 
maintain the pastures in the future. 
 
As a matter of fact, the introduction of the new law ‘On Pastures’ in summer 2009 
caused considerable discontent among the rural population. While at least a couple of 
people in Jergetal were informed that new legislation, including participatory planning 
and per-animal pasture fees, was coming, people in other villages were taken 
completely by surprise. According to various informants, widespread uncertainty about 
the prospects of animal husbandry and pasture use was one of the main reasons –
 besides soaring electricity prices and endemic corruption – why the number of public 
protests in Naryn town drastically increased during winter 2009/10 and eventually led 
to the violent uprising of April 2010156. 
                                                
156 Personal communication with Ulan Kasymov, former director of CAMP Ala-Too, 7 May 2010; and 
with Ayzaada Bekboeva, Mercy Corps Naryn, 12 May 2010. 
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11 Summary and conclusions 
 
 
The provision of ‘secure property rights’ over resources was a central tenet of the 
Kyrgyz agrarian reforms in the 1990s. As I have argued earlier, however, property 
rights do not simply exist between people and resources but also between people with 
respect to resources. Such relations are manifold and are constituted through groups, 
family, kin, community and the like (Hann 2006, 19). This is why, in Chapters 9 and 
10, I analyzed what various actors do today to secure and make use of their property 
rights over arable land, livestock and pastures, and what role related institutions and 
organizations play. 
 
The evidence presented in Chapters 9 and 10 makes clear that people’s property rights 
over natural resources are not simply defined by their endowment with legal ownership 
rights. Instead, property of land, livestock and pastures is also based on cultural norms 
and practices as well as on concrete social relationships between people, including 
socioeconomic disparities and power relations between various actors. This means that 
changes in property relations over land, livestock and pastures also altered the social 
relations between various actors. In addition, it becomes clear that today not all 
households and individuals in the two case study villages have the same chances of 
using their property in a way that allows them to make a decent living. In some cases, 
private property over resources can even have a detrimental effect on people’s 
livelihoods. 
 
 
 
11.1 Private land: burden or blessing? 
 
“I can’t put the land in my pocket or take it home. The land stays…” This statement 
by a farmer at the beginning of Chapter 9 not only expresses the security inherent in 
arable land as an immobile resource which cannot be carried off by others. It also 
points to the fact that the immobility of arable land has made it a cost-intensive 
resource for many rural Kyrgyz. 
 
Land shortage and taxation 
 
In the case of Jergetal, the agrarian reforms of the mid-1990s resulted in a widespread 
shortage of land at household level. The large kolkhoz fields were split up into tiny 
individual plots, which were then allocated to households as a bundle of individual, 
often scattered land shares. Consequently, access to sufficient land did not only become 
difficult, but simply unaffordable for many of the less wealthy. According to market 
principles, transfers between households (in the form of land sale and lease) and 
between households and the state (in the form of land leases from the communal Land 
Redistribution Fund (LRF)) should be able to compensate for the shortage of arable 
land. Analysis reveals, however, that neither the local land market nor the regulative 
institution of the LRF can fully counterbalance land shortage or right some of the 
wrongs of the privatization process. On the one hand, only a few people are ready to 
sell their unused land shares to others, while land is usually only leased out on a short-
term basis. This is in line with previous studies, which have shown that by and large 
the Kyrgyz land market has remained a rental market (Childress et al. 2003; Jones 
2003; Trouchine and Zitzmann 2005; Eriksson 2006). On the other hand, evidence 
from Jergetal suggests that the LRF mainly benefits wealthy people. Renting land from 
the communal fund not only entails costs for rental fees and additional land taxes, but 
also high cultivation costs due to the distances between the village and the LRF land. 
Most smallholders and households without livestock (but also many mid-sized farmers) 
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can hardly afford such expenditure. By contrast, unclear rules and weak communal 
management regarding the so-called ‘re-cultivation land’ in Jergetal allow wealthier 
households to cope with land shortage. Nevertheless, evidence from Kyzyl-Tuu also 
shows that under different circumstances, the LRF has a certain potential to reduce 
land shortages for the less wealthy. 
 
Direct and indirect taxation on arable land is an important reason for the prevalence of 
short-term lease agreements between private farmers and the practice of informal land 
acquisition. Arable land not only bears the burden of land and social taxes, but also 
serves as a basis for calculating child allowances. Seen from this perspective, it may 
come as a surprise that only a few people are prepared to sell their unused arable land. 
Jones (2003, 267) assumes that this reluctance may be related to the fact that 
ownership of private arable land gives a certain sense of livelihood security despite all 
the obstacles to using land in an economically profitable way. After all, livelihood 
alternatives are very limited in rural areas, so many people may consider re-cultivating 
their currently unused land once they have the means to do so. However, as 
Bebbington (1999; compare 2.4.1) points out, resources such as land can also give 
meaning to a person’s world, so there may be more than just economic explanations 
for people’s reluctance to give their land away. However, evidence from Kyzyl-Tuu 
also shows that many households have simply refused to pay their land taxes so far, 
although this deprives them of their formal ownership rights. Thus, the observed 
disparities regarding per capita land ownership (see 5.4) reflect people’s varying ability 
to make use of their land, rather than a physical ‘redistribution’ of arable land between 
asset-poor and asset-rich households157. 
 
High transaction costs for cultivation-related inputs 
 
Access to other production factors is usually associated with significant transaction 
costs and thus related practices again reflect the large gap between asset-poor and 
asset-rich households. In conjunction with the often difficult access to seeds and 
fertilizers, the chronic shortage of water for irrigation and declining land productivity 
has forced many to abandon growing wheat, and has even badly affected recent forage 
and hay yields. Access to functioning machinery is related to repeated price 
negotiations for those who have not ‘inherited’ machines from the kolkhoz, or who 
cannot access them through kin or friends. Regarding workforce, labor is usually 
pooled within households and among close relatives, but hardly ever beyond. If more 
workforce is required, the less wealthy often revert to the social institution of ashar, 
while wealthier farmers increasingly hire wage laborers, which also allows them to 
abstain from reciprocal assistance through ashar. In order to raise cash, rich and poor 
households alike take small, locally available loans of up to 2,000 KGS (US $48; mid-
sized and large farmers also often provide them). When it comes to commercial 
agricultural credits, however, less wealthy households often hesitate about applying, 
since they are unable or unwilling to take the economic risks related to repayment and 
collateral. Regarding the marketing of crops, the narrow line between net producers 
and net buyers became visible when harvests collapsed after the very dry summer of 
2007. While in previous years many of the less wealthy could generate some welcome 
cash income by selling hay and fodder crops, they suddenly had to buy additional 
fodder to feed their own animals through the winter. At the same time, the few large 
farmers who managed to sustain their production profited from the rapidly increasing 
prices. 
 
The observed practices in the use of arable land thus often reflect existing disparities 
between rural households. Some of these practices may even have the potential to 
exacerbate the gap between the asset-rich and the asset-poor, such as lop-sided 
economic relations between large farmers and smallholders. This inevitably leads us to 
the question of to what extent current local realities reflect the initial assumptions 
behind the Kyrgyz agrarian reforms. 
                                                
157 As for example described by Lindberg (2007) for northern Kyrgyzstan. 
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Assets and liabilities of private land ownership 
 
My results highlight that the distribution and eventual privatization of land shares was 
not a blessing for everyone. Obviously, the agrarian reforms did not necessarily lead to 
the creation of economically independent private peasant farms. Evidence shows that 
many rural households are not able to compete with others on equal terms. This is not 
to say that most farmers would not support and approve of private land ownership. 
Private ownership of land endows people with economic value which they can use in 
various ways, as well as with symbolic value that gives them a certain sense of security 
and independence. At the same time, however, land ownership brings with it new 
liabilities. Irrigation is subject to the payment of user fees and contributions for 
maintenance, the terms for the use of machinery must be constantly renegotiated, and 
arable land is subject to taxes. People’s practices around the use of arable land have 
thus become closely related to monetary exchange and barter. This presents a major 
obstacle for many among the less wealthy, who often struggle to earn sufficient cash in 
the local context, and who do not usually have sufficient savings in the form of 
livestock. The estimated 35% of all distributed land in Kyzyl-Tuu that have not yet 
been transferred into private ownership are a striking example of this (see Map 9.1). 
Over ten years after the heyday of reforms, the concept of private farm units has not 
yet been fully accepted, land has become a liability rather than an asset for many, and 
a great deal of land has fallen out of production. Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu thus strongly 
resemble cases in other post-socialist rural areas (cf. Hann 2006; Herbers 2006a,b). 
 
But the effects of decollectivization are not restricted to the economic sphere. Despite – 
or maybe because of – their failure to transform all rural citizens into independent, 
powerful market participants, the agrarian reforms have also profoundly altered rural 
social relations. At least regarding the use of land, the changes in property rights have 
resulted in a new social stratification. Despite the general shortage of water and other 
key inputs for agrarian production, many mid-sized and large farm households can still 
produce sufficient grain, forage and hay. Some of them can sell their grain surplus and 
generate valuable cash income; others lend grain to those who have no seeds, expecting 
part of the harvest in return. This can – intentionally or not – create new dependencies 
among households. Many of those who have a mid-sized or large farm today were 
among those who received large connected land shares in the mid-1990s, or who 
secured or gained access to functioning machines and means of transport. Smallholders 
and households without livestock, however, still struggle with the immense challenges 
related to ecologically sustainable (keeping productivity stable) and economically 
profitable (producing enough to make a living) land cultivation. Evidence from Jergetal 
and Kyzyl-Tuu shows that not all of them cope successfully with this struggle and 
eventually turn away from land cultivation. 
 
 
 
11.2 Pastures: various strategies of claim and access 
 
In Chapter 10, I examined people’s practices regarding pastoral production, which 
comprises the two basic resources of livestock and pastures. Evidence shows that these 
practices are governed to a large extent by the socioeconomic value and significance of 
livestock in rural Kyrgyz society. In the absence of reliable and easily accessible banks 
and credit providers, livestock is a key financial asset for most rural households since it 
can be converted into cash whenever need arises and also serves as an important 
investment fund. But livestock is also the key factor in the reproduction of social 
relations and the definition of wealth. Relations with relatives, kin, neighbors and 
friends are usually established and maintained through the use of livestock as gifts, 
dowries and invitations for feasts. Consequently, those with a lot of livestock often 
have a better chance of maintaining, improving and increasing their social network 
than those with only a few sheep and hens. 
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Similarly, local socioeconomic realities are also reflected in people’s  animal husbandry 
and pasture use arrangements. These include relations between different individuals 
and households, employer-employee constellations, and neighborhood patterns. 
Consequently, herding households select summer pastures according to a complex set 
of economic, ecological, social and institutional criteria. They do not just go ‘where the 
grass is greener’ and where water is abundant; their decision depends just as much on 
their access to markets (usually in the form of traveling traders), their household’s 
wealth, their relation with relatives and paying customers, and their agreement with a 
single employer, as well as on their neighbors on the jailoo. Similarly, livestock owners 
and herding households deploy different strategies to claim and defend their rights over 
pastures (see 11.3 below). The movement patterns of herding households, the location 
of sarays and people’s preferred jailoos therefore also reflect the diverse constellations 
of social networks and the changing economic relations between different local actors 
(compare Map 10.1 and 10.2). 
 
As a consequence of the variety and volatility of social and economic relations 
governing animal husbandry and pasture use, the influence of different organizations, 
institutions and their representatives on local pasture use and management is highly 
diverse, too. Without aiming to draw a clear line between formal and informal 
organizations, institutions and actors, I examined the roles of the Kyrgyz Pasture 
Department and its regional representative, the communal authorities, the annual tülöö 
meeting, local herders, and others. Evidence shows that not all organizations, 
institutions and actors are equally relevant to everyone. For instance, only a minority 
of local pasture users ever concluded a formal pasture lease agreement, although they 
are required to do so by law. In the same way, not all herders respect decisions taken at 
the tülöö, which is widely perceived as the key event for the local regulation of pasture 
access and use. Instead, herders often agree on the terms and conditions of herding 
among themselves and according to their own livelihood needs. Thus, it can sometimes 
be important to herders to remain outside formalized forms of organization such as the 
tülöö. This also explains why different respondents give totally different views of what 
the formal structure is, and why there is such a “wide array of (…) informal forms of 
organizing through personal networks, patron-client relations and customary 
institutions” (Nuijten 2005, 4f). 
 
 
 
11.3 Layered property and practices of ‘forum shopping’ 
 
The evidence presented in Chapters 9 and 10 thus illustrates that official legislation 
(such as the Land Code or the pasture law) is neither the only nor the main institution 
through which land and pastures in the two case study villages are governed. Instead, it 
is just one element among other less formalized rules and practices that constitute what 
Appendini and Nuijten (2002; see 2.4.1) call the ‘local institutional context’.  
 
Table 11.1 sorts out these different orders by referring to the four layers of property as 
put forward by Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006, see 2.3.3). It shows that property over 
resources is constituted of different layers, including social relationships (e.g. kinship), 
power differences (e.g. socioeconomic disparities), and people’s actual practices. Legal 
regulations, i.e. formal ownership rights, are only one of these layers, and for many 
actors they are not the most important point of reference to legitimize their claims to 
resources (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; see 2.3.3). 
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Table 11.1 The four layers of property regarding arable land and pastures 
 
 Arable land Pastures 
   
Cultural-ideological layer Private and communal property State property versus local concepts of  
common and private property 
   
Layer of legal regulation National Land Code (open land market 
since 2001) 
National Pasture Legislation (lease 
system) versus communal regulations 
and customary rights; common versus 
private and open access regimes 
   
Concrete social relationships Wealth disparities regulate access to 
arable land 
Wealth disparities regulate access to 
pastures; economic dependencies 
between herders and customers, 
employers and employees; power 
disparities between herders and mining 
companies 
   
Property practices 
(Organizing practices) 
E.g. Illicit appropriation of communal re-
cultivation land by wealthy farmers; 
Hiring less wealthy neighbors as field 
workers; Lease of machines among 
households 
E.g. Access to pastures with or without 
lease contract; exclusion of non-
leaseholders; construction of saray to lay 
claim to a pasture lot; double taxation of 
village adjacent pastures in Jergetal; 
appropriation of communal pastures by 
mining companies 
 
 
As I have noted earlier, the layer of property practices feeds back into the other three 
layers, since ideologies, laws and social relationships are reflected, reproduced and 
eventually transformed into concrete practices. I therefore focus on the organizing 
practices of state representatives and local resource users to discuss the 
interdependencies between the four layers of property. 
 
Organizing practices of state representatives 
 
Evidence shows that even state representatives at local and regional level do not always 
abide by official laws. For instance, the communal authorities of Kyzyl-Tuu boycotted 
the pasture legislation for several years, fearing that it might foster conflicts among 
local people. At the same time, the authorities in Jergetal received double revenues for 
the village-adjacent pastures (see 10.3.2), while doing little to counter the illicit 
appropriation of re-cultivation land by wealthy households (see 8.2.3). Even the Naryn 
rayon pasture expert ignored existing regulations regarding the minimal duration of 
lease agreements when, in 2008, he tried to wrap up as many short-term lease 
agreements as possible before the new pasture legislation came into effect. However, 
the considerable gap between de jure and de facto procedures regarding pasture use 
and management does not only occur when certain rules conflict with the personal 
objectives of state representatives, but also emerges from ignorance or a physical or 
technical inability to implement the law (e.g. because there is no car to visit the 
pastures). All this shows that even ‘formal actors’ do not always act in accordance with 
the rules and regulations, and that formal institutions do not necessarily cause formal 
behavior of those representing them. Or, in the words of Giddens, “‘social facts’ might 
constrain what we do, [but] they do not determine what we do.” (Giddens 1997, 569f; 
italics in the original). 
 
Either way, the formal organization of pasture use and management hardly ever yields 
any real benefits for the majority of local pasture users – irrespective of whether the 
legislation is enforced or not. It can be assumed that a strict implementation of the 
pasture legislation – including competitive lease procedures for pasture lots – would 
favor the few wealthy households able to compete in a money-driven market. 
However, the example of Jergetal also shows that a fragmentary and selective 
application of the pasture legislation can be equally detrimental to less powerful actors, 
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who are denied access to large areas of pastures by others. Needless to say, this can 
result in long-lasting resource conflicts (see 10.4.6). Yet even the Kyzyl-Tuu communal 
authorities’ complete boycott of the pasture legislation did not result in equal and fair 
conditions for everyone. Instead, it resulted in a virtual open-access regime, which for 
instance allows wealthier households to claim their rights over certain pastures by 
building a saray (see 10.4.5)158. Irrespective of the degree of enforcement, the formal 
structure for pasture use and management thus creates much institutional uncertainty 
and has considerable potential to stir up conflict among resource users. At the same 
time, it offers few avenues of mediation. People neither have sufficient trust in state 
representatives, nor do they have any real possibility to take legal action if their formal 
property rights over pastures are violated. Yet while this uncertainty constitutes a 
serious impediment to the livelihood options of many people, it can also be an 
advantage for those who have the necessary means to circumvent existing rules and 
procedures and enforce their own norms and practices. 
 
Farmers’ and herders’ practices of ‘forum shopping’ 
 
Evidence from Jergetal and Kyzyl-Tuu shows that concrete social relationships – i.e. 
socioeconomic disparities and the resulting economic and social dependencies between 
the rich and the poor – can have considerable influence on people’s property rights 
over resources. Wealthier households draw more often than others on both formal and 
informal norms and practices to legitimize their claims to arable land and pastures. 
Academic literature usually refers to such behavior as forum shopping. In an uncertain 
environment, actors try to hold on to their resources by maneuvering between various 
legitimating principles and standards of measure, and by improvising on practised 
routines within a complex institutional context (see 2.3.3)159. 
 
For instance, several mid-sized and large farm households in Jergetal began to use 
communal land known as ‘re-cultivation land’ without asking for communal 
permission. Having invested much time and money into re-cultivating the plot and 
being aware that not many other households would have the requisite means to do the 
same, many of these farmers considered the land their property. However, when the 
communal authorities noticed their behavior, the farmers usually agreed to sign a lease 
agreement that legalized their claim ex post (see 9.2.3). In another example, many 
wealthier herding households from Jergetal concluded a pasture lease agreement to 
legitimize their exclusive access to intensive pastures and thus defend them from other 
herders. However, as soon as they had obtained the contract, many of them stopped 
paying the annual lease fee to the state authorities, or reverted to informal payments. 
As they were aware of the state’s inability to enforce the law and to sanction offenders, 
they could afford to maneuver between acceptance and rejection of formal institutions 
(see 10.4.3). Yet another example concerns the construction of sarays on the intensive 
pastures of Kyzyl-Tuu. Several mid-sized and large farmers bought an official 
construction permit from the rayon authorities. Even though none of these households 
ever concluded a formal pasture lease contract with the rayon authorities, having a 
saray on the intensive pastures allows them to lay an informal yet effective claim to the 
pastures adjacent to their new building. 
 
The examples show that comparably wealthy households can often use formal rules 
and regulations when they come in handy in order to secure their livelihoods, but they 
also recombine these rules with other, less formal strategies and routine behavior. If 
necessary, formal rules and procedures are even rejected en masse. The practice of 
forum shopping that I observed thus highlights the central importance of negotiating 
power of different actors; those able to draw on several sources to legitimize their 
                                                
158 In this case, the builder-owners also profit from a striking lack of communication between different 
state agencies, in particular between the Architecture Department and GosRegistr. 
159 Other notions brought forward in the critical transition literature to describe such behaviour include 
‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 2001) and ‘recombinant property’ (Stark 1996; Stark and Bruszt 2001; 
compare 2.2.2). 
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rights can usually establish stronger property rights (Meinzen-Pradhan 2001, 2002; see 
2.3.3). In the context of rural Kyrgyzstan, negotiating power is often equal to wealth in 
livestock. This again highlights the significance of the socioeconomic disparities 
outlined in Chapter 5 for people’s property rights over natural resources – irrespective 
of the formal property rights they were endowed with in the course of the agrarian 
reforms of the 1990s. It would however be wrong to assume that only the wealthy can 
practice forum shopping. Instead, less wealthy households also maneuver between 
different frames of reference, although their range of possibilities is not so large. One 
example of this is the behavior of herders who participate in the annual tülöö meeting 
to negotiate the annual herding fees with the communal authorities but adjust the fees 
to suit their own needs a few days later (see 10.2.3). There are several explanations for 
why herders can afford to reject the communal authority. On the one hand, their key 
position in the functioning of animal husbandry at local level endows them with 
considerable negotiating power, since people who cannot herd themselves depend on 
their services. On the other hand, most herders know that the communal authorities 
have few means to sanction their behavior or else they put up with potential fines (see 
10.4.2). The same maneuvering between the formal and the informal can be observed 
in the discussion about pasture use fees. Most herders reject the idea of paying pasture 
use fees, arguing that the communal authorities would be incapable of investing them 
in a useful way anyway. At the same time, however, they say that only the communal 
authorities are in a position to maintain pasture-related infrastructure, such as roads 
and bridges. 
 
’What is happening’ – the role of formal organization 
 
 
“I am in no way arguing that formal organization is irrelevant to what is happening – only 
that formal organization is not what is happening.” (Barth 1993, 157) 
 
This quote may be the best summary of everything that has been said above. The 
evidence presented in Part C makes clear that formal rules such as the official Kyrgyz 
pasture legislation, as well as the state organizations and actors representing it, have 
only a limited impact on local use of arable land and pastures. Many actors – state 
representatives included – do not necessarily care about formal rules or reject them as 
inappropriate and hindering for their personal objectives. Formal organization is thus 
neither the only, nor the main means through which land cultivation and pasture 
management are governed, but is just one aspect among many, constituting what 
Appendini and Nuijten (2002; see 2.4.1) call the ‘local institutional context’. In this 
context, different actors make use of various institutions and organizing practices to 
negotiate and constantly re-negotiate their property rights over resources and thus the 
terms and conditions of agro-pastoral production at large. ‘What is happening’ is thus 
much more than the mere response to formal rules and regulations, but is closely 
related to social relations at communal, household and individual level, to gender roles, 
to the wealth and social status of households and individuals, and to people’s level of 
trust in their neighbors, in the state and its representatives, and in other institutions 
and organizations. 
 
The alteration of property relations by the Kyrygz agrarian reform program has thus 
not only redefined the value of land and other resources, but also the livelihood 
prospects of and the social relations among various actors, between the asset-rich and 
the asset-poor. To a considerable extent, community life has thus followed the logic of 
the market and social relations have become embedded in the (yet poorly regulated) 
economic system, not vice versa (McCay and Jentoft 1998, 26; Bichsel et al. 2010). 
While wealthy and powerful actors can often extend their claims over certain 
resources, the less powerful often struggle with increased uncertainties, since it is 
becoming more difficult to predict how others will behave. 
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12 Conclusions and implications: the multiple ways 
of making a living in uncertainty 
 
 
“We used the livestock we received, and we lost most of it. 
Those who have kept their livestock from then are rich now.” 
 
Smallholder, Kyzyl-Tuu [3b8] 
 
“Not all five fingers of a hand are the same. 
Some people have animals, others do not.” 
 
Mid-sized farmer, Jergetal [3b18] 
 
 
I began this study with a short description of a conflict between local herders and a 
foreign mining company on the intensive pastures of one of my case study villages. I 
did so because I was puzzled by the fact that many herders and other local residents 
had begun to work in the mine, although they knew that the exploitation of their 
pastures and the pollution of the streams directly conflicted with their agro-pastoral 
livelihoods. Although I could not examine the case in every detail, I realized that it 
reflects some of the very issues this thesis focuses on. Therefore, the evidence presented 
in this study might at least have highlighted some of the processes behind this 
confusing situation. Apparently, people’s apparently contradictory behavior in this 
‘mining case’ does not exactly reflect what the radical reformers of the 1990s thought 
rural Kyrgyz people in the late 2000s would do. In fact, development in rural 
Kyrgyzstan has taken other trajectories than the straight neoliberal pathway prescribed 
and predicted by the disciples of the Washington Consensus. Evidence from the micro 
level suggests that the rural Kyrgyz economy has so far not developed into a free 
market economy, and that most rural people are still far from the neoliberal ideal of 
powerful, self-determined market participants endowed with secure property rights 
over resources. 
This insight is not entirely new, however. Recent critical advances in the study of 
post-socialism have argued that the neoliberal transition paradigm cannot explain the 
multiple outcomes of the Soviet collapse and of the subsequent reform policies at both 
local and household level. In line with this critique, I deployed a set of “middle-range 
concepts capable of (…) charting diversity” (Stark and Bruszt 2001, 1130) and 
adopted a livelihoods perspective to explore local processes of transformation from the 
point of view of the actors. Focusing on agro-pastoral livelihoods and processes of 
institutional change in rural Kyrgyzstan, I then examined processes of post-socialist 
transformation at local and household level. To do this, I analyzed the interplay 
between concrete livelihood realities and the wider organizational and institutional 
context of agro-pastoral production in two villages in Naryn oblast, Central 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 12.1 sums up the empirical findings of the 
study and outlines the main local obstacles and opportunities thrown up by twenty 
years of post-socialist transformation and with which rural households must cope 
today to make a living. Section 12.2 refers to the notion of uncertainty (Mehta et al. 
1999, 2001; see 2.4.2) to categorize these obstacles and opportunities. Section 12.3 
then examines the role of different forms of uncertainty for various livelihood 
trajectories (Ashley et al. 2003; see 2.4.3) and explains why certain households seem to 
be trapped in a negative trajectory, while others are not. Section 12.4 reflects on how 
such negative trajectories may be reversed in future and explains why certain 
development approaches that emphasize the building of new local institutions may 
reinforce rather than abolish the current divide between those who have and those who 
have not. The chapter concludes with a number of open questions for future research. 
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12.1 Main findings of the study 
 
After an introduction to theoretical and methodological approaches to transformation 
and concrete policies of transition in the Kyrgyz Republic, the first focus of the study 
was on the persistence of old and the emergence of new socioeconomic disparities in 
rural Kyrgyzstan. The results of a quantitative household survey carried out in spring 
2007 revealed considerable disparities between households in relation to livestock 
ownership – which is the most common wealth indicator in rural Kyrgyzstan – and 
pastoral income sources. In both villages, a few large farm households own more than 
70 livestock units, which is equivalent to 70 cows or 350 sheep. At the same time, 
many households have no more than one cow or five sheep; some have no livestock at 
all. In between these two extremes, smallholders and mid-sized farmers keep flocks 
which usually help them to make a living, but do not necessarily allow them to 
generate cash income from animal husbandry. Instead, a large amount of these middle-
class households depends on social support, either from the state or from relatives and 
friends. Qualitative research showed that such disparities used to exist in Soviet times 
too. In contrast to the socialist ideals of egalitarianism and equity, the redistributive 
economy and the kolkhoz principle allowed rural elites – kolkhoz chairmen and 
leading personnel, party leaders, and to some degree also kolkhoz herders – to earn 
considerably more than others and to accumulate wealth, e.g. in the form of large 
numbers of private livestock. However, the system’s shortcomings and the existence of 
a so-called ‘second economy’ allowed ordinary kolkhoz workers to profit from mostly 
illicit transfers between the kolkhoz economy and their own subsistence production as 
well. By the late 1980s, it was thus not the kolkhoz per se but the symbiotic 
relationship between the state and the semi-formal private economy that enabled the 
rural Kyrgyz population to survive. 
 
By disbanding the state economy, the agrarian reforms of the 1990s put a swift end to 
this symbiosis. Thus, paradoxically, privatization made private agrarian production 
more difficult for many and exacerbated existing socioeconomic disparities. The rapid 
dissolution of collective farms and the distribution of arable land, livestock and 
indivisible property were not always fully transparent and often preempted regulative 
policies decreed by central government. In many cases, this was to the advantage of 
rural elites who often received better land plots and healthier animals than others. By 
endowing all rural households with land and livestock, the agrarian reforms also 
benefited those with the necessary knowledge and experience to practice farming and 
animal husbandry or to market agricultural produce (see Table 8.1). It thus becomes 
clear that what happened after 1991 was anything but a start from scratch – despite 
the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union took many by surprise and the subsequent 
reforms were labeled ‘shock therapy’. Instead, it was a gradual reworking of a complex 
institutional context, so that the privatization of the Kyrgyz agriculture took place in a 
hybrid economic and political system. Thus, although formal property rights and 
professional and social networks were rapidly reworked after 1991, the socialist legacy 
– in the form of wealth, skills, knowledge, and social networks – has continued to 
influence post-socialist development up to the present day. 
 
The second focus of the study was on current actors, organizing practices, institutions 
and organizations around agro-pastoral livelihoods. It started from the assumption 
that property rights over resources such as land, livestock and pastures are never really 
‘secure’, but that they are constantly renegotiated orders between different actors 
endowed with differing degrees of negotiating power. Evidence showed that 
households without their own animals as well as smallholders often struggle to access 
their private land plots outside the village. Especially in Jergetal, many private plots are 
scattered and far from people’s homes, so that high transport costs often make 
cultivating them unprofitable. In addition, many farmers have difficulties getting access 
to necessary production inputs such as irrigation water, machinery, workforce and 
cash. In the absence of the former illicit transfers of inputs from the kolkhoz, people’s 
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practices around the use of arable land have thus become more and more characterized 
by monetary exchange and barter. Nowadays, farming the land involves paying 
irrigation fees and taxes, hiring machines and workers, and buying seeds and fuel. This 
is a major obstacle for those who have only little to offer. In the long term, the 
redefinition of property rights over land has thus led to a new social stratification. 
While many mid-sized and large farm households can cover their subsistence needs of 
grain and fodder and can thus combine farming and animal husbandry, less wealthy 
households increasingly feel that private land is a liability rather than an asset. This is 
why many of them have turned away from cultivating the land in recent years and have 
increasingly pinned their hopes on animal husbandry. 
 
Unlike arable land, pastures remained in the sole ownership of the Kyrgyz state but 
were assigned to rural communities. Local people were given the right to use these 
pastures in accordance with certain rules and regulations, including the payment of an 
annual lump sum or the conclusion of an area-based lease contract (depending on the 
type of pastures). However, analysis revealed a striking gap between these formal rules, 
their implementation by state representatives and the actual resource use practices of 
local pasture users. On the one hand, pasture legislation160 is poorly adapted to local 
people’s needs and practices. The formal classification of pastures as village-adjacent, 
intensive and remote does not take into account the highly flexible character of animal 
husbandry, where flock sizes often vary and herders choose their pastures according to 
a set of economic, social, ecological and institutional criteria (see 10.4.2). On the other 
hand, signing a pasture lease contract involves a very complicated formal procedure, so 
many herders therefore choose not to apply. In addition, the state administration itself 
bends existing rules, either because there are not enough competent public servants or 
because legislative loopholes make arbitrary practices possible. Since pasture use and 
management have also become increasingly monetarized, this allows mid-sized and 
large farmers in particular to do forum shopping, i.e. to refer to different norms and 
practices to secure their household’s access to pastures (see 2.3.3 and 11.3). 
 
To sum up, the empirical evidence presented in this study points towards a number of 
obstacles and opportunities confronting rural households engaged in agro-pastoral 
production. However, what some actors may consider an opportunity, others may see 
as an obstacle. In the next section, I therefore categorize these issues by referring to the 
notion of uncertainty. 
 
 
 
12.2 Uncertainty in post-socialist rural Kyrgyzstan 
 
The sociological transition critique has often related processes of post-socialist 
transformation to the rise of uncertainty. Unlike risk, uncertainty describes a situation 
characterized by indeterminacies that makes it impossible to calculate probabilities. 
Evidence from rural Kyrgyzstan shows how uncertainty affects various spheres of 
people’s livelihoods. Referring to Mehta et al. (1999, 2001; compare Table 2.4), Table 
10.2 distinguishes four types of uncertainty. 
 
 
                                                
160 This thesis refers to the pasture legislation in force until summer 2009. In June 2009, the Kyrgyz 
government passed a new law on pastures. However, since I had already completed my empirical field 
research by then, the present study focuses on the ‘old’ legislation valid at the time of research. For the 
perceptions and preventive practices of various actors regarding the new legislation, see section 9.5. 
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Table 12.1 Four types of uncertainty in the context of rural Kyrgyzstan 
 
Ecological uncertainties Increasing frequency of droughts; unpredictable harvest of cash and fodder crops; 
pasture degradation; detrimental effects of extractive industries on pastures 
   
Livelihood uncertainties Loss of secured incomes; dependence on state support; price fluctuations; insecure 
property rights over pastures; overlapping authorities, norms and rules regarding 
the use of pastures 
   
Knowledge uncertainties Lack of professional knowledge regarding agro-pastoral production; lack of 
information on rural markets; partial or nonexistent knowledge regarding the legal 
framework (e.g. pasture legislation); lack of knowledge about the behavior of 
others 
   
Social & political uncertainties Lack of mutual trust and local forms of cooperation; Corruption and arbitrariness of 
the state administration and the judiciary; unstable political system at all levels 
 
 
Ecological uncertainties are related to the unpredictable and variable nature of 
ecosystems with which people interact. Although environmental issues were not the 
focus of this study, evidence suggests that over recent years many farm households 
have experienced increasing problems with farming their land. In both villages, a series 
of exceptionally dry years resulted in low yields, forcing many households to buy 
fodder instead of selling it. When combined with chronic trouble getting hold of good 
seeds, sufficient irrigation water and other inputs, farming has thus become too 
unpredictable for many. As a result, many households have increasingly turned to 
animal husbandry, which allows them to react more flexibly to droughts and general 
resource scarcity (cf. Scoones 1992; see 9.5). However, pastoral production has also 
been confronted with various ecological uncertainties in recent years. The intensive use 
of village-adjacent pastures since 1991 has badly affected pasture productivity, and 
concurring forms of pasture use, such as the poorly regulated extractive industry on 
Jergetal’s intensive pastures, present an environmental threat whose long-term effects 
are as yet difficult to predict. 
 
Livelihood uncertainties mainly refer to the generally unstable institutional context. 
For many people, the collapse of the socialist economy and the kolkhoz as a ‘total 
social institution’ resulted in the concrete loss of regular wages, adequate pensions and 
subsidized commodities. Little has changed since then. Rural income opportunities are 
still rare, old age pensions and child allowances are hardly ever sufficient to survive, 
and commodity prices have been subject to massive – mostly upward – fluctuations in 
recent years. In addition, many smallholders and households without livestock (but 
also some mid-sized farmers) struggle to use their private arable land in a profitable 
way. Regarding animal husbandry, I have shown that it tends to be wealthier herding 
households that practice forum shopping, drawing on different norms and practices to 
claim and defend their rights over pastures. At the same time, various external actors 
claim authority over pastures. On the one hand, these include representatives of the 
state, such as communal, rayon and oblast authorities, but also the State Agency for 
Environment and Forestry [Russ. leskhoz]. On the other hand, private actors such as 
foreign mining companies claim their rights to the commercial exploitation of pastures. 
In the case of Jergetal, these authorities and claims often overlap, which causes 
considerable confusion and legal uncertainty (see Map 10.1). Needless to say, none of 
this really reduces people’s uncertainty about their prospects regarding pastoral 
production. 
 
Knowledge uncertainties exist because every single actor relies on a different set of 
information and because knowledge is always plural and contested. In the kolkhoz 
system, labor was highly divided, and so was professional knowledge about agro-
pastoral production. Even then, the unequal distribution of knowledge allowed some 
to accumulate more resources and wealth than others. Due to secured wages and 
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subsidized goods, however, those with very limited skills and knowledge could still 
make a living, even if it was difficult. After 1991, however, comprehensive knowledge 
regarding agro-pastoral production became crucial to make a living. Thus, the reforms 
mainly benefited those who already knew how to cultivate land and/or keep animals. 
These were mainly brigadiers, other leading personnel, breeding specialists, and 
herders. Evidence shows that access to knowledge was also crucial during the 
distribution process itself. Numerous accounts from the two case study villages suggest 
that in the early 1990s, many of those who knew about the kolkhoz’ imminent collapse 
diverted healthy animals to their own stables or sold machines before they could be 
distributed to the public. 
Today, knowledge is particularly important for those who wish to make a living 
from herding. Many of those working as herders today either herded for the kolkhoz in 
the past or inherited the necessary knowledge from their parents. Since herding animals 
is one of the few local income opportunities today, such knowledge is critical to 
people’s livelihood security. Another form of knowledge uncertainty concerns people’s 
incomplete knowledge about formal rules and procedures, which is particularly 
apparent in relation to pasture management. While some herders maneuver adroitly 
between more and less formalized norms and practices to access and use pastures, 
others do not have the faintest idea about the formal rules and procedures – and this 
increases their knowledge uncertainty about the behavior of others. 
 
Social and political uncertainties refer to certain trends such as rural out-migration, 
altered forms of cooperation at the local level, as well as to insecure or altered power 
relations at various levels, including changes in political regimes. While migration 
issues have been discussed elsewhere (cf. Schoch et al. forthcoming; Thieme 2008b), 
the evidence suggests that people’s enthusiasm for economic cooperation beyond the 
own household has rapidly decreased in recent years (see 9.3.3). The first setback for 
local cooperation came in the form of the neoliberal privatization paradigm, which 
clamored the superiority of private property and entrepreneurship while associating 
collective action with ‘outdated’ socialist ideals. The second setback came when 
kolkhozes like Karakojun were transformed into ‘new cooperatives’ – economically 
unviable pseudo-cooperatives, which only fostered the enrichment of rural elites. The 
third setback was that those who nevertheless tried to farm their arable land 
collectively after privatization soon failed. Not only did they lack the necessary inputs 
and experience, there was also no official support for small-scale cooperatives at that 
time. The fourth setback was more recent, when a half-hearted attempt by the Kyrgyz 
government to foster local cooperation drove people’s trust in each other and in state 
institutions to an all-time low (compare Box 9b). In the long run, this has not only 
curtailed local opportunities for economic synergies, but has also increased people’s 
uncertainty about the behavior of others. 
Local people often experience political uncertainties when they are required to deal 
with state representatives at communal or rayon level. Many public servants are unable 
to fulfill their duties, either because they lack the necessary skills and tools or because 
they have no funds to invest. As a matter of fact, problems of local funding are 
endemic, since local revenues are often just sufficient to pay local government and 
administration staff. The same goes for public services at rayon level. At the time of 
research, the Naryn rayon administration was the only one in the whole oblast that 
employed a pasture expert to make pasture lease contracts with local herders. 
However, even this highly experienced expert had neither the means to visit the 
pastures in his jurisdiction, nor a reliable map to see them on paper. At the same time, 
there is surprisingly little cooperation and exchange of knowledge among the various 
rayon departments, as well as between the communal and the rayon level. This makes 
any meaningful coordination of public services strictly impossible. Nowehere is this 
more apparent than in pasture management, but it also seriously impedes the control 
of livestock diseases (Näscher 2009). In addition, the ousting of the Bakiev government 
in April 2010 made clear that the high degree of personality politics makes the Kyrgyz 
local government anything but stable. As soon as the president was toppled, the Naryn 
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oblast governor, most rayon akims and numerous heads of ayil okmotu, including the 
one in Karakojun, had to step down (see 4.2.2). 
 
Thus, ‘making a living in transformation’ first and foremost means finding appropriate 
responses to various forms of uncertainty. However, whether someone considers a 
situation insecure or not depends to a considerable degree on their wealth and on other 
social and economic disparities (Mehta et al. 2001; see 2.4.2). Consequently, existing 
uncertainties shape people’s livelihoods in many different ways.  
 
 
 
12.3 Uncertainty and livelihood trajectories 
 
People who are confronted with uncertainties usually try to widen their range of 
options, i.e. to increase the flexibility of the ways in which they can achieve certain 
objectives (see 2.4). One way of doing this is through forum shopping, i.e. to appeal to 
more than one single norm regarding the access to and the use of resources (Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan 2001). Another way is through income diversification, i.e. to 
increase the number and diversify the nature of cash and non-cash income sources (cf. 
Barrett et al. 2001). The considerable socioeconomic disparities that exist today 
suggest that some households were more successful than others to cope with 
uncertainty in the long term. On the one hand, practices of forum shopping are closely 
related to wealth, so mid-sized and large farm households can more easily resort to 
them. On the other hand, smallholders and households without livestock often 
diversify their incomes spontaneously and in the short term, while wealthier 
households can often afford to diversify their income sources in a more strategic way. 
In other words, while some rural households successfully embarked upon a positive 
livelihood trajectory, others repeatedly failed to do so (Bagchi et al. 1998; Ashley et al. 
2003).  
 
Negative trajectories: short-term coping responses and insecure property rights 
 
For many of the less wealthy today (households with no livestock and smallholders; 
compare with 5.3), the vicious cycle of short-term coping and resource depletion began 
in the early 1990s. Having worked as ordinary kolkhozniki in the socialist economy, 
their lack of knowledge concerning agro-pastoral production often prevented them 
from handling their new property – land and livestock – in a sustainable way. In 
conjunction with the striking livelihood uncertainty during the early years of 
independence – in the form of widespread unemployment, the end of all state support, 
and a generally insecure future – many then tried to cope in the short term by selling or 
bartering their animals to survive. At the same time, many of these households tried to 
cultivate their private plots despite their lack of farming experience, often neglecting 
the basic rules of crop rotations and efficient irrigation, so that land productivity 
quickly decreased. Until recently, several smallholders and households without 
livestock nevertheless produced sufficient forage and hay to sell some of it locally. Yet 
when ecological uncertainties in the form of repeated droughts increased, many of 
these small farms soon failed to sustain their production; instead, they suddenly had to 
buy in fodder. In view of the rapidly increasing fodder prices, selling animals was often 
the only possible coping response, although this further eroded the households’ already 
scarce asset base. In addition, asset-poor households usually have to sell animals at 
short notice, i.e. whenever the need arises, even when prices are low and waiting a few 
weeks would bring them far better price. In the long term, the lack or shortage of 
private livestock also affects people’s social networks. Households with few or no 
animals increasingly refrain from inviting others and accepting invitations, since they 
cannot afford to slaughter animals for a feast or buy a present for their hosts. Thus, the 
importance of livestock as a pivotal point in rural social life excludes many from 
establishing, improving or preserving their personal relations with others. Instead, less 
wealthy people often borrow money from mid-sized and large farmers who offer small 
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loans at relatively low interest rates and do not ask for a mortgage. As a consequence, 
new social and economic dependencies between wealthy and poor households are 
emerging. 
 
Positive trajectories: long-term strategies and forum shopping 
 
By contrast, many of those who now belong to the class of mid-sized or large farmers 
(compare with 5.3) had a comparative advantage in the early 1990s. They generally 
benefited more from the distribution of land, animals and infrastructure, since they had 
often worked in leading or specialist positions in the kolkhoz. In the early years of 
independence, these households could keep their flock size stable more often than 
others could. Many of them kept a saray on the intensive pastures and soon reverted to 
rotational grazing, and/or they knew how to treat livestock diseases, which allowed 
them to minimize the number of fatalities after distribution. At the same time, many 
had the necessary experience to practice farming and combine it with animal 
husbandry. In Jergetal, some of these households also profited from the fact that they 
received their arable land in one parcel and not far from the village. Thus having 
preserved or even increased their wealth, these households have often more, and 
usually better, opportunities now to improve and secure their access to resources or to 
diversify their livelihoods. On the one hand, large and mid-sized farm households do 
not necessarily consider legal pluralism and insecure property rights as uncertainties, 
since they often have the means to practice forum shopping and thus take advantage of 
the existence of a variety of normative and cognitive orders. On the other hand, they 
can strategically invest their cash savings – for instance in the local credit business – or 
in new and better animals such as merino sheep, horses or yaks. Also the construction 
of a new saray is a strategic long-term investment, which furthermore allows 
households to cope with insecure property rights over pastures. As they have enough 
livestock at hand, mid-sized and large farms also have less problems maintaining and 
widening their social relations with others. Being a generous host or a welcome guest is 
not so much a problem for them, because they can usually afford to slaughter an 
animal for their guests or to buy a present for others. Having sufficient savings 
available in the form of cash or livestock also allows them to observe the market and 
to sell when prices are best. 
 
This distinction between only two types of trajectories may look like an 
oversimplification. In fact, I have argued earlier that livelihood trajectories are often 
complex and irregular, and that negative and positive trajectories can also overlap (see 
2.4.3). However, what the rough sketch shows is that while asset-poor and asset-rich 
households often do the same – they sell animals, cultivate their land, and raise animals 
–, the outcomes of their activities can be completely different. While smallholders often 
adopt new activities when the need arises (and thus at short notice), mid-sized and 
large farm households can often plan ahead and consider the long-term effects of what 
they do. The ‘mining case’ introduced at the very beginning of this study is an excellent 
illustration of this. 
 
The ambiguous outcomes of conflicting livelihood strategies 
 
The fact that rich and poor people alike began to accept paid employment in the so-
called kombinat particularly puzzled me about the ‘mining case’. However, considering 
the various uncertainties people are confronted with and their differing capacities to 
cope suggest that there may be different motivations behind people’s decision to adopt 
two seemingly conflicting income-generating activities. 
 
For many smallholders and households without livestock, working in the kombinat 
may seem like the only way to improve their standard of living without having to 
migrate to urban areas. Often in immediate need of cash but usually short of financial 
capital, they must make use of every income opportunity, even if it threatens to 
seriously worsen the resource base on which their own pastoral production will depend 
in the future. Their lack of means to make a decent living, poor legislation, overlapping 
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authorities and an unreliable jurisdiction leave them in a weak position to negotiate 
and secure their future access to pastures. By comparison, the mining company seems a 
powerful actor that is capable of securing its commercial interests using the resource 
base – although it might not necessarily do this legally. In view of the insecure 
prospects of private pastoral production, working in the mine may appear a more 
reliable alternative to many. 
By contrast, many wealthier households already have a diversified livelihood 
portfolio and sufficient savings in the form of livestock or cash. In addition, they are 
often in a stronger position to secure and defend their access to pastures. Thus, their 
need for an additional source of cash income may not be so immediate. Nevertheless, if 
compared to agro-pastoral production cycles and the related ecological uncertainties, 
even wealthy households may consider the insecure yet well-paid employment in the 
kombinat an attractive income opportunity. The difference, however, is that they seem 
to be in a better position than their less wealthy neighbors to secure long-term access to 
the remaining intensive pastures. Once the extractive industries have ploughed up the 
intensive pastures around Kumbel, local herders will have to move further afield to 
find sufficient pastures to tend their flocks. Access to pastures will have been 
negotiated afresh by then, with the same advantages for wealthier households. 
 
Although such predictions are pure speculation, it seems probable that in the long run 
the combination of pastoral production and mining may further undermine the 
livelihoods of less wealthy households. Negative livelihood trajectories may thus be 
exacerbated in future, and current socioeconomic disparities between rural households 
may further increase. To put it simply, those who already have are usually in a better 
position to cope with uncertainty, while those who have not are often trapped in a 
vicious cycle of short-term response and further impoverishment. Given the array of 
uncertainties, escaping a negative trajectory is often difficult, all the more so since the 
various imponderables have anything but diminished in recent years. The two 
trajectories thus exemplify how various structural factors influence people’s livelihoods 
in the long term, and that “(…) people make their own livelihoods, but not necessarily 
under conditions of their own choosing” (de Haan and Zoomers 2005, 43). In this 
way, the notion of livelihood trajectories can help to explain patterns of household 
impoverishment or asset accumulation over long periods of time. 
 
 
 
12.4 Implications: closing the gap, reversing trajectories 
 
The analysis of people’s livelihood trajectories and the various factors governing them 
gives us a better understanding of various transition trajectories, i.e. processes of post-
socialist transformation at the micro level. As I argued at the outset of this study, post-
socialist transformation can best be understood as a bundle of non-linear, multi-
directional and open-ended processes of structuration, in which actors at all levels 
recombine the old and the new, and improvise on practised routines in order to 
respond to particular challenges and opportunities. Therefore, a closer look at various 
local actors, the norms and orders they refer to, the decisions they take and the 
practices they deploy improves our understanding of post-socialist transformation, and 
thus of the long-term effects of transition policies. By and large, the results presented in 
this study suggest that the long-term effects of the socialist legacy and the agrarian 
reforms of the 1990s created a hybrid institutional context. In this context, many rural 
households still struggle to secure and make use of the property rights they were once 
endowed with. They are therefore often caught up in a negative livelihood trajectory 
from which they will find it difficult to escape under the given circumstances. The case 
of rural Kyrgyzstan thus provides a good example of the continuing impact of the 
neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ of the 1990s on rural livelihoods and institutions up to the 
present day. 
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One remaining question is how these negative trajectories and the aggravation of rural 
disparities might eventually be halted. In my analysis, I have identified various forms of 
uncertainty and the availability of negotiating power as the two main factors governing 
people’s livelihood prospects. Improving these prospects therefore means either 
reducing uncertainty or improving people’s negotiating power. 
 
Reducing uncertainty 
 
In recent years, a large number of development interventions have addressed 
transformation-related uncertainties through so-called ‘institution building’, i.e. the 
creation of new and ‘stronger’ institutions and organizations. Regarding natural 
resource management, the World Bank-initiated irrigation sector reform for instance 
tried to tackle ecological and livelihood uncertainties through the establishment of 
local Water Users’ Associations, yet with mixed results (see Box 9a). Another 
prominent example is the recent reform of Kyrgyz pasture legislation, which was also 
initiated by the World Bank and paved the way for the establishment of local Pasture 
Users’ Associations (see 10.5). Thus, the two interventions, which build on experience 
from other developing countries161, respond to the same logic as the agrarian reforms of 
the 1990s, which promised to endow people with ‘secure property rights’ over 
resources and to introduce ‘better’ rules for production and marketing. However, as 
Nuijten (2005, 5) comments, the limitations of these approaches often lies in their 
 
“(…) faith that new forms of organizing and fresh rules can make a dramatic difference to 
the lives of the people and the management of resources. (…) Official rules may influence 
existing organizing practices and power relations in many different and often unpredictable 
ways.” (Nuijten 2005, 5) 
 
The evidence presented in this study underlines this concern. First, formal rules do not 
necessarily result in formal behavior, not even of those who are in charge of 
implementing these rules. Second, new regulations often coexist with older institutional 
arrangements, thus adding to a hybrid institutional context that generally benefits 
already powerful actors. This does not mean that creating new and better rules is 
pointless; in fact, the replacement of the ‘old’ pasture legislation was overdue, since it 
disadvantaged the poor and caused great trouble. It does , however, mean accepting 
that even the most well-intended policies cannot do away with uncertainty and will 
always produce unexpected outcomes: 
 
“There are two basic alternatives for planning in an uncertain world. The first aims to 
reduce uncertainties (…) by the collection of more and more data on more and more 
variables. (…) The alternative is to accept that uncertainty and indeterminacy are 
fundamental and central.” (Scoones 1995, 6) 
 
As analysis has shown, uncertainty is usually more problematic for the less wealthy, 
since they often lack the necessary negotiating power to make use of different norms 
and rules. At the same time, uncertainty can be beneficial to those with sufficient 
power, since it allows them to respond more flexibly to challenges and opportunities. 
Therefore, the fundamental question must be how the negotiating power of the less 
wealthy can be strengthened. 
 
Building negotiating power 
 
The general weakness of ‘institution building’ approaches lies in their assumption that 
the establishment of a communal resource user association creates a level playing field 
that allows all local actors to raise their interests and concerns (Leach at al. 1999, 
241). However, while an association may in fact enhance a community’s negotiating 
power towards state representatives, aid agencies or private actors such as mining 
companies, it does not necessarily enhance the negotiating power of individuals and 
                                                
161 The concept of Pasture Users’ Associations, for instance, has already been tested in other countries, 
often with mixed results (Davies et al. 2010, 299). 
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households within that association. The example of the communal tülöö illustrates that 
powerful actors who cannot achieve their desired outcomes through open negotiation 
will do so through other means. Thus, if a resource user association is not only to serve 
those who are already wealthy and powerful, it must actively seek to strengthen the 
negotiating power of its less wealthy members. 
 
One way of doing this would be to include even those households without any 
livestock at an early stage of the process, since most of them do intend to engage in 
animal husbandry again. This would also help to open up future negotiations within an 
association to public accountability (Stark and Bruszt 1998). A second way would be 
to inform people as openly and as early as possible about the new rules and conditions. 
In this way, knowledge uncertainties for those involved could be reduced to a 
minimum, and powerful actors would have less opportunity to renew their private 
control over assets while rejecting responsibility for associated liabilities. 
Unfortunately, this chance was missed during the process of reforming the pasture 
laws. While some herders formed their opinion about the new law on the basis of 
rumors and half-truths, most people had no idea about the imminent introduction of 
local associations and pasture user fees. Consequently, the announcement of new 
pasture fees in 2009 caused great public disarray and discontent, and this eventually 
even turned into one of the key driving forces behind the public uprising in Naryn 
oblast in winter 2009/10162. A third way of ‘leveling the playing field’ among rich and 
poor stakeholders would be to ensure effective sanctions and to calculate fines 
according to people’s wealth. Otherwise, wealthy households will soon realize that the 
benefits of non-compliance outweigh the costs of cooperation, while poor households 
must obey the rules for economic reasons. 
 
In the final analysis, however, the evidence presented in this study suggests that local 
processes of transformation – including changes in social relations, economic 
dependencies and individual organizing practices – are so complex and variable that it 
seems at least questionable whether a uniform ‘institution building’ approach can do 
justice to every single Kyrgyz community. What this study therefore suggests is that, 
under the current circumstances, the introduction of new rules and regulations in rural 
Kyrgyzstan needs careful consideration and must be embedded in a thorough 
understanding of people’s livelihood trajectories and the locally specific processes that 
cause and reproduce disparities between potential stakeholders. Otherwise, apparently 
‘strong’ rules and ‘robust’ institutions run the risk of widening the existing gap 
between rich and poor. 
 
 
 
12.5 Open questions for future research 
 
It can be both encouraging and frustrating to do research in a transformation context. 
Encouraging because the ongoing debates and processes in a ‘young’ state such as 
Kyrgyzstan are often of immediate relevance for fundamental aspects of human 
interaction and wellbeing, and because the simultaneity of the old and the new can be 
highly inspiring; frustrating because processes of transformation are sometimes too fast 
for the mechanism of scientific reflection. Thus, soon after I completed the fieldwork 
for this study, the Kyrgyz government passed entirely new legislation for the 
management of pastures. The same is true of the ‘mining case’ in Jergetal, which it was 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in detail. Consequently, many new questions 
have emerged, while others have remained. 
 
First of all, it is to be expected that the implementation of the new Kyrgyz pasture 
legislation will initiate complex negotiations at various levels. After all, the mere 
                                                
162 Personal communication with Ulan Kasymov, former director of CAMP Ala-Too, 7 May 2010. 
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announcement of pasture fees in summer 2009 fuelled public discontent in Naryn and 
was one of the key factors behind the recent uprisings. Observing that process over the 
next few years and seeing how different groups of actors reposition themselves would 
certainly reveal new insights into the functioning of rural communities. 
 
Second, I have identified a number of setbacks to the idea of collective action (see 
above). However, since most rural households are economically unviable, cooperating 
with others often seems the only way to escape the poverty trap. Therefore, finding 
ways of overcoming structural obstacles and the widespread aversion to any form of 
economic cooperation beyond the immediate household and kin seems of the utmost 
importance. 
 
Third, the linkages between pastoral producers and agrarian commodity markets 
deserve more scientific attention. I have shown for instance that market access is an 
essential criterion in the selection of pastures. Thus, it would be interesting to examine 
how new forms of pastoral marketing could influence the use and management of 
pasture resources. 
  
Finally, conflicts between herders and the mining industry have undoubtedly increased 
in recent years. While many of the larger gold mines in Kyrgyzstan have attracted 
public attention and are now the subject of intense media coverage, most of the smaller 
mines have so far gone unnoticed by the wider public. Yet it is often the small mines 
that disregard existing policies and regulations and try to access attractive deposits 
through informal means163. Thus, the potential for conflict between two major 
branches of the Kyrgyz economy – animal husbandry and mineral extraction – is likely 
to increase in the future, with as yet unknown consequences for the livelihoods of the 
rural population. 
 
                                                
163 Personal communication with Kuban Ashyrkulov, director of the Kyrgyz International Business 
Council, 13 May 2010. 
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Appendix 1 Household survey questionnaire164 
 
 
Household ID-No.: 
 
......................................................  
Name of Respondent: 
 
................................................................................................. 
Name of Head of Household: ................................................................................................. 
 
No. of household members living… 
  …at home (incl. children): 
 
 
.................... 
 
…in migration: 
 
.................... 
Total agricultural land of household… 
…owned (ha): 
 
 
...................ha 
 
…rented in (ha): 
 
....................ha 
Total no. of livestock owned by household: 
 
no. of sheep: .................... 
 
no. of horses: .................... 
 
no. of other livestock 
(specify): 
 
no. of goats: .................... 
 
no. of cows: .................... 
 
 
................................... 
................................... 
................................... 
Where does the majority of your animals graze 
in summer: 
 
1 Near-village pastures 
2 Intensive pastures (kyshtoo) 
3 Remote pastures (jailoo) 
4 don’t know 
 
 
 
Specify: 
................................... 
Does your HH rent any pastures: 
 
1 yes 2 no 3 don’t know   
Main cash income activity of HH 
(more than 50%) 
 
1 animal husbandry: meat 
2 animal husbandry: wool 
3 farming/agriculture 
4 dairy 
5 herding others’ flocks 
6 agricultural labour 
7 non-farm labour 
8 regular salaried job 
9 trade or other business 
10 remittances from migrant(s) 
11 old-age pension 
12 other > specify 
If possible, specify: 
 
.................................... 
 
Secondary cash income activity of HH 
(less than 50%) 
 
 
1 animal husbandry: meat 
2 animal husbandry: wool 
3 farming/agriculture 
4 dairy 
5 herding others’ flocks 
6 agricultural labour 
7 non-farm labour 
8 regular salaried job 
9 trade or other business 
10 remittances from migrant(s) 
11 old-age pension 
12 other > specify 
13 none 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If possible, specify: 
 
.................................... 
 
Date: ............................../ 2007 
 
Name of surveyor:   .................................................................. 
 
                                                
164 During the survey, the enumerators used a Kyrgyz version of this questionnaire. 
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Appendix 2 Checklist for semi-structured interviews with household representatives 
 
 
Life in the USSR 
Memories of the collectivization 
Household occupation and income 
Level of education 
Professional status of respondent/head of household  
Land owenrship and use 
Livestock ownership 
Herding practices 
Life of herders 
Marketing of products 
Role of party membership 
Structure of kolkhoz / hierarchies 
Existing disparities 
 
 
Privatization (early 1990s) 
General impressions of Soviet collapse 
Memories of distribution process 
Involvement of respondent in distribution 
How much animals, land, machines, barns received? 
Role of uruu, uruu baschy 
Occupation, until when ordinary salary 
Land use & herding practices in early 1990s 
 
 
Animal husbandry since mid-1990s 
General importance of livestock / pastures 
Development of private flock size / type 
Main obstacles & opportunities 
Marketing of animals (where, when) 
Herding practices (own, others, relatives) 
Herding arrangements (prices, terms, duration) 
Criteria to select a herder 
Pasture types in use; flock rotation 
Herding as a livelihood option 
Fodder preparation / sale / purchase 
Use of barns 
Role of state (local government) 
Conflicts 
 
 
Land cultivation since mid-1990s 
General importance of arable land 
Land holdings (location, quantity) 
Land lease (out/in) 
Land sale / purchase 
Land use (season, crop, quantities) 
Marketing of output / self-consumption 
Main obstacles & opportunities 
Use of machines: Terms, prices, practices 
Irrigation: Terms, prices, practices 
Labour: Terms, prices, practices 
Role of state (local government) 
Conflicts 
 
 
 
Credits and loans 
Use of credits: When, from whom, for what 
Conditions and procedures 
Main obstacles & opportunities 
Reasons not to take credits 
 
 
Cooperation 
Experiences regarding cooperation with others 
If yes: When, why, with whom, how 
If no: Why not 
If failed: Why, when 
 
 
Role of the state 
Experiences regarding state support 
Role of the state regarding animal husbandry 
Role of the state regarding land cultivation 
Contacts with ayil okmotu, ayil kengesh, rayon 
 
 
Pasture use / herders 
Since when, where, seasonal rotation 
Pasture selection criteria 
Pasture lease 
If yes:  Since when, terms, procedures, motivation, 
use of contract 
If no:  Why not, awareness of formal rules 
Conflicts with others / with state 
Contacts with neighbours (sherine, ashar) 
Perceived quality of pastures (in the past / today) 
Observed trends 
Marketing of pastoral products 
Organization of household 
Contact with village, relatives 
Fodder preparation 
Contact with customers 
Role of local government (rules, regulations) 
Role of uruu for pasture selection 
Awareness of new pasture law; personal opinion 
Personal opinion about pasture user association 
 
 
Livelihood alternatives / outlook 
Did you ever want to do something completely 
different? 
What would you like to do in future? What is your 
plan? 
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Appendix 3 Checklist for semi-structured interviews with representatives of herding 
households 
 
 
Household mobility 
Since when in this place (this year, general) 
Movements since summer 2007 
Organization of transport to/from pastures (costs) 
 
 
Organization of household 
Since when engaged in herding 
How many people involved 
Who is doing what 
If paid helper: Terms, conditions 
Fodder preparation 
 
 
Herd structure 
How many own animals / type 
How many customer animals / type 
Development of flock size / type over recent years 
Number and type of customers 
Agreements with customers (salary, losses, diseases) 
Observed trends 
 
 
Pasture use 
Since when, where, seasonal rotation 
Pasture selection criteria 
Role of uruu for pasture selection 
Role of local government (rules, regulations) 
Pasture lease 
If yes:  Since when, terms, procedures, motivation, 
use of contract 
If no:  Why not, awareness of formal rules 
Conflicts with others / with state 
Contacts with neighbours (sherine, ashar) 
Awareness of new pasture law; personal opinion 
Personal opinion about pasture user association 
 
Pasture quality 
Perceived quality of pastures (in the past / today) 
 
 
Marketing 
Type of products (milk products / meat) 
Prices (trends) 
Traders / customers: Who, where, how often 
General importance of marketing (income) 
Importance of dung marketing (income) 
 
 
Social contacts 
General importance of neighbours on the pastures 
Contacts with other herders: With whom, when, how 
often, for what (sherine, ashar) 
Contacts with customers 
Contacts with relatives in the village 
 
 
Outlook 
What would you like to do in future? Will you stay in 
the same place? How will pasture use develop in 
general? 
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Appendix 4 List of expert interviews, 2006 to 2009 
 
 
Date Person, function 
  
3.10.2006 Akylbek Rakaev, Chairman of the Kyrgyz Sheep Breeders’ Association, Bishkek 
6.10.2006 Pierre-Yves Suter, Manager Kyrgyz-Swiss Agriculture Project, Helvetas, Bishkek 
12.4.2007 Kubat Nazarkulov, MAWRPI livestock specialist, Bishkek 
14.4.2007 Jinara Aidarbekova, Lawyer with the World Bank in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek 
8.5.2007 Eshpolot Osorov, Deputy director of the Kyrgyz Pasture Department, Bishkek 
17.5.2007 Ishenbek Abakirov, Senior Specialist for Social Development, Jergetal ayil okmotu 
18.5.2007 Mars Kulanbaev, Director Water User Association, Jergetal village 
22.5.2007 Gulmira Tashtanbekova, Sectretary of Karakojun ayil okmotu 
22.5.2007 
7.12.2007 
Myrsabek Aidaraliev, Head of Karakojun ayil okmotu 
24.5.2007 
11.12.2007 
30.7.2008 
Abakir Sadyrov, Pasture Department representative for Naryn rayon / oblast, Naryn 
30.5.2007 Jangyl Kozhomuratova, Microcredit specialist with CAMP Ala-Too and GTZ, Bishkek 
24.9.2007 Mukan Mambetakunov, MAWRPI Representative for Naryn oblast, Naryn 
9.10.2006 
4.4.2007 
Kyrgyzbay Alagushev, Senior specialist RAS, Bishkek 
23 & 25.10.2007 
9 & 14.11.2007 
Muratbek Askerimov, Land use specialist Jergetal ayil okmotu 
15.11.2007 Sagynbübü Sydykbekova, Secretary of Jergetal ayil okmotu 
16.11.2007 Azamat Sabyrbekov, Naryn rayon leskhoz, Naryn 
19.11.2007 Sulaika Mambetalieva, UNDP Poverty Reduction Programme Naryn oblast, Naryn 
19.11.2007 Sergey Kim, General manager FINCA for Naryn oblast, Naryn 
4.12.2007 
1.8.2008 
Jeenbek Aidarov, Land use specialist Karakojun ayil okmotu 
5.12.2007 Jeenaly Murzaliev, MAWRPI Representative At-Bashy rayon, At-Bashy 
16.8.2008 Kalkan Kerimaliev, Local historian, Kyzyl-Tuu 
28.8.2008 Beishenbek Kasymov, Chairman of the Jergetal TPS 
29.8.2008 Mr. Yrysaliev, Head of Jergetal aiyl okmotu 
11.9.2008 Abdymalik Egemberdiev, Director of the Kyrgyz Pasture Department, Bishkek 
11.9.2008 Sharsheke Kaynazarov, Former land use specialist Jergetal ayil okmotu, Bishkek 
15.9.2008 Anarbek Matysakov, Former specialist at the sector for agriculture of the Kyrgyz 
Parliament, Bishkek 
15.9.2008 Baibek Usubaliev, Programme officer with UNDP/GEF, Bishkek 
16.9.2008 Erlan Karbai Uluu, Project manager of the ARIS pasture component, Bishkek 
17.9.2008 Amantur Japarov, Social anthroplogist, Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, Bishkek 
7.5.2010 Ulan Kasymov, former director of CAMP Ala-Too, Berlin 
13.5.2010 Kuban Ashyrkulov, Director of the Kyrgyz International Business Council, Bishkek 
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Appendix 5 Structure of public administration in Kyrgyzstan (own figure; based on 
Alymkulov and Kulatov 2003; TACIS 2005; Ibraimova 2009) 
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